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ABSTRACT 
 
Ari Tarkiainen 
 
FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION 
STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
Keywords: innovation, science and technology policies, welfare cluster 
 
This thesis analyses the political construction of the current form of science and 
technology policies (STI policies). The empirical case analysis examines Finland’s 
transition to STI policies since 1990.  In implementing STI policies Finland is often 
seen as a model country: the Finnish case can be seen to illustrate two characteristics of 
its political culture – the strong position of bureaucracy in policy making and its 
tendency to consensual necessities. At the same time STI policies involve a great deal of 
obscurities often characterised as policy lessons. One of these lessons is the welfare 
cluster case. 
Methodologically, the study utilizes the hermeneutical and rhetorical tradition. By 
introducing two rhetorical perspectives, the rhetoric-in-science (RIS) perspective and the 
rhetoric-in-politics (RIP) perspective, the study examines the political construction of 
STI policies. The aim is to explicate the ways in which scientific theories and the 
principles of new governance are embedded in those policies.  
The study stresses that STI policies utilize a variety of rhetorical instruments such as 
the performativity of theoretical concepts and the ethos of new public management in 
order to be able to justify and legitimate those policies. The rhetoric skilfully exploits 
two classical dilemmas, the controversy between the natural and the social (culture vs. 
nature) and the controversy between the oikos and the polis (economy vs. politics). The 
conclusion of the study is that the interpretation of STI policies may have an ideological 
as well as rhetorical version. Both of them stress that STI policies do not refer to disputes 
on science, technology or innovation as such. Rather, they constitute one of the most 
important arenas where our accounts of society and politics are defined. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. A passionate quest for innovations 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the political and rhetorical construction of STI 
policies.1 They are interpreted as a dynamic complex in which the scientification of 
politics and the politicisation of science are intertwined. 
The empirical case analysis focuses on the Finnish science and technology policies 
and, in particular, on the transition to the NIS (National System of Innovation) 
framework since 1990. This transition reflects the political and rhetorical shift from 
welfare policies to innovation policies in Finland in an interesting manner. The aim of 
this study is to show that STI policies provide a central platform in which the debates 
concerning the conditions of the cultural practices of western post-industrialized 
societies will be in the future. 
 The empirical material utilized in the study can be divided into three types. The first 
group is a collection of national and international STI policy material; it consists a 
variety of political documents and studies linked with those policies. The second group 
is composed of key persons’ thematic interviews focusing on the welfare cluster; these 
key persons represent three instances - political administration, research institutes and 
enterprises. The third group consists of statistical studies linked with STI policies and 
produced by different institutes. 
The key term of STI policies is innovation. New terms such as innovation are 
problematic because it is very difficult to give a strict definition for them, as is also the 
case with innovation. On the one hand, it is used as an umbrella type of term referring 
to inventiveness, creativity and novelty and, on the other hand, it has a more specific 
meaning as a complementary term to invention. This study attempts to clarify what 
makes innovations so special in current science and technology policies.  
The speciality of innovations becomes evident if we examine the report Finnsight 
2015 - The Outlook for Science, Technology and Society published by the Academy of 
Finland and TEKES, The Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation in 
2006.2 The report reveals the enchantment with the term innovation very clearly. This 
can be seen in the first chapter:  
 
“The development and strengthening of competences and innovations is the key to 
Finland’s success in the future. Cutting edge basic and applied research coupled with 
broad-ranging expertise and competence will help to reach international excellence. 
Finland needs a national strategy, a vision and commitment to pursue these policies 
as well as an understanding of the challenges that lie ahead for business and industry 
and society as a whole and the means with which to promote our welfare.” 3 
  
The overall point of Finnsight 2015 is to identify the focus areas of the Finnish 
competence for the future in the fields of science, technology, society and business and 
industry, and to develop strategies for them. The project is explained to be instrumental 
in helping to define Finland’s Strategic Centres of Excellence in Science, Technology 
                                                            
1 The term STI policies refer to the current policy domain of science, technology and innovation 
policies. 
2 Finnsight 2015, The Outlook for Science and Technology and Society, 
3 Finnsight 2015. 
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and Innovation in line with the Government’s decision-in-principle on the development 
of the public research system made 7th April 2005. The project is important because it 
deepens the collaboration between the Academy of Finland and TEKES and fosters the 
climate of multidisciplinary debate and discussion.  
The Finnsight 2015 report can easily be read as a report that, like many others, has 
no special value. But although it is fluently written and its structural design is excellent, 
the careful reader finds a variety of interesting issues and topics that the report advocates. 
Undoubtedly, the report is an example of forecast studies in which the idea of 
forecasting is to specify the future by introducing a set of scenarios seeking to start 
political debates and discussions related to them. Such future research, as it is often 
called, is often justified by referring to four arguments: a) The future is shaped by 
human choice and action; it is not a matter of determinism; b) The future cannot be 
foreseen, but exploring the future can inform present decisions; it is rational and useful 
to discuss the problems of the future; c) There are many possible futures and scenarios 
map a “possibility space”; the task of the public discussion is to demarcate the line 
between the possible and the impossible and establish guidelines and milestones; d) 
Scenario development involves rational analysis and subjective judgement; the scenarios 
must be as plausible and justifiable as possible.4 The real point of such forecasts is to 
enable strategic work related to possible futures and to discover new promising 
approaches and angles for the future.  
However, this Finnish report illustrates the present discussion on innovation-driven 
society in Finland. Thus it mirrors the changes in science and technology policy since 
the 1990s and draws an interesting policy trajectory embedded in the innovation policy 
argumentation. All this becomes transparent if we examine the framework that the 
report advocates. We must also keep in mind that the ultimate aim of the Finnish 
forecast project is to support the Academy’s strategic work and needs to strengthen the 
basic research and TEKES’s strategic focus area planning.   
The report does not advocate a single approach or view. Rather, it stresses the need 
to mix approaches, interfaces and perspectives in order to find synergy benefits. In other 
words, the report highlights the flux in economic, political and cultural environments, 
and all countries share the same interest to develop competencies in order to increase 
wealth. The conclusion of the report is that the development of research and technology 
creates new innovations for greater wealth and welfare, and this is possible if it is 
facilitated by those competencies that together with other competencies create new 
practices.  
The report opens and ends with the challenge of globalisation. It attempts to 
describe the ever-changing environment by introducing eight prominent driving forces 
in today’s global operating environment.5 The first of them is globalization which has 
two different elements. The first element is the trend of increasing mobility; the flow of 
goods, money, capital, people, ideas, cultures and values across national boundaries is 
continuously expanding. The second trend is the growing interdependence of the 
different parts of the world, their increasing interaction and cooperation in economy, 
production, social development, communications and human exchange. With the 
breakdown of economic and communications boundaries around the world, nation 
states and regions must rethink their roles.  
                                                            
4 See de Jouvenel 1967. 
5 Finnsight 2015, p. 6. 
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Finland is one of those advanced economies that are losing their status because of 
strong economic growth in the Far East. Also, the focus of economic growth is shifting 
to regions beyond Europe and the United States. These changes have a major impact on 
employment in Finland and its technological and economic competitiveness. Market 
success, stresses the Finnish report, cannot be achieved in the future simply by means of 
technological innovations, but it will require more in-depth knowledge of consumers’ 
wishes and choices and an ability to differentiate them from other products and services.  
 
“As far as the individual citizen is concerned, globalisation means an increased 
freedom of choice both in education, in the labour market and in consumption. At 
the same time, the daily life of individuals is increasingly permeated by growing 
complexity, the increasing vulnerability of business and the economy, instability in 
the work environment and growing cultural tensions between people.” 6 
 
The second driving force is the changing population structure. In countries such as 
Finland the ageing of population means that there is a clear need for more staff in the 
service sector as well as in professions requiring a high level of education. In Finland, 
working people take greater responsibility than before for the welfare of children, older 
people and others who are not in active employment. Also, countries’ dependency ratio 
is rising more sharply than in most European countries. The ageing population is also 
changing the structure of consumption, which also increases the demand for health and 
care services.  
The third driving force is the development of science and technology. They open up 
new opportunities for innovation in working practices, business processes, systemic 
structures and social behaviour. Technological development enables new ways in which 
people can participate in networks in a technological, professional and social sense. 
While the frequency of interaction will increase at the same time it is becoming more 
superficial. The need for human interaction will increase as will also the need for human 
relations supporting human maturation and adding to a sense of security.  
The fourth driving force, argues the report, is the requirement of sustainable 
development. Our decisions and solutions must be ecologically sustainable but also 
economically viable, socially just and culturally valuable. The dramatic environmental 
changes such as the climate change and the loss of biodiversity have also impacts on 
health, well-being and the quality of life. The prices of depleting natural resources such 
as oil, natural gas and uranium will increase, and the scarcity of energy places increased 
pressure on production and transportation systems. It follows that governments must 
find ways to increase the environmental efficiency of industrial processes and reduce 
their emission levels.  
The fifth driving force is the competition for location. It is a key factor in global 
competition and the cost level and availability of a competent workforce are its essential 
elements. Small countries such as Finland must carefully select the fields in which they 
want to reach international excellence in research, technology and innovation. In other 
words, those countries must network globally and develop new ways of exploiting global 
knowledge and competence.  They must also realize that cultural and regulatory 
competencies are important.  
 
                                                            
6 Finnsight 2015, p. 7. 
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“In the future, growing need will be investment in developing competencies that 
creatively integrate basic scientific and technological know-how with business, cultural, 
legal and societal competencies.” 7 
 
The market for competent workforce is becoming increasingly globalised. Therefore, 
every country must make their working and living environment more attractive to 
people coming from the outside. At the same time, people move out in search of the best 
education, science and technology in their own field, wherever it is. The patterns of 
alteration between work, study and leisure during the individual’s life have become more 
and more important for individuals. 
The sixth driving force is open source or open innovation ideology. It means that 
work is becoming increasingly independent of time and location. Organisations may 
work toward the same goals but they may be scattered around the globe, managed and 
administrated via ICT networks8.  
 
“The role of motivation and incentives is set to increase even further, as is the 
importance of a motivating and inspiring climate at work. More partnerships and 
cooperation means more communication. This open innovation concept will 
continue to grow and expand with the rapid changes in earning models. The constant 
changes in needs are increasing job insecurity and short-term job contracts.”9 
  
The seventh driving force concerns the cultural aspects of globalisation. The 
advancement of globalisation means that different sets of values come in contact with 
one another in an increasing manner. The reactions of individuals and societies include 
the denial and suppression of diversity, approval and respect, and active efforts to 
promote multi-cultural interaction.  
 
“As the need for competent people continues to increase with population ageing, 
positive multiculturalism combined with the welfare state is definitely a competitive 
asset.” 10 
  
In terms of Finland’s international attractiveness and competitiveness there must be a 
sufficient range of cultural services and we must keep in mind that the promotion of 
Finnish culture has intrinsic value.  
The eight driving force is the management of change. If global dependence was 
earlier understood in ecological and military security terms, nowadays it is understood 
from the point of view of capital, investment markets, production networks and 
information flows. 
 
“Many of the new challenges and means of governance are related to the deepening of 
cooperation between governments and businesses and industries in which the goal is 
to strengthen national competitiveness. (…) More and more often now, the 
globalization of innovation and production requires joint solutions to issue and 
technology-specific governance issues. These may be in the form of agreements and 
standards, regulation and common rules.” 11 
                                                            
7 Finnsight 2015, p. 9. 
8 ICT= Information and Communication Technology. 
9 Finnsight 2015, 10. 
10 Finnsight 2015, p. 11. 
11  Finnsight 2015, p. 11. 
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States, argues the report, remain important actors but they have to work more closely 
with other domestic, and more international actors when they seek to safeguard national 
interests. The competencies related to governance and the assessment of systemic risks 
will become more and more important.  
In order to link the driving forces in globalisation with the Finnish economic, 
political and cultural contexts the report puts its analytic focus on a variety of Finnish 
competences and evaluates critically their appropriateness in regard with the future. This 
part of the foresight is the key of the report and it results from the work of panels where 
leading research and industry experts contributed their multidisciplinary knowledge and 
insights on the subjects concerned. 12 
Having analyzed the Finnish situation with the challenges in the future the report 
suggests three strategies for Finland. The first of them is that the new policies must be 
presented on human terms. Interestingly, the report highlights the importance of human 
values and issues: the role of learning in innovation processes; the importance of health 
promotion – the utilization of the extensive patent and statistical databases in the 
Finnish public health care, the use of the opportunities of human technology; the long 
tradition of basic education; the heritage of Finnish cultural competence in connection 
with the challenges of the multicultural world and the danger of marginalisation.  
The second strategy highlights the development of core competencies together with 
new practices. The focus of development must be, argues the report, on the following 
issues:  
 
- the service expertise - customers and users must come first, the development of 
the Finnish infrastructure and its functionality;  
- the development of the Finnish social and health care system - to increase its 
efficiency by increasing the productivity of the system by the sensible use of new 
technology  
- the further-development of the Finnish ICT know-how, the utilization of 
materials development and biotechnology - the co-development of the strong 
basis of in-depth expertise and multidisciplinary cooperation;  
- the generation of interfaces and possibilities for interdisciplinary research and 
expertise to present possible new business opportunities;  
- the development of infrastructures for new industrial and commercial 
experiments with end-users. 
  
The focus of the third strategy is on the global economy. The report stresses that 
Finland ought to find political solutions in the following issues: 
 
- the challenges of the global economy – Finland must find as a small country its 
own niches by specializing in areas where it is possible to achieve an 
internationally strong position, first, the management of global knowledge and 
multiculturalism – multiculturalism and difference must be seen as a richness and 
an opportunity;  
                                                            
12  Each ten panels had a sector of its own and they have specified the key areas of competence related to 
a particular sector: 1) Learning and Learning Society, 2) Services and Service Innovations, 3) Well-
being and Health, 4) Environment and Energy, 5) Infrastructure and Security, 6) Bio-expertise and 
Bio-Society, 7) Information and Communication, 8) Understanding and Human Interaction, 9) 
Materials, 10) Global Economy.  
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- the assessment of global risks – global risk management in economy and in the 
energy and environmental sector is increasingly important, and Finland must 
participate actively in the development of global and EU-level regulation;  
- the sustainable environmental management – the globalisation and the 
liberalisation of world trade are fundamentally changing the framework of 
environmental management and Finland has real potential to create significant 
innovations in this field;  
- the challenge of energy production and use – Finland must utilize its competency 
and know-how and find new commercially innovative solutions and 
environmentally sound energy solutions;  
- the management of innovation networks – all significant innovations are 
nowadays created in global networks and Finland must utilize its open 
environment, in which basic and applied research are in cooperation with 
innovative environments.  
 
The key aspect of the management of innovation networks is to understand the 
innovation process as such but also to understand people’s needs and demands as well as 
their behaviour change. This kind of test area is under-developed in Finland. From a 
national economy point of view it is important to optimise the impacts of public 
authorities’ operations. As a summary, the report announces openly that it is only by 
developing new public- private partnerships that Finland is able to provide new 
solutions to many service concepts. The old tricks do not apply anymore.  
As seen in the Finnsight 2015 report the key challenge for Finland is the problem of 
rapidly changing economic, political and cultural contexts, the dilemmas of 
globalisation. The report can be read as an instruction manual for the development of 
the Finnish political governance so that it is prepared to meet the dilemma. 
In reality, it is a very political document. Its political aspects become transparent if 
we compare the Finnish report with some other similar reports, for example the UK 
document Foresight Futures 2020. Prima facie, the Finnish report appears a neutral and 
factual description of the present world and nothing else. The Finnish report introduces 
its message as a set of facts or as an unavoidable and almost determined path that 
Finland must follow. Its major concern is understandably on the nation state level. The 
proper agent of the report is thus Finland as a nation and its concern is the fate of 
Finland in the world of turbulent globalisation.  But the Finnish report is not an 
exception to the  rule. In reality, our contemporary world is full of similar reports in 
which different countries introduce their own future strategies and scenarios related to 
innovation. The beginnings of the Finnish science and technology policy governance are 
often traced back to the 1980s. Since then, the Finnish policy-making structures and 
core institutional arrangements of RTDI (Research, Technology, Development and 
Innovation) have been remarkably constant, and no significant reforms in policy-making 
process and mechanisms have taken place. 13  
In terms of the Finnish policy-making a lot of changes have been made at 
implementation level to adapt institutions and agencies responsible for funding research, 
and technology development, or for company support services. The development of the 
structures of the Finnish innovation policy has been incremental so far, and there is 
stability and a wide spread consensus among the key actors. The key feature of the 
                                                            
13  Lemola 2002. 
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Finnish governance seems to be trust and mutual understanding concerning the factors 
facilitating economic growth and competitiveness.14   
In comparison with some other reports, for example, the UK report,15 the Finnish 
report highlights the future totally differently. The UK report is written with a very 
political vocabulary and it has a clear political ethos. The framework of the UK report is 
based on the scenarios of four interactive sectors or spheres: World market, National 
enterprise, Global responsibility, Local stewardship. These scenarios are presented as 
storylines which set out some general trends and provide more detailed views dealing 
with a number of areas: economic and sectoral trends; employment and social trends; 
regional development; health, welfare and education; the environment.   
One of the most interesting differences between the two documents is how the UK 
report and the Finnish report see the relation between the traditional nation state and 
economic globalisation. Although the UK report stresses that political power remains at 
the UK level and the relationship with the EU remains distant, keeping responsibilities 
for defence, foreign and economic policy with the UK government, it also openly says 
that the diplomatic and security relationship with the US is to be strengthened. The 
report furthermore admits that market values will dominate, and economic and political 
power will be more concentrated in the hands of a few politicians and in the business 
community.  
The report also stresses that the trade-off between liberalised markets and the 
retention of national control over the economy makes this a medium growth scenario 
over the long period. In other words, public investment in infrastructure development is 
reduced but services grow, especially in the areas of health, tourism and retailing. 
Unstable economic development and a lack of job creation in new dynamic sectors do 
not compensate for increasing flexibility in labour markets. Working hours continue to 
increase, especially for lower paid workers who are to supplement their income through 
work in the informal sector. In conclusion, the UK report can very easily to be read as a 
political document contrary to the Finnish report. On the one hand it stresses that the 
scenarios it advocates are open and flexible and, on the other hand, its language and 
vocabulary are clearly political. The Finnish report is as I will show totally different.  
One of the main differences is a stylistic one. The Finnish report is written as if it 
were a serious scientific report without any political connotations. In reality, the report 
is nothing but a political one. Its political aim is to legitimate a set of political strategies, 
open new guidelines and introduce a variety of ideas related to new political instruments 
and tools to be used in the Finnish political context. What makes the Finnish report 
curious is the fact that it advocates its message as if it were not a matter of politics. The 
Finnish report is very important for this study because it opens up the problematics I 
will concentrate on.  
The differences between various countries can be explained by referring to the 
differences of political cultures and practices. The political processes linked with the 
reports have been very different. If the UK report is produced and written by a set of 
scholars specialized to science and technology policies and the report has been revised at 
least twice, the construction of the Finnish report is very different. The introduction of 
the Finnish report emphasises that the report is a result of creative, fascinating and keen 
panel work. It is thus an output of the Finnish consensual political culture in which an 
                                                            
14 EU - The European Commission (2006a). 
15 Foresight Futures 2020. 
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aim of politics is to activate participants and find an objective and coherent 
argumentation basis for consensus.  
 
1.2. Genealogies of STI policies  
 
The common view among STS scholars is that the actual science and technology policy 
directed by the state started after the Second World War in the USA and spread over the 
world very quickly.16 While this is true, it is not the whole truth if we follow Mirowski’s 
and Sent’s17 historical analysis of science policy in the United States in the 20th century. 
They distinguish between three over-lapping periods in their analysis: The Proto-
industrial regime 1900-1940; the Cold War regime 1940-1980; and the globalized 
privatization regime since 1980.  
Their thesis is that the contemporary science and technology policy, the globalized 
privatisation regime, has close links with the developments in international politics after 
the fall of socialist countries ruled by the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s.  
The whole idea of science and technology policies must be linked with the 
international politics after the Second World War and the birth of the Cold War era, in 
particular. In the late 1940s one of the most important developments was the spreading 
of strong political and economic aid via a set of different political interventions 
organized by the US government including the Marshall Plan, the European recovery 
program. The Marshall Plan has produced a lot of debate; one line of those debates has 
been the problem of winners. Some historians have stressed the benefits of the Marshall 
Plan to U.S. industry. 18  
The radical changes in national science and technology policies in the US were also 
very obvious and are often related to Big Science argument. The term Big Science 19 
describes a series of changes in science during and after World War II. While in World 
War I science played a major role in warfare and armaments, the increase in the military 
funding of science the Second World War was unpredictable. The Manhattan Project 
proved that a strong investment on scientific research was important to any country 
wishing to have a role in international politics.  
After the Manhattan Project and during the Cold War international governments i.e. 
the United States and the Soviet Union became the chief patrons of science and the 
character of the scientific establishments changed remarkably. Big Science implied 
specific characteristics: big budgets, big staffs, big machines and big laboratories. One 
interpretation of Big Science has been that it started a new era for governments. It 
started a new form of research facility: the government-sponsored laboratory system 
employing thousands of technicians and scientists managed by universities became a 
model for science as such. The home of scientific knowledge and research was in those 
very expensive laboratories.  “When history looks at the 20th century, she will see science 
and technology as its theme; she will find in the monuments of Big Science -the huge rockets, 
the high-energy accelerators, the high-flux research reactors -symbols of our time just as surely 
as she finds in Notre Dame a symbol of the Middle Ages... We build our monuments in the 
name of scientific truth, they built theirs in the name of religious truth; we use our Big 
Science to add to our country's prestige, they used their churches for their cities' prestige; we 
                                                            
16 Whereas Timothy Lenoir emphasises the German development in the 19th century; Lenoir 1998. 
17 Mirowski and Sent 2002. 
18 Schain 2001. 
19 Galison and Hevly 1994. 
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build to placate what ex-President Eisenhower suggested could become a dominant scientific 
caste, they built to please the priests of Isis and Osiris.” 20 
If the Manhattan Project coined physics and astronomy as big sciences, later also life 
sciences, after the invention of DNA and RNA in the 1950s and the human genome 
project in the recent decade have become new big sciences. This heavy investment of 
government and industrial interests into academic science has blurred the traditional line 
between public and private research. The dependence of research on central public 
funding bodies is often seen as a dangerous development in which the degree of 
independence in contemporary scientific knowledge is questioned.  
After the Second World War science and technology played an important role in 
national policies, and for example German’s and Japan fast economic revival can be 
explained with those policies21. In terms of Big Science the contemporary NIS22 
framework used in STI policies is a new phase in its development; it openly advocates a 
totally new perspective to science and technology as a political program as we have seen 
above. Big Science has been a kind of accelerator for those policies while there was 
initially only a rationale for science policies, there later emerged a rationale for science 
and technology policies, and now we have a rationale for science, technology and 
innovation policies. Why? 
When Thomas Kuhn released his famous The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 
1962 many things changed. Kuhn’s book evoked a lot of discussion among scientists 
and philosophers. At the time one very popular picture of science was as is also today the 
opinion that science develops by the addition of new truths to the stock of truths or 
increasing the approximation of theories to the truth. This progress is in the hands of 
particularly great scientists and it is guaranteed if scientists follow the scientific method. 
In the 1950s the historical study of science was a young discipline and Kuhn was the 
first to articulate that the standard view was too simple and false. 
Kuhn argues that there are no rules for deciding on the significance of a puzzle and 
for weighing puzzles and their solutions against one another. The decision to opt for the 
revision of a disciplinary matrix is not one that is rationally compelled, nor is the 
particular choice of revision rationally compelled. For this reason the revolutionary 
phase is particularly open to competition among differing ideas and rational 
disagreement about their relative merits. This suggestion was interpreted by some 
sociologists and historians of science so that the outcome of a scientific revolution, 
indeed of any step in the development of science, is always determined by socio-political 
factors.  
As Philip Miroswki23 remarks, Kuhn has been an extremely important figure in the 
history of science but we must not focus on Kuhn’s person: we should rather examine 
other facets of the problem.  One of those paradoxes related to Kuhn is how it is possible 
that a person with a disdainful attitude towards the social sciences has become a 
celebrated figure among social scientists.  
Mirowski’s answer is that Kuhn was involved in many other developments in the 
United States; the rise of Big Science and the innovation of OR24. His point is that those 
two interventions were a starting shot for the whole idea of science policy and there were 
two different versions of how science operated: the British and American ones.  
                                                            
20 Weinberg 1961, pp. 161–164. 
21 Freeman 1988. 
22 NIS= National System of Innovation aka The National Innovation System 
23 Mirowski 2004, p. 85. 
24 OR= Operation research. 
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While the British version stressed Michael Polanyi’s idea of “tacit knowledge”,25 the 
American version highlighted Kuhn’s “normal science”. Polanyi’s point was to elevate 
science as the paradigm of human accomplishment with roots in individual cognition. 
His epistemological view was that knowledge was not to be reduced to the brain, and he 
believed that everyday modes of knowing were in principle no different from their 
scientific counterparts. A motto for Polanyi was “We know more than we can say”; 
human knowledge has a tacit dimension. This means that liberty was a necessary 
prerequisite for progress in science and in the economy. 
Mirowski’s claim is that Kuhn’s success was not only an accident but it is related to 
his involvement in Big Science. One of the most important aspects of Big Science is 
according to Mirowski the birth of cyborg sciences. The term of cyborg sciences refers to 
an enterprise to solve the problem of the Natural and the Social by reducing the Social 
to the Natural. This tendency is embedded in neo-classical economics, Social 
Darwinism, Kohler’s psychological field theory, technocracy, eugenics and many other 
research programmes. The common feature of all these programmes is that if the earlier 
versions of scientism left the boundary between the Natural and the Social intact, what 
happened after the Second World War II was totally different.  
Mirowski’s point is that the fundamental of cyborg sciences is to agglomerate a 
heterogeneous assemblage of humans and machines, the living and the dead, the active 
and the inert, meaning and symbol, intention and teleology in which Nature has taken 
on board many of the attributes conventionally attributed to Society. Another one of 
Mirowski’s radical claims26 is that the new cyborg sciences did not simply spontaneously 
arise but that they were consciously made. Cyborg science is Big Science par excellence; 
its militarily imposed rationale of command, control, communications and information 
(the C3I paradigm) is the key to all questions.  
If the birth of science policy is clearly linked with the Cold War the contemporary 
R&D policy27 is totally different. The contemporary R&D policy, often referred to the 
term STI policy or STI policies, is closely linked as we saw earlier with globalisation and 
competitiveness. It is also apparent that the shift from a cold war R&D policy to a 
competitiveness R&D policy is under way and the shift will be lengthy, uneven and 
incomplete. The science and technology policy literature associated with a 
competitiveness R&D policy rationale stresses three issues. If science and technology are 
seen as contributing to economic competitiveness, then funding for academics and basic 
research will increase. Second, it assumes that the funding of science and technology 
with a commercial rationale will not change scientists and their work. Third, it assumes 
that academic science and technology are somehow separate from the universities in 
which they occur. This means that there is a clear need for institutional reforms and 
reorganisations. The question is whether these assumptions are coherent and real.28 
The shift toward a competitive R&D policy has started in the 1980s and it has 
spread to all industrialised countries. The profit-making potential of intellectual 
property and, in particular, the opportunities of biotechnology have intensified 
privatisation and commercialisation in university-based medical education and research. 
The rationale shift is naturally a complex of issues but it is often associated with the 
Reagan and Bush administration and a variety of changes in legislation in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
                                                            
25 Polanyi 1958. 
26 Mirowski 2002, pp. 16–17. 
27 R&D = Research and Development. 
28 Slaughter and Rhoades 2002. 
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The key elements of a competitiveness R&D policy can be reduced into two major 
issues. While the first issue can be reduced to the problem of the economy, the second 
issue is the problem of economics as an analytic cognitive toolbox. The difference 
between the earlier rationale of science and technology policy is not substantial because 
it was based on economic growth and welfare. Rather, it implies a totally different view 
to the realm of economy. This means that we have to develop a new conceptual, 
methodological, metaphysical, theoretical, and instrumental arsenal to study the 
problem of economy. The other issue is linked with the first so that the new rationale 
also advocates the view that science should be understood as if it were as economic 
process.29  
Kenneth Arrow30 who defined science as a form of mining aimed to draw a sharp 
distinction between science and technology. This has later been popularized as the linear 
model of the relationship between science and economy. According to Arrow, if we 
think that science is a commodity, a special case of a troublesome thing called “public 
good”, it follows that basic knowledge will not likely be rewarded as such.  
But the welfare economists in the 1950s thought that in order to achieve certain 
welfare goals certain judicious government interventions are justified. In effect, they 
faced a kind of paradox: on the one hand, science could be conceptualized as a market 
and, on the other hand, it was a special case. This paradox was dovetailed later with the 
idea of market failure in Keynesian macroeconomics that equates technological progress 
with spending on research and development.31  
While the image of science as the production of public goods is still involved in 
science and technology policy, it is also obvious that the public good scenario reflecting 
the Walrasian equilibrium has transformed into the cognitive/contracts scenario 
reflecting game theory and Nash equilibria for non-cooperative games. 32 Science is no 
longer regarded as producing things but rather fostering the existence of a complex of 
cognitive states. This redirects the economics of science towards the questions of the 
optimal organization of the actual process of inquiry in the face of uncertainty.  33 
All this implies that if the earlier account of science understood it as knowledge, as a 
thing, this was completed by the metaphors created in computer science for cognitive 
processes in which the information satiated hybrid is fused to knowledge. This new 
approach adopts the language of the agent as an information processor and takes the 
divergence between individual and social goals as its major point of departure.  
If the traditional version of science policy was closely linked to the philosophy of 
science and the neoclassical economics, the contemporary STI policies have very close 
links with partly evolutionary and institutional economics and also with cyborg sciences, 
measurement and quantification. Mirowski’s third provocative claim is that in the 
contemporary science policy the major issue is the problem of science.  
The crucial question linked with the current debates on science is how the 
universities in the future will be structured. One very embarrassing aspect in the recent 
                                                            
29 In terms of the earlier rationale there were two important contributions or attempts to promote the 
economics of science Richard Nelson’s version, very much based on Paul Samuelson’s welfare 
economics, and Kenneth Arrow’s version based on the Cowles Commission Walrasian theory both 
consultants at RAND. Both of these approaches see science as producing a thing called knowledge and 
both promote the central question related to economics of science whether or not the thing produced 
by scientists qualifies as a public good and therefore deserves public subsidy. 
30 Arrow 1962a, reprinted in Mirowski and Sent 2002, pp. 165–182. 
31 Nelson 1959, reprinted in Mirowski and Sent2002, pp. 151–164. 
32 Rizvi 1994. 
33 Mirowski and Sent 2002, p. 44. 
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debates on science is that scientists and science as such have no special position or 
quality. Research programs and projects are stabilized through the processes of 
negotiation, recruitment, purchase and realignment. Their legitimacy including the 
university system is thus an ongoing construction project.  
According to Mirowski this has started a totally new discussion on science and there 
are two major rival approaches to the problem today: the science studies tradition or 
SSK/STS tradition34 and the economics of science.35 One of the curiosities of STI 
policies is that they openly advocate the benefits of science and technology and link 
them with competitiveness, economic growth and welfare. But as this is not the whole 
truth it makes the problem of STI policies more complex and difficult to understand, 
not to speak of analyzing it. This is due to the fact that for most governmental activities 
of science and technology are not goals in themselves but linked with other usually 
societal goals. Science and technology are often seen as national goals as such. Most of 
the expenditure on science and technology is discussed in the context of other goals.  
But how did the situation develop in Finland and why are the developments at the 
1940s so important? As we will see later in this study Finland has been a late-comer in 
science and technology policies. The Finnish science policy as a particular policy sector 
governed and funded by the state started de facto in the 1960s.  
The ethos of the Finnish science policy is linked on the one hand with the Nordic 
welfare state ideal and with the interests of the export industries on the other hand. Two 
different perspectives for the transformation of those policies can be discovered. First, 
the construction of those policies can be seen as a negotiation process in which these two 
interests are politically interlocked so that the contradictory elements are dissipated. 
Second, the construction of these policies can still be seen as an amalgamation of Big 
Science and OR but its ethos is totally different from the earlier policy rationale.  
One curious aspect of the Finnish science and technology policy analyses is that the 
OR aspect of those polices is often neglected and the role of cyborg sciences has not 
been critically analyzed in Finland, although one of the key debates in the Finnish social 
sciences in the 1960s and 1970s concentrated on such issues. The debates related to 
cybernetics have been very influential after the Second World War in the era of the Cold 
War both in the West and the East.36 In Finland, OR has been a kind of invisible or 
hidden agenda in many debates in social and political sciences. In Finland, one very 
interesting curiosity has been the birth of mass communication studies and its political 
construction as a discipline in Finland in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Yrjö Ahmavaara implemented cybernetics in social theory37as connected to the 
Finnish Broadcasting Company program strategy development in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Another example i Osmo A Wiio and his communication theory. Those two theorists 
utilized the idea of OR and other possibilities of cyborg sciences in different ways. 
Although the key issue for both theorists was to see human beings as constructors of 
social institutions and information processors i.e. their theories were different 
applications of systemic theory. Whereas Ahmavaara stressed in his Marxian favoured 
                                                            
34 SSK= Sociology of Scientific Knowledge; STS= Science and Technology Studies. 
35 The interest of the first community is on the sociality of science i.e. the social dimensions of science 
and scientific knowledge and consists of such scholars as Donald MacKenzie, Sheila Jasanoff, Steve 
Shapin, Trevor Pinch and Andrew Pickering. The second community has close links with the 
philosopher of science Philip Kitcher but also with those who advocate social epistemology of science 
such as Alvin Goldman, David Hull and Miriam Solomon. 
36 Susiluoto 2006; Berndtson, Susiluoto, Palonen 1979. 
37 Ahmavaara 1970; Ahmavaara 1974; Ahmavaara 1974. 
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theory the role of cybernetics as a new instrument for planning government and 
administration Wiio rather stressed the meaning of human communication and its 
complexity at the basis of Herbert A. Simon’s information theory. An interesting point 
is that Ahmavaara revised later his ideology totally, but Wiio remained faithful to his 
theoretical backgrounds. 
In terms of the development of communication sciences in Finland, these two 
theorists have been very influential and Wiio, in particular, was very active in SITRA’s 
early years38. His original point was to advocate SITRA as a Finnish version of RAND 
and his contribution to the development of science and technology policies in Finland 
was significant.39  
The very apparent aspect of science and technology policies is that they imply a sort 
of promise, a warranty for the future. Although the bottom line in STI policies is that 
they involve a lot of insecurity, hopes, conjectures, contingency and risk, the ethos of 
these policies is that this is not the case. The nitty-gritty of those policies is simply that 
no real choices and alternatives are available. This aspect is often called in science and 
technology studies “technology-determinism”; the whole idea of the representative 
democracy is often excluded from the agenda of science and technology policies. The 
decisions that governments make are so complex and difficult, being full of high 
expertise and know-how, that it is impossible to translate them into lay persons’ 
language.  Both Ahmavaara and Wiio have advocated strongly the idea of social scientists 
as “software engineers” who model and analyze the human communications systems and 
its rationale, and both of them stressed the political aspects of “software engineers” 
expertise.  
In other words, in the final analysis STI policies are inherently parts of politics and 
the ultimate aim of these policies is societal. But as the Finnish Finnsight 2015- report 
analysis clearly shows, the scenarios of Finland are the outcome of complex intellectual 
labour. It is a serious analytic work based on highly qualified expertise and know-how. 
The report is a know-how manifest advocating the ethos of objectivity, neutrality and 
impartiality often linked with the notion of scientific knowledge. The report also 
illustrates the ethos of enlighted policy making, a new mentality in political governance 
in which two administrative philosophies new public management and late cameralism 
are interlinked with one another.40 
 
1.3. Purpose and the structure of the study 
 
Two theses  
 
It is apparent that if innovations are the core of STI policies there are two difficult 
problems that policy makers has to live with. The first problem is to give an exact 
definition of innovation: what are innovations. The second problem is to clarify the 
right ends and effective means to be utilized successfully in policy making. In terms of 
STI policies the concept of innovation is a matter of life and death due to the following 
reasons. On the one hand, the concept of innovation is important because it is used as 
justifying the new framework for science and technology policies and, on the other 
                                                            
38 SITRA= The Finnish National Fund for Research and Development Fund; nowadays SITRA uses the 
attribute, The Finnish Innovation Fund. 
39 Särkikoski 2007. 
40 Hood and Jackson 1991, pp. 177–195. 
26  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
hand, the concept is vital because it is used as a legitimation basis for the new ethos of 
political government that STI policies imply.  
In the traditional science and technology policy context the idea of innovation was 
understood through linearity. In other words, it was a linear and sequential model of 
innovation in which the actors of science “discover” truths, technologists find 
“applications” for those scientific inventions by working out its practical implications, 
and the resultant products “diffuse” unchanged to users. 41 The pull-push mechanism 
embedded in a linear model [Basic research->Applied research->Development-> 
(Production and) Diffusion] assumes that scientific inventions function as catalysts in 
the pursuit of becoming concrete and tangible through technology.  Technological 
innovations are sort of embodiments of scientific knowledge and there is a linear bond 
between a scientific invention and a technological innovation. Technological 
innovations are the basis for all innovations.  
In the traditional science and technology policies the idea of innovation was linked 
with a technological innovation. Today one of the key arguments of the contemporary 
science and technology policies (STI) is to advocate a broader definition of innovation as 
a key aspect of science and technology. For example, one of the key arguments 
embedded in the NIS framework is that the traditional account of innovation must be 
reconsidered thoroughly. The idea of NIS is, rather, to advocate the idea of non-linearity 
and make the hidden aspects of innovation transparent in pursuit of creating innovation 
responsive environments as soon as possible.  
In other words, one of the key arguments of STI policies is that there are no simple 
linear mechanisms between science, technology and economy there may be some 
mechanisms but they are more complicated than we have As entities science and 
technology do not interact as disembodied knowledge, but as embodied expertise: 
science is a resource that engineers draw on creatively, rather than apply in a simple and 
straightforward manner.   
 But what does the framework on National Innovation System add to the earlier 
approach? As Benoit Godin
42
 remarks, although the NIS framework has close links with 
the system approach, it is different. The earlier view deal with policy issues: the 
government was believed at that time to have a prime responsibility in the performance 
of the system. The role of government was to secure its capacity to make the system 
work. But the policies had to be adapted and coordinated. Within the National 
Innovation System, the role of government is different: the framework stresses that its 
role is to create preconditions and platforms for those policies. The message is directed 
towards the actors, or sectors, and the focus is on the need for greater “collaboration”. 
Whereas the early system approach was focused on the research system and its links with 
other components or sub-systems, the NIS framework’s focus is on the firm as its main 
component, around which other sectors gravitate. The two approaches, however, put 
strong emphasis on technological innovation and its economic dimension, and urge all 
sectors to contribute to this goal – under their respective roles.  
Taking into account all this it is possible to introduce two rather abstract theses 
regarding the STI policies as a political complex. These theses attempt to capture the 
core of the new STI policies rationale. The theses are based on the assumption that the 
concept of policy is a form of coordinated and regulated teleological activity in which 
structures and rules have an important role.  
                                                            
41 Sörensen and Williams 2002. 
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The first thesis that might be called an internal thesis of STI policies focuses on the 
policy sector per se: One of the key points in STI policies is to reject partly the 
traditional linear model of innovation and replace it by the new non-linear model of 
innovation. This interpretation highlights the idea that by situating innovation to the 
middle of science and technology policies we must re-define both the content and form 
of science and technology policies. It follows that we have to analyze the hybrid of 
science, technology and economy, and provide a rational analysis of dynamics of that 
hybrid. It also means that we have to focus primarily on the problem of innovation 
instead of invention. But, as we will see later, the shift to NIS and to the knowledge-
based-economy (KBE) is far from easy to do. They both imply a variety of theoretical 
and statistical difficulties that are very complex.  
The key point of the internal thesis is that the shift to STI policies changes also the 
ethos of science and technology policies. The conclusion is that the resources of these 
policies must be re-allocated. In other words, the political discussion concerning the 
relation between the internal vs. the external aspects of those policies must begin 
immediately. All this implies a series of rhetorical moves in which a variety of rhetorical 
resources are used and adopted to justify the new rationale of those policies. 
The second thesis that might be called an external thesis of STI policies is a kind of 
derivation from the first thesis. It argues that the first thesis is not enough. The whole 
idea of STI policies is to expand political debates beyond the traditional domain of those 
policies and overtake a hegemonic position over other policy sectors. It follows that the 
rationale of STI policies must be linked with a new mentality of political governance.  
If the first thesis emphasises the significance of theoretical labour in pursuit of a 
better understanding of the hybrid containing science, technology, economy, and  
seeking to a plausible justification for new strategies, the second thesis highlights the role 
of political governance as a precondition for changing existing policy practices. If these 
two theses are accepted as valid it means that STI policies must necessarily involve two 
dimensions: first, to highlight the significance of innovation and, second, to highlight 
the construction process of responsive societal environments for innovations in 
particular. The second thesis introduces a totally new approach to science and 
technology policies and can be understood as a reversal of the first thesis. This approach 
is often called the horizontal aspect of science and technology policies. These two aspects 
of STI policies can take different names depending on the context. We might call them 
“theory-based top down policies” and “practice-based bottom up policies” and argue 
that the real challenge for STI policies is how to make these two aspects work together.  
The NIS framework stresses that innovations are dynamic processes. It is only by 
utilizing the ideas of systems, complexity and contingency that we are able to understand 
them. This implies that technological innovations are possible through negotiations and 
compromises i.e. they are inherently social and political by nature. It follows that the 
interventional focus of that policy must be adjusted, and the quest for new policy 
instruments must be started immediately. 
In analysing the political aspects of STI policies the research must focus on those two 
aspects. Only by taking into account these two totally different approaches are we able 
to access to the political core of that policy.  This means that if the aim of the study is to 
analyze the political aspects of STI policies it is not useful to examine them only as an 
internal reform of science and technology policy. Rather, they should be understood as 
broad political and administrative processes in which the nitty-gritty of the policy is 
linked with new political governance. The political focus of new political governance 
consists of a set of self-reflexive political interventions in seeking to solve the dilemma of 
28  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
the public sector as such and, in particular, to find a legitimation basis for the new 
political government and the expertise it prevails.  
If this kind of an interpretation is accepted, it follows that the traditional science and 
technology policy arrangements and its power chances are in flux. One of these changes, 
perhaps its most radical reform, is that the role of basic research must be re-defined 
while its relevance and significance remain to be stressed. This kind of re-definition does 
not mean that the traditional idea of pure science or scientific research i.e. the autonomy 
of research and scientific knowledge remain untouched. Neither does it change the role 
of pure science but may change the role of scientists and scholars as well as their 
institutions.  
Universities and other research institutes and organisations must not only be 
theoretically innovative but they also have to link theories to practice and thus explicate 
the possible benefits of their research with regard to possible innovations.43 In other 
words, they have to link the external interest and the scientific interest more carefully 
than earlier.  
One of the key challenges for political governance is how to make this very radical 
change real so that the shift from the scientific and/or technological invention to the 
other aspects of innovation such as diffusion and commercialisation becomes possible 
and plausible. All this puts a lot of pressure on political government, and what is perhaps 
the most important and radical change in regard with the traditional science and 
technology policy it changes the ethos of those policies. This change implies that 
political governance must utilize new theoretical knowledge dealing with science, 
technology and innovation in order to justify and legitimate the new agenda, its 
guidelines and milestones. But how are theory and practice linked with each other?  Is 
the distinction theory vs. practice useful at all?  
One of the curiosities embedded in the NIS -framework is that it although it refers 
to the KBE (knowledge-based-economy) argument it competes with NIS. 44 The KBE 
framework claims that, on the one hand, knowledge and know-how are the most 
strategic resources of the current economy and, on the other hand, learning is its most 
important process. The KBE argument sounds very plausible and is easy to accept. As 
some scholars have argued, this aspect has apparently helped the implementation of STI 
policies very much.45 
One of the cornerstones of the learning economy emphasizes the role of new 
emerging knowledge and new co-developments between the dichotomy market vs. 
hierarchy- industrial networks. Its explicit aim is to speed up the rate of change by 
imposing growing international competition, deregulation and new technological 
opportunities in order to provide an incentive for companies to hire personnel with a 
high learning capability. Another cornerstone of the learning economy is the 
information technology and the codification of new technology that reinforce the 
acceleration.  
The process is characterized by cumulative causation excluding a large and growing 
proportion of the labour force from normal waged labour. As Bengt-Åke Lundvall, one 
of the leading advocators of the learning economy, puts it. “This kind of approach to 
economy implies the need to develop a new perspective on policy-making- a new kind of social 
compromise or the need for a new deal. The need is to further speed the rate of learning the 
                                                            
43 In the OECD this means that biotechnology and other science-based industries such as 
nanotechnologies have a special position in science and technology policy context.  
44 Godin 2007a. 
45 Godin 2003. 
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sectors facing international competition in order to obtain a bigger share in the most rapidly 
growing markets.”46 
The KBE framework stresses the significance of national policies. It means that 
nation states with their responsibility to implement STI policies have two different tasks. 
On the one hand, they have to create an open and flexible system of governmental 
environment for companies and industries to advance in global competition and, on the 
other hand, they have to create a sheltered sector where learning takes place at a slower 
rate and take into account the need to redistribute the access of information networks 
and the capabilities to learn in favour of the potentially excluded. The various ways in 
which this bipolarity peculiar to the construction of STI policies has been taken into 
account is one thematic addressed in this study. 
This study focuses on the case of Finland because of the following reasons. First, 
Finland was the first country in the world to apply the NIS- framework in its science and 
technology policies. Second, Finland is an especially interesting case because Finland’s 
performance in implementing the NIS has in many international studies been evaluated 
as excellent. Finland is often seen as a model country that has successfully linked the 
demands of global market with the Nordic welfare state tradition. Third, Finland as an 
actor has been very determined and serious in its ambition to fulfil all the principles of the 
NIS very carefully.  Naturally, there are a lot of explanations available why Finland chose 
the NIS framework and why Finland has been successful but those issues will be dealt 
later. 
Although this narrative of Finland as a success story is evidently a true story it is not 
the whole truth. One will get a bit different picture if the focus is put on some political 
interventions and experiences that have engendered a lot of obscurity and bafflement. 
One of those very peculiarities is the welfare cluster case, a particularly idiosyncratic 
political intervention linked with the renewal of the Finnish industrial policies in the 
1990s. There is a lot of disagreement about its outcomes and results, some views suggest 
that it was a failure while others express a different one.   
What makes the welfare cluster case so fascinating is the fact that prima facie it has 
nothing to do with STI policies. It is often argued that the welfare cluster case was only 
an exception to the rule and nothing else. My interpretation is that the welfare cluster is 
an important aspect of STI policies in Finland. This view is based on the following 
arguments. 
One very interesting aspect of the welfare cluster is that the term was a buzzword, a 
neologism and its translation into English has been difficult. On the one hand, it is 
translated as the well-being cluster and, on the other hand, it is translated as the welfare 
cluster. Although there are a lot of political documents that prefer the term well-being I 
will use here the concept of the welfare cluster because of the following reasons.  
First, the noun well-being is defined in an English dictionary as “the state of being 
happy, healthy, or prosperous”. In other words, it is used as an attribute of an individual or 
a community and often as a synonym for a quality of life. The noun welfare is defined as 
“the state of doing well aid in the form of money or necessities for those in need especially in 
respect to good fortune, happiness, well-being, or prosperity”. The noun welfare also refers to 
aid in the form of money or necessities for those in need, or it may refer to an agency or 
program through which such aid is distributed.  47  
                                                            
46 Lundvall 2002; Freeman 1991. 
47 “Wellbeing”in Merriam-Webster Unabridged Online, 2008. 
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Second, the semantic difference between the terms “well-being” and “welfare” 
becomes apparent if we examine the concept of a social welfare program. Encyclopaedia 
Britannica says that 48 
 
“The chief characteristics of a welfare or security program are the risks to be protected 
against, the population covered, eligibility criteria, levels of benefits, manner of 
financing, and administrative procedures. All these criteria are subject to wide 
variation in practice. In particular, eligibility criteria often include a “time-lock,” 
which requires participation in or coverage by a program for a specified time. 
Financing is generally accomplished by exacting contributions from covered persons, 
employers, or both, by the government out of general revenues, or by a combination 
of the two.” 
 
The conclusion is that the term welfare cluster describes the Finnish case more 
appropriately as will be shown later. The term was used exactly in the sense in which the 
term welfare is defined above. Furthermore, it is important to note that welfare 
economics as a branch of economics seeks to evaluate economic policies in terms of their 
effects on the well-being of the community.  
Eventually, what is more important is the intervention as such because it opens a 
totally different outlook onto STI policies in Finland. The welfare cluster case can be 
seen as a practical case or a kind of policy exercise that opens up the door for the hidden 
aspects of STI policies. My thesis is that the welfare cluster has been one of the most 
important interventions in the Finnish STI policies because it deals with some very 
fundamental issues embedded in the Finnish political culture and its practices. This 
means that there are a lot of reasons why the welfare cluster intervention is useful for this 
study. These include following ones.  
First, the welfare cluster case can be seen a long and multi-faceted process between 
the early 1990s and the early 2000s. Many experts see the intervention as a policy 
exercise linked with many other developments in the early 1990s and interpret it as a 
sort of failure or lesson for political government because its outcomes were different 
from those estimated. 
Second, the intervention also reveals a lot of problems embedded in the NIS.  It 
highlights well the problem of horizontality in particular. Third, the intervention also 
illustrates how the political and national aspects are important in STI policies. The 
welfare cluster case is a very Finnish intervention that has no other comparable cases 
anywhere in the world. Fourthly, the welfare cluster case is important because through it 
we are able to analyze the political aspects of STI policies. In other words, it illustrates 
how STI policies are ultimately and inherently parts of politics. Finally, what makes the 
welfare cluster case extremely interesting is that it seems to have a variety of its 
unintended effects and impacts. Although the original intentions and scenarios 
embedded in it never fulfilled the significance of its catalytic powers is enormous because 
most of today’s political struggles are linked in a way or another. 
 
The structure of the study  
 
This study is structured in the following manner. I will start by introducing four slightly 
different accounts of understanding rhetoric. I will present two rhetorical perspectives 
the RIS perspective (rhetoric in science) with a focus on STI policies as a dilemma of 
                                                            
48 “Social welfare” in Ensyclopedia Britannica Online, 2008. 
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theory and the RIP perspective (rhetoric in politics)with a focus on STI policies as a 
dilemma of practice. Then I will explicate textual strategies used in analyzing STI 
policies. I will explicate the empirical research questions and discuss how textual material 
is used in the study.  
The rhetorical analysis has been divided into two parts. The first part is composed of 
two cycles: the cycle of contextualisation and the cycle of re-contextualisation. The 
second part, the rhetorical re-description of STI policies, is the nucleus of the study and 
is composed of five thematic moves. The point of the analysis is to locate new re-
interpretations needed for understanding STI policies as theoretical and practical 
political constructions.  
The first part consists of two cycles. The first cycle, the analysis of texts in pursuit 
of contextualisation, concentrates on the history of the Finnish science and technology 
policies. It seeks to clarify the transition to STI policies in the 1990s. Special emphasis is 
put on cluster policies and on the welfare cluster case in particular. Another aspect of the 
historical context is to examine the international context of STI policies, the role of the 
OECD in science and technology policies and the role of the EU in today’s European 
innovation policies.  
The second cycle, the analysis of texts in pursuit of re-contextualisation, focuses on 
current Finnish STI policies. The first part of the analysis focuses on Finland in the 
international context. The second part of the analysis concentrates on the welfare cluster 
case and utilizes the key actors’ interpretations on the case and its outcomes. 
The second part is called the rhetorical re-description of STI policies. It includes 
two cycles, the cycle of de-contextualisation and the cycle of re-interpretation. The first 
cycle is composed of five thematic moves which enable us to analyse STI policies from 
two RIS and RIP perspectives. The idea of rhetorical re-description is based on Quentin 
Skinner’s idea on the innovative ideologist. Skinner’s aim is to explain how the existing 
vocabularies utilized in politics can be manipulated so that new concepts, terms and 
slogans start to live a life of their own and the old meanings are replaced with new 
meanings.  
The first thematic move explores the political anatomy of STI policies. It asks 
whether they are ideology, rhetoric or what. The second thematic move examines the 
role of scientific frameworks and models in STI policies. The third thematic move 
clarifies the problem of new governance in STI policies and focuses on the problem of 
horizontality and the welfare state. The fourth thematic move investigates the cultural 
and national aspects of STI policies and explores the Finnish consensus political culture 
in particular. The fifth thematic move studies the role of rules and performatives in STI 
policies and concentrates on the role of conceptual frameworks and institutional 
reforms.  
The second cycle, the cycle of re-interpretation, concludes the analysis. Its aim is to 
discover new horizons to understand the theoretical and practical challenges that STI 
policies evidently imply. 
The discussion part of the study critically evaluates the rhetorical method and its 
appropriateness for examining STI policies as a political construction. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYZING STI POLICIES 
 
2.1. Dilemma of language  
 
When Ludwig Wittgenstein started his Philosophical Investigations (PI) with a quote 
from Augustine’s Confessions “which gives us a particular picture of the essence of human 
language”, he actually argued for the importance of the idea that “individual words in 
language name objects”, and that “sentences are combinations of such names.  
Despite its plausibility, this reduction of language to representation cannot catch the 
nature of human language. In reality, human language has also other functions than the 
representative function. This picture of language is the basis of the whole tradition of 
philosophy and Wittgenstein wanted to find a new way of looking at philosophy and 
language.  “For a large class of cases – though not for all - in which we employ the word 
“meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (PI43) 
In order to describe the multiplicity of uses, their un-fixedness, and their being “part 
of activity”, Wittgenstein introduced the key concept of his later philosophy, “language-
game. The properties of language-games could be characterized as follows. First, they are 
a part of broader context termed a form of life. Second, the concept of language-games 
points to the rule-governed character of language. It is linked with the conventional 
nature of human activity rather than with the strict and definite system of rules for each 
and every language-game. Third, by using the concept of language-game Wittgenstein 
wants to stress the analogy between language and game. In a similar way as we cannot 
find a final, essential definition of “game”, we cannot find the final definition of 
language.  
Wittgenstein rejects the idea of general explanations and definitions based on 
sufficient and necessary conditions. Instead of the philosopher’s craving for generality, 
Wittgenstein wants to use the concept of “family resemblance”. We ought to investigate 
the uses of a word as if they were “a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and 
criss-crossing” (PI 66). The notion of family resemblance also exhibits the lack of 
boundaries and the distance from exactness that characterize the different uses of the 
same concept.  
His point is that we use the concept of knowledge in different situations as “closed”, 
although those situations are “open”. In those situations we must speak of certainty 
rather than knowledge. We have solved the problem of the external world before we are 
able to ask the question about its existence. As Wittgenstein puts it “What I hold fast to is 
not one proposition but a nest of propositions.”49  The truth of those statements is fused 
into the foundation of our language-game. And those statements can be understood as 
moves in our language-game; the statement concerning the external world is not a 
contingent fact as the concept of unicorn is.  
The concept of Weltbild refers to culture and community; we belong to a 
community which is bound together by science and education. “But I did not get my 
picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am 
satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish 
                                                            
49 Wittgenstein 1969, § 225. 
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between true and false.”50 Wittgenstein considers that these propositions might be part 
of a kind of mythology and their role is like of that of the rules of game. These rules can 
be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules. Some propositions 
having the form of empirical propositions are hardened and they function as if they were 
fluid channels for empirical propositions. This relation alters with time, fluid 
propositions harden and hard ones became fluid. 
Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of the river bed to describe the problem. The river 
bed provides the support, the context, in which claims that one knows various things 
have meaning. The bed itself is not something that we can know or doubt. In normal 
circumstances no sane person doubts how many hands he or she has. But unusual 
circumstances may occur and what was part of the river bed can shift and become part of 
the river. I might, for instance, wake up dazed after a terrible accident and wonder 
whether my hands, which I cannot feel, are there or not. The foundation for language-
games is a kind of precondition for actual practices.51  
Jaakko Hintikka,52 as also Martin Kusch,53 has made an interesting distinction 
between two types of theories of language; views of language as the universal medium 
and views of language as calculus. This distinction is a generalization of a contrast 
between two ways of looking at logic suggested by Jean van Heijenoort54. While the first 
takes logic to be a universal language, the second conceives it as a calculus in the sense of 
being re-interpretable in a larger scale like a calculus. If the conception of language as the 
universal medium leads to the thesis of ineffability of semantics i.e. to the claim that the 
relation between language and the world cannot expressed, the opposite conception of 
language as calculus will conceive language as a tool as something that can be 
manipulated and re-interpreted, improved, changed and replaced.  
A believer in language as the universal medium is tempted to reject meta-language 
and to distrust the idea of truth as correspondence. Since there is no way of stepping 
outside of one’s home language, there cannot be a meta-language. According to the 
classical account of truth as correspondence, “truth” is a meta-linguistic term that 
expresses a certain correspondence between a sentence and a state of affairs in the world. 
According the view of language as the universal medium there is no vantage point from 
which this correspondence can be viewed or discussed.  
In political sciences the universal account of language is sometimes called the 
constitutive view of language55 and its premise is that a moral or political language plays 
a key role in politics. It is a medium of shared understanding and an arena of action 
because the concepts embedded in it inform the beliefs and practices of political agents. 
In other words, who and what we are, how we arrange, classify and think about our 
world- and how we act in it- are deeply limited by the argumentative and rhetorical 
resources of our language.  
Words and terms, as well as frameworks, theories, models and concepts, have always 
histories and linguistic origins. This applies to the concepts and terms used in politics, 
too. It is very apparent that the terms and concepts used in politics can never be 
                                                            
50 Wittgenstein 1969, § 94. 
51 Hintikka and Hintikka 1986. 
52 Hintikka has recently strongly defended the option of calculus as a philosophical resource. See               
Auxier and Hahn 2006. 
53 Kusch 1989.   
54 Heijenoort van 1986. 
55 Ball and Farr 1989. 
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timeless, and that the changes in the vocabularies can never be purely linguistic. This 
kind of approach is very common among political scientists.56  
The curiosity of the frameworks and vocabularies used in science and technology 
policies is that many categories embedded in them are taken for granted as if those 
conceptual frameworks had no histories and backgrounds. One of those assumptions 
taken for granted in science and technology policies concerns the distinctions between 
basic research and applied research, and the distinction between development and 
diffusion.57  Those distinctions are important in the sense that they serve as a kind of 
argumentative and rhetorical resource in debates and confrontations linked with science 
and technology. Yet those distinctions are not universal - they are man-made artefacts 
and these categories have histories of their own. 
To accept these ideas on language means that we also accept the view that politics 
and language are interwoven with one another. Let us imagine a situation in which a 
person asks another person to imagine politics and the political world without language. 
It becomes evident that such a state is extremely difficult to imagine. We should imagine 
politics without the attributes such as criticism, promise, argumentation, bargain, 
negotiation, compromise, hope and so forth. The situation becomes more difficult if we 
think of revolutions, peace talks, demonstrations, courts or parliaments and other 
existing political practices and institutions. To imagine politics without language is, in 
practice, a pure impossibility. 
 
2.2. Dilemma of politics 
 
Chantal Mouffe has in her recent writings stressed that if we want to find new horizons 
to understand the political we have to return to Wittgenstein’s insights in his later 
philosophy.58 Her aim is to examine a series of issues which are currently central to 
political theory and show that Wittgenstein provides us with a new way of theorizing the 
political. Mouffe examines the following issues linked with Wittgenstein: dilemma of 
universalism versus contextualism, democracy as substance or as procedures, democratic 
consensus, agonistic pluralism, and responsibility. 
Her analysis stresses that liberal democratic “principles” cannot be seen to provide an 
unique and definite answer to the question of what is the good regime. Rather they 
provide one possible “language game” among others. “Democratic action in this 
Wittgensteinian perspective, does not require a theory of truth and notions like 
unconditionality and universal validity but a manifold of practices and pragmatic moves aim 
at persuading people to broaden the range of their commitments to other, to build a more 
inclusive community.”59 
While many scholars in political sciences have no interest to advocate or underwrite 
any particular account of the political realm it may be useful to give some examples of 
contrary views. My choice here is to introduce Hannah Arendt’s philosophy and then to 
clarify the dilemma of the concept of politics in general. Arendt is often seen as an old-
fashioned nostalgic scholar whose thinking has nothing to do with our contemporary 
times. My outlook is however just the opposite.  
                                                            
56 Koselleck 1985. 
57 Godin 2007c. 
58 Mouffe 2000. 
59 See URL=< http://them.polylog.org/2/amc-en.htm>”Wittgenstein, Political Theory and 
Democracy”, 19.5.2008. 
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Arendt never represented any systematic political philosophy, a philosophy in which 
a single central argument would be expounded and expanded upon in a sequence of 
works. Her writings rather cover many and diverse topics, spanning issues such as 
totalitarianism, revolution, the nature of freedom, the faculties of 'thinking' and 
'judging', the history of political thought, and so on.  
The most original aspect in Arendt’s philosophy is her theory of action where she 
utilizes the ancient notion of praxis and replaces it by the notion of action,. This term 
she distinguishes from another ancient notion, poiesis, and replaces it by the notion of 
fabrication. Her original theoretical contribution by linking action to freedom and 
plurality is to show its connection to speech and remembrance. By viewing action as a 
mode of human togetherness she develops a participatory democracy and contrasts that 
with the bureaucratized and elitist forms of politics in our contemporary world.  
Arendt argues that it is a mistake to take freedom primarily as an inner, 
contemplative or private phenomenon, for it is in fact an active, worldly and public 
phenomenon. Our sense of an inner freedom is derivative upon first having experienced 
“a condition of being free as a tangible worldly reality”. The importance of publicity and 
plurality for action implies that action would be meaningless unless there were others 
present who see it and give meaning to it. The meaning of the action and the identity of 
the actor can only be established in the context of human plurality, the presence of 
others who are sufficiently like ourselves so that they can understand us and recognize 
the uniqueness of ourselves and our acts.  
This communicative aspect of action is extremely important for Arendt and her 
endeavours to connect action to speech. Her argument is that it is through action as 
speech that individuals come to disclose their distinctive identity: 'Action is the public 
disclosure of the agent in the speech deed'. The action of this character requires a public 
space in which it can be realized, a context in which individuals can encounter one 
another as members of a community.  
Arendt uses the Athenian polis as the model for such a space of communicative and 
disclosive speech deeds.“The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical 
location; it is the organization of people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and 
its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen 
to be.60  
Such action is synonymous with the political. Politics is the ongoing activity of 
citizens coming together in order to exercise their capacity for agency, to conduct their 
lives together by means of free speech and persuasion. Politics and the exercise of 
freedom-as-action are one and the same. For Arendt, the polis stands for the space of 
appearance and that space must be recreated by action. Its existence is secured whenever 
actors gather together and it ceases when they do not. 
The way in which Kari Palonen has returned to Arendt’s problem concerning how to 
define the realm of politics is interesting. His point is based on the idea that we have two 
separate but intertwined perspectives to define politics: politics-as-sphere and politics-as-
activity.  
Palonen61 argues that these two perspectives refer to two different and partially 
competing modes: the first “scope” analysis leans toward the use of spatial metaphors, 
whereas agency deals with politics in temporal terms. Politics-as-sphere and politics-as-
action are competing modes for the conceptualization of the new phenomena of politics.  
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61 Palonen 2006. 
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In political sciences we have the following alternatives: we may focus on polity, 
politics, policies, politicking and politicization. If our focus is upon politicking and 
politicization, we must give an account of what is political action and agency. Max 
Weber’s account is that politicking is a search for new power shares within an existing 
polity, while politicization concerns the redistribution of such shares in a polity-complex 
in a manner that opens new Spielräume for politicking. 62 
If we accept that power-changes are linked with all political action, it follows that the 
rhetorical moves and strategies are a condition for understanding theoretical 
contributions, always related to a situation, constellation and an audience to be moved63. 
Here this Skinnerian perspective is very important. 
Politicking is often seen as an agonistic struggle (action) between various political 
partners and actors e.g. in parliament election campaigns. In the case of politicization we 
are dealing with the issues related to political power. Therefore, we have to focus our 
scientific interest on the following issues: 1) how is the political context defined and by 
whom; 2) how is the political and the apolitical differentiated; 3) who are the players of 
that particular game; 4) what is the issue under consideration and why just it; 5) what 
are the explicit and implicit rules of that game - who decides point of time when the 
game has started and when it is over.  
One usual strain in politics is that there is a huge disagreement on these issues. 
Politics is traditionally seen as a continuous flux; it is a contest of defining the game and 
its rules incessantly. Politicking and politicization must be understood as an action or a 
process where this dynamic and emergent character of politics is present.  
If we are interested in polity and policy we are dealing with the more static issues. 
The concept of polity, usually understood as an organized geopolitical unit refers to 
steady political structures that make politics possible; in polity the boundaries for politics 
are established and articulated. It means that for example the constitutional issues are 
referring to polity; they define the boundaries of adequate political space. The concept 
of policy can be defined so that it is a distinctive style of politicking, an attempt to 
regulate and coordinate one’s activity. It refers to a line, programme or project.64 In 
other words, it refers to administrative and governmental issues and mechanisms; one 
definition might be that a policy is a plan to guide decisions and actions. The terms may 
apply to government, private sector organisations and groups and individuals.   
To read politics in this way means that we can analyze political judgments in 
temporal terms having relation to present, past and future. Palonen suggests that this is 
possible if you accept his nominalistic65 approach and divide a matrix of historical time 
into a field of nine types of temporal experience:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
62 Weber 1919. 
63 Skinner 1988b. 
64 Arendt 1958, p. 198. 
65 Palonen stresses strongly his nominalism; I think that his strategy is to follow Weber and his 
methodological insight. His nominalism is a critique of Platonian essentialism and resembles the 
Aristotelian argument: species do not die as individuals. Palonen 2003 a. 
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POLITICIZATION 2 
future/future 
POLITICS FICTION} 
past/present 
POLICY 1 
present/present 
POLITICKING 
 
future/present 
POLICY 2 
past/past 
“PREHISTORY” 
 
present/past 
POLITICIZATION 1 
future/past 
POLITY 2 
PAST PRESENT FUTURE 
 
Figure 1. Typology of four nouns: polity, policy, politicking and politicization 
 
His idea is to distinguish political time (limited) and historical time (unlimited) and to 
examine the dilemma of political judgment in that context.  “Prehistory” and “politics 
fiction” are of course relevant in a wider sense but they are irrelevant for the present 
political situation and therefore they are excluded here. As we can see, “politicking” as a 
performing action is the center of the political timetable understood as a temporal 
conduct within the limits of an extended present. This extension of the present makes it 
possible to include the self-assessment of the performance by political actors as in 
political judgments.  
This typology helps us to understand the most important aspect in judging 
politically. This concerns politicization, understood nominalistically as any move 
opening a specific dimension of contingency for the play of politicking. The present 
politicking takes place within a definite horizon of the possible, Chancen. While 
politicization refers to the opening moves of playing with contingency, polity is a limit 
figure which refers to the moves of standardizing some existing types of politicization. 
These moves both exclude and delimit the use of available forms of politicization. In so 
doing they create an obstacle for the possibility that new Chancen would become 
commonly acceptable. Politicking as performance is not related to those politicizations 
which are open in principle, but also to the commonly accepted and regimented forms 
of polity.  
What makes this typology useful in this study is that it illustrates well the problems 
of politics in general.66 It also helps us to understand why language is an essential aspect 
of politics and why politicking as agency is at the heart of politics and why policy 
formulations are so complex and difficult in practice.  In other words, the traditional 
question “What is politics?” must be replaced with a new question “What are political 
agents doing when they are acting politically?”  
The typology is of a great importance as it allows us to understand the special 
character of the concept of policy. Policy does not refer here to the totality of the sub-
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possibility, the problems of modality in philosophy. One of the key issues among philosophers has been 
the problem of fiction in the case of the possible worlds. See Lewis 1986. 
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sectors. This typology provides new horizons to understand the problem of politics in 
STI policies. 
 
2.3. Rhetoric as a tool for studying STI policies 
 
Rhetoric as a phenomenon has often been compared to a combination which opens a 
lock. The “lock” is a complex situation involving a particular issue, a particular person or 
group, a particular time and place. The combination is that form of discourse which will 
convince a particular audience as to act over an issue.67 In this study rhetoric is 
understood as a tool helping us to find the combination with which we open the lock of 
STI policies.  
The chapter introduces four different accounts of rhetoric. The first account is the 
tradition of the new rhetoric. Then the focus shifts onto the linguistic turn in political 
sciences: how the rhetorical perspective is understood in political sciences. The third 
account of rhetoric might be called the rhetoric of science perspective and its focus is on 
the rhetoric of economics. The fourth account of rhetoric is linked with the STS 
(Science and technology studies) and SSK (Sociology of scientific knowledge) traditions. 
 
2.3.1. The new rhetoric tradition 
 
In everyday life we all regularly engage in argumentative practices, when we advance 
arguments in defence of certain assertions or actions and when we react to arguments 
put forward by others. Argumentation is a verbal activity normally constructed in an 
ordinary language.68 A speaker or writer, engaged in argumentation, uses certain words 
and sentences to state, question, or deny something, or to respond to statements, 
questions or denials. Argumentation is accompanied by non-verbal means of 
communication such as gestures and facial gestures, but the verbal expressions can never 
be totally replaced by nonverbal communication. Without the use of language there is 
no argumentation.  
Argumentation is a social activity, which is in principle directed to other people. 
Thus, when people try to put forward their arguments, they attempt to meet the 
outspoken or tacit reactions of others. Argumentation is an activity of reason, which 
indicates that the arguer has given some thought to the subject. To put forward an 
argument implies that the arguer attempts to show that a rational account can be given 
to defend his or her position in the matter. This does not mean that argumentation has 
no emotional aspects; vice versa, argumentation has often very strong emotional 
dimensions.   
In general, argumentation always relates to a particular opinion, standpoint, on a 
specific subject. The need for argumentation arises when opinions concerning this or 
that subject differ. Holding an opinion is not enough to initiate argumentation. 
Argumentation starts from the presumption, right or wrong, that the standpoint of the 
arguer is not immediately accepted, but is controversial.  
Argumentation is intended to justify one’s standpoint, or to refute someone else’s. In 
an argumentative justification of a standpoint one is attempting to defend the  
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standpoint by showing that it conveys an acceptable proposition. In argumentative 
refutation one attacks the standpoint by showing that the proposition is unacceptable 
because an opposite, or contradictory, proposition is acceptable. Justifying and refuting a 
standpoint by way of argumentation proceeds by putting forward propositions. Those 
constellations of propositions have a special communicative function. To justify a 
standpoint is to put forward pro-arguments, and to refute a standpoint is to put forward 
contra-arguments. Argumentation is aimed at increasing or decreasing the acceptability 
of a controversial standpoint maintained by the listener or reader. In principle, the very 
act of arguing involves an appeal to the reasonability of the audience. In practice, arguers 
addressing an audience with a view to justifying or refuting a standpoint will generally 
presume that there are certain standards available for judging the quality of 
argumentation.  
The new rhetoric examines argumentation in ordinary language; it seeks to  a 
description of that kind of argumentation which can be successful in practice. One of 
the starting points for Perelman’s endeavour was the realization that in the era of logical 
empiricism it was not possible to conduct a rational analysis of value judgements.69 
Olbrecht and Tyteca regard classical rhetoric and dialectic as a single whole. For 
them dialectic is a theory relating to the techniques of argument, whereas rhetoric is a 
practical discipline indicating how dialectical techniques can be used to convince and 
persuade people. The new rhetoric approach suggests that we are not allowed to separate 
these three elements in discourses but, vice versa, we have to combine them, because its 
practitioners think that every discourse makes use of these three elements.  
They call their new theory the new rhetoric rather than the new dialectic because 
they think that the latter is too confusing. One of the reasons for this is that Hegel 
adopted the term dialectic and used it for his philosophical purposes. Another reason is 
that Aristotle’s rhetoric relates to orations and debates involving large groups of people 
and conducted for a specific purpose, to solve political and legal problems. The new 
rhetoric applies to oral as well as written argumentation addressed to any audience on 
practically unlimited subject matter.  
This means that in scientific argumentation all argumentation is rhetorical; all we 
need to do is to separate logic and demonstration from other forms of argumentation. 
For Perelman, rhetoric is aimed at an audience and he distinguishes four different kinds 
of audiences that are not merely physical: the Self, the Single Interlocutor, the 
Specialised Audience and the Universal Audience. The difference between the last two 
lies in the kind of adherence you are looking for.  
The efficacy of a discourse on the audience depends on 1) the premises used by the 
locutor, 2) the choice of presentation and 3) the arguments used. The premises refer to 
the “object of agreement”: the “real” and “the preferable”. 70 Thus, rhetoric has four 
elements: 1) the persuader, 2) the persuadee, 3) the aim of persuader to persuade the 
persuadee and 4) the argument as the means to attain the aim. Premises about reality use 
facts, truths and presumptions to persuade and convince. Not all facts are effective; only 
those that are true for an audience are facts. Furthermore, these conceptions that people 
hold and believe are true, are also true for Perelman. Presumptions refer to common 
sense: they are about normality and what people expect. Agreements about what is 
                                                            
69 Perelman 1979. 
70 Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca 1971, p. 11. 
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“preferable” draw on values and hierarchies: they have six loci71 of “preferability”: 
quantity, quality, order, existence, essence and person.72 
The use of suitable terms and premises is not enough: it must also be ensured that 
the audience recognizes the form of argumentation as logical. In order to do this the 
speakers and writers will form their argumentation as clearly as possible. Perelman and 
Olbrecht-Tyteca divide the quasi-logical argumentation into argumentation claiming a 
logical relation and argumentation claiming a mathematical relation.  
The problem is that genuine logical contradictions can occur in systems with 
unambiguously defined term, which is impossible in ordinary language. The meanings 
of the terms are rarely defined unambiguously and enable different interpretations. In 
quasi-logical argumentation to claim a mathematical relation is very closely related to the 
locus of quantity. 
It is important to notice that the whole idea of new rhetoric was to create a 
framework for all non-analytic thinking. Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca offer a 
rhetorical concept of rationality in which the soundness of argumentation is equated 
with the degree to which argumentation is suited for those for whom it is intended. As a 
result It follows that they also accept that the soundness criterion is that the norms of 
rationality that prevail are relative to a more or less arbitrary group of people.73 
 
2.3.2. Rhetoric: An essential aspect of politics 
 
In political sciences, some scholars speak of the idea of “reading” politics rather than of 
rhetoric. 74 To engage in “reading politics” means that we have to focus our theoretical 
gaze on the political language as a form of political action. In politics rhetoric has had a 
special role and it seems to have a variety of functions.75 One of the key publications is 
Political Innovation and Conceptual Change,76 and a set of leading Finnish scholars in 
political sciences have utilized it as an ideal in their own analysis on the Finnish political 
vocabulary.77 
It follows that we have to scrutinize the problems of language in general.78 This 
means that have to be prepared to go beyond the strong distinction between rhetoric 
and reality and the categorical distinction between “words and deeds”. To speak is an act 
that is similar to the act of waving one’s hand. The other issue that the rhetoric approach 
presupposes is that we have to discuss such classic issues as the differences between 
demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical argumentation and how persuasion is involved 
in the argumentation. It also implies that we have to focus our interest on how 
“functionalizing” tendencies are embedded in politics.  
                                                            
71 Perelman and Olbrech-Tyteca prefer the Latin term loci to the Greek topoi. 
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74 Skinner 1978a and 1978b; Palonen & Hänninen 2004; Godin 2002; Godin 2003. 
75 Miettinen (2002). 
76 Ball, Farr and Hanson 1989. 
77 Hyvärinen, Kurunmäki, Palonen, Pulkkinen, and Stenius 2002. 
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This kind of rhetorical analysis is not the same form of analysis known discourse 
analysis. The problem of discourse analysis is its trend to be inclined to some 
predetermined discourses. The rhetorical approach can be seen as an alternative because 
it emphasizes the idea that politics is a matter of action in which practice and theory are 
intertwined. 
The social and political world is conceptually and communicatively constituted or,  
to put it better, pre-constituted. The notion of the linguistic constitution of politics 
embodies two general claims: First, a great number of political actions are carried out in 
and through language. Second, political beliefs, actions, and practices are partly 
constituted by the concepts which political actors hold about these beliefs, actions and 
practices. In other words, according to this constitutive view of language, who and what 
we are, how we arrange, classify and think about our world and how we act in it are 
deeply limited by the argumentative and rhetorical resources of our language. 79  
It is worth remembering that Weber wanted to purge the whole language of his 
contemporaries. He opposed the naïve realism and essentialism concerning the concepts 
and their usage by stressing that reality is an analytic borderline concept to which one 
refers to not as something knowable but as something inexhaustible by all forms of 
conceptualizations.80  
Weber’s research programme is interestingly continued in the work of Skinner. 
While he is usually not recognized among the Weberologists, he combines the Weberian 
approach with the Austinian speech act theory and classical rhetoric.81 For Weber, the 
commitment to the vocabulary of the contemporaries is a rhetorical strategy seeking to 
persuade some special audience. This strategy consists of a variety of rhetorical moves 
and illustrates a shift towards and appraisal and conceptualization of contingency in 
terms of Chancen. This Weberian moment in the history of political thought is one of 
the most important starting points of this study.82 
Skinner has strongly advocated the interconnectedness of politics and rhetoric. His 
claim is that a whole community of language users may be capable of applying such 
highly general terms as being or infinity with perfect consistency, but there is no concept 
which answers any of their agreed usages. 83  
 
Rhetoric and the ideal type of innovating ideologist 
 
The rhetorical perspective offers an alternative to normative theory which attempts to 
minimize the role of politics as activity.84 One of the fundamentals of contractarian 
theories juxtaposing the “state of nature” and “the state of civilization” is that the 
formation of a polity by signing of a “contract” ending the state of nature turns the 
polity into a realm in which the maximal freedom of the state of nature is irrevocably 
lost. Yet the state of nature remains as a model, and as much as possible should be 
maintained of it in order to minimize the loss of freedom. The polity of the contract 
theories is “depolitized” as far as possible, and they construct a special space that must be  
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constantly maintained. In other words, all forms of uncontrolled politicking must be 
repressed and political action is reduced to specific moments, to the act of contracting 
and its analogies.   
All this implies that we question the necessity of functionalizing politics by 
transferring a set of economic or other mechanistic models or metaphors onto the 
political sphere. One of Skinner’s most important ideas has been a rhetorical re-
description of the relations between political life and political theorizing. In general 
terms, no doctrine can be so indispensable that it should be accepted regardless its 
political costs.85  
Skinner’s point of departure in his speech-act oriented approach is the action 
perspective in which the relation between texts and contexts is a crucial one. According 
to Skinner’s view of linguistic action texts are always linked with contexts: they are 
implicit parts of texts rather than opposed to it.86 Contexts do not determine action but 
they imply a horizon of possibilities.  
The relation between politics and rhetoric becomes apparent when we consider the 
history of parliamentary procedures and practices in the ideal situation where the 
speakers express their views for and against a proposal. In our parliamentary system 
politicians have also a special competence in “timing” their actions and it has been 
crucial in sophist and rhetorical styles of thinking. Skinner’s main point is to discuss the 
strategies and tactics rendering political change legitimate by altering the rhetorical 
dimension in the use of the descriptive-evaluative language. Skinner asks simply: How is 
it actually possible to manipulate an existing normative vocabulary in such a way that 
legitimates new and untoward courses of action? He suggests that the innovating 
ideologist has two distinct strategies. The first consists of manipulating the standard 
speech-act potential of an existing set of descriptive terms. The agent’s aim is to describe 
his own actions in such a way that even though he may be using a set of terms usually 
applied to express disapproval, he is nevertheless using them to express approval or at 
least neutrality in this particular situation.  
There are two tactics available to the innovating ideologist to carry out his strategy. 
First, he may introduce some wholly new and favorable evaluative-descriptive terms into 
the language. The other possibility is to coin new terms to describe the allegedly new 
principles and then apply them as descriptions of the apparently untoward actions one 
may wish to see commended. The other common version of this tactic consists of 
turning a neutral description into a favorable evaluative-descriptive term. The creation 
of new slogans and keywords is a key strategy for the successful modern politician 
because they can provide new topics for the political agenda. The second tactic is 
connected with linguistic action, and its point concerns abandon all pejorative usages. 87 
The point of the second strategy is to challenge ideological opponents and force 
them to reconsider “…whether they may not be making an empirical mistake… in failing 
to see that the ordinary criteria for applying an existing range of favorable evaluative-
descriptive terms may be present in the very actions they have been condemning as 
illegitimate” 88 
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One of Skinner’s legacies to the study of contemporary political thought is as 
Palonen89 has noticed his insistence on the omnipresence of a normative dimension of 
the key concepts such as democracy, freedom and equality.  
In his nominalistic approach Palonen90 has divided politics into the two verbal 
figures of politicization and politicking. Understanding politics as activity as a 
Bewegungbegriff in the Koselleckian sense, the primary “performative“ operations are 
simply politicization and politicking; the former refers to the marking of a Spielraum of 
contingency and the latter to performances within this Spielraum. Polity is a limiting 
case demarcating that which is “confirmed” as a commonly accepted Spielraum of 
politicking in a situation, while policy refers to regulated forms or “lines of politicking of 
any agent engaged in politics”. This kind of reading turns politics into a verbalized and 
temporalized phenomenon: it allows us to understand that politics may be manifest in 
thematically different but interconnected styles of activity. Those activities have an 
inherent potentiality to contradict to each other.  
Such a conception of language embodies two things. First, a lot of political actions 
are carried out in and through language and, second, political beliefs, actions, and 
practices are partly constituted by the concepts which political actors hold about these 
beliefs, actions and practices.91 
Skinner92 distinguishes two main modes of conceptual change through rhetorical 
description, namely renaming and the reinterpretation of meaning. Both of them are 
facilitated by the reassessment of its significance or by the revaluation of the activity. It is 
obvious that the process of conceptualization itself consists of renaming as politics; 
something becomes political if it is named as such. Therefore, it is possible to think that 
the re-conceptualization in politics is a process of redefinitions of terms or that it is a 
process of giving names to previously unidentified objects.  
Such conceptualization has two separate levels for Skinner. On the one hand, it can 
be appreciated as a move within the situation and, on the other hand, as a 
perlocutionary effect of the alteration of the conceptual horizon. The change may alter 
the current debate or sketch an original view on politics worth remembering and 
explicating. The original move, considered as a marginal move, may open a totally new 
topos. It is important to be aware that Skinner’s account of rhetoric has nothing to do 
with the media or communication rhetoric. For Skinner rhetoric is the name for an 
orientation towards the world that makes such an approach possible, and at the same 
time fully acknowledges the constitutive role of politics in conceptual change. As 
Palonen puts it in his analysis on Skinner’s rhetorical perspective: “The rhetorical attitude 
of questioning all authorities and theory monopolies and arguing in a mode of making 
weaker logos stronger as a strong resource against all depoliticizing claims in the name of 
order and in the name of truth as well.” 93 
All this implies that the pursuit of political theory must be reconsidered. To be a 
theorist is to be a critic. It follows that theorists must not seek theories as such. Rather, 
they should seek new problems and re-conceptualizations. While this is often 
understood as a form of criticism, it is not directed against abstract propositions but 
beliefs, actions, and practices in the political domain. The conceptual change may be  
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explained in the terms of two issues: how the political actors try to solve speculative or 
practical problems and how their criticism has exposed in their beliefs, actions and 
practices.  
Language constitutes the political world; it is an essential part of political reality. 
This means that in order to examine that reality we have to abandon the idea of 
considering language as a neutral medium. To put that differently, naming things is an 
essential part of politics. It follows that beliefs, actions and practices in politics are partly 
constituted by the concepts used by the actors and for whom language is an arena of 
political action.  
Conceptual histories tell stories of conceptual change and political innovations. “The 
surest sign that a society has entered into the secure possession of a new concept is that new 
vocabulary will be developed, in terms of which the concept can then be publicly articulated 
and discussed.” 94 Therefore, it is important to understand how concepts emerge out of 
earlier conceptual material. Furthermore, concepts figure also in theoretical 
constellations and conceptual schemes, and a single concept is always linked with other 
concepts. The scholar interested in conceptual histories seeks to find explanations for the 
emergence and transformation of concepts where actors use them for political purposes. 
The political concepts are alive only in relation to political actors who use and change 
them.  
The meaning of political concepts must be understood in terms of contexts within 
which actors put them in use: to study them is to examine changes in contexts and use. 
In addition, we have to keep in mind that politics is always dealing with power. To be in 
power means that one are able to govern the use of language: It means that one is able to 
set or at least suggest criteria for applying political concepts, to determine or suggest the 
range of things these concepts refer to in the political world and to influence the range 
of attitudes expressed by these concepts.   
In his Notebooks Antonio Gramsci95 stresses in his analysis of hegemony that it is 
necessary “…to combat economism not only for in the theory of historiography, but also and 
especially in the theory and practice of politics. In this field, the struggle can and must be 
carried on by developing the concept of hegemony.”  The point Gramsci makes is relevant 
for this study: his claim involves the idea that language is a crucial material force in 
political struggles.  
Another side of conceptual histories is that various phenomena and developments, 
both political and apolitical, that are often understood as self-evident must be 
reconsidered because their background is often an outcome of political struggles. To 
analyze the contemporary concepts and conceptualizations requires an open attitude 
toward contingency. Many issues understood as “self-evident” seem to become 
problematic in historical analysis; to study conceptual histories is to study the 
contemporary world.  
Historians of science have usually thought that science implies progress. This is not 
the case in conceptual history because scholars refuse to subscribe the idea of seeking 
universal criteria when analyzing their material. Also, concepts understood as “scientific” 
must be analyzed as participating in political struggles as well as politicians and 
journalists. The concepts are equal in the sense that there are no differences between 
them. From this it does not follow that the uses of concepts are equal unless reference is 
made to their contexts.  
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It is apparent that the German project “Geschitliche Grundbegriffe” and the 
Cambridge research project have different viewpoints onto how to understand concepts 
in politics. A leading figure in the latter project has been Skinner96  with his interest in 
linguistic conventions, speech acts and rhetoric moves. One of the central themes in 
Skinner’s studies is the problem of text and its context. His claim is simply that in order 
to understand single texts we have to understand the conventions and debates of that 
historical era. For Skinner the context is a project of construction in the sense that in 
many cases there is no context without that construction. While a scholar constructs 
such a context, she or he simultaneously accepts that there are also other contexts. If a 
scholar has no linguistic competence a single text or speech act becomes inaccessible and 
incomprehensible.  
In his Begriffsgeschichte Koselleck97 maintains that concepts create the point in which 
action, ideas and structures meet each other. Social and economic structures constrain 
the boundaries of options in which we are able to use these concepts. He also stresses 
that the concepts reproduce and transform those structures and makes a distinction 
between expectations (Erwartungshorizont) and experiences (Erfahrungsraum). The 
historical events may change concepts and concepts always include a variety of historical 
times. It is the implicit strata of temporal times that pose disputes on concepts and their 
meaning.  
This concerns Koselleck’s view that the moves of emancipation following the 
Enlightenment presuppose a political limit, based on the acknowledgement of the 
heterogeneity of purposes. It is its neglect that turns the Enlightenment into an apolitical 
utopia.98  
 
2.3.3. Rhetoric as a methodological alternative in economics  
 
An interesting account of rhetoric which is important for this study is the rhetoric of 
economics. The tradition, usually linked with neo-pragmatism and the discursive turn in 
economics99, has also links with hermeneutics.100 One of the most famous advocators of 
the rhetoric approach is Deirdre McCloskey, whose argument for utilising rhetoric in 
economics is based on the failure of big Methodologists (usually positivists and 
Popperians) to understand the professional activities of economists. Small 
methodologies, on the shopfloor level, are more useful in terms of practices. If scientific 
theories are underdetermined, and observations are theory- laden and science is social, 
interest-laden, situated, contextual and contingent a priori philosophical speculation it 
does not capture the actual practice of successful science. Metaphorically speaking the 
role of the philosophers of science as methodological rule-makers is compared to that of 
governmental bureaucrats.101  
The key issue for McCloskey is persuasion: what is worth of our attention is 
persuasiveness and nothing else. The study of persuasion is a domain of rhetoric; the 
study of persuasion in economics forms the rhetoric of economics. In other words, all 
discourse aims to influence a particular audience and the rhetorical strategies preferred 
by the practitioners of a discipline reflect their views on what it is that can be known. 
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Rhetoric is in this sense epistemic. Later McCloskey has shifted towards a more liberal 
definition of “rhetorical analysis” so that also Kuhn and SSK are rhetorical approaches 
for McCloskey.102 This is very strongly in contrast with the view of Collins & Yearley, 
who think that discourse analysis has been abandoned within SSK.103  
McCloskey, Arjo Klamer 104and many other economists advocating the rhetorical 
approach argue that economists have to persuade each other and it is to achieve that end 
that they work on different arguments. The work on a model is part of a theoretical 
argument but to present the results of an economic test is something else. The 
connection between these two arguments is often loose because they often follow their 
own logic, rules and conventions.  
Klamer105 has distinguished between philosophical arguments (about the implied 
view and non-scientific values), common-sense arguments (any reasonable person will of 
course choose the best option) and epistemological arguments (arguments about the 
nature of science and the proper scientific strategy for economists). The point of the 
rhetorical approach is for Klamer its ability to bring out and characterize differences.  
 
Stories and models in economics  
 
“Metaphorical thought is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be construed as an 
ornamental substitute for plain thought.” 106 
 
The contribution of the rhetoric of economics advocated by McCloskey has other 
interesting impacts on our understanding of the special status of economics among the 
social sciences. Traditionally, philosophers of science interested in scientific models have 
concentrated on the model-theory relationship but if we try to understand why those 
models help us to understand the economic world we have to interpret them as if 
economists were telling stories about the world. As Gibbard and Varian107 argue in their 
analysis on theoretical models in economics stories are an integral part the ways in which 
the models work. Modelling involves questions, structures and stories. But as Mary S. 
Morgan108 remarks, their analysis does not explain how the story about the model itself is 
told.  
Metaphors are never precise, complete, or literal mappings. If they were precise, they 
would not be metaphors. The juxtaposition involving a degree of similarity and 
dissimilarity can have both creative and damaging effects. The use of metaphors in 
economics has often been explicit, and it is often argued that modern economics is 
dominated by the metaphor of a mechanistic system. In economics, there has been also 
another strand where also biological metaphors have been adopted to illustrate economic 
phenomena. One of the key points justifying the use of biological metaphors has been 
that both economic and biological systems are complex. It is also self-evident that the 
economy involves living human beings; it is not a mere mechanistic world of billiard 
balls and planets.  
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Yet both the biological and the mechanical analogy have a prominent problem: the 
conceptualization of the human agent. Neither of those analogies provides any room for 
individual choice.109 In the view of McCloskey 110, models are metaphors and stories 
are something different; they are different but complementary modes of explaining. For 
her economic models are metaphors, they are discipline’s “poetics". She argues that 
stories come together with models in counterfactuals and the inherent contradictions 
between the elements persist. The vaguer the model, the better the story is and the more 
exact the model, the more absurd history comes. 
Metaphors and stories connect the economists’ explanations of the world; metaphors 
are static and forward-looking, stories are historical and time-based. Stories are histories 
about actual economies and metaphors involve hypothetical economies with imagined 
but not necessarily idealized properties. Models need stories.  
One of the simplest models in economics is the supply and demand curve. 
Economists typically fill in the gaps when they use the model by introducing a variety of 
interpretations how to use the model. In other words, the model involves the option of 
answering questions but within the limits of the particular model. This implies that 
models have certain peculiarities of narrative modes of reasoning. Narratives are 
ambiguous about causality and necessity: “narrative does not demonstrate the necessity of 
events but makes them intelligible by unfolding the story which connects their significance.”109 
To quote McCloskey: 
“Economists, especially theorists, are for ever spinning “parables” or telling “stories”. 
The word story has in fact to have a technical meaning in economics, though usually spoken 
in seminars rather than written in papers. It means an extended example of the reasoning 
underlying the mathematics, often a simplified version of the situation in the real world that 
the mathematics is meant to characterize…Here the story is the modifier, the mathematics the 
subject.”110 
This quotation nicely points to the ways in which stories relate the mathematics to 
the world. In other words, we use a mathematical characterisation to answer questions 
relevant to the world. In so doing we tell stories linking them back to the world. 
McCloskey portrays these two links as happening together.  
The first link is about the way in which the models are built, and the second link 
concerns the way in which stories link mathematics to the world. 111 The first link 
involves deeper questions about the nature of representation or denotation used, and this 
is often understood as the realism of assumptions. But most economic models are not 
built on realistic assumptions, which has been one of the problems in the philosophy of 
economics. But there are still a lot of problems we have to find answers for.   
One of them is the problem of how to link stories and explanations. Traditionally, 
explanations are characterized as answers to question why whether we portray stories as 
answers to those questions. In other words, we use narrative as a cognitive tool: it is a 
tool with which we explain something or come to understand more about the world. In 
contrast to the wide discussions of the philosophy of history or literature, there is little 
similar debate dealing with the methodology of economics.  
In building a model, we try to represent the situation in the world in such a way that 
we incorporate into it our general theoretical claims or hypothesis about the world. But 
when we use economic models, we do so in order to relate the general claims back to the 
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specifics of the world.112 Narratives are often misunderstood; they are more than 
chronicles because they give more than a listing of the order of events. The narrative sits 
between theory and the world in terms of a generalizing device because models involve 
the process of simplification i.e. the model is always more simple.  
The rhetoric of economics has generated a lot of criticism113, and the rhetorical 
approach has been accused of irrationalism and objected to the “so what” question. 
Some critics have pointed to the dangers embedded in rhetorical analysis. Yet 
McCloskey´s argument and answer is simply that rhetorical analysis can improve 
economic prose, teaching, economists´ relation to other disciplines, economic 
argumentation and even the temper of economists.  
Uskali Mäki114 has argued strongly pro rhetoric emphasising its adequacy and 
usefulness for economics from the realist point of view, in particular. His view is that 
rhetoric must not be excluded from the agenda of economics and its special nature as a 
form of scientific knowledge. It is a viable option that must be implemented in 
economics.  
In short, Mäki argues that in our discussion on rhetoric we must always reconsider 
which side – realist or anti-realist we favour. The realist alternative is to view rhetorical 
persuasion as an attempt to discover and communicate truths about the economy, which 
has an objective existence. Whereas plausibility is a pragmatic notion with a coherentist 
bent, truth in the realist sense is a semantico-logical notion. Realists are willing to 
incorporate the notion of plausibility in their epistemology, but not in their semantics 
and ontology.  
The non-realist pragmatist tends to conflate these fields and thus also the notions of 
plausibility and truth. For a realist truth is an objective property of statements that can 
be discovered; plausibility is a subjective property subject to creation and re-creation. 
Rhetoric is seen as constitutive of scientific justification and discovery, rather than as 
constituting the nature of truth. This is the main reason for confusion amongst the anti-
realists and others, Mäki argues. 
His suggestion is that the notion of rhetorical persuasion is to be analysed in terms of 
belief, coherence and plausibility. As a result he is able to present a coherence theory of 
justification without committing himself to an antirealist coherence theory of truth. 
Mäki has two aims: first, to illustrate that McCloskey`s conception of rhetoric is an 
example of antirealist truth theory, second, to break the monopoly of antirealist rhetoric 
and to create space for the improving the persuasiveness of the rhetorical approach for 
studying economics.  
An old characterisation of beliefs says that a belief is a property predicable of human 
beings in their relation to statements. We may say that we have beliefs in the truth of 
statements. Plausibility is a predicate of that kind: a statement is plausible if a person or 
a group believes in it. The plausibility of a statement is conferred upon it by other 
statements, which bear a certain relation to it. Plausibility is an epistemic and pragmatic 
notion and it comes in degrees like a belief.  
Rhetorical persuasion is the transference of plausibility by the means of arguments. 
Whereas the persuadee finds the premise plausible, the persuader tries to illustrate that a 
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statement may be formed upon that premise. A rhetorical argument connects a 
conclusion to a set of premises so that the conclusion is coherent with the premises. The 
premises must be chosen so that the persuadee believes in them and that a belief is 
transformed into a conclusion by presenting an argument.  
This is the basic idea of Mäki´s conception of the coherence theory of justification. It 
starts from defining the system of beliefs and connects it with plausibility and coherence 
in terms of argumentative persuasion. What is important in Mäki´s account is that he 
distinguishes clearly between epistemology, ontology and semantics. He promotes the 
alliance of the correspondence theory of truth with the coherence theory of justification 
and denies that rhetorical persuasion contributes to the truth of a statement. What 
persuasion contributes to is the plausibility of a statement.  
In his defence of realist “bottom up” philosophy of economic rhetoric Mäki argues 
tat there are no self-justified, privileged epistemic foundations for economic knowledge. 
The truth of a statement is independent of the rhetorical arguments given for or against 
it in any rhetorical situation. The statements are true or false because of the way the 
world objectively is. This amounts to a correspondence notion of truth. Plausibility is a 
relational in two ways: it relates to other statements and to human beings with their 
beliefs. The relationality of plausibility is pragmatic and logical. Truth is relational in the 
semantic sense, because it is a matter of relationship between linguistic items and their 
objects in reality.  
His thesis is that one may coherently think that linguistic items have both the 
rhetorical and representational aspects at the same time. Truth is a semantic attribute of 
statements, and acceptance and belief are epistemic attributes belonging to human 
beings. Rhetoric is good when it directs persuadees to accept true statements as true and 
to reject false ones as false. According to Mäki this is possible if we reject both the 
modern position of correspondence theory of truth plus the foundationalist theory of 
justification and the non- realist position of coherence theory of truth plus the coherence 
theory of justification and replace it by his own suggestion. This is the correspondence 
theory of truth plus the coherence theory of justification. 
In his realist account of rhetoric the world and truths about the world are not 
dependent on persuasion amongst economists and their audiences.115 The occurrence of 
rhetorical persuasion does not alone rule out the possibility of attaining and 
communicating persuasion-independent truths about economic reality. His point is that 
although economics, as it is currently practiced, is nothing but a rhetorical game of 
persuasion, it might in some cases be correct, but from this it does not follow that it is 
correct about everything.  
It is important to notice that in Mäki’s view we do not have to replace the realist idea 
of scientific discovery by the rhetorical idea of invention as Alan Gross has suggested.116  
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2.3.4. STS and rhetoric 
 
Steve Fuller has explicitly stressed the fruitfulness of rhetoric as a theoretical resource117 
and advocated in his many works the idea of rhetoric and the program of social 
epistemology as an alternative framework for STS studies. His endeavours have been 
partly very philosophical and sometimes too idiosyncratic as models for actual research, 
but in spite of his deficiencies Fuller has been an important source of inspiration in this 
thesis. Fuller118 has plausibly argued in his smart analysis on Kuhn that Kuhn was not a 
cause but merely a symptom of the larger deformations of philosophy, politics and 
economics of science in the United States after the Second World War. 
Another STS scholar who has inspired me is Andrew Barry.119 Barry’s focus has been 
on Europe, and European integration. One of his major claims is that we have to locate 
science, technology and politics at the heart of European integration and analyze it as a 
form of new political governance. As a STS scholar Barry owes theoretically a lot to 
ANT scholars, especially Bruno Latour and Michel Callon.  
His radical conclusion is that although political institutions and identities are 
important technology has become central to any analysis of political life. Barry is very 
much advocating Foucault-type analysis of technology and he sees the new political 
culture as a form of constructing a new political machine for Europe. As such, Barry’s 
contribution is important.120  
 
SSK and STS - a lot of theoretical heterogeneities and antagonisms  
 
Obviously, Kuhn was one of the most important catalysts for the SSK and STS, but 
naturally there are also other important figures including William Whewell who coined 
the term scientist in 1840 and actually opened the field called “History and philosophy 
of science”, (HPS).  
As Steve Fuller121 has pointed out Whewell’s project entailed a twofold strategy:  1) 
Eliciting principles of epistemic growth that could be transferred across all disciplines 
and that could be made the possession of all disciplines (physics as an ideal) and 2) 
Favoring the study of certain revolutionary periods in which the process of major 
epistemic change was more evident. In other words, the internal and external aspects of 
science must be seen as an interactive processual forum in which the other aspect does 
not exist without the other. This was also one of Kuhn’s points. 
It is thus obvious that recent enthusiasm on science and technology studies owes a 
lot to Kuhn’s ideas. Yet it can also bee seen as a defence of sociology or as an enterprise 
to make sociology not only a legitimate but a highly relevant discipline to study science 
and scientific knowledge.122 Within those traditions two different variants can be 
distinguished. The first, The Strong Program was introduced by David Bloor in the late 
1970s. The Strong program can be reduced to its four methodological principles: a) 
causality, b) partiality, c) symmetry, and d) reflexivity. Those principles are important in 
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terms of the sociological explanations of the propositional contents of beliefs or theories 
held by scientists.123 The second variant, often defined as a determined defence of social 
constructivism, is based partly on ideas elaborated by Berger & Luckman´s124 in their 
analysis of knowledge and its social nature based on Schutzian phenomenology.125 
It is thus important to note that the Strong program and ethnographic traditions are 
very different in many respects. The Strong program stresses four issues: a) external 
factors are significant; b) it stresses causal explanation, not interpretative descriptions of 
scientists and their community; c) it prefers sociological reconstructions of historical 
materials rather than contemporary cases; d) the focus of its interest is in scientists as 
holders of beliefs, not actors.  
When compared with the Strong program the ethnographic tradition appears 
markedly different: 1)it has produced a lot of detailed studies on scientific practice; 2) 
the focus of studies is mainly on micro level and macro level is unimportant; 3) the 
methodological preference is on qualitative methodology (fieldwork, ethnographic 
inquiry, participant observatory); 4) negotiation is seen as a general principle for 
studying scientific knowledge as study object: this means that scientific knowledge is the 
product of an ongoing, continuous, and radically contingent negotiation among 
scientists, their agents, and institutions; 5) nature is seen more as an object of 
construction than one of discovery - scientific communities are epistemic and practical 
communities; 6) their aim is to consciously challenge scientific rationality and realism by 
arguing that nature plays little role in scientific knowledge.126  
The starting point for a social constructivist is the acting subject with his/her beliefs, 
intentions as an actor. The basic activity of a scientist is based on the construction of 
scientific facts and theories in local communities. Facts and theories are seen as 
fabrications based on the processes of selections, interpretations and negotiations.127  
These guidelines, supported by most of social constructivists, have also been a 
fashionable object for very aggressive philosophical and scientific attacks and wars 
focusing mainly on social constructivism and its problems.128 
The STS tradition has a strong tradition of “laboratory studies”, which applies to a 
broad variety of different kind of approaches as ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, 
semiotics and other approaches coming from sociology, anthropology and political 
sciences.129  
The most controversial and provocative suggestions have been introduced by such 
ANT theoreticians as Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law.130 They have 
suggested that one of the key problems for STS scholars is how to detach oneself from 
the western philosophical tradition in which such traditional oppositions between 
subject/object and society/nature play a major role. Their aim is to find a new 
provocative methodology which helps us to transcend the traditional dichotomy 
                                                            
123 Bloor 1976. 
124 Berger & Luckman 1972. 
125 Collins 1985; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983. 
126 See Hands 2001, p. 190. 
127 Latour and and Woolgar 1986; Knorr- Cetina 1981; Lynch 1985. 
128 Sokal & Bricmont 1998; Niiniluoto 1999. 
129 See Knorr-Cetina 1981; Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983; Latour 1987. One of the most appreciated 
scholars in this tradition is microbiologist Ludwig Fleck and his famous Genesis and Development of a 
Scientific Fact. One of the key concepts in Fleck’s approach was the concept of thought collectives and, 
interestingly, Thomas Kuhn in his foreword stresses that his and Fleck’s ideas have a lot of common.  
130 See Jasanoff & al 1995; Law 1999. 
53 
 
between human/non-human and the opposition between human and natural sciences so 
that we may be able to analyze socio-technical transformations in a different manner.  
Latour and his associates have stressed strongly the interest dimension in scientific 
inventions and innovations.131 Also, the role of translation and the necessity of political 
rhetoric in innovations and actor-networks have been in the core of their theoretical 
developments.  
For them, scientific work is a form of writing aiming to produce “literary 
inscriptions”- e.g. figures, curves, diagrams and written reports. The proper core of 
science is the rhetorical use of language in social contexts - “the organisation of 
persuasion through literary inscriptions”.132 This persuasion has one very peculiar 
feature: “The function of literary inscriptions is the successful persuasion of readers, but the 
readers are fully convinced when all the sources of persuasion seem to have disappeared”.133 
The ANT theoreticians have attempted in their network analysis to elaborate a 
vocabulary enabling them to analyse how actors “build networks” or to “enrol others” as 
a process of seeking tools by which actors can manipulate, transform and create 
interests.134 They speak of “enrolment” as the construction of networks and of 
“translation” as an umbrella term for different methods of enrolment.  
Translation can be understood as a pure “interéssement”: what someone is doing or 
as the more complicated form of “problematisation”.135 The latter form of translation 
means that the network builder attempts to create support for his project by presenting 
it as a necessary step towards reaching the goals of other parties. This kind of persuasion 
is a very essential part of Latour´s detailed analysis of different kinds of enrolment and 
translation tactics to be applied in order to be successful in the network builder´s 
project.  
Latour and Woolgar136 speak of the “modalities” that one statement might have in 
these processes of persuasion. They distinguish five modalities: 1.wild speculation, 
2.plausible suggestion, 3. reporting the findings of others, 4.fact stating (teaching texts) 
and 5.being-taken-for-granted.  
A statement reaching the modality 5 has become “black boxed”. Latour’s argument is 
that scientific knowledge is a kind of dialectics from artefacts to facts.137  Starting from a 
statement/artefact, it transforms itself into a fact, tacit knowledge and instruments and 
then the process re-starts. Latour´s point is that we have a kind of continuum which 
forms the institutions of science: literature- laboratory- machine- tribunals of reason-
centres of calculation.   
His point is that science is a process of closing black boxes so that all struggles and 
fuzzy histories are not remembered. Such statements can function without being argued 
for to support of further, other claims. Latour and Woolgar argue that the debates and 
struggles have this kind of “modality logic” in scientific context.  
It follows that the aim of scientific struggles and debates is to reach the “blackbox” 
status or at least the fourth modality because nobody denies the significance of the 
foundational statements after reaching those levels. In other words, Latour and Woolgar 
argue that there are no foundational nor basic beliefs in science; there is nothing given, 
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there are no incorrigible or privileged beliefs. All we have is a set of social facts with 
plenty of communal support.  
Scientific action or activity is a social property and the credibility of an actor is 
dependent on other persons in a social context. In order to achieve this goal, scientists 
must utilize a variety of tactics and strategies but they remain constrained by others and 
their reactions. For Latour and Woolgar,138 to interpret the realm of science as a market 
means that scientists have only one utility function: credibility. In order to obtain their 
goals they act as if they were agents in the market. They talk about costs, profitability, 
investments, risks, opportunities, and returns. Latour and Woolgar have proposed that 
science must be characterized as a field of competition where scientists act as capitalists 
trying to monopolize the field by accumulating scientific authority.  
After having reached the monopoly position, they attempt to define the most 
significant and real research problems. They ask: what are the appropriate research 
methods and what are the important theories from their position in the field? If Pierre 
Bourdieu’s invention was to consider scientists as entrepreneurs, Latour’s and Woolgar’s 
contribution is to consider science as a market and credibility as its central attribute. 
Scientists act like stockbrokers: they possess a lot of knowledge, they have the necessary 
competence and training, and they are very much dependent on reputation.  
Reputation is like a paramount good in science, a kind of universal currency. It is 
one of the most important resources for convincing other experts in science as well as 
non-experts inside and outside the context of science. In their evaluation of credibility 
Latour and Woolgar distinct three aspects: 1) the source’s epistemic competence: what is 
the level of competency, 2) the moral character of the source: what is the level of 
trustworthiness and 3) the credibility in relation to third parties: what is the possibility 
of testimony? Latour and Woolgar do not think that the pursuit of credibility is a 
psychological motivation for scientists; it is rather a part of competition that the game 
science involves. 
Knorr-Cetina,139  who has strongly defended the role of social construction in her 
laboratory studies, has argued that among scientists there is also a variety of 
“transepistemic arenas” and a set of resources like funding, careers, important people and 
so forth that they must take into account if they want to play the game. Scientists have 
to apply in their rhetoric very different means in order to direct their persuasion to 
different audiences and players both in academia but also outside it. They have to obtain 
support from their sponsors, journalists, businesses, politicians, bureaucrats and the 
larger public. Various disciplines have various strategies and tactics that depend on their 
needs and audiences.  
H. M. Collins140 has suggested in his empirical programme of relativism that STS 
scholars must focus their attention to controversies. They are interesting and useful 
because:  
a) They make possible to study arguments, ideas, concepts and theories. 
b) They illustrate the mechanisms of closures as the tactics and strategies the 
scientists employ in order to force their opponents into agreement.  
Collins141 pays attention to two of them: rhetorical closure and closure by the 
redefinition of problem.142  While the first is a body of tactics by which scientists attempt 
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to weaken their resistance by argumentation, the second is a method of changing the 
scale. They make it possible to relate the closure mechanisms with social and political 
context.  
But what is the SSK and STS writers’ real point? Firstly, they want to stress strongly 
the social and cultural dimension of science. This means that they insist determinately 
that we have to admit the possibility of relativism and the constructive elements in 
scientific action.  
Secondly, in order to do so they or some of them want to re-conceptualise the old 
dualism favoured by the Mertonian sociology of science suggesting that we have “social” 
factors affecting “mental productions”.143 In other words, we have to abandon the idea 
that we have some internal logic of science, which can be explained by social factors 
conditioning the form, content and dynamics of cognitive products. Instead, we have to 
replace the vocabulary so that we ask how nature and society are co-produced: it can be 
seen as an attempt to overcome the Kantian dichotomy of subject/object or 
society/nature.  
Thirdly, their argument is that the new vocabulary by which they blur the 
distinction between natural objects and artefacts helps us to understand the role of social 
communities in scientific cultures and histories and how artefacts convert themselves 
into facts in those communities and what role argumentation and rhetoric play in that 
metamorphosis.  
One of the problems in social studies in science is that it is often very difficult to 
grasp what is the intended explanandum or whether the author intends to explain 
anything. Also, the theoretical apparatus used for the explanatory work may be very 
imprecise: the concept of interest has a different meaning for sociologists than 
philosophers. It is worth noting that philosophers speak about credits and sociologists 
about credibility. In fact, philosophers seem to understand credit as a psychological 
motive but Latour and Woolgar do not view credibility like that. Rather, hey seem to 
say that there is no common motive or goal for scientists apart from the fact that they 
are forced to participate in the cycle of credibility.144  
The employment of theoretical resources within the SSK and STS traditions has 
been rather liberal because the origins of these traditions are so diverse. This has caused 
the current situation: the traditions have evolved slowly from different heterogeneous 
theoretical aggregations and become different internally homogeneous and often 
paradigmatically contradictory variants debating bitterly with each other.145    
There have been at least two generations in the SSK and STS traditions. The first 
generation – the Strong Program and social constructivism and the second generation - 
the ANT and the reflexivity branch.146 One important historical divide is the year 1992 
when the article “Epistemological chicken” by Collins and Yearley was published. In this 
article they argued that the point of the SSK is to argue that, on the one hand, scientists’ 
beliefs are caused by social factors and, on the other hand, the SSK is no longer a version 
of “discourse analysis” as it used to be. Metaphorically speaking, the SSK has touched its 
bedrock.  
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The problem of the market in STS 
 
One of the recent developments in the STS tradition points to the problems of economy 
and economics. As Barry and Don Slater147 argue in their analysis on contemporary 
economic life, there are two commonplace observations. The first observation is that the 
production and consumption of knowledge, information and culture have become 
increasingly central to economic activity. The generation of new knowledge and other 
immaterial goods is thought to be increasingly important for economic success. The 
second observation is that there has occurred a huge growth in the production of 
knowledge about economic life. A point of departure of their economic sociology is the 
recognition that the forms of knowledge produced about economic life are performative, 
not just descriptive or analytical. In other words, these practices of knowledge 
production create various phenomena.148 
Knorr-Cetina149 and Donald MacKenzie150, among others, have increasingly focused 
their attention on economic analyses and financial knowledge. Callon151 has repeatedly 
insisted that sociologists must rethink their relation to economics, and sociologists must 
study carefully the role of economics in the constitution of markets. Instead of viewing 
economics as a bad science it would be better to view it as a set of technical practices that 
have a strong relation to real economies. “Social science [including economics] is no more 
outside the reality it studies than are the natural and life sciences. Like natural science it 
actively participates in shaping the thing it describes.” 152 
Barry and Slater think that there are a lot of reasons why the simultaneous utilization 
of economic sociology and science and technology studies is valuable. First, whatever the 
object of economic knowledge is, be it the consumer or the market, something is always 
constituted as being external to these objects. In other words, the frame or boundary of a 
market, or capitalism, or any other economic object, is itself contestable and negotiable. 
If the objects of economic knowledge are invented, they can also become contested, 
politicised and transformed. Yet Barry and Slater do not think that capitalism or the 
global economy is a unified totality. Rather, they insist that we have to analyze how 
those generalised notions have been both informed and operationalized through various 
specific forms of political and governmental practice.  
Second, the recognition of the importance of innovation and creativity in economic 
activity points to the path-dependency of historical change. As sociologists and 
economists have shown, social and technological forces drive and shape the direction of 
technological change.153  But this does not mean that we have to understand the social as 
a context within which invention happens. Rather, we have to understand the social as 
something which is itself transformed through invention.  
Third, the importance of innovation and creativity in economic life points to a 
broader set of questions concerning the way how the relation between social and 
material objects is conceived. In short, material objects are never purely material; their 
force and effects depend on their relations with other elements, including information. 
But this informational environment, for example in the case of a drug molecule, is not 
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simply external to the drug. Information is not a set of signals because information can 
become information in so far as it becomes bound into a complex environment, 
including an environment of material objects.  
Fourth, economic transactions increasingly take place through technological 
mediation, and these tools are not neutral tools of economic policy or practice. Such 
contemporary terms such as “network society” and “globalisation” point to the role of 
technologies in conceptualising and reconfiguring economic action.  
If the STS tradition in the 1980s wanted to challenge the technological determinism 
and advocate a view saying that technology is socially shaped or socially constructed, the 
technological economy following Callon’s footsteps wants to adopt a different position. 
If the earlier versions of STS considered the economy as a set of factors or forces 
influencing the direction of the technological change and the design of technological 
artefacts, those advocating the technological economy approach insist that the 
distinction between the social and the technical i.e. the distinction “human” and  “non-
human” is problematic. First, it is impossible to differentiate between these two aspects 
because they have been disrupted in the process of technical change. Second, the very 
idea that the social is something like a structure is problematic because it has been 
impossible to give a purely social explanation of technological change as technological 
objects themselves form a crucial part of what the social is.  
Such a view is based on two central ideas: the actor-network and translation. “ By 
translation we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and 
violence thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself, authority 
to speak or act behalf of another actor or force.”154 
The notion of translation, originally a term created by Michel Serres155, emphasises 
the way in which the identity of actors, and their relations, is always in process. It also 
conceives that translation is a political process in which politics is conceived not in terms 
of competing ideologies or interests, but as a calculated Machiavellian act. In other 
words, the process of technical change could not be explained by reference to various 
social, political and economic interests. Technical change is itself a form of politics that 
both reveals and translates the identity of social and economic actors.  
Within this approach Barry and Slater identify four specific points of contact 
between STS and economic sociology. First, the phenomenon of technical change itself: 
there is a long tradition of the political economy of innovation from Smith and Marx to 
Schumpeter that addresses the question of relations between economic and technical 
change; yet most conventional economics treats technology simply as an exogenous 
variable. But as we have seen, the technological economy deconstructs both the 
independent and determining character of technology. If the earlier STS generations 
wanted to open the black box of scientific knowledge, now we must open the black 
boxes of the economy. It follows that we have to focus our attention onto the technical 
details of economic and financial analysis: financial markets are not an imperfect sphere 
of economic rationality, but a sphere in which the “economic” and the “social” 
interweave seamlessly.156  
Third, the focus of investigation, empirical case studies, must be put on the question 
of how the formation of economic realities proceeds. It means that contingent, 
heterogeneous and local, particular economic forms are important rather than structural 
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analyses. This implies that the distinction between macro and micro levels of analysis 
must be carefully reflected.  
A fourth point of contact concerns the importance of metrology and calculation157. 
Metrology and metrological practices (such as quality control, financial analysis, audit or 
environmental monitoring) create new realities (calculable objects) that can, in turn, be 
the object of economic calculation. Measurement seems to function as an “anti-political” 
device by reducing the space of possible contestation.158 On the one hand, metrological 
and calculative practices may serve to open up new objects to political reflection and 
contestation and, on the other hand, calculations are always contestable. As we know, 
the use of calculations in the natural sciences does not end debates and controversies, 
and there is no reason to imagine that the development would be different in the social 
sciences.  
Calculation is both a technical and ethical practice; it is not something that agents 
are naturally able to do once the markets have been formed. The capacity to calculate 
depends upon the separation or individualisation of objects into discrete transactable 
entities, with temporally stabilized properties that can be placed within a frame of 
calculation. In the case of markets, material reality consists of legal inscriptions, spatio-
temporal arrangements, regulatory institutions that govern the form, shape and 
circulation of objects, as well as metrological devices that stabilise accounts of their 
properties.  
It is important to understand that Callon’s approach is a critique of contemporary 
approaches in economic sociology because calculativeness is not only a property of 
“economic man”. For Callon homo oeconomicus exists and his aim is not to give a soul 
back to a dehumanized agent. “The objective may be to explore the diversity of calculative 
agencies, forms and distributions, and hence of organized markets. The market is no longer 
that cold, implacable and impersonal monster that imposes its laws and procedures while 
extending them even further. It is a many-sided, diversified, evolving device which the social 
sciences as well the actors themselves contribute to reconfigure.”159 
For Callon markets and economic rationality are derived from the analyses of 
contingent social arrangements and they are not manifestations of deeper processes. He 
does not see that macro-structures can be treated as a higher level of abstraction but 
rather as another kind of locality, as a similarly heterogeneous assemblage of agencies. 
But if we set our focus on micro-level contingency we have difficulties to visualize the 
replication and transformation of structuring processes over time. Political economy has 
traditionally captured these structuring processes by referring to some intrinsic forms of 
capitalism and it is difficult to write histories of capitalist economies without the notion 
of capitalism as a unified totality, or the idea of a universal process of development or 
modernisation.160 
In analyzing the relation between politics and the economy sociologists tend to adopt 
a particular spatial metaphor. The economy is more or less solid foundation on top of 
which rest political and ethical principles. But Callon wants to utilize a totally different 
metaphor in which the concepts of frame and externality have a major role instead of 
determining what is below and what above and makes three remarks. 
First, politics is generally placed outside the frame of economic calculations because 
measurement and calculation have the effect of cooling the temperature of political 
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debate. They have anti-political effects and all possible objects of political contention are 
placed outside the frame.  
Second, framing forms a kind of surface on which forms of political reflection, 
negotiation and conflict can condense. Callon’s interest is to understand the new forms 
of politicisation and his suggestion is as follows. On the one hand, the rise of the service 
economy, the “economy of qualities” leads to an increasing focus on the quality, 
qualification and re-qualification of products. Although some of these qualities might be 
measurable and quantifiable they are always contestable. On the other hand, the 
organisation of markets has become a collective issue and the economy becomes in this 
sense political. The problem is to develop forms of political institutions that make it 
possible to debate the question of how markets should be organized. The demarcation 
line is not drawn between those who favour markets and those who favour state 
ownership. Rather, there is a series of debates both concerning the form of market 
regulation and control and the particular role of economic experts and laypersons in 
economic government.  
Third, Callon’s analysis does not revolve around an opposition between life-world 
and system world or between instrumental and communicative rationality as in the case 
of Jürgen Habermas. His analysis draws inspiration from etnomethodology and 
symbolic interactionism and he wants to follow in his analysis the trajectories of actors 
themselves. The role of the economic sociologist is neither legislative nor interpretative, 
but experimental.  
Barry161 has utilized Callon’s approach in his analysis of the anti-political. A 
conventional account of politics stresses the politics of election, political parties and 
governments, and this kind of account of politics relies on the idea of a careful framing 
of political actions and events. It demands the development of anti-political as well as 
political technique.  
The contemporary discussion on “new economy” and its many cognate terms - 
information society, network society, knowledge-based economy, cultural economy and 
so forth is at the heart of something important. The diversity of labels and metaphors 
points to the inevitable convergences between technology and economy and, in 
particular, they stress the significance of technological innovation. This means that 
information and knowledge are placed at the centre of economic processes. But these 
extremely broad definitions of information and knowledge are used because they stress 
the increased centrality of cultural and social relations in economic processes. These 
broad notions must be, argues Barry, understood as descriptions of an increasingly 
dematerialised and networked economy. They form part of attempts to establish new 
material arrangements and rather are models of the political and economic future.162 
 
Meaning finitism in SSK 
 
Bloor,163 in his evaluation of Wittgenstein’s account of rules and rule-following wants to 
defend the collectivist reading of Wittgenstein. For an individualist, a rule in its simplest 
form is just a standing intention; for a collectivist, it is a shared convention or a social 
institution. Bloor is defending the collectivist account but not because he is against the 
individualistic account but rather because individualism as well as collectivism has no 
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essence. We can distinct a generalized ideological individualism; those who want society 
to be organized in extending the scope of the market. 
As a point of departure Bloor takes Wittgenstein’s famous problem, the mystery of 
the compulsion of rules, the “hardness of the logical must164, and he uses it as an example 
how to continue the sequence of the even numbers 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14. If we have a 
rule of the kind we have no physical necessity to do a certain thing. Rather, we must do 
the thing in question if we are to conduct ourselves rightly. We can do something else, 
but then we do something wrongly. So the necessity we are dealing with is like a moral 
necessity. Then we can say that the mysterious character of rule following is not 
mysterious at all. It must be accepted as a plain matter of fact.  
In order to be able to understand these problematic issues we can choose the view, 
meaning determinism. This is the claim that the compelling and infinite character of 
rules derives from the property called “meaning”. In other words, rule following is 
possible by our power to grasp the meaning of the concepts used in the rule. Grasping a 
concept is a purely individual achievement, an individual mental act.  
Wittgenstein rejected meaning determinism and argued that rule following is not a 
simple, impenetrable matter of fact. His account was extremely simple in its general 
outline. First, rules are social institutions or social customs or social conventions. 
Second, to follow a rule is therefore to participate in an institution and to adopt or 
conform to a particular custom or convention. To obey a rule is similar to playing a 
game of chess, customs.165  
Bloor has together with Barnes and Henry suggested that the Wittgensteinian 
account of rule following may be called meaning finitism. In order to understand rule 
following we should look at how we learn to follow rules, and how we might teach 
someone a rule was Wittgenstein’s advice. “Once you have described the procedure of this 
teaching and learning, you have said everything that can be said about acting correctly 
according to a rule.” 166 
Another very important aspect of meaning finitism is that it rejects the traditional 
classical distinction in semantics i.e. the “extension” and the “intension” of a term. The 
meaning of a term is said to fix the extension. For a finitist there is no such thing as the 
“extension” i.e. propositions have no longer a determinate content. Particular things, or 
individual objects, exist in advance, but not classes of things. When philosophers think 
of the “extension” of a term they think of an envelope surrounding a set of objects. They 
imagine a line drawn round them limiting a definite area.167 
“According to meaning finitism, we create meanings as we move from case to case. We 
could take our concepts or rules anywhere, in any direction…We are not prevented by “logic” 
or by “meanings” from doing this…The real sources of constraints [are] our instincts, our 
biological nature, our sense experience, our interactions with other people, our immediate 
purposes, our training, our anticipation of and response to sanctions, and so on through 
the gamut of causes starting with psychological and ending with the sociological.” 168 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry169 summarize meaning finitism as follows: 1) The future 
applications of terms are open-ended; 2) No act of classification is ever indefeasibly 
correct – similarity and analogy rather than identity; 3) All acts of classification are 
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revisable; 4) Successive applications of a kind term are not independent; a successive 
application of a word changes the array of exemplars and thus influences subsequent acts 
of classification; 5) The applications of different kind terms are not independent of each 
other.  
According to Bloor, we might say that social institutions must be analyzed as self-
referring systems of talk and thoughts, and he gives a couple of examples. To say 
someone “I welcome you” is to welcome them. This kind of language use is an example 
of a performative utterance: it makes itself true by being uttered. In other words, an 
institution is a collective pattern of self-referring activity. This self-referential model 
explains, according to Bloor, how the rule itself is part of the currency of interaction, 
and a medium of self-understanding. The rule “exists” in and through the practice of 
citing it and invoking it in the course of training, in the course of inciting others to 
follow it, and in the course of telling them they have not followed it at all or not 
followed correctly. 170 Any attempt to justify the “must” will only lead us back to the 
practice itself.  And this is exactly the “linguistic idealism” Bloor is defending: the 
ontological status of an institution is a reality having no existence independent of our 
collective thoughts about it, and references to it.  
Another very interesting development in SSK has been made by MacKenzie who has 
written a series of interesting analyses focusing on economics and economic issues such 
as financial markets, financial derivate markets, and accounts. As a SSK scholar, 
MacKenzie 171strongly defends the idea of finitism and reminds that finitism holds for all 
terms from everyday observational terms to mathematical terms. The quantitative as well 
as the qualitative aspects of science and technology can be analyzed according to the idea 
of finitism. 
His analysis on option theory and the construction of derivates markets is based on 
“Barnesian” performativity although he has leanings with Callon’s ideas. In other words, 
he uses the terms a label for a particular subset of the performativity in economics. His 
claim in the case of the Black-Scholes-Merton model is that the market practices 
informed by the model altered economic processes towards conformity with the model, 
and the model was thus an instance of “knowledge substantially confirmed by the 
practice it sustains.  
MacKenzie stresses that it is too easy to ask: Is the realm of economic theories or 
models real or not? We must rather ask whether the use of those theories or models will 
make the world it posits more real, or less real.   
MacKenzie’s point is to argue that economic models and their products make 
possible to “calculate” derivates; to legitimate, to compare, to evaluate, to price, and to 
hedge them. He uses the terms “Barnesian performativity” and “counterperformativity” 
simply as new names for self-fulfilling and self-negating prophecies and reminds that we 
are not dealing with some mysterious power of words. We can never identify 
performativity as a purely linguistic process but investigate the social, cultural and 
political nature of the process.  
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3. METHOD AND MATERIAL: 
HERMENEUTICS AND TEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS OF STI POLICIES 
  
3.1. Two rhetorical perspectives to STI policies 
 
If the premise of this study is that the concept of politics is a key to understand politics 
and political phenomena and if the concept of policy is understood as a limit of 
politicking and the concept of polity as a limit of politicization it follows that STI 
policies must be examined as linked with these issues. It means that, on the one hand, 
STI policies are examined as a construction of a new policy program where the point of 
the construction is to establish new forums for politicking and, on the other hand, STI 
policies are examined as a generator of polity in which the focus is on politicization, on 
the construction of new issues and horizons.  
The political agenda of STI policies can be seen as follows. As mentioned earlier the 
rationale of STI policies is twofold. First, it seeks to find justification for the STE hybrid 
and, second, it seeks to dissolve the idea of horizontality into those policies. It follows 
that there are two complementary views to STI policies: the theoretical and the practical 
one. In this study, I will call them the RIS perspective and the RIP perspective. 
While the RIS perspective highlights the top-down aspect and focuses on the theory 
linked with STI policies, the RIP perspective studies the bottom-up aspect and focuses 
on the practice of STI policies. The first RIS perspective provides a horizon of 
scientification of politics and focuses on the role of scientific knowledge in STI policies. 
This perspective enables us to examine STI policies as a process of justification in which 
a belief becomes justified when there is something that justifies it. This can be reduced 
to a variety of epistemological dilemmas such as the dilemma of fact and fiction in 
science and politics.  
The second RIP perspective provides a horizon of politicization of science and focuses 
on the role of political government in STI policies. This perspective allows us to 
examine STI policies as a process of legitimation in which not only epistemological 
issues but also norms and values must be taken into account. By utilizing these two 
perspectives we are able to analyze how rhetoric is embedded in STI policies.  
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Figure 2. Two rhetorical perspectives 
 
3.1.1. RIS perspective on STI policies: From theory to practice 
 
In terms of this study, the RIS perspective primarily focuses on the theoretical core of 
STI policies. On the one hand, policy makers speak about the NIS framework as an 
enterprise to find a theoretically coherent and scientifically plausible enough rational 
justification for STI policies and, on the other hand, they speak about the necessity to 
start a series of political interventions in pursuit of legitimating and implementing it in 
pursuit of establishing a totally new culture of political administration based on the idea 
of innovation. 
This kind of account of rhetoric is similar to Perelman’s view172 in that 
argumentation aimed at justification is a rational activity which stands alongside formal 
argument and is complementary to it. Argumentation in the ordinary language is never 
compelling and in argumentation there is no question of validity but of plausibility. In 
other words, Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca offer a rhetorical concept of rationality in 
which the soundness of argumentation is always related to an audience.   
One approach to the rationale of STI policies is to examine it as an enterprise to find 
an answer to questions about modality.  In other words, the rationale of STI policies is 
composed of questions about necessity (or what has to be, or what cannot be otherwise) 
and possibility (or what can be, or what could be otherwise).  
One of the most interesting aspects of the NIS framework is that policy makers 
interpret and advocate the new framework as “a paradigm, as a political agenda having 
scientific justification and as a tailored answer to the complex problems of globalization 
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and technological change. The ideological core of STI policies is designed skilfully in the 
sense that it utilizes openly the problems of modal logic: a modal is an expression 
(“necessarily” or “possibly”) that is used to qualify the truth of a judgement. This 
ideological core is understood in the STS context as technological determinism, or 
technological imperative; the progress of technology is inevitable, unavoidable and 
irreversible. 173  
Within the STI policy context this means that the process of argumentation proceeds 
by introducing a variety of “rational scientific concepts and plausible models” having 
correspondence with “politically realistic scenarios”.  This gap between the “possible” 
and the “necessity” is followed by a series of political interventions linked with plausible 
political scenarios in pursuit of finding a credible position in terms of power and of 
finding thre raison d'etre of that policy so that they are able to make sufficient 
interventions and reforms in order to change all conceivable obstacles and barriers in the 
existing political culture and political governance.  
One of the key issues embedded in the NIS - framework is to make the dynamics of 
the science, technology and economy -hybrid as plausible as possible and to make the 
STE -hybrid a justified and legitimated basis of those policies.  But what is the point of 
the STE hybrid and what makes it so important?  
It is important to be aware of the fact that the term, STE hybrid, is used in this study 
for analytic purposes. It resembles to a great extent John Pickstone’s analysis of the 
history of medicine in which he uses the acronym, STM hybrid to mean the science-
technology-medicine hybrid. In his analysis Pickstone differentiates between two 
different approaches to the history of medicine: on the one hand, the WoKs perspective 
(Ways of Knowing) and, on the other hand, the WoWs perspective (Ways of Working, 
or Acting). These two perspectives are complementary in the sense that they both 
include four internal elements, the WoKs reading, natural history, analysis and 
experiment, and those of the WoWs rhetorics, craft, rationalization, and invention. 
These eight elements coevolute by a series of acting on/with ”objects” by a) texts ( 
rhetoric vs. reading), b) kinds ( natural history vs. craft), c) compounds (analysis vs. 
rationalization), and d) controlled systems ( experiment vs. invention).174  
Interestingly, Pickstone admits that his model and use of the acronym STM is a 
conscious choice and that these acronyms as well as Latour’s “technoscience” are prone 
to a variety of interpretations having nothing in common. For example, the recent 
discussion of Mode 2 or any other similar enterprise in pursuit of understanding the 
changing role of academic research in our society is interesting but such enterprises have 
a tendency to become unhistorical.175The idea of differentiating between two 
complementary approaches to knowledge is strongly based on two different concepts: 
the concept of knowledge per se embedded in the WoKs and the concepts of 
commodity and service in the WoWs. In other words, Pickstone intuitively holds that 
this kind of differentiation is not problematic.  
In his critique on Pickstone’s framework Barnes176 remarks that his most important 
contribution is that he challenges the idea of “technoscience” as such177. There are a 
considerable number of English words that are obvious derivates of four key ancestors: 
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“ars”, “scientia”, “techne”, and “episteme”. The problem is that it is hard to make firm 
distinctions between the meanings of these four kinds of words.  
Nowadays, we speak of science and technology as if they both had a mysterious 
composite essence with two different entities having two different characteristics. We 
usually think that science is the knowledge (and/or the trusted methods of extending 
knowledge) of a specific field of learning, and technology is the practice (or the study of 
the practice) of the various applied sciences and mechanical arts. Science and technology 
may be confronted as if externalities. In other words, we speak of the effects of “science 
and technology” upon the culture or society of which in truth they still remain a part.  
We often perceive science as a reified realm, separated from the everyday life of 
human beings as a set of concepts and classifications, or theories as a distinct mode of 
knowledge and expertise. The current concern with science and technology as practices 
and processes is based on the idea of regarding them as sets of socially organized and 
embedded practices not as a reified Platonic realm. This is Pickstone’s contribution to 
STS, argues Barnes.  
The language of the technological imperative is often full of inexplicit, taken-for-
granted assumptions. It also has an animated, visionary and prophetic tone. The key 
problem is naturally how to understand the concept of technology. The term technology 
has in English usage four different senses178: a) that of science policy studies, in which 
technology encompasses all scientific and engineering activities; b) that of government 
statistics, in which labour activities in the technology category include all workers up 
through engineers as opposed to scientific workers; c) that of engineers, who would limit 
technology in craft techniques; and d) the common dictionary definition of technology 
as the science of industries.  
Stephen Klein179 introduces four definitions of technology as artefacts or hardware, as 
sociotechnical systems of production, as technique or methodology, and as 
sociotechnical system of use, and Carl Mitcham180 has developed this in his analysis of 
technology by introducing four different approaches to technology: technology as 
knowledge, technology as activity, technology as object and technology as volition. All 
this implies that technology is embedded in our practices as a form of knowledge and 
that the use of the term varies a lot. 
Mirowski181 provides a totally different approach to the dilemma of STE. He has in 
his recent studies tried to open the Gordian knot of science/economy problematic and 
argues that the previously pertinent disciplines such as Philosophy, Economics, Science 
Policy were thoroughly reconstituted in the post-World War II period in the American 
academy. The post-war phenomenon of analytic philosophy182 is one element; the rise of 
American Neoclassical economics is another; the post-war construction of politics is the 
third and the rise of Mertonian sociology of science, constituted as a study of science 
purely from the outside looking in is the fourth.  
But what is the point of the STE hybrid? One of the key points of the STI policies is 
that it openly promulgates a totally new view onto science and technology as well as to 
economy although its bottom line is still very traditional: the more economic growth, 
the more wealth and well-being.  
                                                            
178 Fores 1970. 
179 Klein 1985. 
180 Mitcham 1994, p. 159. 
181 Mirowski 2004, p. 
182 McCumber 2001. 
67 
 
In other words, STI policies have a history of their own in which scientific 
knowledge is linked with politics in many ways. One of the paradoxes hidden in the idea 
of STI policies is that, on the one hand, it introduces a set of new models and 
representations to understand the recent changes in the economy by highlighting a sort 
of unavoidability and determinism embedded in those transformations and, on the other 
hand, it openly lists a group of deficiencies of the traditional approaches and encourages 
scholars and researches to find new interpretations and models to understand and 
analyze science and technology.  
Because the contemporary economic phenomena are so complex, we have to be 
unprejudiced and tolerant and introduce a new spectrum of approaches and methods to 
be used in order to understand those complex phenomena. Although the impetus of the 
NIS, one of most important theoretical frameworks used in STI policies, is explicitly to 
expand its theoretical nexus and open the black box, a corollary of contradictions is 
discussed among the economic methodologists. 
 
3.1.2. RIP perspective on STI policies: From practice to theory 
 
If the fulcrum of the RIS perspective is to analyse the STI policies as a dynamics from 
scientific representations to politics, the RIP perspective provides a totally different 
approach. By setting the focus on a dynamics from politics to scientific representations it 
highlights the problem of politics as such. The RIP perspective allows us to link the 
theoretical dimension embedded in STI policies with the practical dimension of those 
policies. It means that STI policies are evidently linked with the challenge of the new 
political governance in which a lot of issues are still in progress.183 
 The political ethos embedded in STI policies strongly highlights the problem of 
change and contingency and the necessity of large societal changes in our socio-cultural 
environment by stressing that its proper focus is not on science or technology or 
economy as such. Rather, the ideological focus of STI policies highlights the significance 
of activity and initiative and discounts passivity and reactionary attitude echoing Marx’ s 
famous dictum: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point is to change it.”184  
It follows that the ultimate target of STI policies is not only to focus its interventions 
to economic sphere to enterprises, customers and economic policies but rather to 
engender a variety of political and societal changes in the society as a whole including 
the political and administrative context itself. The quest for socio-cultural political 
reforms surprisingly resembles Hayek’s account of conscious order taxis and spontaneous 
order cosmos.185   
Seppo Tiihonen186 in his analysis of political governance highlights three new 
elements of governing: the renewal of the governance linked with the state and public 
administration, the renewal of the governance of the markets, and the renewal of the 
governance linked with the whole society. Its major aim is to generate a totally new 
framework to understand public sector governance and its functions.  
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This implies three sets of complementary interventions: a set of public 
administration interventions which focuses on legality and is linked with public sector 
administration, a set of interventions which clarify public market functions, and a set of 
interventions which focus on the governance of public services. In terms of practices the 
new discourse highlights the efficient institutions and institution building, democracy as 
well as networking and trust. According to Tiihonen, the key issue is to re-define the 
task of state.  
The most influential discuntants are economists who emphasise economic reasons. 
In a typical task catalogue those discutants suggest that the contemporary state is said to 
have responsibility “1) to establish rules and institutions aiming at enforcement of contracts 
and protection of property rights to help expand the role of the markets, 2) provide a legal and 
regulatory framework that reduces transaction costs and promotes market efficiency through 
strategic market intervention in case of market failure by providing public goods (defence, law 
and order) and by providing information (for consumer protection), 3) promote macro-
economic stability, 4) address externalities (environment protection), and 5) regulate 
monopoly (utility regulation and competition policy). “ 187 
Christopher Hood, who has specialized on the study of executive government, 
regulation and public sector reform,188 has investigated administrative philosophies, 
doctrines and the role of persuasion in administration. Administrative philosophies 
include a set of doctrines - a set of maxims - and a set of justifications - a set of reasons 
for adopting doctrines.  
A doctrine can be described so that it is “a set of doctrines that lies half-way between 
“theory” and “practice” – where “theory” means an attempt to explain  some part of the 
environment, so as to make all observations about it consistent with one another, with the sole 
purpose of approaching “truth” or understanding; and “policy” means a statement of 
intention towards some part of environment, designed to initiate and guide actions in it so as 
to make all actions consistent with one another, with the purpose of furthering or preventing 
change. A “doctrine” then, looks both ways; it makes plain, but in the manner of “revealed 
truth” rather than the tentative hypothesizing of theory; it shows what must be done, but as if 
it were from necessity rather than the instrumentation of policy. The doctrines of actors are 
derived from theories that are not questioned; policies are derived from doctrines that purpose 
to be “fact”.189 
According to Hood, the primary object of a doctrine is influence and its key test is its 
persuaveness. The problematic for a doctrine is to provide the link between argument 
and acceptance and in order to solve the problem a variety of methods of proof are used. 
Hood’s argument is that NPM (New Public Management) and late cameralism190 as sets 
of administrative philosophies have a lot of common. This is seen in the following issues: 
the use of the term “public management”, the stress on administrative technology as the 
key to effective state management, the view that execution should be separated from 
high policy, the central emphasis on the financial system of the state, the preference of 
avoiding direct state management of complex transactions or processes, the essentiality 
of top-down and centralist nature in practice, and the lack of questioning of the 
parameters of social and political order within which public management operates.191 
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The RIP perspective enables us to study these problems of political governance and 
analyzeits hidden ethos. The ethos of political governance becomes visible in the idea of 
eGovernment strongly advocated in the EU in recent years. The idea of eGovernment is 
closely linked with the Lisbon strategy and its key argument the knowledge triangle- 
research, education and innovation -hybrid as a motor of knowledge–based society.  
The term, eGovernment, is defined by the European Commission as the use of ICT 
in public administration combined with organisational change and new skills in order to 
improve public services and democratic processes and to strengthen support to public 
policies. eGovernment is an enabler to realise a better and more efficient administration. 
It improves the development and implementation of public policies and helps the public 
sector to cope with the conflicting demands of delivering more and better services with 
fewer resources.192 
The aim of the EU eGovernment program is to enable organisational change, to 
revise central-local cooperation and coordination, to redefine public-private relation, and 
to strengthen best practice ethos in political government. The concept of the 
eGovernment includes four other subcategories: the concept of eAdministration, the 
concept of eDemocracy, the concept of eService and the concept of eGovernance.193  
The ideals of the program are as follows: first, we will have a public sector that is 
open and transparent: governments will be understandable and accountable to the 
citizens and open to democratic involvement and scrutiny. Second, we will have a public 
sector that is at the service of everybody; the user-centred public sector will be inclusive, 
that is, will exclude no one from its services and it will respect everyone as individuals by 
providing personalised services. Third, we will have a productive public sector that 
delivers maximum value for taxpayers’ money; it implies that less time is wasted standing 
in queues, errors are drastically reduced, more time is available for professional face-to-
face service, and the jobs of civil servants can become more rewarding.194 
These challenges are translated in the EU jargon into the back office and the front 
office framework. The back office is a term related to the front office which in this 
context is a user interface to an online service. The back office receives and processes the 
information which the user of a service enters in order to produce and deliver the desired 
service. This may be done completely manually, fully automatically or by any 
combination of both.  
In some cases such a service is produced by one unit or back-office, in other cases 
several back-offices of the same service supplier agency or of different agencies, at the 
same government level or at different levels may be involved. In order to recognise the 
complexity involved and to achieve the comparability of different cases a common 
terminology is needed195. 
The concept of eGovernment is sometimes replaced with other concepts such as 
digital government or online government but it is noteworthy that the concept of 
eGovernment has a strong political connotation and is a developmental concept. It is 
likely that the term loses its political potency and will be replaced with other concept 
such as u-government (ubiquitous government) or m-government (mobile government). 
The whole point of eGovernment is to utilize information technology in re-organizing 
the public sector and its administration.196 
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But sometimes the concept of eGovernance is seen as a “relational” concept in which 
the point is highlight the governance element embedded in it. In effect, the concept is 
seen as a development concept for political government and administration itself as is 
the case in the OECD definition of eGovernment. 
 
”E-government provides an opportunity to develop a new relationship between 
governments, citizens, service users and businesses, by using new ICTs which enable 
the dissemination and collection of information and services both within and outside 
of government (government to citizen; government to business; government to 
government) for the purposes of service delivery, decision making and 
accountability.” 197 
 
What makes the eGovernment procedure so interesting is that it illustrates the 
contemporary problem of government. It seems very obvious that the landscape of 
government is changing i.e. the relationships (power and responsibility) between the 
players – between service providers and industry, between the public, private and third 
sector, and between government and citizen.  
The new forms of governance are emerging due to the changing organisational and 
economic structures. This has profound consequences for the way in which we 
understand and exercise citizenship. It is clear that eGovernance is not just about putting 
government services online and improving their delivery, but also constitutes a set of 
technology-mediated processes that may change the broader interactions between 
citizens and government.198 
One of the key evaluation frameworks utilized in the eGovernance proposal is the 
Good Practice Framework.  The aims of the framework are characterized as follows: 
  
”The objective of the action is to establish a framework to facilitate the exchange of 
good practices, their transfer when appropriate and learning from experiences at local, 
regional, national, European and international level in order to foster strong 
commitment and continuity in the practical implementation of eGovernment.”199 
 
The usefulness of the framework is that it clarifies 
 
“critical issues that might hamper the transfer of good experiences such as the legal 
aspects of the process of re-using successful developments among the different 
administrations, the ownership of the systems and their relationship with the public 
tendering procedures which the public administrations have to follow, the various 
aspects of the public-private partnership undertaking.”200 
 
The exchange of good practices is needed because it helps us to evaluate how 
 
…to change management and organisation of work (back office/government process 
re-organisation) within the administrations because it is important that all future 
users and stakeholders are prepared and qualified to manage the technology and 
eGovernment solutions.201 
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In this study the welfare cluster case illustrates all those problems discussed above.It also 
provides an interesting arena for analyzing the problems of political governance 
embedded in STI policies. In effect, the welfare cluster case makes transparent how a 
variety of problems of politics are present in STI policies.  
The welfare cluster case is interesting because it was Finland’s own attempt to start a 
variety of reforms nowadays implied in one subprojects of the eGovernment, the 
eHealth program.  Finland, as well as Sweden, Denmark and Norway, started to 
renovate their health policies in the second half of the 1990s and the welfare cluster was 
the Finnish version of that renovation.  
Terminology used in the European Commission linked with health care technology 
programs has varied in the course of time. During 1989 - 1994 the research program 
was called “Advance informatics in Medicine” in the Framework Programme 2 and 3.  
The emphasis was on regional networks and telemedicine applications. In the 
Framework Programme 4 (1994 - 1998 the program was called “Health telematics”, and 
the emphasis was still on regional networks and telemedicine applications. In the 
Framework 5 during 1998 - 2002 the program was called “eHealth”, and the emphasis 
was on internet-based applications and patient empowerment.   In the Framework 6 
(2002 - 2006) it was called “ICTs for Health”, and the emphasis was put on prevention, 
personalisation, patient safety, knowledge infrastructure, and support to molecular 
medicine (biomedical informatics).  
An action plan adopted by the European Commission on 30 April 2004 shows how 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) can be used to deliver better 
quality health care Europe-wide.202 ICT for Health systems includes tools for health 
authorities and professionals as well as personalised health systems for patients and 
citizens. Examples include health information networks, electronic health records, 
telemedicine services, personal wearable and portable communicable systems, health 
portals, and many other ICT-based tools assisting disease prevention, diagnosis, 
treatment, health monitoring and lifestyle management. 
 
3.2 Hermeneutical understanding as the basis of the analysis 
 
In principle, we might distinguish between two different interpretations related to 
causation. According to the first interpretation, causes are to be regarded as handles or 
devices for manipulating effects. One version of this interpretation can be found in 
different theories of action. According to the second interpretation, causes are usually 
events (singular events or event types), but they might also be things, states of affairs or 
universals so that causation is often understood as a sort of mechanism. One very 
controversial version of the second interpretation is naturally David Hume’s thesis that a 
cause is “an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first, are 
followed by objects similar to the second.”203  For Hume causation is based on experience, it 
is not a priori; we perceive two different states of affairs and link them together using the 
idea of causation.  
These two approaches constitute the core of methodological debates in social and 
human sciences and often provide a borderline between those who stress the speciality of 
human and social sciences and those who do not find anything special in them. In 
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practice, this controversy is often seen as a controversy between quantitative or 
qualitative methodology and is often translated into the dilemma of the agent-structure 
relationship.204  
The controversy involves two important fundamental problems along which the 
proponents of the competing research traditions consistently differ. 205 The first of them 
concerns the epistemological significance of individual agents and their choices vis-à-vis 
the structures that define their positions, roles and identities in relation to one another 
(the problem of methodological individualism/collectivism). Does the ontological 
primacy of individual actors also accord them with epistemological primacy vis-à-vis the 
structures that constraint, or give meaning to, their actions? 
The second problem concerns the relative significance of concrete material factors, or 
hidden “fuzzy” ideal factors in the analysis if individual motivations and patterns of 
social interactions. Can the material features of social life (wealth, resources, rules, social 
networks and so forth) be more directly observed than the ideal features (norms, 
identities, symbols, cognitive schemas and so forth) accord to the former a greater 
epistemological significance in the interpretation of social phenomena? 
As Rudra Sil206 argues the real problem in the study of politics is that we often have 
to make a choice between a problem-driven and method-driven approach. While the 
collective output of social scientific research is usually evaluated outside the academy 
primarily in terms of its utility in relation to concrete problems, individual scholar has to 
face tradeoffs between acquiring greater mastery of a given method and seeking a deeper 
understanding of a given substantial problem. 
 In social sciences a scholar need to offer claims about methodological rigor and 
substantive utility in order to be taken seriously in the eyes of a particular research 
community. There are scholars who share a common academic interest in a particular 
substantive problem and there are scholars who share a common interest in a particular 
methodological approach and theoretical vocabulary.  It follows that research 
communities embrace often conflicting understanding of what problems are significant 
and what methods are appropriate for tackling them.  In this study the substantial 
problem has played the major role and, in effect, it has also dictated the methodological 
choice because of the following reasons. 
If we accept the idea that the use of language plays an important role in politics it 
makes the role of a scholar difficult. In other words, it is extremely important to be 
aware of how to understand her or his position in relation to politics. Politics has 
traditionally had two faces. First, it is a phenomenon that must be interpreted; it is a 
target of interpretation and, second, politics is a process of advocating a particular 
interpretation; it is an enterprise to justify and legitimate a particular interpretation. It 
follows that scholars and scientists necessarily participate in that process of interpretation 
in a way or another. 
Thus, the role of critical reflexivity in studying politics is of a great importance and it 
is logical and coherent to start this study by clarifying a couple of very radical theses 
focusing on these issues. Or to put it differently, I want to argue that to study political 
phenomena is different from solving cross-word puzzles or finding a murder.  Its aim is 
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not to transform the unfamiliar to the familiar and to discover something as a piece of 
new knowledge but rather find new perspectives to see the world.207  
The first thesis is that research is a particular form of interpretation. Its starting point 
is the idea that we always have preconceptions and the aim of the research is to change 
those preconceptions. Every interpretation is possible to contradict and to every 
interpretation is possible to give another interpretation. No interpretation can ever be a 
comprehensive or ultimate one; to study politics means that you are obliged to take a 
relativist stand because the knowledge in political sciences is always based on a variety of 
prejudices. The aim of the research is to change those prejudices by introducing new 
interpretations.  
The second thesis is that interpretation is a series of intellectual operations. As is the 
case in policy formulation and implementation, the interpretation process is also a kind 
of procedure. In other words, the research process is a kind of composition process in 
which a sort of intellectual procedure must be adopted. This analytic procedure provides 
a kind of intellectual repertoire with which the scholar is able to establish the essential 
themes and substantial nodes of the study. 
The third thesis is that the research in political science resembles politics in many 
respects. Every phenomenon has or may have a political dimension. Nothing is sheltered 
from politics - including the research itself. This kind of interpretation is based on the 
idea that politics is a matter of controversy and conflict. It is no sense to ask whether this 
or that is a matter of politics. Rather, we have to ask how this or that becomes political, 
part of politics. Politics is always a matter of definition. 
The fourth thesis is that the paradigmatic data, a source of knowledge and 
information, in political sciences is a text and the use of other sources must be 
proportioned to texts. All political phenomena have always a kind of textual reference 
whose recognition and explication is the precondition for identifying the political 
phenomena. Similarities between theatre performance and political action are obvious in 
the sense that theatre performances are based on of texts but performance as an action is 
always more than a text. Action makes both politics and theatre alive. One of the central 
arguments for those two rhetorical perspectives is that the totality of STI policies is a 
political process and it has to be studied as such. It means that this study is very lnked to 
the rhetorical tradition in political sciences.  
The fifth thesis is that the researcher must examine politics as a two-layered process - 
as a corollary of political phenomena but as a corollary of concepts as well. The research 
interest must be focused on concrete political action and on political thought linked 
with that action. Traditionally, political thought and political action are understood as 
distinctive camps of research. While the other camp attempts to clarify and analyze the 
philosophy behind the action, the other camp attempts to focus on concrete political 
phenomena.  
These five theses introduced above can also be read as an approval of hermeneutical 
thinking as a methodological way of addressing the problem studied here. Since the 
concept of hermeneutics is for many synonymous with obscurity and sloppy thinking208, 
it would be reasonable to clarify how hermeneutical thinking helps us to grasp the 
totality of STI policies.  
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The term “hermeneutics” is usually understood to be a theory of understanding and 
interpretation of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions.  The hermeneutic tradition 
has roots in ancient Greek philosophy. In the course of the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, hermeneutics emerges as a crucial branch of Biblical studies.  
One of the central figures in the development of early modern hermeneutics is the 
Italian philospher Giambattisto Vico. Vico opposes the Cartesian thinking and argues 
that thinking is always rooted in a given cultural context.209 This context is historically 
developed, and intrinsically related to ordinary language, evolving from the stage of 
myth and poetry to the later phases of theoretical abstraction and technical vocabularies. 
If we want to understand ourselves, we have to understand the genealogy of our own 
intellectual horizon.  
Vico’s idea is to grant a role for the historical sciences; he offers a model of truth and 
objectivity that differs from those entertained by the natural sciences. The historian does 
not encounter a field of idealized and putatively subject-independent objects - she rather 
investigates her own world.  Vico argues that there is no clear distinction between the 
scientist and the object of her or his studies. Understanding and self-understanding 
cannot be kept apart; self-understanding does not follow any law-like propositions. It 
appeals to tact and common sense within a given historical context of practice and 
understanding. 
Martin Heidegger, one of the key philosophers in modern hermeneutics, thinks that 
the fundamental familiarity with the world becomes transparent through the process of 
interpretation. Interpretation does not have a propositional nature; it makes things, 
objects, the fabric of the world appear as something. Yet, this is possible only in the 
background of the world, as a totality of practices and intersubjective encounters of the 
world that is opened up by Dasein's being understandingly. 
For Heidegger hermeneutics is not a matter of understanding linguistic 
communication. Nor is it about providing a methodological basis for the human 
sciences. For Heidegger hermeneutics is ontology; it is about the most fundamental 
conditions of man’s being in the world. Whereas Vico initially started the critique of the 
Cartesian notion of certainty, Heidegger tries to analyze how Cartesianism is part of 
modern philosophical reason. It is also one of the leading themes in his opus magnum 
Being and Time.210 
Heidegger211 argues that for Descartes the task of philosophy is to show how the 
subject can rationally establish the norms of epistemic certainty whereby a given 
representation is judged to be true or false. It is very close to the idea that the truth and 
the methods provided by the natural sciences are very close to each other. Heidegger 
claims that such a model forgets the most fundamental, pre-scientific aspects of our 
being in the world; this is one of the key points in Heidegger's hermeneutics. It is the 
hermeneutics of facticity, as Heidegger calls it, and that is what philosophy actually is. 
Heidegger’s account of understanding is not a method of reading nor any kind of 
procedure of critical reflection. It is not something we consciously do or fail to do, but 
something that we are. Understanding is for Heidegger a mode of being, and as such it is 
a characteristic of human being, of Dasein as he calls it. The world of Dasein is the 
mental horizon of Dasein that consists of its presuppositions, expectations, attitudes and 
beliefs. In fact, understanding is a dialogue between Dasein’s world and everything that 
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terminates the disclosure of its possibilities. “As the disclosedness of the ‘there’, 
understanding always pertains to the whole of being-in-the-world. In every understanding of 
the world, existence is understood with it and vice versa. All interpretations, moreover, 
operate in the fore-structure. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any 
random kind of knowledge may move, it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of 
Dasein itself”212 
Heidegger’s account of assertion is of a great importance. He claims that only 
through assertion is the synthesizing activity of understanding and interpretation 
brought to language. In disclosing the as-structure of a thing interpretation discloses its 
meaning. Assertion pins down this meaning linguistically. The linguistic identification 
of a thing is not original but it is predicated on the world-disclosive synthesis of 
understanding and interpretation.  
This account covers our enterprises to solve the truth-value of the assertion. The 
world-disclosive truth of understanding is more fundamental than the truth presented in 
the propositional structure “a is b“. This Heideggerian reformulation of the problem of 
truth is a new conception of the hermeneutic circle. It refers to something completely 
different: the interplay between our self-understanding and our understanding the 
world. The hermeneutic circle is no longer perceived as a helpful philological tool, but 
rather as an existential task which each of us confronts. 
Heidegger’s student Hans-Georg Gadamer wanted to combine the Heideggerian 
notion of the world-disclosive synthesis of understanding with the idea of education 
(Bildung) in culture. In his major work Wahrheit und Methode Gadamer explains 
Heidegger’s conception of the circular process of understanding as 
follows:“Interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones. 
This constant process of new projection constitutes the movement of understanding and 
interpretation. A person who is trying to understand is exposed to distraction from fore-
meanings that are not borne out by the things themselves. Working out appropriate 
projections, anticipatory in nature, is to be confirmed.  "By the things" themselves, is the 
constant task of understanding." 213   
Gadamer’s major claim is that the human being is a being in language. It is through 
language that the world is opened up for us. We learn to know the world by learning to 
master a language. Hence we cannot really understand ourselves unless we understand 
ourselves as situated in a linguistically mediated, historical culture. To put in other 
words, language is our second nature. 
It follows that historical works can never be studied as neutral and value-free objects 
of scientific investigation. They are part of the horizon in which we live and through 
which our world-view is shaped. We are formed by these great works before we are given 
the chance to approach them with an objectivizing attitude. 
In other words, Gadamer argues that in the process of analyzing texts we never fully 
understand its original context or the intentions of its author. Tradition is always a 
living process. The past must be understood as a fabric of interpretations that becomes 
richer and more complex as decades and centuries pass.  
Furthermore, Gadamer argues that we do not address the texts of tradition, but the 
canonical texts address us. We identify the authority of a text by engaging with it in 
textual explication and interpretation, by entering into a dialogical relationship with the 
past. For Gadamer, this movement of understanding is the fusion of horizons.  
                                                            
212 Heidegger1962, p. 194. 
213 Gadamer 1979, p. 267. 
76  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
In a process of interpretation we understand something that at first appeared alien. It 
follows that we participate in the process of interpretation and gain a better and more 
profound understanding not only of the text but also of ourselves. In other words, the 
co-determination of text and reader is Gadamer’s version of the hermeneutic circle. The 
meaning of the text is not something that we can grasp once and for all. Gadamer's 
philosophical point is that our historically conditioned being is always more being (Sein) 
than conscious being (Bewusstsein). 
It is worth noting that in his critique of Gadamer Habermas argues that Gadamer 
places too much emphasis on the authority of tradition, leaving no room for critical 
judgment and reflection. His critique is that Gadamer’s account uncovers his political 
naiviety. Hermeneutics, Habermas argues214, must be completed by a critical theory of 
society. 
He does not claim that Gadamer's approach to hermeneutics is completely mistaken; 
the fundamental problem with Gadamer's hermeneutics would not be solved by calling 
for a hermeneutic method. The idea of a formal method is indeed convincingly 
criticized by Gadamer. Habermas suggests that one must work out an adequate standard 
of validity - the quasi-transcendental principles of communicative reason. Only then can 
hermeneutics, guided by the social sciences, have a real role in advocating emancipation 
and social liberation. 
Gadamer’s answer was that his aim was never to dispense with every appeal to 
validity, objectivity, and method in understanding. Rather, it highlights the role of 
prejudice in our understanding. In fact, it is his version of the hermeneutic circle. The 
concept of prejudice is important for Gadamer because he highlights the priority of the 
question in the structure of understanding.215 All interpretation is necessarily prejudiced 
in the sense that it is always oriented to present concerns and interests, and it is those 
present concerns and interests that allow us to enter into dialogue with the issue at hand. 
The basic model of understanding is for Gadamer that of conversation. In a 
conversation there are conversational partners that seek agreement about some matter at 
issue. But such an exchange is never completely under the control of either 
conversational partner, but is rather determined by the particular issue. Conversation 
occurs in language and is thus always linguistically mediated.  
Because conversation and understanding presume an agreement, Gadamer argues 
that all understanding involves something resembeling a common language. All 
understanding is interpretative, and, insofar as all interpretation involves exchange 
between the familiar and the alien, so all interpretation is also translative. Gadamer doe 
not rule out the possibility of other modes of understanding, but he gives primacy to 
language and conceptuality in hermeneutic experience.  
His thesis is that we are ‘in’ the world through being ‘in’ language. Language is that 
within which anything that is intelligible can be comprehended; it is also that within 
which we encounter ourselves and others. In this respect, language is itself understood as 
essentially dialogue or conversation. Like Wittgenstein, Gadamer thus rejects the idea of 
‘private language’.  
Gadamer claims that language is the universal horizon of hermeneutic experience and 
that the hermeneutic experience is itself universal. This does not mean that the 
experience of understanding is familiar or ubiquitous. Hermeneutics concerns our 
fundamental mode of being in the world and understanding is thus the basic 
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phenomenon in our existence. Understanding is in Gadamerian view a mode of insight 
with its own rationality. It is irreducible to any simple rule or set of rules, it  cannot be 
directly taught, and it is always oriented to the particular case at hand. According to 
Gadamer tradition, prejudice, language, and habit can be sources of truth, as well as an 
error, and this constitutes a point of departure for the methodology of this study.  
Gerard Delanty has listed the dominant tendencies of the hermeneutical approach as 
follows. Interpretation; the hermeneutical approach stands for the subordination of 
explanation and description to interpretation. Anti-scientism; the approach stresses a 
strong separation between social and human sciences and natural sciences. Value-
freedom; the strong role of interpretation in the hermeneutical approach is often linked 
with a departure from positivistic social science and the approach has been accused on 
relativism.  Humanism; different cultures and times have different values and it must be 
involved in our interpretations. Linguistic constructivism; the hermeneutic approach 
stresses the importance of language as the basic structure of society. Intersubjectivity;   the 
hermeneutic approach presupposes an intersubjective relationship between science and 
its object.216 These hermeneutical underpinnings constitute a basis for the 
methodological resolutions of this study. 
 
3.3. Textual strategy for the analysis  
 
In this kind of study the research problem is linked to the distinction between texts 
(textum)217 and contexts (con-textum). It is, of course, possible to see texts without their 
contexts but the point of the rhetorical perspective is that “meanings” are always linked 
with their contexts. Therefore, we have always need to pose the questions related to a 
text: what is its real content, what is its form, whose text it is, to whom it is addressed, 
and when and why has just this text become real. 
One of the most curious aspects of meanings is that they may change and they may 
differ considerably, but all texts carry their original contextual index outside its own 
context.218 The political meaning of a text changes every time when the context changes.  
Contextual barricades are therefore very essential in terms of interpretation.  
It follows that we must be aware of those contexts in the sense that the distance from 
“the unfamiliar” to “the familiar” must be critically reflected. To understand something 
better always presupposes a kind of Verfremdung-attitude.219 This attitude is sometimes 
defined as an act of de-contextualization or as an intentional heuristic intellectual 
process in pursuit of finding new interpretations for texts in question. It is possible to 
give a narrow interpretation for it and understand it as a particular Zeitdiagnose. The 
point of de-contextualizing is not that those interpretations are definite and 
undisputable; its point is rather to highlight some aspects at the cost of some other 
aspects.  
Another perspective to see those barricades is the point Koselleck makes in his 
Begriffgeschicht project when he focuses on the development and invention of the 
fundamental modern political and historical concepts. For him the era of Sattelzeit 
(ca.1770 - 1850) is the most important. According to Koselleck, all political and social 
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concepts must be seen in a historical context. As the political, cultural and social theories 
today are openly used as an aspect of politics and this is a kind of starting point for self-
reflexivity in this study.  
Hence, the research is a cyclic cognitive process in which the proper object of the 
study is examined and analyzed within a process of “reading politics”. This implies that 
both of those rhetorical perspectives, the RIS and RIP perspectives, are utilized in the 
process.  
It follows that the proper object of this study is defined as a complex in which texts, 
contexts, and interpretations form a totality. When the aim of the research is to 
understand the totality of STI policies as a theoretical and practical challenge it has to 
find new horizons and interpretations for those policies. Although this study deals with 
Finland and its transition to STI policies in the 1990s it is apparent that the Finnish case 
resonates with cases in many other countries as well.  
The analysis is based on Skinner’s idea of rhetorical re-description. What the re-
description means to this study is that STI polices must be analyzed as a series of 
rhetorical moves by which we are able to disassemble hindsight and canonized 
interpretations.220 It follows that we have to focus on issues, linguistic conventions and 
meanings of concepts. The rhetorical perspective implies that we need not ask whether 
the search for real meanings is possible. A rhetorical move is only an instrument for 
opening new chances. 
Another important aspect of re-description is that the focus must be set on the 
legitimation process because it is legitimation analysis that helps us to understand “the 
point” in Skinner’s sense.  
In his version of rhetorical re-description of politics as a concept Palonen221 
introduces nine topoi: irregularity, judgement, policy, deliberation, commitment, 
contestation, possibility, situation, and play & game. He uses the rhetorical term topos 
in its original sense as a “common place” from which to search for arguments and 
conceptions. The topoi serve as principles that organize the narrative and form a definite 
thematic complex by treating spheres, agents, content, and the direction of politics as 
mere contextual conditions of conceptualisation. Palonen stresses that each topos 
includes a broad range of possibilities for conceptualising politics independently of the 
conditions of its initial use.  
In the use of topoi, the conceptual history of politics can be abstracted from both the 
history of events and processes and the fragments of explicit debates on the concept. The 
initial connections between the sphere and activity concepts of politics were equally 
metaphorical. The opposition between them concerns the questions of whether a 
metaphoric transfer and de-contextualisation of the activity is legitimate and whether the 
activity itself should be called politics. The defenders of the sphere concept follow the 
linguistic model of the ordinary and extended meaning of a concept. 
If we consider the irregularity criterion as a borderline case of the politics-as-sphere 
concept, the remaining topoi can be divided into two means of conceptualizing politics. 
The first four - prudence, policy, deliberation and commitment - can be understood as 
such topoi that are oriented toward continuity in activity. The last four - contestation, 
play, situation and possibility - operate with the moment of discontinuity serving as the 
constitutive event of politics-as-activity. 
                                                            
220 Skinner 1988a, p. 280. 
221 Palonen utilizes Quentin Skinner’s idea that we have to examine the conceptual changes in terms of 
the rhetorical re-decsription of concepts. See Skinner 1996. 
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It is also possible to divide the topoi into three thematically interconnected clusters. 
Prudence and policy refers to modes of conceptualisation that directly attempt to qualify 
activities, deliberation, commitment and contestation to opposed criteria of 
distinguishing the political moment within an activity, while chance, situation and play 
& game refer to the contingency of chances as the constitutive criterion of politics.  
In this study the analytic focus is on the Finnish STI policies. The aim of the re-
description is to stress the ambiguities and controversies embedded in STI policies. The 
study utilizes the idea of a hermeneutic circle: our understanding of the parts is dependent 
on our understanding of a larger whole, which, again, can only be understood on the 
basis of the parts. The movement back and forth between the parts and the whole of the 
text, is an important theme in this study.  
The rhetorical analysis in his study is a process of hermeneutical circle which is 
composed of four cycles of analysis.  
The first cycle is called the cycle of contextualisation in which the aim is to characterize 
the external and internal contexts of the Finnish STI policies.  
The second cycle is called the cycle of re-contextualisation in which the aim is to open 
up the interpretations related to those policies and, in particular, explicate the welfare 
cluster case as an illustration of those policies. This cycle is mainly based on the 
interviews with key persons who participated in the formulation of the welfare cluster 
policy and its implementation. A special report based on these interviews has been 
published in 2005222.  
The third cycle is called the cycle of de-contextualisation. It consists of five thematic 
moves. This cycle is the core of the analysis and it is also called the rhetorical re-
description of STI policies.  
The fourth cycle is called the cycle of re-interpretation closes the analysis. It seeks to 
open up new horizons for understanding STI policies as a scientific and political 
construction.  
 
3.3.1. Empirical research questions 
 
The empirical research in this study can be seen as a series of textual analyses including 
three cycles as follows.  
The first cycle focuses on the analysis of texts in pursuit of contextualisation. Its aim is 
to analyze the case of Finland and, in particular, focus on the dilemma of Finland and 
NIS. This cycle is based on the following research questions: 
 
1. How and why did Finland decide to utilise the NIS framework in its science and 
technology policies? The core of the question is to analyze the history of science and 
technology policies in Finland and to find out about its international origins. 
2. How and why did  Finland decide to utilize the cluster framework in its industrial 
policy renewal? This question seeks to analyze the emergence of cluster thinking in 
Finland and to find out about its international origins. 
The second cycle concentrates on the analysis of texts in pursuit of re-
contextualisation. Its aim is to analyze Finland’s success story and highlight the 
curiosity of the welfare cluster case, in particular. This cycle is based on the following 
research questions:  
                                                            
222 Tarkiainen 2005. 
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3. How are the welfare cluster and STI policies linked to one another? The aim is to 
analyze the welfare cluster case as a theoretical dilemma of STI policies.  
4. Why did Finland start the welfare cluster intervention and what makes the case so 
exceptional? The aim is to analyze the welfare cluster as a practical dilemma of STI 
policies. 
The third cycle is composed of the analysis of texts in pursuit of de-contextualisation. 
The cycle is called here the rhetorical re-description of STI policies iand it will 
nclude five thematic moves. These thematic moves enable us to analyze or “re-read” 
the research object from two rhetorical perspectives in which both the theoretical and 
practical aspects of STI policies are analyzed. 
5. How and why are scientific knowledge and STI policies linked to each otherr? The aim 
is to analyze the theoretical dilemmas embedded in STI polices  
6. How and why are political governance and STI policies linked to each other? The aim 
of the question is to analyze the practical dilemmas embedded in STI policies. 
The fourth cycle is called the re-interpretation of texts in pursuit of finding new 
horizons for STI policies by making a synthesis of the three previous cycles. Its aim is 
to locate new horizons and interpretations for STI policies as a particular form of 
political and cultural activity. This cycle is based on the following research question.  
7. How and why are rhetoric and STI policies linked to one another? The point of the 
questions is to analyze the problem of rhetoric embedded in STI policies and find 
new interpretations for them.  
 
3.3.2. Use of empirical material 
 
The empirical analysis of this study focuses on the evolution of the Finnish STI policies 
between 1990-2005. The materials utilized are referred to as texts. The textual material 
is used in the process of “political reading” according to the five theses introduced in 
Chapter 3.2.  
While this kind of approach involves a variety of methodological problematic issues, 
I will concentrate here on two of them: the problem of documentation and the problem 
of delimitation. I have resolved the first problem in this study so that all the empirical 
materials used in the study have been documented very carefully. The quotes from 
document materials and personal interviews have been separated from the text but the 
other quotes have been italicized within the text.  
The second problem may be characterized simply as follows: how to select adequate 
empirical materials and discard inadequate materials? The problem in the case of STI 
policies is a critical one: there are a lot of traditional written documents available and 
also plenty of material in digital form. Almost all the key documents, including a variety 
of policy strategies and guidelines, policy papers, and scientific reports related to recent 
science and technology policies in Finland, are available in traditional or digital form, 
and naturally the similar type of material is available in the OECD and EU internet 
services as well.  
Today, a skilful scholar interested in science and technology policies may gather a 
vast amount of textual material including a long list of policy documents and their 
backgrounds and he/she can also access a huge reserve of secondary materials including 
scientific publications and conference presentations in a very short period of time. The 
crucial question for a scholar is thus how to organize this vast reserve of empirical data 
and what are the criteria for organizing it.  
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This is naturally one of the most crucial aspects in collecting empirical data. In this 
study the strategy I have followed the following strategy. 
 
1) Document material. This study utilizes a variety of political documents related to 
STI policies including a variety of policy papers and documents as well as plenty 
of research reports and studies produced in the Finnish and international 
contexts. Almost all documents utilized in the study are in the form of 
publications: different kinds of reports and strategy papers, study reports, articles 
and so forth. Document material can be classifed into two sub-groups.  
 
a) National level. This group includes the Finnish science and technology 
policy documents, reports and surveys from the 1980s to 2008. Those 
documents can be divided into the following groups: 
Science, technology and innovation policy: Council of State accounts and 
resolutions; reviews and other publications of the Science policy Council, 
(later the Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland); strategy 
documents and annual reports and memoranda of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, TEKES, the Ministry of Education and the Academy of 
Finland. 
Information society policy: National Information Society strategies, reports 
of the Information Society Advisory Board and the Information Society 
Council; strategies of  the Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health; official 
papers of the Government Information Society Prgramme and other 
reports and surveys published by SITRA.  
Economic policy: Strategy documents, annual reports and memoranda of 
the Ministry of Finance. 
Social policy: Strategy documents, annual reports and memoranda of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and STAKES. 
 
One important type of documents are the government programmes 
since1989. These documents are important because they constitute an 
interesting frame for the Finnish political culture in recent years. In these 
programmes governments present their political goals, clarify priorities and 
guidelines for improvements. A Finnish curiosity is that the governments 
tend to follow very carefully those programmes. These programmes are 
understood as a binding contract among political parties involved, and 
they are also used as a “checking list” by the opposition. 
 
b) International level. These materials cover the OECD and EU science 
and technology policy documents, reports and surveys from the 1980s to 
2008. 
 
OECD:  OECD is known for its publications - Outlooks, Country surveys 
and Statistics. All the publications utilized in this study are documented as 
carefully as possible. 
EU:  EU has a strategy of its own, and its current policies emphatically 
stress the digital option: all important documents related to science, 
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technology and innovation policies are available through various internet 
services. 
 
The OECD and EU documents are important and valuable for this study 
because they provide a valuable and necessary context for my theoretical 
and practical analysis of the Finnish STI policies. Finland, as a member of 
the OECD and the EU, has been very willing to fulfill quickly and 
precisely the proposals and obligations of these international actors. In 
terms of Finland’s STI policies, the OECD as a think-tank and the EU as 
a political machine are the most powerful organisations set the substantial 
rules for those policies and who develop varieties of procedures to be used 
in implementing those policies. 
 
2) Statistics: Statistical data is used in this study mainly as a supplementary source of 
information. The role of statistical data is of a great importance in STI policies 
and its argumentation. Thus, the deliberate use of statistical data is arguable. 
3) Personal interviews:  One very important empirical source is the interviews with 
14 welfare cluster key persons interviews carried out in 2004. The interviews were 
carried out in a semi-structured manner so that the themes and most of questions 
were planned in advance but a lot of flexibility was allowed during the interviews. 
The duration of interviews varied from one and half hour to two and half 
hours.223 The backgrounds of the interviewees varied; all of them were closely 
linked with the idea of the welfare cluster. Some of them participated in its 
implementation very actively while others were “grey eminences” behind the 
curtains. This discrepancy produced several interesting analyses and individual 
remarks, but it also provided a mirror to reflect the actual policy-making and its 
practices. The interview data, a compilation of transcriptions on the basis of 
recordings, functions as a contrast to the other materials in the sense that the key 
persons were able to interpret very freely how they understand the development 
of the welfare cluster intervention. Simultaneously, they also assessed the totality 
of STI policies.  Most of them saw it as an evolutionary learning process in which 
scientific knowledge and political governance were at its core. 
                                                            
223 The lists of interviewees and thematical questions is in Appendix. 
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4. INNOVATIVE FINLAND AS A PART 
OF EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
 
4.1. OECD and its role as a think-tank  
 
After the Second World War, the leading industrial countries such as USA, Soviet 
Union, France, Germany, and the UK established a series of political interventions in 
order to find mechanisms and procedures in pursuit of legitimating a particular 
governmental sector. Gradually, also smaller countries started to organize their 
administration in similar ways. These arrangements, as Salomon224 points out, mark an 
irreversible turning point in the relations between science and technology as a national 
asset and the direct intervention of governments in the direction and range of research 
activities. Traditionally, one distinguishes between four different phases of science and 
technology policies225 from the Second World War until the early 1970s.  
The first phase was characterized by high public faith in the efficacy of science and 
the prestige of scientists took place mainly in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The evolution of the Cold War dominated this period and was characterized 
by a considerable increase in research budgets. A large proportion of the budgets, in 
bigger countries more than three quarters, went to military, nuclear and space research. 
The OECD had an important role as a catalyst in the diffusion of mechanisms to orient 
the R&D effort.  
The second phase began in the early 1960s and was characterized by the gradual 
emergence of economists and system analysts as an intellectual resource. If the earlier 
phase was linked with the euphoria of science and technology the second phase focused 
more on other issues. In the era of the Cold War the role of science and technology in 
economic growth was reduced to technological competition. The argumentation was 
based on the idea that the real problem was technological gaps between the United 
States and Europe as well as the gaps between developed and less developed countries. 
Science and technology policies must be subjugated to this problem, and fill the gap.    
The third phase has been described as a period of disenchantment with science and 
technology and as a period of questioning and challenge. The attack on science became 
from both the Right and the Left.226 The Right viewed science as a wasteful pastime of 
high professionals who did not care about economic and industrial development and the 
Right denounced science and technology as instruments of military and economic 
domination, disregarding society’s needs. High-technology industry was regarded as 
regressive in its impact on income distribution and science itself anti-egalitarian in its 
organization and morals. Economic growth was no more a blessing for the mankind. 
The fourth phase is normally associated with the Brooks report and the new 
perspectives which it opened. The OECD report 1971 was also important in the sense 
that the priorities of the 1960s were re-examined and re-ordered. The concern was now 
more on social well-being and less on technological progress as such. One of the main 
                                                            
224 Salomon 1977. 
225 Salomon 1977; Freeman and Soete 1997; Salomon 1987. 
226 Lemola 2001b. 
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recommendations of the report was that science and technology should be an integral 
part of social and economic development. This implies closer relationships between 
policies for science and technology and all socio-economic concerns and governmental 
responsibilities than had existed previously. 
The oil crisis in 1973 changed the course of science and technology policies so that 
all industrialized countries shifted their research effort to energy. Yet the difficulties the 
industrialized countries faced were more deep-seated and required a totally new 
orientation to science and technology strategies. The change in the science and 
technology policies was partly linked with these developments, but it was also closely 
associated with the competetion with Japan and the Japanese “national system of 
innovation”.227 The institutional model of science and technology policies moved from 
Washington to Tokyo.228 
If the NSF, the National Science Foundation in the United States, has originally 
been a catalyst for science and technology policies, the OECD has been the organisation 
which has globally been the most influential in the domain of science and technology 
policies. The OECD is often seen as an impartial and independent international actor, 
as a gigantic international think-tank.  
In reality, it has a curious political history of its own. The birth of the OECD is very 
much tied with the developments in international politics after the Second World War. 
Later it was an important political instrument against the Soviet Union and communism 
in the era of Cold War. In sum, it has been a strong political and ideological link 
between North America and Europe.  
Since its establishment in 1961the OECD’s vocation has been to build strong 
economies in its member countries, improve efficiency, hone market systems, expand 
free trade and contribute to development in industrialized and developing countries.229  
In 1950 the Chairman of the OEEC council put forward an action plan for the 
economic integration of Europe specialization of activities, division of labour and the 
creation of a single European market. In 1951 the Americans shifted their policy 
regarding the aid within the Marshall Plan in favour of NATO. The September 1951 
NATO conference in Ottawa decided that the OEEC would deal with European 
economic questions, including those relating to the functioning of NATO. In 1961 the 
OEEC was superseded by the OECD, a worldwide body consisted of the original 
founder countries plus the United States and Canada. NATO and the OECD were two 
arms of a Western strategy providing security and prosperity in the post-war Europe.230  
Nowadays, the OECD wants to be a pathfinder, a power house of policy discussions 
leading to agreed best practices, and stress multilateral learning in political 
administration. Its contemporary strategy seems to follow Arnold Toynbee’s idea that 
the rise and fall of civilizations is dependent on two legs: the economic/technological leg 
of wealth creation and the socio/political leg of distribution, equity and environmental 
health.  
                                                            
227 Freeman 1977. 
228 Salomon 1985. 
229 The forerunner of the OECD was the Organisation for European Economic CO-operation (OEEC) 
formed to administer American and Canadian aid under the Marshall Plan. Its first objective in 1948/9 
was to prepare the European Recovery Programme and make proposals for freeing trade. By the end of 
1950 60% of private intra- European trade had been freed, the percentage was in 1955 84% and in 
1959 89%. 
230 The OECD does not have the same political clout of the United Nations and not the operational 
power of the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. It has the analytic capability, 
the professional impartiality and the capacity to innovate. See Gass 2003. 
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As an international organisation the OECD231 provides a forum for 30 member 
countries where they can compare and exchange policy experiences, identify good 
practices and promote decisions and recommendations. Dialogue, consensus, peer 
review and pressure are at the very heart of OECD. It is one of the world’s largest and 
most reliable sources of comparable statistical, economic and social data.  
The OECD has been of a great importance for Europe and later for the development 
of the EU. Originally, the analytic focus of the OECD has been on the market economy 
but its scope is changing. The matrix is moving from consideration of each policy area 
within each member country to analyses of how various policy areas interact with each 
other across the countries. Such issues as effects of social policy and globalisation have 
become part of its matrix.  
One of the leading frameworks the OECD has advocated has been the knowledge-
based world economy. The mission of the Directorate for Science, Technology and 
Industry (STI) is to help OECD countries to understand and shape the evolution of a 
knowledge-based economy, and, to adapt national policies to achieve the highest 
innovation potential and seize opportunities provided by technological change and 
globalisation. The directorate provides indicators, analysis, recommendations and “soft-
law” guidelines to help governments to formulate policies on science, technology, 
innovation and industry issues. The Committee on Industry, Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship examines framework conditions for competitiveness in industry and 
services, productivity growth and the implications of globalisation and technological 
change. 
 
“Accelerating innovation and globalisation are transforming the drivers of economic 
growth and development in our time. The OECD is helping its member 
governments and other stakeholders to understand and, where necessary, influence 
these trends. A fact-based analysis and dialogue on these issues is more essential than 
ever to maintain the relevance and effectiveness of national policy making.”232 
 
The key question for the STI is how scientific research and technological innovation can 
best contribute to economic growth. One of the tasks is to examine innovative 
performance in individual OECD countries and in specific sectors, such as 
biotechnology, energy and knowledge-intensive services. It is also developing new 
approaches to assess the effectiveness of national science and innovation systems, 
including business research and development, public science systems and industry-
science linkage.  
                                                            
231 OECD 2007, p. 7. The key activities of the OECD are Economic Growth and Stability; 
Employment, Social Cohesion and Environment; International Trade and Taxation; Governance; 
Development of Non-Member Economies; Statistics; Communications. The members meet and 
exchange information in committees devoted to key issues, with decision-making power vested in the 
OECD Council.  It is composed of all the members under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, 
meeting regularly at the level of Permanent Representatives. At ministerial level the Council meets once 
a year. There are about 200 committees, working groups and expert groups in all. Some 40 000 senior 
officials from national administrations come to OECD committee meetings every year to request, 
review and contribute to the undertaken by the OECD secretariat.  
232 OECD 2006, p. 2. 
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In principle, the STI has three levels. First, it continues the methodological work 
related to statistics and databases.233 Second, it makes policy analyses and country 
reviews.234  
Third, it provides practical tools, recommendations, rules of the game.235 OECD’s 
way of working is based on a continued monitoring of events in its member countries as 
well as outside the OECD area, and includes regular projections of short, medium-term 
economic developments. The OECD Secretariat collects and analyses data, after which 
committees discuss policy regarding this information, the Council makes decisions, and 
then governments implement recommendations.  
It is also argued that the idea of science and technology policies only seems to be a 
newcomer because, in reality, it has been present before the Second World War. After 
the war a variety of interventions took a decided, organized and institutionalized form.236 
The widely used OECD- definition237 of science and technology policies means the 
collective measures taken by a government in order, first, to encourage the development 
of scientific and technical research and, second, to exploit the results of this research for 
general political objectives.  
These aspects are complementary, policy for science and technology (the provision of 
an environment fostering research activities) and policy through science and technology 
(the exploitation of discoveries and innovations in various sectors of government). 
Scientific and technological factors affect political decisions and, at the same time, they 
condition the development of economy, social life and also defense policy. The idea of 
science and technology policies is determined by the idea of a deliberate integration of 
scientific and technological activities into the fabric of political, military, economic and 
social decision.238 
Because of the differences in national histories, cultures and political contexts, there 
is a broad diversity among countries in their goals, priorities, directions, ranges and 
instruments and in the performance of science and technology policies. As Henry 
Ergas239 has pointed out, technology policy was linked in some countries to the 
objectives of national sovereignty and he calls them “mission oriented” countries (USA, 
UK, France) and “diffusion oriented” countries (Sweden, Germany, Switzerland). The 
countries belonging to the latter category are closely bound up with diffusing capabilities 
throughout the industrial structure and its development. Japan was for Ergas a category 
of its own because its technology policy was both mission-oriented and diffusion-
oriented.  
                                                            
233 This work includes revision of the OECD Oslo Manual on measuring Innovation; Publication of the 
biannual OECD Main Science and Technology indicators; Update of the OECD databases on Patents 
and Business R&D; Development of “blue sky indicators”( new indicators of policy and innovation 
performance).  
234 These analyses focus on Management of science and innovation systems; Public-private partnerships 
for research and innovation; Globalisation of R&D; Intellectual property rights (IPR), innovation and 
economic performance, management of IPR by public research institutions; Sectoral patterns of 
innovation, including innovation in services; Reviews of national innovation policy; International 
science and technology co-operation for sustainable development.  
235 This consists of guidelines to access to research data from public funding; country-specific 
recommendations for the improvement of innovation policy; evaluation and guidance on the effects of 
governments R&D funding on business R&D strategy.  
236 Lemola 2001a. 
237 See OECD 1963; OECD 1971. 
238 Salomon 1977. 
239 Ergas 1986.  
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The priorities of the OECD member countries were concentrated on the same 
technologies and it raised concerns about overcapacity. The new science and technology 
policy framework was also increasingly interventionist in the spirit of liberalism.240In the 
late 1980s the science and technology strategy in the OECD countries changed so that 
the ICT sector became a key to economic progress and a pillar of the knowledge-based 
economy. 
 
“Scientific advances and technological change are important drivers of recent 
economic performance. The ability to create, distribute and exploit knowledge has 
become a major source of competitive advantage, wealth creation and improvements 
in the quality of life. Some of the main features of this transformation are the growing 
impact of information and communications technologies (ICT) on the economy and 
on society; the rapid application of recent scientific advances in new products and 
processes; a high rate of innovation across OECD countries; a shift to more 
knowledge-intensive industries and services; and rising skill requirements.”241 
 
Later, this pillar has been constructed as a list of challenges for governments. 
Governments need to make public research more efficient, foster the diffusion of 
knowledge and address the interests of a more diversified set of stakeholders.  In other 
words, public research systems face new challenges of globalization because the 
globalization of scientific and innovation networks has become more and more 
important. This is particularly important for small and medium-size countries.  
Another cornerstone of science and technology policies in the OECD has been 
regionalization; it became, in particular, an important strategic aspect in all EU member 
countries in the 1990s. It included a lot of initiatives and interventions such as the 
creation of technical research centers and laboratories, technology transfer centers, 
commercial and technical assistance and information centers, venture capital funds, 
science parks and incubators. The EU policies consist of a lot of governmental issues 
such as best practices, assessment and evaluation.  
This was the background for the new science and technology policies. The OECD242 
countries started to put emphasis on the stimulation and support of industrial 
innovation as a major blanket element of national economic and industrial strategies. In 
particular, the new science and technology policies focused on the rapid development of 
new technologies and their application in the economy. It followed that governments 
became involved in planning, financing and managing large national programs related to 
promising technologies. This also widened the university-industry cooperation, and the 
governmental measures in relation to R&D included also application, diffusion and 
commercialization.  
As Keith Pavitt243 remarks in his analysis, the investments in basic research are totally 
different issues in the United States and in small countries. The small north-west 
countries like the Nordic countries, Netherlands and Switzerland are the world’s biggest 
investors in academic research and they have the biggest outputs without heavy 
investments of their own. The capacity to understand and use the results of basic 
research performed elsewhere requires considerable investments in institutions, skills, 
equipment and networks. Those countries have succeeded in producing considerable 
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242 OECD 1985; OECD 1988. 
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inputs into world class business firms in engineering, medical products, electronics and 
mobile telephone.  
Pavitt also refers to a “European Paradox” according to which Europe is strong in 
basic research but lacks the entrepreneurial capacities of the USA to transform it into 
innovation, growth and jobs. His conclusion is that although the US developed theory 
for the public support of basic research has held up well in practice it still has a lot of 
deficiencies. The US support of basic research has neglected the training of basic skills 
and it has not advocated the meaning of investments in supporting institutions, 
equipment and networks. All these issues are present in contemporary STI policies. 
 
4.2. NIS: A new political agenda for Finland 
 
The history of the Finnish science and technology policies starts with the foundation of 
the Royal Academy of Turku in 1640 as a Swedish university. It comprised four faculties 
and the main purpose of the Academy was to train clergy, civil servants, physicians and 
officers to convey and utilize the best available knowledge. When Finland became part 
of Russian Empire in 1809, Csar Alexander I expanded the university and in 1882 
higher education was moved to Helsinki.  
The new university was a community in favour of the Humboldtian ideals of science 
and culture, studying humanity and its living environment by means of scientific 
methods. Its task was to promote the development of “the Sciences and Humanities 
within Finland and, furthermore, educating the youth for the service of the Tsar and the 
Fatherland.” The University of Helsinki was the only university and higher education 
institution in Finland in those days  
The Helsinki school of Economics and the Technical school of Helsinki were 
founded in 1911. The Swedish-speaking Åbo Akademi was established 1917 and the 
University of Turku was opened in 1920. The basis of the existing structure of the 
Finnish universities started when the University of Oulu was established in 1959 and 
other new universities were established in the Middle and East Finland in the 1960s. 
Government research institutes have been a significant component of Finland’s 
research system. The establishment of the Geological Survey Centre of Finland, the 
Agricultural Research Centre, the State Forest Research institute, the Water Research 
institute, the Geodetic Institute, and the Meteorological Institute date back to the 19th 
century or the early 20th century.244 The Technical Research Centre of Finland was 
established in 1942, and there are nowadays around 30 government research institutes.  
The Academy of Finland was established in 1946 but at first it was only a college of 
recognized scientists and artists of exceptional merit. Later the Academy of Finland has 
become an important aspect of the Finnish research system. Before the 1960s there was 
no research policy in Finland, only two state research councils, one for the humanities 
and the social sciences and one for the natural sciences. In 1969, the number of research 
councils was raised to six including councils for the humanities, natural sciences, 
medicine, agriculture and forestry, technology, and social sciences.  
In terms of the institutionalization of science and technology policies, the 1960s and 
the 1970s were important for Finland although the development was slower than in 
many more developed OECD countries. The reason for organizational and institutional 
reforms in economic policy and social policy as well as in other sectors of the public 
administration was economic. Finland’s production structure was very narrow and very 
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much dependent on the forest industry and its level of technology was also very low 
compared to the country’s other competitors.  
Science and technology was seen as an instrument of industrial renewal and Sweden 
became a model for implementing those reforms. The Keynesian growth policy played 
also an important role by advocating government intervention in supporting and 
promoting the innovative activity of firms.245 But what occurred in Finland in the 
1960s? 
Jussi Välimaa246 has in his analysis of the history of Finnish higher education stressed 
two issues. The national university was politically and culturally an important locus in 
the making of Finnish national identity. Probably this aspect has strengthened the high 
social status that universities and higher education degrees enjoy in Finland. Another 
important aspect of the history of higher education in Finland is that it follows the logic 
of expansion in the 20th century. At the end of the century the number of universities 
has grown from one university to 20 universities and 32 polytechnics and the number of 
students from 2300 to 248900 students. The establishment of the new university 
network in the 1960s and 1970s was based on the idea that the founding of a university 
was seen symbolically, culturally and economically important to the development of a 
given region. All this was a sort of implementation of a welfare-state agenda; to create 
equal educational opportunities, including equal access to higher education, became an 
important object of that agenda.  
When analyzing the historical development of the Finnish science and technology 
policies, Tarmo Lemola calls this Finnish development in the 1960s and 1970s as a 
preparation phase including three important aspects in the 1960s. The first aspect was 
linked with the development of higher education and the renewal of universities which 
started in the 1950s and continued until the1970s. There were three reasons for the 
renewal. First, there was a growing awareness of the importance of higher education and 
basic research for economic and industrial development. Second, there was a political 
pressure to expand the Finnish university system outside Helsinki in order to boost more 
equal regional development. Third, to find a solution for the pressure of the large post-
war generation was a social and political necessity. 
The second aspect was the establishment of the Science Policy Council in 1963; the 
prime minister as a chairman, four other ministers, and the chairmen of six research 
councils. In the beginning the Council was concentrating on the development of 
research under the Ministry of Education. The Council had no funds of its own and no 
direct administrative authority, but its opinions and recommendations had a great 
weight. The most visible role the Council has been to initiate science and technology 
policy programs. 
The third aspect was the establishment of the six research councils in which new 
mechanisms for planning, coordination, and financing R&D were created. The reform 
of research councils was oriented to the development of basic research carried out in the 
universities but the preparations with the aim of improving the conditions of industrial 
R&D started also. The establishment of the Finnish National Fund for Research and 
Development (SITRA) in 1967 was part of it.  
All these aspects constitute a kind of basis for the Finnish science and technology 
policies. In reality, the start-up of the Finnish science and technology policies was full of 
disputes and contradictions and there were several competing ideas and aspirations on 
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how to organize the development of the Finnish system.247 One model was to build on 
the universities without any central national agency. Its advocators wanted to put 
emphasis on the development of university education rather than on the development of 
university research. Another model very much supported by governmental research 
institutes was based on the idea that universities should concentrate on education and 
the role of governmental research institutes must be increased. The third model was 
based on the development of the Science Policy Council that would be a centralized 
science and technology agency independent of sectoral ministries.  
The result was a dualistic structure with a particular policy domain for science and a 
particular policy domain for technology. The original idea of centering the governance 
around the Science Policy Council, the Ministry of Education, and the Academy of 
Finland failed because particular strong interest groups linked with technical and 
industrial R&D managed to intervene and introduced their own model. Simultaneously, 
since 1968 the Ministry of Trade and Industry began to support research and product 
development of firms, and it also received an additional resource for goal-oriented 
technical research.  
The Finnish science policy had now four levels. The first level, the Science Policy 
Council chaired by the prime minister, became a high-level political body which 
introduced the Finnish science and technology policy guidelines. The second level was 
divided into two sectors: the Ministry of Education took a special role as a coordinator 
in science policy, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry coordinated as a coordinator 
in technology policy. The third level was the financing level in which the Academy of 
Finland and the Ministry of Trade and Industry together with SITRA played an 
important role. The fourth level was comprised of the universities, government research 
institutes, and companies. This organizational structure was to become the basis of the 
Finnish science and technology policies later. 
At the turn of the 1970s the Finnish science and technology policy was characterized 
as “the years of rationalization and planning”.248 At the end of 1960s the research 
councils were encouraged to draw up science policy programs in their own sectors but 
the results were poor. The next planning round was clearly influenced by the Brooks 
Report249 and the first Finnish national science policy program was published by the 
Science Policy Council in 1972. Interestingly, the major task of science policy was to 
estimate on the basis of general social policy, the need for research in various disciplines 
and allocate resources on the basis of these estimations.250  
What was distinctive to the Finnish science and technology policies in the 1980s was 
the promotion of governmental interventions focusing on industrial innovation. In 
other words, the new thematic core of the technology policy was the competitiveness of 
industry. Its focus was on the development and application of new technologies, and its 
motivation, as mentioned earlier, was based on the Japanese economic and technological 
success.  
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250 See Salomon 1977. The program was also the first Finnish plan for increasing the financing of R&D 
from 0.9 % of the GNP- share in 1971 to 1.7 % in 1980. But the program was not implemented and 
R&D expenditure in 1979 was only 1.1 % of the GNP, one of the lowest among the OECD countries. 
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Due to the recession in the mid-1970s the development of the Finnish economy was 
slow and the attempts to accelerate scientific and technological development 
unsuccessful. There was a national consensus on the necessity for technological 
development and a clear pressure to find a new way for science and technology policies. 
The report of the Technology Committee is an excellent example of those political 
changes.251 Its key conclusion was to stress the significance of information technology, 
and the applications and recommendations suggested include the strengthening of 
science and technology policy by increasing resources and emphasising the fields of high 
technology.  
One of the most important consequences of the committee was that it led to the 
formation of the National Technology Agency (TEKES) after the Swedish model, the 
Board for Technical Development 1983. TEKES is by now the key planner and 
executor of the new technology-oriented policy. R&D loans and grants, as well as 
appropriations for goal-oriented technical research were assigned to TEKES. The 
development of national technology programs, following the models of Sweden and 
Japan, became a new and important policy instrument for TEKES.  The national 
technology programs have been very influential in terms of increasing national 
cooperation between companiess, research institutes and universities. TEKES has also 
been a national instrument for the development of international cooperation and it had 
an important role in organizing Finland’s participation in Eureka in 1985 as well as in 
preparing the country’s participation in the European Union’s research framework after 
1987.  
The late 1980s also saw the creation of new programs and organizations associated 
with technology transfer, diffusion and commercialization. The nation-wide networks of 
technology parks and centres of expertise were set up in Finland simultaneously. The 
technology parks have introduced many new instruments for commercializing products 
and initiated spin-off projects and incubators. The venture capital market has been less 
developed in Finland. As a symbol of the technology orientation of the 1980s the name 
of the Science Policy Council was changed in 1987 into the Science and Technology 
Policy Council. 
 
A determined shift to the NIS framework  
 
In the late 1980s the Finnish economic development was rapid: the share of knowledge-
intensive production grew, technical development was rapid, and productivity growth 
was faster than in the OECD countries in average.252 The growth of the metals and 
engineering industry in the 1980s was 50 % and the electronics industry grew by 150 
%. The share of high-technology products in industrial exports in 1980 was 4 % and in 
1990 11 %.  
The reviews of the 1990`s Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland in 
1990, 1993, 1996 and 2000 provide a comprehensive picture of how the strategies of 
the Finnish STI policies changed.253 The profits of paper industry exports was higher 
than that of Finland’s rivals, and the growth rate of Finnish patenting in the United 
States was one of the fastest in the world. Finland was labelled “Japan of the North”. But 
in the early 1990s everything changed. Finland’s gross domestic product declined 20 per 
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cent between the years 1991-1993, the stock market collapsed, the value of the Finnish 
currency was 40 per cent from the level prevailing at the beginning of the decade, 
foreign debt and the budget deficit grew rapidly, unemployment approached 20 per cent 
and the country’s banking system was in a deep crisis.  
Finland recovered from the crisis surprisingly quickly. One important factor was the 
rapid growth in exports. In the late 1990s export accounted for a larger share of the 
GDP than ever, and the growth of the ICT cluster, in particular, was phenomenal. The 
share of the ICT cluster is nowadays the largest export industry, and the traditional 
paper industry less than one quarter. But there was also another big surprise behind the 
corner waiting for Finland: the big ICT bubble in 2001. This implied a severe recession 
with a lot of bankrupties and unemployment in the ICT sector. 254 But the late 1990s 
reveal a strong faith on the ICT sector and the promises of new economy, as it was 
called. Many economists were very suspicious of the new paradigm and criticized its 
rationale later with well-reasoned arguments.255 
It is often claimed very convincingly that one particular company, Nokia, played an 
important role in Finland’s recovery from recession.256 The development of the Finnish 
science and technology policies in the 1990`s is linked closely with the Finnish system of 
organizing the governing of science and technology policies. The cornerstone of the 
Finnish system is the Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland: the scopes, 
ideals, goals and objectives of the Finnish application of NIS adhere strongly to several 
suggestions that the Council has made since 1990.257 The role of the Council together 
with two ministries, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Education, 
has proved to be essential in terms of the strategic and operational management of the 
Finnish application of NIS.258  
The Finnish application of the concept “national innovation system” has stressed 
that a national innovation system is a whole set of factors influencing the development 
and utilization of new knowledge and know-how. The advantage of the concept is that it 
allows us combine all these factors and examine it as a system. It follows that the 
prevailing atmosphere in society influences the production and application of new 
knowledge as well as interaction and cooperation between different actors play an 
important role in NIS. As the internationalization process influences the activities of an 
innovation system and it means that there is a need to improve conditions creating 
innovations nationally. In this period the ethos hidden in the idea of the national 
innovation system was strongly linked with the idea of linking the idea of science and 
technology policies with the idea of public policy.  
The introduction of NIS in Finland has been a long process comprising a series of 
interventions in which the scopes, goals and measures seeking to construct a new culture 
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of innovation have been specified and focused. One very important change in terms of 
specifying the idea of innovation policy occurred in the mid 1990s when the Science 
and Technology Policy Council introduced the concept of a knowledge-based society as 
a complementary concept into the national innovation system. This new strategy was 
very much in line with the Finnish national strategy for information society introduced 
in 1995.  
This new strategy following carefully the recommendation of the OECD puts 
emphasis on the significance of learning and knowledge, instead of information, and 
allowed to link employment with STI policies. The point was that knowledge-intensive 
growth has a strong influence on the national economy but labour market measures do 
not ensure adequate preconditions for knowledge-intensive growth. Therefore, there is a 
need for various innovation policy measures relating to R&D, education, competitive 
conditions, laws and regulations for the protection of intellectual property, national and 
international cooperation networks, and technology transfer and exploitation.259 
The adoption of NIS in Finland can be seen as a cyclic policy process in which the 
reviews published by the Science and Technology Policy Council illustrate the phases of 
the process exhaustively.  
The first cycle, the introduction of the concept of a national system of innovation in 
1990, stressed that the factors influencing the development and utilization of the new 
knowledge and expertise need to be located. In other words, the emphasis was more on 
thematic level: the mission was that the issues must be taken seriously under 
consideration. In terms of legitimation it is worth noting that the Cabinet Economic 
Policy Committee defined in 1992 that the NIS is a central developmental target in the 
preparation and pursuit of economic policy. It was also the point of departure for the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry to industrial policy.260 
The second cycle, introduced in 1993, set its focus on structural policies. The 
concern for economic policy and its development was the issue number one. The review 
of 1993 stressed the significance of knowledge and know-how as the cornerstones of 
international success. This implied the development of knowledge-intensive regions and 
fields within the Finnish know-how context, particularly in information, materials and 
biotechnology. Also, the investments in R&D and education sector were mentioned as 
means to improve the Finnish position in the global market.  
One explanation for this interpretation is naturally the deep economic recession in 
Finland in the beginning of the1990s. The political point was to connect the NIS 
framework with both the structural development of the Finnish political governance and 
that of the Finnish industry. This coupling was justified with the efficiency argument 
and the problems of the public sector in general. Another important aspect of the 
Finnish situation was the heavy unemployment problem Finland faced. The country’s 
membership in the EU in 1995 also changed definitively the R&D- policy climate in 
Finland. 
The third cycle, introduced in 1996, sets the focus on the interactions between 
various actors in the context of innovation; both sides, those who produce knowledge 
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and those who utilize knowledge, must be included under the umbrella of NIS. The 
1996 review is in many ways the most significant only and it can be seen as a theoretical 
and practical attempt to link the NIS framework with the Information Society 
framework. The review strongly stresses the significance of innovations and innovation 
activity, and the competitive challenges hidden in the information society spread rapidly 
across the society. Interestingly, the review suggests a set of fundamental concepts to be 
used: the national innovation system (NIS), the regional innovation system (RIS), the 
industrial policy based on clusters, networks as a kind of imperative to interaction, 
know-how and expertise as a precondition of inventions, innovation and national 
competitiveness.  
The fourth cycle, introduced in 2000, focused on strengthening the interaction 
modes and models between various actors. The NIS remained the central concept by 
which the Finnish science, technology and innovation policy and the long-term 
strategies must be set up. The interesting feature in the review was that it stressed 
strongly the regional aspect and regional development: all science parks and centres of 
regional expertise were to be essential elements in the innovation system. The strategic 
focus was now in regions and in the future. The 2000 review interestingly illustrates the 
normative dimensions of innovation policy. The text is written as if there was a strong 
consensus about the innovation policy strategy. In other words, one important phase of 
innovation policy was completed; it has a strong legitimation in Finland and the next 
step is to continue the policy implementation. 
The fifth cycle, introduced in the 2003 review, is of a great interest because the 
Finnish innovation policy seems to change the course totally. If the earlier reviews 
stressed explicitly the interactive role of technology and economy, the 2003 review 
stresses exclusively the social aspects of such a policy. The speciality of the 2003 review is 
the introduction of the idea of social innovation as an essential aspect of the innovation 
policy. It means that the term of NIS and, in particular, the idea of an “innovative 
system”, must be replaced with a new term, “innovative environments”. The fifth cycle 
can be seen as a preliminary arrangement for a totally new approach and mentality.   
In other words, the political agenda of STI policies has become now closer to public 
policies rather than science and technology policies. Its vocabularies are inherently 
“social” and its ideological emphasis is on such issues as “social capital”, “institutional 
reforms”, “the new public sector“, “creativity and learning”.261 Its core focuses more on 
the interaction between the private, public and third sector, and its ideological aim 
seems to be to open the locks of routines, habits and institutions.    
 
4.3. EU and the horizontal innovation policy 
 
If the focus of traditional science and technology policies was on the generation of 
scientific knowledge and fostering industrial applications seeking to support 
technological innovations, the idea of innovation policy in the EU is different. Its major 
aim is to pay attention to the interactive and systemic characteristics of innovation 
processes and their institutional, organisational and social backgrounds.262 
This wider perspective emphasizes the utilisation of technologies in the economy and 
society, entailing a need for a closer integration and tighter integration of these policies 
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and other policy domains.263 This horizontal aspect of innovation policies has generated 
a lot of discussion on the contents and structures of innovation policies.264 
It is very apparent that the idea of innovation policy is linked with some other 
developments in the OECD. These links become obvious if we examine closer the other 
OECD directorate, the Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate 
(GOV). It identifies changing societal and market needs and helps countries adapt their 
governmental systems and territorial polices. This involves improving government 
efficiency while protecting and promoting society’s longer-term governance values.  
GOV provides various forums where countries can exchange ideas on how to address 
the governance challenges they face. The two committees – the Public Governance 
committee and the Territorial Development Policy committee - and several specialist 
groups aim at improved public sector governance through comparative data and analysis, 
the setting and promotion of standards, and the facilitation of transparency and peer 
review. It promotes understanding of the dynamics of public management and territorial 
development policies in different societal and market conditions, and to safeguard the 
long-term interests of all citizens. 
 
“In today's fast-moving world, governments need to rethink their role to meet the 
challenges posed by forces such as globalisation, decentralisation, new technologies, 
and the changing needs, expectations and influence of citizens. Good governance 
principles transform not only the relationship between governments, citizens and 
parliaments, but the effective functioning of government itself. These principles are: 
respect for the rule of law; openness, transparency and accountability to democratic 
institutions; fairness and equity in dealings with citizens, including mechanisms for 
consultation and participation; efficient, effective services; clear, transparent and 
applicable laws and regulations; consistency and coherence in policy formation; and 
high standards of ethical behaviour. The OECD seeks to analyse and develop 
solutions to the common challenges and needs of governments, and to promote good 
practices that enhance the effectiveness of democratic institutions. Work on public 
governance includes activities on e-government, regulatory reform, public sector 
budgeting and management, citizen participation in policymaking, and fighting 
corruption.” 265 
 
These two aspects of innovation policy have been embedded in the whole idea of NIS. 
The horizontal aspect of innovation has been also the essential part of European 
integration and a cornerstone for new political European governance.  
It is worth noting that the birth of the European Union is closely linked with the 
history of the OEEE and the OECD. In 1950, the French Foreign Minister proposed 
integrating the coal and steel industries in Western Europe. In 1951, the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up by Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands with Jean Monnet as its first President. In 1957 the 
same six countries signed the Treaty of Rome266, creating the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The 
explicit aim of the treaty was to create a “common market”.  
In 1967, the institutions of the three European communities emerged:there was now 
a single commission, a single Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
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Subsequently, open co-ordination has been applied to the fields of social exclusion 
and poverty, to the development of the Information Society, to the Internal Market, to 
risk capital markets, to R&D, and to innovation.  
The whole history of the European Union’s innovation policy starts from the year 
1995 when the Green Paper on Innovation was published. The First Action Plan for 
Innovation in Europe was published in 1996. In order to contribute the idea of 
innovation policy the European Commission has used a broad of set of policy 
instruments.  
The Commission is responsible for Annual Country Reports which highlight 
innovation policy trends and priorities seeking to progress towards the relevant Lisbon 
objectives. It also produces European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) which is the main 
statistical tool of the “European Trend Chart on Innovation” under four categories: 
human resources, creation of new knowledge, transmission and application of 
knowledge, innovation finance, outputs and markets. A very important policy tool 
related to EIS is Trend Chart workshops which provide policy makers with the 
opportunity to embark on intelligent benchmarking. Together with the National 
Innovation Policy Database and EIS, the workshops build up a comprehensive picture 
of innovation policies across Europe. Those workshops can be seen as an 
implementation of the “open co-ordination” approach laid down by the Lisbon Council 
in 2000.269  
The importance of the innovation policy becomes apparent if we analyze the 
Communication from the Commission in 2003270. The objective of the Communication 
is to describe the diverse routes to innovation and analyze the consequences for the 
design of innovation policy and to find new means by which innovation policy is put 
into action. The important point is that structures, problems and opportunities relating 
to innovations are not necessarily similar in all the world’s major economic areas. While 
innovation policy takes place mostly at the national and regional levels, the aim of the 
Communication is to intensify co-operation for the strengthening of innovation in the 
EU.  
After the Lisbon strategy achieving the world reference for innovation performance is 
the ultimate and explicit aim for the EU. It strives to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. It represents an opportunity that 
means also better living standard over the coming years.  
According to the Communication, R&D is an essential factor for long-term growth 
and European prosperity. If the innovation policy was based earlier on the linear model 
of innovation, now the design of policies must be based on a totally different approach. 
It follows that the design of public policy becomes the most important asset among the 
political instruments available. The aim is to encourage and support innovative 
enterprises as much as possible.  
                                                            
269  The European Commission also publishes communications and consultations on innovation. The 
list of communications provides a good picture of the European innovation policy: Communication 
“Innovation and Growth” 1998, Communication “Innovation in knowledge-driven economy”2000, 
Communication “Innovation policy: Updating the Union’s approach in the context of the Lisbon 
strategy” 2003, Communication “More Research and Innovation - on the Implementation of the 
Community Lisbon Programme 2005, Communication “Putting knowledge into practice: A broad-
based innovation strategy for the EU” 2006.  
270  EU – The European Commission (2003e). There are also many other documents available but their 
content is very similar to this one. Recently, there has been a lot of critical discussion concerning the 
Lisbon strategy. As a strategy it has been too ambitious and uncritical.   
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In other words, the design of public policy should be addressed to understand and 
analyse the weaknesses of innovation in the European context. The designers of this 
policy must ask: what is the real nature of the innovation process and what are actions 
that could be taken. They must identify effective responses and implement them in 
order to be able to design the political context that will contributes novelty. 
The Communication stresses that the innovation phenomenon is multidimensional 
and that it sets pressures to those responsible for designing public policy. Although the 
route from an invention in the laboratory to innovation is an important aspect of 
innovation, the main problem is the phenomenon itself. Radical innovations are rare 
and they are often based on the findings of new high technology. Usually, innovations 
are incremental, based on a long series of small steps and it makes the design of public 
policy difficult.  
The Communication stresses that while research is a major contributor to 
innovation, it is only a starting point. Without entrepreneurial action there is no value 
creation and no innovation. The other side of this is that the speed and efficiency of 
diffusion of innovation through economy are critical to productivity and economic 
growth. It follows that the critical aspects of innovation competition and imitation, are 
both equally important.  
The both descriptions of the innovation process – the linear and systemic models - 
highlight R&D as a decisive factor. However, those models usually forget other aspects 
of innovation. Capacities and performance in non-technological forms of innovation, 
and market factors are not present in them and thus unsubject to analysis. This may 
explain why the data from countries do not match with their performance and strong 
economic growth.  
In terms of the design of public policy the innovation terrain is very complex, but the 
Communication wants to highlight three main dimensions to be focused on in the 
future. The first is the “policy governance” dimension. This means that the policy 
should influence the innovation capabilities and behaviour of enterprises at local, 
regional, national, EU or even global level. The coherence and complementariness of the 
different levels is the key point. The second dimension is sectoral and includes many 
factors affecting different industrial sectors that must be recognized and whose relative 
weight must be considered in each sector. The third dimension is interaction with other 
policy areas. Innovation policy must be implemented via other policies and, therefore, 
innovation concepts must be increasingly embedded in these policy areas, according to 
the Communication. The main obstacle to effective policy is that while innovation is 
everywhere, it is nowhere.  
The earlier Communication 2000 identified271 that there are five priorities to steer 
action in Member State and EU-level actions: a) the coherence of innovation policies, b) 
a regulatory framework conducive to innovation, c) the creation and growth of 
innovative enterprises, d) the improvement of key interfaces in the innovation system, 
and e) the need to encourage societies to be open for innovation. This means that the 
diversity of public policies that have influenced or may potentially influence on 
innovation performance must be put on the centre of analysis.272 The Communication 
2003 suggests that the Member States should build and strengthen innovation strategies 
by adopting an approach that is well co-ordinated across all government departments 
with areas of responsibility having a bearing on the conditions for innovation. It 
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mentions that the Science and Technology Policy Council in Finland as an example of 
good practice and suggests similar actions to other countries. The second aspect of 
systemic policy-making is a better integration of research, innovation and competition 
policy. It follows that the “vertical” coordination and the specification of mechanisms 
related to that coordination are of a great importance because they interlock EU, 
national and regional levels.  One implication is that there is a clear need for more 
adequate analyses and utilization of statistics dealing with innovation, innovation 
systems and innovation performance.  
The underlying point in finding new directions for European innovation policy 
development is that the innovation imperative must be developed further. This means 
that the European Union must focus on competition policy; it is one of the main factors 
of innovation. Another key is the Internal Market policy. A wellfunctioning Internal 
Market, without barriers to trade across borders, encourages competition in goods, 
services, capital and the mobility of people. It is also important to develop a European 
Regional Development Fund towards the encouragement of innovation and to create an 
environment favourable to enterprises by developing better taxation policy. This 
involves many changes in existing policy areas. In particular, the instruments available in 
fiscal policy must be considered thoroughly.273  
The Communication 2003 lists a variety of suggestions to be implemented as soon as 
possible in order achieve the goals of the Lisbon strategy. The list includes a set of 
actions in pursuit of better performance: 1) the stimulation of greater market dynamism, 
2) the promotion of innovation in the public sector, 3) the strengthening of the regional 
dimension of innovation policy. A successful innovation policy could help to reduce the 
productivity gap between the Union and the major economic areas such as the United 
States but only if the European characteristics suggested by the European social model 
are recognized. 
Evidently the innovation policy has been an important aspect of policy making in 
the EU following the Lisbon strategy. Interestingly, it has become the ideological and 
political core from which variety of policy aspects are reflected and assessed. The Lisbon 
strategy and the implementation of innovation policies have been subjected to criticism. 
Wim Kok’s high level group has suggested274 that the strategy must be sharpened by 
focusing on economic growth and employment. It follows that the strategy should 
address to five areas: the knowledge society, the internal market, the business climate, 
the labour market and environmental sustainability. In order to achieve the goals of 
higher growth and increased employment, powerful, committed and convincing political 
leadership is required. Members states and the European Commission must re-double 
their efforts to make change happen. The group criticizes that the Lisbon strategy was 
loaded with too many goals, its coordination has been weak and the priorities have been 
mixed.  
The innovation policy in the EU has also been a subject for criticism in Finland. The 
expert group chaired by Esko Aho275 presented a strategy to create an Innovative Europe. 
To achieve this goal requires a combination of a market for innovative goods and 
services, focused resources, new financial structures, and mobility of people, money and 
organisations. These constitute a paradigm shift that goes well beyond the narrow 
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domain of R&D and innovation policy. One of their central recommendations is a Pact 
for research and innovation in which the efforts should be addressed to three areas. 
The first recommendation is the creation of an innovation-friendly market for 
businesses in Europe. This needs actions on regulation, standards, public procurement, 
intellectual property and fostering a culture that supports innovation. The second 
recommendation involves the 3 per cent target as an indicator of innovative Europe but 
it is not sufficient. Measures to increase resources for excellent science, industrial R&D 
and the science-industry nexus are needed. The third recommendation relates to 
mobility. It means that the measures improving the mobility of human resources are 
needed. Europe also needs a more effective venture capital sector and new financial 
instruments for its knowledge-based economy. It also means that the existing barriers 
and structures preventing interaction and networking must be abolished. Innovative 
Europe is possible only if these recommendations are taken seriously.276  
 
The European commission advocates the new programme in the following manner:  
 
“The Lisbon European Council of March 2000 set the objective of making Europe 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge- based economy in the world by the 
year 2010. 
By strongly and firmly placing competitiveness at the heart of the European political 
agenda, the reinvigorated 'Lisbon process' aims at making Europe a more attractive 
place to invest, by boosting the entrepreneurial initiative and creating a productive 
environment where innovation capacity can grow and develop. In order to fully meet 
the Lisbon goals, a particular attention has been given to ensuring coherence and 
synergy among all actions implemented at the EC level in the field of innovation and 
competitiveness. Following the recommendations of the 2003 Spring Council, the 
European Commission has decided to put forward a proposal for the implementation 
of a Competitiveness and Innovation framework Programme (CIP) which is meant to 
become the main legal basis grouping all Community actions in the field of 
innovation and competitiveness.”277 
 
                                                            
276 In October 2006, the European Commission has adopted a decision on establishing Competitiveness 
and Innovation framework Programme (CIP) for the period 2007-2013. The program provides a 
coherent framework for all Community actions implemented in the field of entrepreneurship, SMEs, 
industrial competitiveness, innovation, ICT development and use, environmental technologies and 
intelligent energy. The final budget for the CIP is 3.62 billion euros. The programme is structured 
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focussing on SMEs; The ICT Policy Support Programme, to support the adoption of ICTs in business, 
administrations and public sector services; The Intelligent Energy Europe Programme. 
277 EU – The European Commission, 2006. 
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5. THE FINNISH CLUSTER POLICY 
AND THE WELFARE CLUSTER CASE 
 
5.1. Transition to cluster framework in the finnish industrial policy 
 
In Finland the development of the cluster approach has been a long process that has 
links with industrial policy renewal in the early 1990s.278 The Finnish industrial policy 
renewal had two origins. Firstly, it was clearly a genuine enterprise to find a new broader 
approach to an old policy in which the forestry and metals industry were the two pillars 
of economy and, secondly, it was an essential part of implementing the NIS paradigm in 
general.  
The “NIS thinking” had gradually entered policy discussions and it was easy for 
policy makers to adopt the cluster approach. While earlier interventions were very 
practical, the 1996 Science and technology policy council review (STPC review 1996) 
discussed clusters at a general level. The main objective for the inter-ministry cluster-
based programmes was to improve collaboration between the various ministries and 
sectors of government.  
The idea of those programmes is of course based on the cluster approach but their 
primary aim was to open up a totally new arena for science and technology policy 
developments. The programmes wanted to gather all the stake holders - research 
institutes and companies - but also sectoral government research laboratories and users 
together so that joint projects could be planned and executed.  
By introducing the inter-ministerial cluster programmes the government wanted  to 
duplicate work that had been done earlier. The management of these programmes was 
carried out by programme steering committees, comprised of the funding organisations 
and the major stakeholders. The specific objective of those programmes was to create 
and improve linkages between government (ministries), research and industry. The 
political aspects of the Finnish cluster programmes were versatile. They provided a 
totally new approach to emerging industrial contexts and they opened up new political 
instruments to integrate science and technology policies in a new way. In other words, 
these programmes strongly advocated cross-disciplinary thinking and new alliances 
between actors. 
Within the history of Finnish industrial policies the cluster programme was a chain 
in a long process. The idea of industrial policy was introduced in Finland as late as in 
1969 when KTM-68 committee published its report.279 The report was important in the 
sense that it lists a set of suggestions to be involved in the totality of industrial policy. It 
makes a clear distinction between industrial and technology policies and, in particular, it 
recommends the development of R&D policies in Finland as soon as possible. 
According to the report the concept of industrial policy comprises the following 
elements: funding, R&D- system, education and energy policies.  
It is worth noting that the KTM-68 report illustrates the Finnish political culture 
and the committee system as an essential aspect of policymaking. The committee system 
was an essential aspect of policy making at the time and offered a forum for introducing 
new ideas and reforms to Finland as well as illustrating the controversies embedded in 
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politics. The Finnish committee system has been an important part of the Finnish 
political culture; it has served as a sort of mediator between the interest groups and the 
government.280 Also, the system has been important in terms of preparing various 
reforms and initiations and developing existing political practices. The reports of 
committee also illustrate the development of political practices in Finland.281 
In the 1970s the governance of the Ministry of Trade and Industry was re-
institutionalized by differentiating two departments: Industries Department and 
Technology Department.282 The establishment of KERA (Fund for underdevelopment 
areas) in 1971 and the post-1975 new legislation on regional planning intensified the 
development of regions.  
In the 1970s one of the most difficult political issues in Finland was the problem of 
European integration. In 1973, when Finland became a member of EEC and Urho 
Kekkonen was re-elected as President with the help of an emergency law extending his 
presidency by four years mainly due to these problems. The ethos of the Finnish system 
of political governance was in the 1970s very much that of “rational planning”.283 
Interestingly, the aims of industrial policy were justified by a set of economic theories in 
which the aims of structural policies were linked with the allocation problem of national 
economy. Both Unto Lund284 and Reino Hjerppe285 stress in their dissertations that 
structural planning must be based on the idea of efficient resource allocation. One of the 
basic issues in economics is the scarcity problem that requires answers to three questions: 
what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to produce. There are a variety of 
schools in economics stressing different aspects of those questions.  
In principle, there are two general paradigms, the paradigm of distribution and the 
paradigm of production, and the points that scholars from schools are similar in many 
respects. Lund points out that the task of economics is to find means and instruments 
for economic policy. He stresses the significance of long-term forecasting and linear 
programming and suggests a list of economic areas to be applied in allocating resources 
in government economic policy.286 Another interesting example is Hjerppe’s and O.E. 
Niitamo’s study on the exploitation of economics in societal planning in which they 
advocate the idea of operational research as an ideal of organizing the follow-up system 
by utilizing the capacities of computers.  
This kind of functional approach was very much in fashion among the social 
scientists in the 1970s. The task of social sciences was to introduce a variety of methods 
that would describe “the state of affairs in society”. It followed that the development of 
                                                            
280 The committee system was suspended in the 1980s and the contemporary system favours one-man 
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281 Tuori, K. 1983. 
282 The aims of industrial policy were listed as follows: the strengthening of competitiveness and 
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social indicators, input- output analyses, means-end hierarchies and systems of 
programming was seen as a legitimate function for the social sciences. The fundamental 
idea was to create a set of instrumental and rational instruments for linear and cybernetic 
planning systems.287  
This idea of social planning was strong in Finland in the 1960s and it became one of 
the most important instruments in terms of developing public administration. The 
requirement for the relevance of social research elicited the growth of demand for 
expertise in social sciences. The purpose of planning was to improve coordination in 
public administration by introducing a set of appropriate means based on scientific 
analysis to be utilized in pursuit of achieving the goals set by politicians. The planning 
ideology was, on the one hand, based on the idea of the Nordic welfare state and, on the 
other hand, on the reforms in accountancy and financial administration in the public 
sector.288 From the scholars’ point of view the idea was the “scientification” of welfare 
issues to legitimate a variety of social policy reforms a piecemeal social engineering.289 
While the planning ideology was full of optimism, it was also full of contradictions 
and controversies. In particular, it illustrates nicely the bureaucratic and technocratic 
tendencies of capitalism that Weber calls the problem of rationalization. In reality, the 
expectations were too high on both sides, and there was a lot of disappointment within 
the political governance; the view of scholars themselves was also very critical. Their 
critique focused on such issues as the problems of power, democracy and participation, 
the inconvenience of instrumental rationality and alternatives for incrementalism, the 
problems of strategic planning and rational decision making.290 This was also in line with 
the OECD recommendations highlighting the significance of centralized planning and 
coordination in the 1970s.  
The renewal of industrial policy in the 1980s was based on the recommendations of 
two committees: the report of Technology committee and that of KTM-81.291 The 
Technology Committee was a grand committee with a variety of subsections that had 
representatives from industries, commerce and administration, political parties as well as 
from research institutes and universities. According to the report the aim of industrial 
policy is to create a favourable environment for entrepreneurship and investments by 
linking the development of new technology with economic growth. The conclusion was 
that Finland must raise the GDP share of R&D expenditure to 2.0 per cent and increase 
public funding in education significantly. 
The report claimed that the most important area in economic growth was a high-
tech aggregate of microelectronics, telecommunications and industrial automation. The 
definition of policy was strongly based on the “picking the winners” ideology but it also 
included the know-how related to science. In the regional policy the focus must be set 
on technology transfer and subsidiary policies; the argumentation was now based on 
development and geographical theories rather than on economic theories.292 
If the idea of the Technology committee was to introduce new horizons for science 
and technology policies, the KTM-81 committee was an explicit intervention to pursuit 
of renew the political administration of science and technology policies. The central aim 
of industrial policy was now the enhancement of the growth of productivity, the 
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competitiveness of industry and its structure. In terms of industrial policies the most 
important aim is, on the one hand, to specify the focus and, on the other hand, to link 
other policy sectors with the aims of that policy. The task of industrial policy is to 
provide a horizontal strategy in which all other policy areas were part of that policy. This 
same goal was also strong in the 1993 strategy of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
The committee recommended that the cooperation between the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry and the Ministry of Education would be re-organized so that the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry were responsible for reparations of technology policies. This aim 
became concrete after the establishment of the Science and Technology Policy Council 
in 1986. The birth of the Council was interesting because the representatives of science 
policy were strongly against the idea. The work of the Council was organized so that the 
prime minister was its chairman. There were also two secretaries-general, the other 
representing the Ministry of Trade and Industry, focusing on the science policy issues, 
and the other representing the Ministry of Education, focusing on technology policy 
issues.  
The Science and Technology Policy Council increased the reconciliation of science 
and technology policies and clearly highlighted the significance of economic and 
technological elements in science policy. It is worth noting that in the 1980s there was a 
clear tendency to find scientific justification for technology policy.  
One of the first attempts was Raimo Lovio’s and Lemola’s study293 in 1984 in which 
they stressed the meaning of innovations and the significance of public technology 
policy in terms of the national economy and its success. It was extremely important, the 
scholars argued, that Finland must raise its investments in natural sciences and 
technology as well as in education. One of the major problems of the Finnish industrial 
policy was that it was strongly based on singular industries and homogenous products 
rather than on heterogeneous combinations between them.  
The report is important in many respects. First, it introduced a totally new approach 
to industrial policy based on the ideas of Freeman’s school and evolutionary economics. 
Second, it also introduced an idea of industrial complexities, very close to the idea of 
cluster. Third, it highlighted the significance of collaboration between users and 
producers as a precondition for industrial policy. Fourth, it advocated the idea of 
networking between branches of industries as well as advocating the meaning of 
cooperation between various ministries.  
In the late 1980s the focus of industrial policy was again on politics because of the 
change in international contexts. It also expanded the domain of industrial policy 
towards European integration and internationalization. The vision for Finland294 
highlighted two issues: the change of international context and the idea of creating the 
Internal Market in Europe. One of the cornerstones of industrial policy was the 
European Monetary System (EMS), and Finland, together with many other small 
countries, started to consider joining the EMS in the coming years.295 The prediction 
was that also EFTA- countries were to join the system in the 1990s. It is also obvious 
that the government also silently accepted this definition of policy.296 Before the fall of 
the Berlin wall, all public documents in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s were 
formulated so that all references to full membership in the EU were excluded but, in 
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reality, since the 1980s there was an elite coalition in Finland advocating the idea of 
globalization and the defence of EU integration.297 
The definite aim of industrial policy was to highlight the creation of infrastructures 
and preconditions for industrial policy that contrasted with traditional industrial policy 
in which regional policy was linked with a variety of subsidies. The aim of new regional 
policy was to create environments and preconditions favourable for companies and their 
development.  
 
The shift toward the cluster framework  
 
In the early 1990s Finland was in the middle of an economic crisis and the Economic 
Council of Finland ordered a series of reports to discover means to a variety of problems.  
Traditionally, all policy documents and strategies related to industrial policy were 
prepared carefully under the control of various interest groups but the work on the new 
strategy was organized totally differently.298 The Ministry of Trade and Industry was 
indifferent in terms of theories and theoretical frameworks and thus it was natural that 
the key concept for the new industrial strategy was that of cluster. It was an analytic 
concept used also in other Nordic countries, and it was also a central part in the cluster 
research project started by ETLA. One of the central points of the new strategy was that 
it must be in line with the industrial policies of other European countries.  
The cluster framework is applied in the new industrial strategy,299 but the method of 
implementation was curious. The first step was to build up a strategy in 1992-1993, the 
second step was to conduct a stray in 1992-1995 and the third step was to publish a 
vision of industrial policy.300 The original strategy process was based on ten expert 
groups, and their role was to act as think-tanks.301 
What makes the cluster approach interesting is that it was the first time when the 
industrial policy strategy was warranted by referring to a scientific model as a 
justification. The new strategy was also exceptional because it was very much in line with 
the industrial policy guidelines in the EU. The main principles of competition policy 
were embedded in its broad framework as well as such important issues as investments in 
technology and education. One of the leading ideas in the new strategy was that 
industrial policy in Finland must not concentrate on a single industry, forest industry, 
but it should focus on the development of preconditions for a set of existing and 
emergent industrial clusters.  
The idea of the cluster framework was to shift the traditional focus of industrial 
policy to preconditions of industries, networks and infrastructures, competition and 
factors of production. The old tricks were not valid any more. The new strategy 
emphasized two new important areas. First, the new strategy was openly advocating the 
idea of market failure; the new strategy was justified by the claim that the state must 
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have a strong role in those policies. It followed that the priorities of the Finnish 
industrial policy are created in accordance with the national aims and with a vision for 
the future. In other words, the strategic scope was subordinated to a set of national 
characteristics.  
Second, its other strategic contour was on the idea of a strong competition policy. 
That is to say that the focus of the new strategy was to stress the significance of the 
market mechanism by highlighting the significance of a series of institutional reforms as 
a precondition for industries. While the scope of their new strategy provided an 
exceptionally broad approach to the development of industries, this kind of approach 
has been very common in the Nordic countries and it was also hidden in the KTM-81 
committee report.302 
The concept of the cluster was above all understood as a strategic tool through which 
policy makers aimed to underpin the dialogue between actors and communities and the 
forging of strategic alliances and networks. As a term, the welfare cluster proved to be 
ambiguous and very fruitful for policy making. 
To choose the term was a conscious political act; it was also a step forward in 
strategic sense. On the one hand, it was a strategic political move towards new industrial 
infrastructure and, on the other hand, it was a move towards a new structure of science 
and technology policies. The cluster policy framework provided a theoretical tool in 
terms of renewing the industrial policy structures as well as in terms of increasing the 
domain of that policy. 
When the Ministry of Trade and Industry published its Industrial political vision in 
1996 it was a cut off to the cluster development in the sense that the cluster framework 
had provided a tool for a larger political process. The economic policy review by the 
Government in 1996303 gave a new meaning for the term cluster so that the emphasis 
was on networks. Now the term had a larger societal content shifting the main focus on 
cooperation between government and industry. The stress was now on the role of the 
state and the public sector; the aim of the policy was on the balanced national economy, 
a low interest level, a firm currency and a competitive taxation policy. The review 
suggests that if the government manages to reckon with all these aspects the operational 
preconditions for enterprises and companies will be sustainable. One example of the new 
policy was a welfare cluster.  
In the Finnish context TEKES has played an important role of implanting the 
cluster- framework to technology policy. Since its foundation in 1983, TEKES has been 
an independent actor in the Finnish science and technology policy.304 Technology 
programmes have been powerful instruments in Finland. In 2004, TEKES provided 171 
million euros to financing technology programmes. In autumn 2005, a total of 22 
extensive national technology programmes were under way. Technology programmes are 
used to promote development in specific sectors of technology or industry, and to pass 
on the results of research to business in an efficient way.  
It is worth noting that TEKES has utilized the cluster framework for two different 
purposes. Within the cluster framework TEKES has financed a variety of cluster 
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programmes as well as having used the framework in order to analyze and reorganize its 
own institutional structures and strategy.305  
The two technology programmes of TEKES (in 1997 and 1999) are of a great 
interest because both utilized the cluster framework in their strategy construction. The 
oddness of the cluster framework is that it seems to be very flexible and useful for many 
purposes.  
TEKES has revised its strategy and its institutional structures many times. I 2005 it 
published a new strategy where its base - mission, vision and values – determinesits 
objectives, methods, policies and actions. The primary objective is 
 
“…to promote the competitiveness of Finnish industry and the service sector by 
technological means. Activities aim to diversify production structures, increase 
production and exports, and create a foundation for employment and societal well-
being”.306 
  
The renewed strategy is still based on the cluster framework. The application of the core 
areas is derived from the cluster analysis and, surprisingly, the Finnish and English 
versions are different. The Finnish version emphasizes the opportunities in the health 
sector and highlights the significance of health and social services in terms of national 
economy and competitiveness but the English version remains silent about these issues. 
The cluster framework is still today an important aspect of the Finnish technology 
policy; we have to remember that TEKES has its own technology-oriented role in the 
Finnish science and technology policy context. 
Naturally, it is possible to explicate the reasons for the use of the cluster framework 
in many ways. The cluster framework has proved to be a successful framework although 
it is a very difficult concept in terms of technology policy tradition: the traditional 
approach to technology is based on different types of technology and the term cluster 
blurs these technological know-how constellations. The cluster framework has changed 
not only the technology policy language but it has also changed the strategy as such. The 
latest strategy mentions at the same time the clusters and sectors i.e. it refers to 
governmental issues and existing boundaries between professions, expertise and lines of 
business.   
Another important actor VTT, Technical Research Centre of Finland, has been 
more traditional and its organisation is based on various technologies.307 Its own role is 
to function as an expert organisation that carries out technical and techno-economic 
research and development.308  
In 1997 the Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry published a review where the 
cluster framework was replaced by the market failure framework309. The analysis was 
based on a very liberalist interpretation and some criticized its inappropriateness for 
                                                            
305 This is very coherent and takes into account the fact that professors Guillame and Zegveld had 
suggested in their evaluation in 1995 that TEKES should catalyze five cluster programs as some other 
countries. See Jääskeläinen 2001 p. 182. 
306 TEKES 2008a. See also TEKES Online Annual Review 2007.   
307 In 2005 it has eight expertise areas- environment, materials, pulp and paper, ICT, nuclear, 
renewables, transport and life science. 
308 Established in 1940 its history is a very interesting aspect of the Finnish research system evolution 
VTT with its 2800 employees, over 5000 domestic and foreign customers and EUR 210 million 
turnover in 2004 has been very active in the welfare cluster research context. See Michelsen 1993. 
309 KTM 1997. 
108  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
Finnish policy makers.310 Although the cluster framework was problematic, the new 
approach to technology policy was outmoded. A kind of cluster framework 
breakthrough took place in 1996311 when the Government decided to increase public 
R&D funding between 1997 and 1999. The aim was to raise the national research input 
to 2.9 % of the GDP by 1999 by increasing the efficiency of support and co-operation 
between the different players in the innovation system. The finances of the cluster 
program were based on the revenue from state-owned companies. The Science and 
Technology Council of Finland also adopted the concept of cluster in its analysis.312 
The aim of the program was to intensify the function of the national system of 
innovation. Most of its resources was channelled to TEKES and the Academy of 
Finland, but also the resources of the universities and VTT were increased and a cluster 
program was established.313  
The content of the term cluster is again, very broad among 300 diverse projects. It 
implies that all relevant partners are called together to participate and that the 
governmental and administrative boundaries are broken intentionally. A closer analysis 
of the brochures of various cluster programmes proves that the projects seem to interpret 
the concept of cluster very freely. Many of them are carried out jointly by the industry. 
Various governmental actors stress openly that their project advocates and illustrates a 
new action model for policy making. The term cluster is now understood as a 
governmental tool. The central benefit for political governance is that the cluster 
projects contributed new co-operation and partnerships, yet many projects yielded only 
internal administration processes and discussion between various fields of 
administration.  
The cluster framework was an important part of constructing the Finnish industrial 
policy but it was also used in labour policy. The main reason for that was the 
membership in the EU in 1995 and the options that the ESF (European Social Fund) 
funding provided. ESF funding was coordinated by the Ministry of Labour in Finland 
and it started to utilize the cluster framework to forecast the changes of labour market 
and professional skills.314  
The cluster framework was useful from the Ministry of Labour viewpoint in terms of 
analysing the changes of labour market from a wider perspective. However, it was used, 
above all, as a heuristic and illustrative tool. The evaluation of ESF project during 1995 - 
1997 points out that most projects adopted the cluster framework in very superficial 
ways. They used the term but clearly in a rhetorical sense.315 However, there was still 
interest in the cluster framework because in 1998 - 1999, apparently due to the fact that 
some researches inspired by future studies and forecasting methodology, advocated the 
cluster framework openly.316 The recent preference of forecasting methodology in 
political governance becomes understandable seen in this context of change. As Ian 
Hacking argues, the taming of change has been a long historical continuum; forecasting 
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methodology provides a tool by which security and order is assured in today’s extremely 
contingent world.317 
 
5.2. The welfare cluster – An idiosyncratic intervention 
 
Why did Finnish policy makers make the decision to apply the cluster framework?  
What made it so seductive? There are many explanations available but let us start from 
the idea as such. 
Professor Michael E. Porter from Harvard is the person behind the cluster 
framework. His expertise is focused on business administration and strategic thinking. 
Porter has been very influential as an analyst of such issues as national competitiveness 
and an advocator of strategic thinking in public administration and national economies. 
His interpretation, derived from game theory, is that there are five forces that determine 
the attractiveness of a market: the bargaining power of customers, the bargaining power 
of suppliers, the thread of new entrants, the thread of new substitutes and the intensity 
of competitive rivalry. This analysis based on five forces has been criticized a great deal 
and many have attempted to introduce a sixth force in order to develop a better 
theory.318  
Policy makers in Finland utilized Porter’s theory of the competitive advantage of 
nations where the competitiveness and future growth prospects of the industry form the 
core of the analysis. Porter’s popularity among policy makers has been a small mystery 
but also very understandable. Porter’s theory is an answer to changes in the global 
market. As a theory it is very simple, opposing mainstream economics and advocating 
openly the strengths of evolutionary economics and hermeneutical aspects.319  
In his book The Competitive Advantages of Nations Porter has two central ideas: a 
model of the sources of competitiveness and a cluster-model. The diamond model 
explicates the sources of competitiveness of an industry or a region and can be used as a 
strategic and political tool. The national competitiveness is based on its industries’ 
capacity to be innovative and regenerate its modes of production and products.  
The diamond model (1990) that is derived from the model of five forces consists of 
four determinants that influence competitiveness: 1) factor conditions, 2) home 
demand, 3) related and supporting industries, and 4) firm strategy, structure and rivalry. 
Porter contends that regions must develop a competitive advantage based on their ability 
to continuously innovate. Innovations are based on the following four key elements: 
 
1) Factor conditions, such as a specialized labour pool, specialized infrastructure, and 
sometimes selective disadvantages that drive innovation;  
2) Home demand, or local customers who push companies to innovate, especially if 
their needs or tastes anticipate global or local demand;  
3) Related and supporting industries, nationally competitive local supplier industries 
who create business infrastructure and spur innovation and spin off industries;  
4) Industry strategy, structure and rivalry, intense rivalry among local industries that 
is more motivating than foreign competition and a local "culture" that influences 
individual industries' attitudes toward innovation and competition. 
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In addition to these areas, the Porterian approach includes the roles of the government 
and chance. Historical accident and/or government actions tend to play significant roles 
in the early development or the location of local industrial clusters.  
 One of the concepts of this theory is the concept of cluster. It is usual that both of 
those models are called clusters. Clusters illustrate the networks and organisations of 
production. A cluster is born in a situation in which the sources of competitiveness 
toughen one another.   
The original idea was to adopt the cluster framework in order to enhance the 
creation and growth of advanced and specialized production factors as well as to 
stimulate the emergence of strong industrial networks320. If the diamond model was 
employed as an analytic tool for the determination of the objectives of broad policy-
making, the cluster model was used as an evaluative tool to analyze the competitiveness 
of Finnish business and industry.  
One way to understand the cluster approach is to identify four cluster types in terms 
of presence and absence. The types are the absence of cluster, the presence of a potential 
cluster, the presence of an emerging cluster and the presence of a functional cluster.  
The first situation is that there is little interaction between firms and there is little or 
no institutional support. Potential clusters are characterized by the presence of 
interconnected firms and industries, by the emergence of fragmented and low density 
business networks, by the absence of synergies between firms and the absence of 
synergies between firms and by the absence of tools that would enable policy- makers to 
intervene. Emerging clusters are characterized by the presence of a critical mass of firms 
and industries, by a certain concentration of the activities of firms at the local level, by 
entrepreneurs’ low awareness of the potential gains from a cluster, by low synergy due to 
the lack of a common vision among stakeholders and by the presence of efficient linkage 
mechanisms.  
The presence of a functional cluster is identified 1) if entrepreneurs are involved 
greatly in their region; 2) if there are entrepreneurs who identify themselves with the 
regional system; 3) if there is good common infrastructure including good services; 4) if 
there are good business practices and the exchange of knowledge between players.   
 
Historical developments towards social technology 
 
It is interesting how quickly the ideas of clustering and networking diffused across the 
various administrative fields. In particular, the reception of the welfare cluster was very 
enthusiastic. One explanation for it was that there were a lot of activities close to the 
idea of welfare cluster in progress. For example, STAKES (the National Research and 
Development Centre for Welfare and Health) had started many projects on various 
welfare issues with close links that were quite similar to the idea of the welfare cluster. It 
seems that in Finland three different dimensions of the progress assimilated into the 
process, and were later coined as a welfare cluster. 
First, STAKES (formerly National Board of Social Welfare) had participated actively 
in many international and EU programs since the late 1980s. Those programs were 
focusing on elderly and disabled people, and one of the slogans it wanted to contribute 
was the “barrier free” or “design for all” ideology. These research projects and 
experimental programs wanted to highlight primarily such policy issues as housing and 
physical environments as a pre-condition for providing social and health care services.  
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The bottom line of those R&D -programs was very simple. We must not only focus 
our interest on services but rather to take into account a variety of infrastructures of 
those services. It implies that often the focus must be laid on technological contexts such 
as the context of housing policies and urban planning, the context of architectural 
interior design, the context of construction industries and building practices. All these 
programs wanted to pose a very simple question: Why not to design housing 
environments, proper houses and individual homes taking into account also the needs of 
elderly people and the disabled? The ethos of these programs stressed strongly that 
different forms of professional interaction and networking beyond traditional 
private/public boundaries are important.   
The general director of STAKES, Vappu Taipale, published an article in 1994321 
where she suggested that the idea of the welfare cluster must be taken as a framework for 
analyzing both the services, the training and education in the social and health care 
sector and the co-operation between research and industry. The article was very 
influential in the sense that it produced the Oulu welfare cluster project in 1995322. 
STAKES wanted to interpret the concept of welfare cluster so that it would refer to a 
complex composed of five elements: welfare services, education and training, research 
and industry.323 The idea was to call together various partners with no earlier interaction 
in order to fuse their various interests, needs and perspectives.  
All those developments had a longer history because in 1991 SITRA published a 
report that was a kind of manifesto advocating the new approach called social 
technology. Its prime interest was to highlight the problems related to social welfare and 
technology, and it was also a kind of umbrella concept for the Marjala housing fair in 
Jooensuu, Eastern Finland. One of its major arguments was that there was a great need 
to adjust the focus from hospital technology toward non-institutional care and 
services.324 It also advocated the barrier free framework as a new ideology for blurring the 
relation between the social and the technological. 
In Finland, one of the most epochal reforms in terms of non-institutional care was 
the adoption of the emergency telephone for elderly and disabled people in the 1980s.325 
Simultaneously, Finland participated actively in various programs at Nordic and EU 
level. The aforementioned SITRA report stresses strongly professional issues and the lack 
of technological investments in social welfare. Ironically, the most prevailing 
technological equipments in use in those days were in many municipalities a bicycle and 
a kick sled. The concept of social technology was referring to low-technology and, in 
reality, as it never got through in media, the broader concept of welfare cluster replaced 
it later. 
Second, another player that had specialized on welfare cluster issues for many years 
was VTT. In contrast, its competence focus was mainly on hospital care and health 
technology. Its interest was on medical sciences, pharmacology and ICT, and it 
highlighted clearly high technology and such technical devices as diagnostic instruments 
and other medical care products. 326 Its emphasis was more on technology and industry 
co-operation and hence very much in line with the welfare cluster analysis made by 
ETLA.  
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The third player which traditionally was active in many issues linked with welfare 
issues was SITRA. The Fund was set up in conjunction with the Bank of Finland in 
1967 in honour of the 50th anniversary of the Finnish independence. One of the most 
promising projects coordinated by SITRA was the EMA project327. Its aim was to 
promote the growth of disabled equipment industry in Finland, and to support 
independent living at home among elderly people. The idea was to collect all significant 
players and especially companies together. The interest of entrepreneurs faded away very 
quickly because of rivalry and the project was soon closed. Another project, a kind of 
follow-up to the former, was created to build up a rehabilitation network connecting 
know-how in specialised medical care, rehabilitation and physical education. The centre 
of the project was the concept of senior gym and the aim was to construct the concept 
and address the European market but it also failed.328 
All those actors had very different views on the relation between welfare and 
technology. If STAKES stressed the role of welfare services, VTT highlighted more ICT- 
issues and health care industries. SITRA wanted to increase awareness of the meaning of 
networking and the problem of marketing welfare among the Finnish SME companies.  
 
The key findings  
 
In Finland the cluster analysis was carried out by some ETLA economists as a part of the 
renewal of industrial policies. The scholars end up dividing the nine Finnish industrial 
clusters into four classes:329  
 
a) Strong clusters (forest industry),  
b) Semi-strong clusters (basic metal and energy technology),  
c) Potential or emerging clusters (telecommunications, well-being and 
environment)   
d) Latent or defensive clusters (construction and foodstuffs). 
 
The analysis suggests that many originally factor-driven clusters have developed 
gradually from technology-driven or knowledge-driven clusters. According to the 
analysis the fastest growing industrial clusters are those of telecommunications, well-
being and environment.  
In the original cluster analysis the term was clearly an analytic tool by which scholars 
identified the issues of well-being and health care. Very soon the term started to live a 
life of its own. The reason why the policy makers preferred the term welfare cluster and 
dispensed the health care cluster is doubtless connected with the Finnish economic crisis 
and the financial problems of the state.  In any event, the findings of the ETLA analysis 
are extremely interesting.  
As its point of departure is a kind of SWOT analysis. The strength of Finland is that 
the system of social and health services is of very high quality. Finland has also been 
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successful in health care technology and especially in specialized medical care 
technology, but Finland has no tradition in these issues unlike Sweden and Denmark.  
The weakness of the Finnish welfare cluster is that there is no real Finnish welfare 
cluster in the sense the analysts have understood the term because of the following 
reasons. First, technology companies related to welfare and well-being were relatively 
small, and pharmaceutical industries were small and young. Almost all Finnish firms 
were operating in a very specialised niche, market segment, and many of those firms are 
based on one particular invention by its owner. Second, the peculiarity of the Finnish 
technology enterprises in health care is that although they are usually considered as very 
innovative their marketing performance has been poor.  
The calculus [1:10:100] illustrates very well the problems those companies have. If 
an entrepreneur has an idea or an invention, it equals the resources [1]. In order to start 
large scale production he/she needs ten times more resources to produce it, and if he/she 
wants sell the product in the market he must allocate ten times more resources than the 
production expenses were.  
Another aspect of the Finnish welfare cluster is that pharmaceutical companies have 
merged. In 1985 there were 13 companies, but now there are only four. One of the 
main reasons why the development of Finnish pharmaceutical companies has been so 
unsuccesful is the patent legislation. The problem of pharmaceutical development work 
is that it is a long-term, expensive and risky effort but to copy the finalized and tested 
products is often fairly simple.  To copy the product is possible if the production 
method is different from the original. The Finnish pharmaceutical companies and the 
development of medical products in general have very much been favouring the Anglo-
Saxon medical tradition.330  
The most promising areas in the welfare cluster were fitness and sports equipment as 
well as functional foods. However, the most promising related and supporting industries 
were in the emerging ICT sector. The irony is that later the term welfare cluster seemed 
to refer to ICT-sector only, and all those other aspects were unimportant.  
According to the ETLA analysis the possibilities embedded in the welfare cluster can 
be reduced to the issue of ageing.  Ageing must be seen as a huge innovation potential 
hidden in the Finnish welfare service system if we approach the dilemma with open eyes.  
This implies two radical accounts. First, we have to pay attention to the possibilities of 
technology in welfare and well-being and, second, we have to focus on the problem of 
the welfare market.  
The analysis highlights strongly that these two issues are linked with the problem of 
efficiency in the system of social and health care services. The point the analysis makes is 
that if we seriously want to maintain our welfare service system we have to find new 
cost-effective and innovative solutions to both institutional and non-institutional care. 
The argumentation proceeds so that if we put our interventionist focus on technology 
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and interpret social and health care as a market, the only possibility we have is to 
develop technology and new forms of services. This means that there is a room for 
technological development and services produced by private companies.  
According to the analysis the real target of the welfare cluster must be the Finnish 
welfare system and its deficiencies. One of these big problems concerns the non-
transparency of the system. The conclusion was that the boundary between the provider 
and the producer must be clarified. The reason was that the Finnish welfare service 
system is very much based on the Finnish local government system, and this system 
distorts the market conditions and prevents fruitful competition. The final conclusion is 
that as a political intervention the welfare cluster must highlight these structural and 
transparency problems. In other words, only then can the innovative environments be 
possible and the challenges embedded in the welfare cluster real. 
One of the most original arguments of the analysis is that if the welfare cluster is not 
a real cluster it must be used as a catalyst of innovation. This means that the strategy 
must focus on three assets. First, it must exploit the differentiation into the public and 
non-public R&D units and therefore link universities and research institutes with R&D. 
Second, the creation of strong national networks for marketing and trade must be 
started immediately. Third, the utilisation of diversified industrial know-how and 
production development must be started as soon as possible. This strategy was important 
because the operation context of the Finnish welfare industries was often on SME 
context.  
The welfare sector and social and health services were thus as important parts of 
national competitiveness. They were also a resource for well-being, but they were also an 
option for innovations and new markets.    
In contrast to other Finnish industrial clusters, the welfare cluster analysis highlights 
the problems of the public sector. The analysts assess that a deciding factor for the 
welfare cluster is how governmental officials understand and utilize the possibilities 
available. The most important aspect of the welfare cluster is how are governmental 
officials able to translate the argumentation and to take into account of the needs of the 
Finnish industry? 
The core of the welfare cluster is thus that the public sector is a catalyst of 
innovation. The aim of the welfare cluster is to find and experiment a variety of cost-
effective innovations. This implies that the infrastructures of social and health services 
must be re-organized. The benefit of the re-organisation is that only then does the 
welfare cluster have a real value.  
The conclusion that the analysts make is of a great interest. They argue that it 
implies two strategic moves. The first is that Finland must increase the market 
mechanisms to tolerate rivalry and increase entrepreneurship within the social and health 
service sector. The second is that this implies an increase of technology in social and 
health care. As a matter of fact, it is the only choice for genuine and real efficiency in 
welfare sector. 
The analysis clarifies that cooperation and collaboration with other industrial clusters 
must be self-explanatory but the links with the ICT cluster are even more important. 
The analysts predict that the most promising Finnish cluster is the ICT cluster but the 
second will be the welfare cluster. If we compare Finland and Denmark in terms of 
welfare clusters, it would imply that our export would overrun e.g. the Finnish energy 
industry. The prediction is that this might not be possible before the years 2005- 2010.  
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Arguments pro the welfare cluster 
 
What is also obvious is that the conclusion that the ETLA- scholars made, the core of its 
political intervention being on the Finnish welfare model and its dependency of the 
public sector is problematic. In various OECD countries the systems of welfare are very 
different and depend on historical and cultural differences and it implies that the role of 
the public sector in the social and health services is totally different. 
It is obvious that the original agenda of the welfare cluster shifted gradually towards 
technology policy and closer to the development of Information Society. In 1993, the 
US government published The National Information Infrastructure Agenda for Action, the 
first comprehensive statement of the administration's visions and goals for the NII 
initiative that provides an overview of the goals and objectives of NII. 331 This very 
influential document did not mention the information society but rather encouraged 
investments in new technology and networks. It became an important document for the 
development of the information society in the USA and  in other countries. A similar 
document, the Bangeman report, was published in 1994. It advocated the idea of the 
information society. Its core was on the development of the ICT sector industries but its 
approach was different from the NII -report.332 The Information Society report was a list 
of recommendations for the European Council, and it strongly highlighted the 
opportunities of that revolution for Europe and European citizens.   
The authors of the report forecast that the Information Society benefits European 
citizens and consumers, the content creators, Europe’s regions, governments and 
administrations, European business and small and medium sized enterprises, European 
telecommunications operators, equipment and software suppliers, and computer and 
consumer electronics industries.  
In Finland the development was also very rapid. If the report on Finland’s future and 
alternatives in 1993 attempted to illustrate various scenarios for Finland, it does not 
mention the notion of information society at all. 333 Later the Parliament established the 
Committee for the Future, originally on a temporary basis, but later in 2000 the 
Parliament decided to make it a permanent committee. The idea of the information 
society became an essential part of the EU’s political rhetoric; it provided new challenges 
for European collaboration and human interaction. It also became the ideological core 
of the development of EU governance and its administrative scenarios. 
It is very natural that Finland, as a member candidate of the EU, also wanted to 
follow the NII and the Information Society pathway in its strategies. The Finnish 
strategy of the information society was published in 1995. This so called TIKAS report 
includes seven sub-reports. The Finnish strategy was very national and patriotic and in 
many respects very Finnish; one result of the strategy process was that Finland started to 
advocate itself as a leading information society.  
As a part of the TIKAS process the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health also 
introduced its strategy on how to implement and adopt the Information society 
developments in its activities.334 SITRA became a kind of nexus for the political 
legitimation of the information society. SITRA published a lot of material advocating 
the unavoidability of the ICT revolution, and its different programs advocated the point 
                                                            
331 Malhotra, Al-Shehri & Jones 1995.   
332 Bangemann 1994. 
333 VN, 1993. 
334 Sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon tietoteknologian hyödyntämisstrategia, Työryhmämuistioita 1995:27, 
Helsinki:STM, 1996. 
116  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
that there are huge challenges hidden in the idea of the information society. There are 
only few examples of publications having direct links with the welfare cluster and its 
themes.335 
In the information society context the welfare cluster was rather an eccentric 
experiment. One reason for this was that its political agenda was not linked with the 
information society as such. Its origin was on industrial policies and it was far from the 
concrete issues of social and health policies.336 When the information society reports 
were published by MSAH the situation changed.337  
The welfare cluster from the MSAH perspective was now seen as a form of 
technology policy rather than as a form of industrial policy. In the latter half of the 
1990s the welfare cluster was not part of science and technology policies but rather a 
part of the Information Society strategy. The real links with these policies were exposed 
later. 
It seems to be obvious that the term welfare cluster was more like a buzzword.338 As a 
political term it aroused interest and it sounded fascinating. Some STAKES scholars 
specialized on the welfare cluster problems conjecture in their study suggesting that 
almost all decision makers in social and health care were familiar with the term and 
thought that they have understood its content. It was an essential part of the fashionable 
welfare jargon in the late 1990s.339 
The Finnish social and health service system was based on a complex system of 
legislation and regulation in which municipalities were responsible for organizing 
services autonomously. The system was principally based on the idea of the public sector 
performing in two roles as a purchaser and provider. The whole idea that there would be 
market in the late 1980s in social and health service system was not acceptable. It was 
argued that the municipalities dominated the system.  
After the year 1993 there have been four strategies for Finnish municipalities340: (a) 
The public sector produces the services; the public sector funds and organizes the 
services; the public sector supervises and regulates. (b)The private sector produces the 
services; the public sector funds and organizes; the public sector supervises and regulates. 
(c)The private sector produces the services; the public sector funds and organizes and the 
public sector supervises and regulates. (d) The private sector produces the services; the 
private sector finds and organizes services without any supervision and regulation.  
The idea of the welfare cluster was, on the one hand, to promote the application of 
new technology in those services but, on the other hand, it also, as we have seen earlier, 
advocated the rigidity of the Finnish system. Its more or less explicate aim was to bring 
about changes within the Finnish welfare service system which was a problem.  
In fact, the socio-political situation in 2040 in many developed countries will be 
different from the current situation. The invention the ETLA analysts made was that 
they wanted to combine the problem of ageing with the problems of welfare in general. 
The scholars explicitly forewarned politicians and policy makers that if we continue our 
aging policy without any changes, the finance of our existing system collapses. The most 
alarming aspect of aging is, as the scholars rightly remind, the phenomenon of double 
ageing. It means that while the number of older people increases, the number of the 
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oldest people increases more quickly. The problem is real because the probability to be 
involved in the systems of institutional care increases significantly after the age of 85. It 
implies that the use of medicines increases as also does the investment in medical care 
and medication.    
In the early 1990s one of the most burning issues in Finland concerned the strong 
emphasis on institutional care. There were 12.5 beds per 1000 inhabitants while e.g. 
Denmark had only 5.6 beds. A conclusion made by the analysts was that Finland has 
become to a cul-de-sac. The Finnish institution favoured system was too expensive and 
ineffective and, in particular, the demographic changes in the future implied new non-
institutional social and health care models and solutions.  
Elderly people as a population group provide new options and possibilities for the 
Finnish industry. The conclusion made by the ETLA analysts was to focus on 
independent living issues. It means that we have to connect the emergent radical 
developments of social and health care with the developments of technology and 
implausible opportunities, and changes will be ready. The analysts remind that the 
earlier the entry occurrs the better it will be for Finland. It was a real opportunity 
Finland must take advantage of.  
Recently, EU policies related to ageing have radically changed. After the publication 
of the Green Paper “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between 
generations “341in 2005, the problem of ageing has become an important part of EU 
policy making. What is worth noting is that the Green Paper links the challenges of the 
Lisboa strategy with the challenge of ageing. It also means that the EU must institute 
birth-friendly policies and address the possible contribution of immigration in a 
balanced way.  
The Green Paper stresses that that it is necessary to continue to modernize social 
protection systems, especially pensions. Public policies must take these democratic 
changes into account in all policy areas concerned. In Europe, because of the varieties of 
the social protection systems it has followed, the focus has been more on families: 
families are the cornerstone of public and social life. Taking into account all 25 member 
states, the problem of ageing is more a problem for families; the Finnish and Nordic 
welfare state model is only an exception in a rule. Reconciling work and family life is a 
key policy factor for both women and men, and necessary for solving demographic 
problems in Europe.  
It is natural that these institutional circumstances affect the behaviour of consumers. 
In Finland the public sector is the most important provider of health care as also in 
many other OECD countries. The size and growth of the public sector is usually 
described by the proportion of GDP. In the European countries the average expenditure 
of public sector has been higher than non-European OECD countries.342 
Taking into account all this, it is interesting that the issue of ageing became so 
important. In retrospect, it is easy to see that one of the most important driving forces 
was the economic recession; the national economy of Finland was really in crisis but 
what made the issue of ageing so important, was that it was understood as a political 
challenge in the context of industrial policies.  
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My interpretation is that although ageing was a real problem having lot of political 
potential the skilful ETLA analysts linked the problem with other problems of the 
Finnish welfare society. Ageing was a real challenge but what was more important was 
that it reflected the Finnish system of welfare services and its strong dependence on the 
public sector. The increase of competition in the welfare sector was the proper issue that 
the ETLA analysts wanted to highlight. In other words, the analysts did not make any 
radical conclusions. Rather, they suggested a critical attitude. They spoke with the 
mouth of experts, nothing else.  
All this makes the issue of ageing very sensitive in the sense that it refers to a real 
problem. The analysts translated it in order to enrol their original aims.343 Later, this 
problem was translated into a form of economic efficiency and technological 
effectiveness.  
In reality, the problem of ageing is far more complex and difficult. In terms of social 
policy and social protection ageing is often associated with the problems of health and 
diseases, but it must also be seen in a broader perspective within the system of social 
health. Most preventive care and non-institutional services allocated to elderly people is 
in Finland, as well as in many other countries, outside the public health care system.  
One of the central arguments advocated by those working with the elderly has been 
that ageing is not a matter of disease or diagnosis as such. It is a particular phase in the 
life-span and it should not be reduced to a matter of medicalisation. In ageing, the 
medicalisation of death plays a central role in the sense that suc issues as the definition of 
a healthy and normal human being as well as the decisions related to medicine and other 
medical interventions become important.  
In a way it is curious that the most important argument for the welfare cluster as a 
political intervention was very close to the analysis made by Besley and Gouveia344 who 
have identified in their analysis three basic “types “of health care systems. Type 1: 
Finance and delivery by the private sector (e.g. the US, Turkey); Type 2: Public finance 
and substantial private delivery (e.g. Canada, German, the Netherlands); Type 3: public 
finance and delivery (e.g. Sweden, Finland, UK). Many recent reforms have aimed to 
move type 3 systems towards type 2.  The welfare cluster was a clear intervention toward 
type 2.  
Another interesting aspect of the welfare cluster was that the issues it highlighted 
have become important in the EU. It is possible to interpret the welfare cluster as a 
learning experience. Finland was a kind of specimen for this kind of policy making. 
Naturally, similar trends occurred also in other Nordic countries, in Sweden, Norway 
and Denmark, in particular but also the experiments in the Netherlands and the UK as 
well as in Canada were very similar.345  
                                                            
343 I am referring here to ANT theory. I will return to these issues later. 
344 See Besley and Gouveia 1994. This discussion on public economics and the economics of health care 
has a long tradition. See also Barr 2001; Barr 1993. 
345 Godin 1997. 
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6. RE-CONTEXTUALISATION OF STI 
POLICIES IN FINLAND  
 
6.1. Finland and STI policies: A success story beyond compare 
  
In this chapter I will re-contextualize the Finnish STI policies by utilizing a variety of 
assessments and evaluations of those policies. Those evaluations provide two different 
pictures of Finnish STI policies. The first picture is very adulatory and positive; Finnish 
STI policies form a success story. In other words, Finland, as measured by a set of 
statistical indicators based on international standards, has been one of the most 
successful countries in implementing STI policies in this millennium. This view is so 
plausible that Finland is often used as a show case for those policies. This view stresses 
two issues.  
First, Finland has performed high intellectual capacity and assimilated its policies 
into the NIS framework very quickly. Second, it has re-organized its policies and 
political administration in accordance with the NIS guidelines admirably. This has 
encouraged the progress of competitiveness and economic growth as well as developed 
Finland as a modern flexible society. This kind of view is a sort of visiting card Finland 
readily delivers to foreigners. 
Another view of Finland is slightly different, not as polished and perfect as the 
former view. This view stresses controversies and struggles behind the curtains. In other 
words, it suggests that the success of Finnish STI policies is a series of coincidences and 
successful and well-timed decision-making. It is an outcome of skilful and active 
politicking. Although the Finnish actors have been active and skilful, Finland’s success is 
mostly a series of fortunate incidents.  
This view becomes tangible and concrete in the welfare cluster case. The cluster 
programme, as shown above, was a part of the public additional appropriation 
programme in the late 1990s in which the government wanted to improve Finland’s 
R&D performance. The programme reflects the fact that the government had a lot 
confidence and trust in the NIS framework at the time. It also illustrates a political shift 
towards new thinking. The focus was now clearly on the R&D issues rather than on 
something else. The investments in R&D are also investments in the future. 
The aim of this re-contextualisation analysis is to examine these two complementary 
views and, in particular, to focus on the latter view. The analysis utilizes a variety of 
policy documents and a stock of surveys and studies linked with STI policies including 
thematic interviews346 with key persons carried out in 2004 focusing on the welfare 
cluster. The reason for carrying out such an analysis is that it helps to analyze the 
political aspects of STI policies and makes them visible. 
In recent years, in the STI policy context policy makers have introduced the term the 
Finnish model. The Finnish model is a political construct, a coinage that refers to 
Finland’s capacity to adapt to the changing economic and political context in the era of 
globalisation. It can be read as a heroic saga where a hero, a small Finland, bravely 
battles against difficulties and adversaries in the era of globalisation.  
According to many international studies and surveys a key issue in the Finnish model 
concerns Finland’s competitiveness among industrialized developed countries. Finland’s 
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competitiveness has been high for many years. There are many institutes that produce 
statistical information linked with competitiveness and although those surveys utilize 
different statistical methodologies, the figures and rankings are surprisingly parallel.  
Among those institutes producing a variety of international statistical information is 
the World Economy Forum (WEF). It introduces itself as follows:  
 
”The World Economic Forum is an independent international organization 
committed to improving the state of the world by engaging leaders in partnerships to 
shape global, regional and industry agendas.” 
 
WEF, incorporated in 1971, and based in Switzerland, relies on the motto 
”entrepreneurship in the global public interest”. In other words, WEF believes that 
economic progress without social development is not sustainable, while social 
development without economic progress is not feasible. One of the most important tools 
of WEF is the Global Competitiveness Report series.347 
The Nordic countries are ranked highly because they share with Switzerland a 
broadly similar institutional and structural profile. The Nordic countries have better 
rankings on the macro economy pillar of the GCI structure since they all run budget 
surpluses and have lower levels of public debt. Finland and Sweden have best 
institutions in the world and occupy places in the top ten in health and primary 
education and in the top three in education and training - where Finland’s first position 
is remarkable for its long standing. According to the report the Norodic countries show 
that transparent institutions and excellent macroeconomic management, coupled with 
world class educational attainment and a focus on technology and innovation, are a 
successful strategy for maintaining competitiveness in small, highly developed 
economies.348 The most problematic pillars are market efficiency and the market size. 
The Institute for Management Development’s (IMD) located also in Switzerland has 
released the World Competitiveness Yearbook since 1989.349 Finland’s ranking fell from 
the previous year, which was due to the lack of foreign direct investments and high 
taxation rate. A well functioning education system, good public administration and 
cooperation between industry and universities are listed as Finland’s strengths. 
 In the European Innovation Scoreboard Report 2006350 ranks Finland together with 
Sweden, Switzerland, Germany and Denmark the European innovation leaders. The 
methodology the report applies is different in the sense that it distinguishes five key 
dimensions of innovation – innovation drivers, knowledge creation, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, applications and IPR and this means that although the trend is similar 
to other reports it highlight also some very interesting challenges. Also leading countries 
such as Finland must critically reflect the problem of innovation efficiency i.e. how to 
                                                            
347 The recent report 2007-2008 based on the Global Competitiveness Index includes nine pillars: a) 
the basic requirements  - Institutions, Infrastructure, Macro economy, Health and primary education; 
b) the efficiency enhancers - Higher education and training, Market efficiency, Technological 
readiness; c) the innovation and sophistication factors - Business sophistication and Innovation ranks 
the countries as follows: 1) The United States, 2)Switzerland, 3) Denmark, 4) Sweden, 5) Germany 
and 6) Finland. World Economic Forum, 2008. 
348 According to the report Finland’s most problematic factors are: tax rates, restrictive labour 
regulations, tax regulations. 
349 The IMD yearbook 2007 is based on a different methodology in which Economic performance (79 
criteria), Government Efficiency (72 criteria), Business Efficiency (71 criteria) and Infrastructure (101 
criteria) place Finland in position 17 among 55 countries. 
350 EU - The European Commission 2006. 
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transform their innovation assets (education, R&D and innovation expenditures) into 
innovation results (turnover from new products, employment in high tech sectors, 
patents) is of particular interest. 
The 2007 Index of Economic Freedom is a survey based on the work carried out by 
the the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation, and it covers 10 freedoms 
from property rights to entrepreneurship in 161 countries.351  
A very special aspect of the Finnish science and technology policies has been the 
development of the Finnish university system. The annual number of doctoral degrees 
more than doubled in Finland during the 1990s, and the growth has continued in the 
early years of the 21st century.352 In relation to its population and GDP, Finland is one 
of the world’s biggest producers of scientific publications, ranking ahead such 
traditionally strong countries in scientific research as the UK and Germany.
353
 
The R&D expenditure has been growing without interruption since the early 1990s, 
mainly owing to business enterprises but in recent years also due to increased 
expenditure in the higher education sector. Business enterprises account for 71 per cent 
of R&D expenditure. The increase in business enterprise R&D expenditure is due to the 
electronics industry.354 One interesting dimension of science and technology policies is 
the number of Finnish patent applications.355  
Finland’s performance measured by using different indicators linked with economic 
growth and competitiveness has been excellent in this millennium. In other words, 
Finland’s success is a indisputable fact, nothing else. But, as we will see later those 
international comparison studies involve a variety of problems and difficulties. Most of 
these problems are either purely methodological or downright ideological. 356 
  
                                                            
351 The top five are Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, United States and New Zealand whereas 
Finland’s rank is 16, Denmark 13, Iceland 15 and Sweden 21. This study suggests that in terms of 
economic freedom Finland is quite liberal. 
352 For example in 2006 there were 1,409 new doctorate degrees and in 2004 there were nearly 13,000 
employees with doctoral degrees, which makes about 0.5% of the workforce. The employment of PhDs 
is good; the rate of unemployment ( 2.2 % in 2004) among PhD degree holders in Finland is among 
the lowest in international terms,  Ministry of Education, KOTA Database. 
353 In 2005, Finnish researchers produced 8,300 publications, the highest figure ever recorded. The 
number of publications by Finnish researchers in international esteemed scientific journals has 
increased 2.5-fold during the past 20 years. In relation to population, the number of publications 
produced in Finland in 2005 was 1,600 per one million inhabitants. See OECD 2006. 
354 In 2005, nearly 5.5 billion euros were spent on research and development in Finland. Over 77,000 
persons of which over one of the half of the research personnel worked for business enterprises were 
employed in the R&D sector. In all, one third, 26,400, of the R&D personnel were women. Source: 
Statistics Finland – Science, Technology and Information Society Statistics, R&D In the period from 
2002 to 2004 37 per cent had product innovations, 28 per cent process innovations and 26 per cent 
innovation projects. Half of manufacturing enterprises had innovation activity and 14 per cent of them 
had all of these, that is, product and process innovations and innovation projects. Thirty-seven per cent 
of all service enterprises had innovation activity and 10 per cent of them had innovations relating to 
goods or services, process innovations and projects aiming at innovations. Among the service industries, 
innovation activity was most widespread in data processing, where 67 per cent of enterprises had had 
innovation activity in the period 2002 - 2004, Statistics Finland – Science, Technology and 
Information Society, innovations. 
355 The patent applications were at its highest at the turn of millennium. When 2,500 application were 
submitted, Statistics Finland, Science, Technology and Information Society Statistics, Patenting. 
356 Finland’s ranking in those studies has dropped in recent years. In 2008, Finland’s position was 15( 
IMD) and some Finnish scholars have admitted the problems of those surveys. See Helsingin Sanomat 
15.2.2008 “Suomen sijoitus kilpailukykyvertailussa laski”. 
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6.2. Welfare cluster: Key persons’ interpretations and remarks 
 
Cluster programmes as a part of additional appropriation programme  
 
The SITRA expert group357 that evaluated the additional appropriation programme 
presented in the late 1990s lists a variety of findings that justify that the additional 
public appropriation had a positive impact on private research investments, personnel 
training and employment. The programme was important in terms of integrating the 
new and the old economies358, and it had positive effects on regional development. The 
cluster programmes have made it possible to initiate fruitful cooperation between the 
various sectors and to provide a valuable link between technology and public services.  
The expert group did not only find a series of successes but it also listed a set of 
policy suggestions for the future. It recommended that the basic orientations for the next 
policy steps should be planned differently and therefore introduced the following 
suggestions: 1) The focus must be put on improvement in building up the competencies 
of individuals, sectors, and systems; 2) It must more clearly stress the co-evolution of 
public and private R&D; 3) The focus from R&D must be widened to innovation and 
problem-solving; 4) There must be better balance between high-tech, integration of the 
new and the old economics, and diffusion; 5) Finland must pay attention to its 
attractiveness internationally and improving her influence in Europe; 6) The ethos of the 
future policies must be against marginalisation (regions, workforce, individuals).  
In effect, the expert group highlighted that strengthening the conditions for basic 
research is the most important aspect of the knowledge-based economy. The argument is 
reasoned by the logic that without trained people and ideas Finland is not able to attract 
or keep world-class companies. This implies that it is necessary to invest in the 
development of the university system and its scientific infrastructure but also to start 
systematically review university research. The development must be focused on the 
support of inter-disciplinary research and its infrastructures, and it must focus on the 
creation of closer linkages between basic, applied and industrial research. 
The expert review strongly highlights the role of the cluster mechanism as a catalyst 
for progress. It wants to extend the life of the clusters although none of the clusters has 
yet reached any level of maturity. Therefore, the clusters should be understood as an 
experiment and a new form of learning where the creation of interactive nexuses for the 
exchange of experiences forms their political core. If the technology push type of 
innovation policy has been successful earlier, it is now the time to focus on a more 
customer-driven policy. In some cases, this involves shifting the focus from invention on 
true innovation. According to the report the key actor in this arena is TEKES. 
In terms of customer-driven policies it is important to understand the customer in 
the contexts of different cultures and religions, and cultural know-how has an important 
role in developing new products and services. It follows that the Finnish innovation 
system must not be based on technology transfer policies but rather on knowledge 
transfer policies.359 All this can be seen as a critique of the Finnish innovation system as 
such. Interestingly, the critique has two different targets.  
                                                            
357 Prihti, Georghiou, Helander,Juusela, Meyer-Krahmer, Roslin, Santamäki- Vuori & Pulkkinen 2000. 
358 The idea of new economy was based on the idea that high-tech industries and knowledge-intensive 
services offer the highest growth potential. See also Koski et al 2002. 
359 This theme has been very important in STPC reviews. 
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First, it can be read as a critique of the enthusiasm related to the Finnish STI policies 
in the late 1990s and, second, it can be read as a critique of the Finnish version of NIS. 
The first critique has never been fashionable and popular in Finland. As a matter of fact, 
the overall impacts of additional appropriation expressed by the expert group were 
positive, which implies that the decision to increase R&D investment in Finland was a 
right step. The second critique has been present in Finland on many occasions and levels 
and it has been transformed into a self-critique. The bottom line of the critique has been 
very simple: the Finnish innovation system is not even half-ready.  
 
Welfare cluster - an experiment of what   
 
All the issues that the SITRA expert group wants to highlight are of a great interest if we 
examine one particular cluster programme, the welfare cluster. Although the SITRA 
report advocates customer-driven policies and sees that the benefits of the cluster 
programmes must be understood as a learning experience, we may pose a couple of 
simple questions: What kind of experiment was the welfare cluster case eventually? Was 
it an experiment of customer-driven policies or what?  
It is evident that the welfare cluster must be linked to the development of the 
Finnish industrial policies.  The new industrial policy strategy of 1993 changed the 
traditional context of the Finnish industrial policies. While the earlier strategy had put 
emphasis on companies as a part of regional policies and recipients of direct subsidies, 
the focus of the new strategy was clearly on the general infrastructure of industries. 
Direct support was replaced by indirect support in which the introduction of new policy 
instruments had a major role. Also, the traditional policy instrument – devaluation – 
had no use in policy making because of EU- integration.360  
The industrial policy vision in 1996 was very close to the industrial strategy of 1993 
in the sense that it utilized scientific arguments. Yet its theoretical apparatus was 
different. It utilized the market failure framework and stressed the role of efficiency as a 
precondition for economic growth. If the cluster framework was designed by a small 
group of scholars and experts, in the case of the industrial policy vision the interests of 
the economic life were taken into account. The idea was to find a solution to the 
deficiencies of the cluster policy. The cluster policy framework was too abstract and 
general; to adopt it into a concrete substantial problem was difficult.361 However, the 
reception of the vision was quiet and partly negative.  
All those developments culminated in the late 1990s in Macropilot, the welfare 
cluster intervention par excellence.362  Simultaneously, a variety of projects linked with 
the welfare cluster were launched. Among various actors SITRA was the most vital as 
that it started a long and broad range of welfare cluster projects focusing on the 
problems of care for the elderly and on the options of older people’s independent living 
at home. Another pole of SITRA’s policy interventions focused on marketing issues in 
the well-being sector and on various attempts to build up networks of welfare 
companies. In retrospect, almost all those projects failed if ICT projects are excluded.363 
In the mid-1990s TEKES launched a series of technology programs such as TDM 
(Digital media in medicine), iWell and some programs in medicine. Although the 
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363 Source:Interviews 2004. 
124  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
challenge of biotechnology was originally part of the welfare cluster framework and its 
analysis, it quickly disengaged itself e cluster framework. 
A kind of flagship of the welfare cluster,as it was marketed in those days,was its 
biggest single project, the Macropilot project, started 1999 and was closed in June 2001. 
The idea of the Macropilot was to test a variety of regional ICT applications in social 
and health care, nd its aim was to support a seamless linking of services by a variety of 
service providers in terms of the client’s needs. It was based on the more extensive IT 
strategy of the MASH and its practical aim was to test a safe and more effective way 
transferring electronic client data in a form of an electronic client card. This implied a 
lot of other problematic issues including, for example, that the Parliament passed a 
special law to comply with the project.364  
The Macropilot assessment report openly highlights that the project was in practice 
full of problems and difficulties, all due to poor preparation, bad organisation, 
inappropriate supervision and idealistic scheduling.  The Macropilot was of course only 
one single project and it can be seen as an example of the customer-driven project.  Yet 
the welfare cluster as a whole was much more interesting as a profound policy 
experiment consisting of a variety of political and ideological issues.365   
From its very beginning the welfare cluster was interpreted as a highly problematic 
case in terms of science and technology policy practices. Prima facie, it was a multi-
facetted internally contradictious policy intervention in which many traditional 
boundaries were knowingly transgressed. In other words, it can be seen as a series of 
experiments toward horizontality in STI policies, and it involved a lot of internal 
dynamics that later proved to be problematic in many respects.  
Some of these difficulties show the welfare cluster proceeded as a political process. 
This makes it possible to investigate what kinds of appraisals and interpretations of the 
case have been presented. Although the interviews provide a lot of new horizons for the 
analysis I will focus here on four aspects that the key persons wanted to highlight.  
The first aspect of the welfare cluster was the problem of definition: what is the 
welfare cluster. The definition problem is a very typical aspect of political terminology 
and the words are used as if they had a received interpretation which is not the case.  
The second aspect of the cluster was linked with the improvement of collaboration 
between two ministries, MTI and MSAH366. This aspect is a link to horizontality and it 
is based on the idea that all political government must participate in STI policies.  
The third aspect concerns the problem of ageing. The demographic changes in the 
future in all western industrialized countries will be one of the most crucial issues that 
policy makers must commit themselves to. Above all, the problem deals with how to 
maintain a system of high quality health and social care services.  
The fourth aspect was that the welfare cluster must be understood as an experiment 
or as a policy exercise rather than as anything else.  
All adversities and difficulties of the welfare cluster illustrate very well the various 
dimensions of the science and technology policy renewal. In order to assess all those 
difficulties I will first highlight the most important ones that the key persons wanted to 
pay attention to. Later I will discuss these issues further. 
The biotechnology entity was too problematic, fashionable and expensive in terms of 
technology policies. It was also an ideal case in terms of traditional science and 
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366 MTI=Ministry of Trade and Industry; MSAH = Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
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technology policy unlike other developments in the welfare cluster. Most key persons 
admit that the very traditional technology programs of TEKES linked with well-being 
and the welfare cluster, were quite successful and influential. The advantage of those 
programs was that they were clearly defined and compact unlike many other projects 
and actions within the welfare cluster.367 
It is interesting that the cluster framework proved to be so powerful, and also 
extremely useful in defining the aims and structures of technology policy. In other 
words, the cluster framework seemed to be flexible and analytic enough as a political 
tool. As a policy framework, cluster thinking was useful in terms of broadening the 
traditional scope of technology policies, because it was not used as a practical decision 
making framework. One controversial aspect of the cluster policies was that the cluster 
framework was imported from outside to the MTI – the know-how and knowledge of it 
within the ministry was poor. However, the ministry and its high officials started to 
market it to other ministries. The problem was very obvious; the cluster framework was 
a theoretical construction with thin links with political administration. The situation 
was similar in other countries.368   
The idea of the welfare cluster was appropriated very quickly. This was natural 
because the welfare cluster gathered the polarities of earlier experimentations and 
experiments in Finland as we have seen earlier. The developments of VTT in hospital 
technology and the ideas generated by STAKES and its predecessor National Board of 
Social Welfare converged with each other.    
A curious aspect of the welfare cluster is that it is extremely difficult to assess the total 
expenditures of the cluster because there were a great number of other projects linked 
with it.369 In the following chapters I will examine in detail how the key persons linked 
with the welfare cluster interpreted the birth of the welfare cluster and how they 
understood the problems that it invoked. A short report dealing with the key persons’ 
interviews was published in Finnish in 2005.370  
 
6.2.1. From simplistic theories to complex practices –  a problem of translation 
 
“The welfare cluster produced a lot of activity which is important as such. Sometimes 
I have pondered whether it had any real international intentions. The idea of the 
welfare cluster was to understand international competitive industries. It was a 
starting point, not the idea of attracting more money to the region in order to 
generate new things. It was not a bad thing, but… (Interviews 2004)” 
 
One of the major problems in the welfare cluster as most of the key persons wanted to 
stress, was how to define it: what is actually an entity called welfare cluster? Is it a real 
entity in the real world, a fictional construction, a scientific model, a kind of theoretical 
description or what?  
Many interviewees wanted to point out that although many terms used in politics are 
empty or blurred, they ought to be “realistic” in the sense that it must refer to some real 
and concrete aspects in the world: in the case of the welfare cluster this was problematic. 
In Finland, there was no real welfare cluster but only a possibility for Finland. Cluster 
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analysts suggested that Finland should try to benefit from it. In other words, the term 
welfare cluster was a speculative term but its political potency was apparent. 
 
“One of the major issues concerning the welfare cluster is simply: is it real? I would 
rather think of innovation environments. Innovative environments imply 
entrepreneurs and experts. That cluster idea stresses an industrial perspective - that is 
to say that the current philosophy should be changed into attractive, dynamic 
platforms for enterprises and that the whole complex ought to be rethought. 
(Interviews 2004)” 
 
Many interviewees thought that the term was worthwhile because of its analytic potency 
to discuss the problems of welfare sector in general. But in terms of policy practices, the 
term was impotent because it did not provide any practical advice for policy makers 
facing concrete situations.In practice, the locks were still locked. 
The attractiveness of the term was based on its ability to describe the new emerging 
global environment. It shifted the political focus on different issues from the traditional 
science and technology policy including industrial policy. In so doing it combined two 
different world views together. 
 
“We were searching for such commodities-goods and services, that possess or will 
possess hidden potentiality for competitiveness and export. The Finnish dilemma was 
then, in the early 1990s how to cope with the breakdown of export. We found a 
variety of products e.g. dental chairs, hospital technology- a very potential branch. In 
addition, there were problems like double-ageing and the cost-efficiency problem of 
the public sector. A huge demand potential! At the crux of that cluster there was a 
group of companies and industrial branches providing commodities related to well-
being and welfare, and one of the most important purchasers was the public sector. 
We wanted to increase cooperation and partnerships between the private and public 
sector. We approached the domain in which politics mattered. Most of the welfare 
services belong to the public sector’s activities. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
It was a kind of chimera for policy makers in the sense that the welfare cluster embodied 
a variety of issues embedded in STI policies. Actually, for policy making it was a huge 
chance; an option, full of potentiality and complexity that nobody afford to neglect.  
In retrospect, the origins of its political attractiveness are very obvious. However, to 
argue that the introduction and adoption of the cluster policies was a result of its 
framework’s excellence is problematic. Vice versa, it is more plausible to argue that the 
theoretical models that the policy makers tried to apply did not change the domain of 
politics and policy making as such.  The idea of the welfare cluster rather provided a 
theoretical resource by which policy makers were able to generate a variety of issues 
linked with new political governance. It explicitly created a new forum for discussion 
and interaction.371 
 
“Cluster” was a good title but you have to generate action rather than to control the 
use of the concept. To be in interaction implies that novelties and synergies between 
local, regional, national and global emerge. But the term - welfare cluster- I doubt a 
health care cluster – a more usual term - would have been better. We wanted to 
inform that our aim was broader and in the ultimate analysis we wanted to contribute 
to people’s welfare in general, and one aspect of it was that we simultaneously support 
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the technology development in welfare services – well-being cluster in English. 
(Interviews 2004)” 
 
Furthermore, it is plausible to argue that the use of the cluster framework changed the 
infrastructural setting of industrial policies. It introduced a totally novel synopsis for 
industrial policies and re-defined the role of actors. The scope of the new synopsis was 
different from the traditional one; although its theoretical core was the economy and the 
national competitiveness, its political aim was to highlight the meaning of societal 
environments as a core of industrial policies. The focus was now more on infrastructural 
issues rather than on industrial policies as such. 
But the whole idea embedded in the welfare cluster was difficult to articulate. The 
problem was that it seemed to generate a lot of new questions but it did not give any 
concrete answers. The theoretical power of the cluster framework was apparently 
confined and difficult to translate into practices. Although the ETLA analysts wanted to 
highlight the meaning of the demand side in terms of generating the real Finnish welfare 
cluster, the distance between suppliers and production was too big. The welfare systems 
– the systems of social and health care - and their organisational structures and expertise 
were too complex and full of historical and cultural inertia. However, the welfare cluster 
was, in spite of its deficiencies, a new and unprecedented political innovation.  
The renewal of those complex systems of expertise and professions and their working 
environments embodies a great variety of professional perspectives and interest 
approaches such as productivity, quality of services and the development of working 
environments.  
Yet, in reality, the welfare cluster as a term was unclear and as we will see later, the 
later events and developments blurred the term even more. 
 
6.2.2. MTI and MSAH dialogue: A challenge for horizontality 
 
“Here we have a fallacy when we discuss the progress of the welfare cluster - what 
happens today because of it, or without it. The bottom line is that in relation to the 
market we have tried to act as an opposing force. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
The speciality of the welfare cluster was that it started a dialogue between the two 
ministries. The dialogue proved to be difficult in the sense that it articulated many other 
issues, some of them apparently ideological and political. In order to understand the 
problem of that dialogue we have to focus on two highly problematic issues: the problem 
of transparency and the problem of privatisation in the social and health service sector.  
 As mentioned earlier, the welfare cluster has been a conscious political intervention 
also in the terms of horizontality embedded in the NIS framework. This aspect became 
also a dividing factor because the political process par excellence drifted towards an open 
controversy between two ministries, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH). What was the collision about and why 
did the cooperation seem frequently to be impossible? 
 
“In terms of policies there is a great contradiction and confrontation between the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The 
other promotes and supports chances of business and entrepreneurship. MSAH 
promotes people’s welfare and good life. The question is whether they are in real 
contradiction. To ask a question like that is fruitful. Before the welfare cluster we 
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never thought that this kind of interaction existed and that both policy sectors would 
be put into the same basket. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
It follows that the controversies and conflicts are understandable in the sense that 
although there was a consensual understandiong behind the whole idea, the interests and 
aims of the two parties were ultimately different. The reasons for that controversy were 
numerous but one of the most obvious ones is connected with the problems of 
boundaries and legitimacy; especially with the problem of how to legitimate boundaries 
between these two policy sectors as well as the differences in paradigms and procedures.  
It is important to be aware that in the early 1990s the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, in particular, was in a problematic situation because of the deep economic 
recession. Its institutional structures and infrastructures were in danger and its 
governmental and economic resources were diminished substantially.372 Because of these 
problems MSAH was obliged to set its strategic focus on completely different issues than 
MTI.  
It could be said that its raison d'etre was at risk; many rapid societal changes and 
transformations made the traditional Nordic welfare state system vulnerable to criticism. 
In Finland, political debates turned into the problems of the public welfare services373and 
one of the hottest issues was the problem of the welfare state as such. In retrospect, there 
was a clear need for radical reforms in social policy but the problem was how to start the 
reform. To argue that the welfare cluster was part of that discussion is not to argue that 
it was only a single part of it. Its role as a political intervention was more important in 
the sense that it started a lot of discussions and opened the door for new debates. It also 
started a dialogue between the two ministries. This dialogue has become later one of the 
key issues in the debates linked with the internal market in the EU. 
When analyzing the key actors’ answers it seems very apparent that the welfare 
cluster as a horizontal intervention was a conscious aim, but it proved to be more 
complex than many thought. One of the reasons was that the welfare cluster thinking 
was linked with the Macropilot project. The Macropilot project changed thoroghly the 
original welfare cluster design with industrial policy being its important aspect because 
the responsibility and funding was now in the hands of the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health. The link between industrial polices became weaker and many interviewees 
think that the Macropilot- project broke it finally. 
 
“MSAH took over the Macropilot project management. Instead of providing 
something for enterprises, the real recipients were municipalities and federations of 
municipalities. First, they claimed – I read those documents recently- that both 
enterprises and public sector actors will benefit. But when one reads the policy 
announcement carefully one notices that there were no companies. Only 
municipalities and federations of municipalities were valid participants. (Interviews 
2004)” 
 
Thereafter, MSAH started to plan and compose the project within its own political 
instruments and tools. What followed was that this turn changed totally the idea of the 
welfare cluster. Now, the welfare cluster was a totally different policy intervention. Its 
focus was on ICT issues and it was clearly a part of the Information Society strategy; its 
core was now the social and health service system and the slogans of the Information 
                                                            
372 I will discuss the problem later in details. 
373 Andersson et al 1993. 
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Society were its political message. In retrospect, this was a very logical and coherent form 
of policy making.  
 
Controversy 1: Transparency in the public sector  
 
In terms of the boundaries of various policy areas and their legacy the welfare cluster 
intervention was extremely problematic.It was also problematic in terms of transparency.  
 
“While speaking about the accomplishment of a market MTI strongly advocated the 
idea that it is the service system that must be reorganized. Whereas we stressed that it 
is a political issue. All political parties in Finland are of the opinion that the public 
sector must be a provider for welfare services, it has the responsibility over needs. The 
issue is how services are rationalized and intensified by using market mechanisms in 
this context. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
The analysis on the key actors’ opinions and conceptions shows that they share a lot of 
with the whole idea of the welfare cluster. To a great extent the original idea of the 
intervention was based on industrial policy arguments. Its implementation made the 
intervention more concrete. It was clear that the welfare cluster must start from the 
welfare service context and its interventionist focus is infrastructural and indirect. The 
idea of mediation was its core but the proper problem was that it was beyond the 
boundaries of a traditional MTI policy area. Although this kind of intervention was 
rational, it was not reasonable.  
 
”As a cluster the welfare cluster was different from other clusters. The funding of 
other clusters was organized through traditional channels- through the Academy of 
Finland and TEKES. This went totally differently. MSAH took over the Macropilot 
project. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
In addition, the intervention was politically very laden, a sort of political minefield but 
its architectural design was brilliant. Its ideological target was based on the infrastructure 
argument saying that the Finnish public sector was too heavy, ineffective and full of 
psychological and institutional barriers.  
Its brilliance in terms of politics was that it seemed to refer to a variety of political 
realms simultaneously: first, it highlighted the development and renewal of the industrial 
policies i.e. its original aim was very plausible. Second, it also highlighted the renewal of 
the Finnish system of welfare services where the horizontal aim was linked with the first 
aim. Third, it coupled these two issues by reminding of the problem of the public sector 
and so provided the basis for the translation procedure. Fourth, it set its focus on the 
welfare sector as a generator changing the original purpose upside down. Fifth, it 
highlighted the options available on the welfare sector stressing the hidden possibilities 
embedded in it. In sum, it transformed the problems of the Finnish welfare system into 
a set of challenges to STI policies.  
 
“The barricade or barrier is if such innovations emerge in the public health care that 
nobody seems to be interested in completing them into products or to earn money 
with them. All are involved in everyday work and in the troubles of scarce resources. 
The mechanisms for creating and diffusing innovations lack. We ought to have a 
distinct organisation - an enterprise for example - specialized in products and in 
making such models or ICT application or whatever real. Its interest should be to 
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disseminate the outcome. This becomes possible i there were enough incentives. It 
does not work just now. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
As many interviewees emphasise such extensive approach, including a conscious 
intervention to transgress the traditional policy territories, was a kind of catalyst for 
contradictions and disputes. Within the totality of the political governance, different 
policy areas have histories, usually including remarkabel struggles and controversies. 
Each policy area has a disciplinary heritage and legitimacy of its own. The birth of 
various policy areas is an outcome of political struggle and those policy areas represent 
the power of different professional expertises and practices. But many key actors think 
that in the end the welfare cluster intervention had more advantages than disadvantages.  
 
“The import of the term of welfare cluster enabled us to understand that it was a 
matter of interaction between service providers and enterprises and in terms of policy 
making a matter of cooperation between MTI and MSAH. That is to say, it was 
about interaction between industrial and social policies. A novel big issue was whether 
these two actors could encounter and support one another. Is it possible to enhance 
simultaneously welfare policies and industrial policies? Those policies were 
traditionally in isolation. My answer to a question is that what was before the welfare 
cluster is that in terms of welfare services there were earlier higher walls between the 
enterprises and the public sector. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
The starting point for the cooperation was controversial. Traditionally, the cooperation 
between those two ministries was insignificant; the other was promoting the interests of 
business and industries and the other was promoting people’s welfare and well-being. 
The problem in cooperation was whether there was a problem at all. 
 
“In terms of policies there is a great contradiction and confrontation between the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The 
other promotes and supports chances of business and entrepreneurship. MSAH 
promotes people’s welfare and good life. The question is whether they are in real 
contradiction. To present suc a question is fruitful. Before the welfare cluster we 
neither thought that this kind of interaction existed and both policy sectors would be 
put into the same basket. Or, to put it otherwise, it was not possible to think of 
private and public sector cooperation. All these elements existed before the welfare 
cluster, but it joined some earlier disconnected elements together and at least gathered 
people around the same table. But it did not imply that there was a real change. It 
provided only a new perspective – a helicopter perspective to see that these issues are 
interrelated. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
One of the most important sources of controversies was the Finnish welfare state model 
in which the municipalities have a key role in organizing and providing welfare services 
including the system of education, the system of libraries and many other leisure time 
and cultural activities as well as most of the social and health services.  
The Finnish social and health care service system was strictly under the MSAH 
control; the ministry made decisions related to funding and it also supervised the system. 
MSAH made also a short-term and long-term strategies for the policy area, and it was its 
responsibility to develop the legislation and to defend its funding apparatus and its 
legitimacy. It was natural that the welfare cluster transgressed the traditional boundaries 
of policy areas. Also, it was understandable that all the interventions aiming at changing 
the Finnish system were provocative from the MSAH perspective. 
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“Then our logic was that we are not interested in externalizing the core activities 
which in our thinking belong to the public sector. We must search for new 
technologies supporting the decisions of our policy making system. MTI wanted to 
reorganize the whole process on the outsourcing and marketing bases. We wanted to 
stress the responsibility and political decision making in organizing and enhancing 
these issues. I have always been a sceptic with clear distinctions between purchasers 
and providers. That is the way Britain and other countries have chosen. It includes 
advantages. It works in certain situations but it has deficiencies. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
The central argument for reconstructing the Finnish system of welfare was its non-
transparency. The point of the argument was that the Finnish system was a hidden 
system of political bargaining behind the curtains. The system was very much based on 
the ideas of political democracy and while municipal autonomy was seen as good in 
principle, in practice, it was full of faults and flaws. In the end the mandates and 
argumentation procedures of MTI and MASH were totally different. 
 
Controversy 2: Privatisation argument  
 
Perhaps the most controversial issue the welfare cluster invoked was the problem of 
privatisation in the social and health care sector. The ETLA analysis highlighted this 
point openly.  
In the Finnish social policy the role of the public sector is extremely important and it 
has long historical origins. In the Finnish system the constitution safeguards economic, 
social and educational basic rights for all people living in Finland.374 The realisation of 
these basic rights is guaranteed by the state and the municipal authorities. From the 
standpoint of social policy the right to comprehensive social protection is one of the key 
fundamental rights.  
Social protection is made up of preventive social and health policy, social welfare and 
health services, as well as sickness, unemployment, old age and other benefits. The aim 
of social protection is to safeguard the working and living environment of the 
population, and to ensure good standards of health and working ability, sufficient 
income, services and social security at different stages in life. Practically every household 
receives at some point some form of income transfer or uses social and health services. 
This was pointed out concretely in one interview. 
 
“Our Finnish cultural way of acting is very conservative.  It seems impossible to think 
that we would follow Sweden and externalize hospitals and health care centres. They 
all share a very generally known problem- if the accounting documents indicate losses 
– what to do next. The experiences from abroad are unambiguous: the payers pay in 
the end. In Finland, it is reasonable to think that the Helsinki-Turku -Tampere 
region would be suitable for this kind of market orientation. In rural areas such 
services are not profitable. If we take the competition option it follows that services 
are too expensive. These issues are difficult, they cannot be measured with money. 
Money is attached to a single patient as well as his/her care and then we have to take 
the whole national context and the resources available. It is impossible to think that if 
I have been well today and all the money has been spent so I have to be healthy the 
rest of the year. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
                                                            
374 Strategies for Social Protection in 2010, MSAH publications 2001:12. 
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The Finnish social protection system is structured in line with the principles of the 
Nordic welfare model in which the most important aspects include the following areas: 
It is based on the principle of universality which covers the right to all social protection 
for all those living in Finland; it is based on a strong public sector; its basis is in tax 
funding with respect on the legislative rights of residents and citizens, and the principles 
of equal treatment and proportionality.   
The public sector has a central role in the development of social protection.  MSAH 
directs and guides the development and policies of social protection, social welfare and 
health care. It defines the main course of social and health policies, prepares legislation 
and key reforms, and oversees their implementation.  
The problem of markets and competition was not among the first issues in MASH’s 
policy agenda; it was naturally an essential part of the Finnish health care service system 
in which the private sector had a clear role together with the public sector. Traditionally, 
the argument against the market ideology was that there was no market in social and 
health care or should such market exist it was only a quasi-market. One aspect of the 
welfare cluster was to start this kind of discussion.  
 
”The most difficult issue of the Advisory Board was attitude to business. The 
juxtaposition between MTI and MSAH was more than apparent. There were many 
negotiations on the high level and Matti Vuoria and Markku Lehto almost bridged it. 
In particular, the lower authorities did not accept the idea and saw that the focus of 
the welfare cluster should not be on the privatisation of social and health sector. 
(Interviews 2004)” 
 
Some of the interviewees claimed that the privatisation discussion was important to 
start. The brilliance of the welfare cluster intervention was that its point of departure was 
on the demand side. In other words, the ETLA analysts wanted that the whole idea of 
the intervention was to generate the ideas and make them transparent for industries. But 
it was only the other side of the intervention because the opposing side was more 
provocative. However, this was a conscious aim, as one interviewee admits. 
  
“We come here very quickly to the distinctions in which the definition of the market 
and the non-market and the role of the public sector are important. That kind of 
demarcation was important for MTI. How to intensify activities? What role might 
competition have in this service sector, that is, how to increase the spectrum of service 
providers and to facilitate enterprises entries to the welfare sector? It is one of those 
political dimensions embedded in the welfare cluster - to increase the possibilities of 
enterprises de facto. And, of course, there is the competition argument. (Interviews 
2004)” 
 
If the aim of the welfare cluster was clearly to start the renewal of the welfare sector, it 
was natural that the authorities in MSAH saw the situation differently. One of the nicest 
aspects of the welfare cluster was that it made it possible to change the subject. The 
subject was the reform of the public sector including the welfare services and therefore it 
was necessary to speak about new scenarios. The new subject was that the welfare cluster 
represents a huge possibility for Finland; it concealed a new Nokia. This was the real 
point, not the problems of the welfare sector as such. 
 
“In terms of welfare policies we had arrived at the situation in which some questioned 
the role and dimension of the welfare sector with relation to its warranted aim. There 
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were elements of economic recession but also ideological changes. The whole process 
started in our sector from the idea of finding new Nokia-type conceptions and success 
stories. Was it possible to think of finding a service model suitable for export? 
(Interviews 2004)” 
 
In retrospect, it is easy to find other reasons for the privatisation argument although it 
was clearly an ideological comment. The principles for funding the Finnish welfare 
services changed in the early 1990s and it also provided a new horizon for this kind of 
discussion. The old system was based on the strong steering system and control by 
MSAH and the new system established was far more liberal. The autonomy of the 
municipalities organising and providing most of the services increased., MSAH lost 
simultaneously its central instruments and tools for efficient governance. The 
municipalities were autonomous to make their own decisions according to the changes 
in the funding system. This opened doors for competition and the market ideology. 
 
”From the MTI-side the interventionist focus was on such issues as the development 
of the industrial policy and the private vs. the public juxtaposition in the welfare 
sector. Originally, the starting point was the integration of industrial and health 
policies with innovation policies. MTI wanted to highlight the economic aspect and 
issues related to the public vs. private dilemma. Which segments of health service 
sector should be arranged on a business basis? It was of a particular interest in the 
early 1990s when the legislation changed so that also municipalities were not obliged 
to produce those services - they were only responsible for providing  the social and 
health services and they could purchase them. The proper problem is still up in the 
air, understanding the role of partnerships in development activities. (Interviews 
2004)” 
 
As many interviewees remark the intervention was of a great importance. It posed a lot 
of important questions, among them the question of controversy. Is the controversy 
between those two ministries real or constructed? It seems as if the welfare cluster had 
opened the eyes of the authorities; it revealed something important for developing the 
Finnish welfare service system and tells something of the Finnish industrial policies. It 
provided a totally new perspective from which it was easy to see that these issues are 
linked with each other more closely than people used to think.  
 
6.2.3. Ageing – A real problem or not 
 
”The message is quite sad. Thereafter we tried to be in contact with some European 
parliamentarians and other opinion leaders and introduce the theme of ageing within 
the sixth framework but it was a disaster. Naturally, we have now the seventh 
framework but my point is that we lack the structure. In Finland, STAKES is not 
liable, neither TEKES nor Finpro. The theme of ageing is no-man’s land. In order to 
export we ought to have a structure. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
In terms of political rhetoric one of the most brilliant ideas was to link the idea of the 
welfare cluster with the challenge of ageing. The demographic change in developed and 
industrialized countries is and will be one of the most difficult political issues of the 
future. The argument of ageing was not a new one but the welfare cluster intervention 
emphasized a variety of issues usually ignored in debates. It strongly stressed that the 
demographic change must be taken into account, but this involves two big problems.  
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First, the costs of social and health care will increase and therefore the reform of the 
existing system of welfare services is necessary. It follows that the system based on the 
high standard of taxation and the public sector system must be reformed. Second, the 
existing system does not pay attention to the customer’s perspective – some of them 
elderly people of the future have significantly more purchasing power and their needs are 
important.375  
A very usual argument has been that ageing implies the increase in the need for care 
among the ageing population. It means that the ageing population will increase the costs 
of social and health care; ageing entails more sickness and a lot of pressure for the health 
care system. Ageing also implies also the decrease of functional capacity increasing the 
need for care increases.  
 
“To link ageing and the welfare cluster is a bit problematic… what different elements 
are hidden in ageing – post-industrial society, globalisation, education and 
competition? If we want to focus on ageing it is obvious that there is a lot of chances. 
My point is to ask whether we have understood the challenge of ageing really and my 
answer is no, simply not really. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
Another very usual argument has been that ageing involves a Pension Bomb. In other 
words, the pension system will collapse because the active part of the population is not 
able to finance the system. This aspect also refers to the scarcity problem of the working 
force and the possible growth of immigration from abroad.  
Both conclusions are naturally very controversial as there is a great disagreement 
among experts about what are the real impacts of ageing. While ageing is usually 
interpreted as a problem, it is also possible to interpret it as a challenge and resource. 
The traditional scenarios of ageing are often based on a kind of gloomy thinking.  
But although the welfare cluster was closely linked with the ageing issue, it proved to 
be very complex and problematic. It was clearly a political issue and all the attempts that 
the Finnish actors wanted to advocate at the EU level failed. In terms of ageing there was 
no real political consensus in Europe; there were only single programs but no common 
policy program. The problem of ageing was clearly a national issue because it belonged 
to the basket of social policy. Every member state makes the decisions related to ageing 
and social policy independently.376 
 
”The history of the COST A5 program was unfortunate because its closing in 1996 
also closed a lot of networks and activities. Thereafter, there was no home base for 
those activities; COST A5 was the only network. It was simply closed. (Interviews 
2004)” 
 
                                                            
375 In Finland, in the year 2005 16% of the population were over 65 years old; the prediction is that in 
2030 26% and in 2040 27% of the population are over 65 years old. It means that if in 2005 there are 
around 840 000 people over 65 in 2040 there will be ca. 1, 400 000 people over 65, Source 
Tilastokeskus, väestötilastot. 
376 Health care in Finland is primarily funded from tax revenue. In 2003, total health care expenditure 
was almost 11 billion euros, amounting to 7.6 % of GDP. It is below the average for the OECD 
countries.  In 2002, municipalities funded 43 % of total health care expenditure, while the government 
funded 17 %, health insurance 16 %, households 20 % and other private bodies (e.g. insurance 
companies) 4 %. The share of client fees in 2002 was 8, while municipalities paid out 67 %, and the 
government 25 %.  
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The original idea of the welfare cluster was to advocate the new consumer-driven health 
care system as an incremental rather than revolutionary process. The problem in the 
Finnish system was that the consumer-driven ideology and its management were far 
from everyday routines and practices. However, the consumer- driven thinking and 
ideologies have rapidly spread to Finland and there is a broad consensus among actors 
that the impacts of old tricks are very restricted. 
 
“This well-being technology is demanding in the sense that there are a lot of rules, 
regulations and high thresholds. To pass that regulation jungle and get all approvals 
and licences as regards the product or service you are marketing, it takes time. 
Because the systems of health care, funding and management vary so much between 
different countries, the embedding of innovations is on average more difficult than in 
the more homogenous industrial and consumer sector. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
The original idea of the welfare cluster seemed to be too ambitious. The frustrating 
conclusion was that innovations were context-dependent and that there were a lot of 
problems in transferring them to other contexts. Different countries and regions seem to 
have not only totally differently developed management systems but also totally different 
information and communication systems.  
Most key persons stressed that it was naïve to think that an excellent idea or a 
technological invention compatible with the Finnish environments and platforms would 
be an excellent idea or invention also in some other countries. Although the hardware 
systems up to a certain point were similar in each country the software systems are 
totally different. The conclusion was that there was no use to design information and 
communication systems without taking into account the professionals and practices.  
It is more than obvious that as a result of this the issue of ageing became an essential 
part of the welfare cluster as a sort of translation. It was not a solution to the problem 
because the issue of ageing proved to be more difficult and politically more controversial 
than the policy makers wanted to admit. The welfare cluster turned out to be a political 
rather than a technical case.  
All these issues played an essential role in the key person’s attempts to analyze the 
real nature of the welfare cluster. Almost all accepted the view that we need good slogans 
and new terms in politics; almost all also advocated the view that the welfare cluster case 
is a lesson for policy making but only one of them was wandering and critically 
analyzing the problem of ageing.  
 
6.2.4. The welfare cluster – An important lesson for policy makers 
 
”It was a learning process for all and the effects of the welfare cluster have been very 
important. It has been a lesson for all of us. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
It is interesting that the cluster framework proved to be so powerful and useful in 
defining the aims and structures of technology policy. In other words, the cluster 
framework proved to be so flexible and analytic that it could be used as a political tool. 
As a policy framework cluster thinking was useful in terms of broadening the traditional 
scope of technology policies, it was not used as a practical decision making framework.  
One controversial aspect of the cluster policies was that the cluster framework was 
imported outside the MTI the know-how and knowledge of it within the ministry was 
poor. However, the ministry and its high officials started to market it to other ministries. 
The problem was obvious; the cluster framework was a theoretical construction having 
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only weak links with traditional mentality in political administration. The situation was 
similar in other countries.377   
 
“The welfare cluster produced a lot of activity which is important as such. Sometimes 
I have pondered whether it had any real international intentions. The idea of the 
welfare cluster was to understand international competitive industries. It was a 
starting point, not the idea of attracting more money to the region in order to 
generate new things. It was not a bad thing, but… (Interviews 2004)” 
 
The biotechnology entity was too problematic, fashionable and expensive in terms of 
technology policies. It was also an ideal case in terms of traditional science and 
technology policy, contrary to other developments in the welfare cluster. Most key 
persons admit that the traditional technology programs of TEKES linked with well-
being and welfare cluster issues were quite successful and influential. The advantage of 
those programs was that they were clearly defined and compact unlike many other 
projects and actions within the welfare cluster.   
 
“If we think of pharamacial industries, biotechnology and hospital technology they 
are different technologies utilized in the medical diagnosis and care. In my mind the 
welfare cluster focused more on the dilemma reorganizing service system with the 
help of new technology. It is a much more complicated issue. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
Macropilot was seen in this sense as controversial. The idea of Macropilot was closely 
connected with the cluster policies and it is often seen as a test of those policies.378 We 
have to keep in mind that the Finnish cluster program in the late 1990s was financed by 
the returns obtained from the sales of state-owned companies and Macropilot was based 
on the shares allocated to the domain of the MSAH.  
In terms of resources Macropilot was an attractive enterprise for both ministries. It 
was a new resource for the MSAH after the long series of socio-political cuts since the 
early 1990s. For the Ministry of Trade and Industry it was a new option for horizontal 
policies. But both of those ministries were later disappointed because contrary to 
expectations the Macropilot project proved to be extremely complicated and full of 
obstacles and difficulties. It became difficult for MSAH in terms of cooperation with 
companies and various institutional partners, and it also became a disappointment for 
MTI because of the adversities with cooperation with other policy sector.  
It is interesting that the representatives of both of these ministries saw the cluster 
program differently. MSAH advocated strongly the ICT dimension and wanted to stress 
the technological aspects of new institutional structures and services. It also wanted to 
guard its traditional policy domain. For MASH Macropilot was primarily a 
technological intervention. 
 
“A point of departure from our point of view was and is on practice and services. Our 
concern is not on technological innovation but rather on social innovation: how to 
organize services cost-effectively following social policy guidelines. This is our 
innovation that we adhere to. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
                                                            
377 Penender 1999. 
378 Kivisaari et al 2002; Nykänen2002; Ohtonen2002. 
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The interest of MTI was not so much on technology as such but it rather wanted to 
highlight institutional and organisational aspects. This implied that it had to enter 
outside its own policy domain or territory. The adoption of new technology is a 
complicated process and it demands a lot of engineering and technological know-how 
but it also demands new institutional settings and new approaches to work as such. This 
cat and mouse game generated numerous debates and controversies between those two 
ministries. 
 
“People from MSAH stressed that they wanted to develop their own system. We 
thought that we ought to broaden the view and compare the international health care 
systems globally in order to develop our R&D infrastructure. People from MASH 
maintained that Macropilot and the welfare cluster were part of social policy, but 
only a neww by which to rationalise the existing system. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
In retrospect, most evaluators and experts think that Macropilot was a failure; if it was 
not a total failure it was surely not a success story. This was also a common view among 
the key actors. 
 
“One of the biggest failures in Macropilot was that many important decisions related 
to participants and companies were made at the local government level.  The motives 
were often regional. In other words, the ”shoulders” of enterprises and companies 
were very narrow. Another problem was simply the know-how. A rope is useless in 
pushing. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
The criticism was cut-throat: the ambitious and unspecific goals of the project together 
with rapid schedule and fuzzy project organisation never met the real needs of 
institutions, organisations, companies and people.  Because its basic premises and 
infrastructures were too vague, the objects of interventions too unspecific and its policy 
instruments inappropriate, it was natural that the outcomes were far from successful. 
Many have interpreted that Macropilot became a lesson for Finnish policy makers. 
 
“One very positive aspect related to the welfare cluster is that there are a lot of more 
people interested in these issues. In other words, there is more and more people who 
understand the problem. However, this is more about creating preconditions and 
infrastructures,and we could say that in spite of many difficulties and frustrations this 
has been a process of progression rather than that of regression. (Interviews 2004)” 
  
According to many evaluations 379 related to the welfare cluster and the Macropilot 
project in particular the outcomes were controversial. The original idea of the 
Macropilot was that it would be one of the most extensive ICT projects in the world 
with a focus on the social and health sector. This aim was too ambitious. Its schedule 
was too tight, aims unrealistic and its management a failure. The interaction between the 
welfare services and the ICT sector was also difficult.  
 
“The problem of Macropilot was simple – its schedule was too fast and it was laden 
with inordinate expectation. It has parallels with biotechnology and its profit 
expectations are huge. They are unrealistic. They will never get it. It is a bubble. It is 
also ridiculous. We have to proceed more moderately. And then that assessment and 
                                                            
379 Kivisaari et al 2002; Kivisaari 1997; Mäkinen et al 2001. 
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evaluation! Before you did anything, it was decided that the assessment process starts. 
It does not matter. Now evaluators have done their work and if we have three cases 
on the elderly, they should have been important…This kind of assessment kills 
enthusiasm too early. All return to old practice sooner or later. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
According to the original welfare cluster analysts the Macropilot was not a well-
organized process with clear intentions and resources. One explanation the interviewees 
often gave was that MSAH was not able to and capable at organizing the project 
properly. In other words, the Macropilot was more like a political experiment or a 
heterogeneous process rather than a well-defined technology project with explicit aims 
and goals in the manner of TEKES technology programs.  
Actually, TEKES and other technology policy infrastructures were not involved at all 
in the process. One of the most important reasons was MSAH and its policy traditions: 
it started to manage the project as if it were a mere social policy project. It also changed 
the agenda of the project so that the Macropilot was closer to information society 
projects than to industrial policies. This is understandable if we recall that the original 
idea of the welfare cluster was problematic from the MSAH perspective. It was more 
comfortable to work with the project in which the point was on information society. In 
spite of all the criticism the Macropilot was according to interviewees, an important and 
fruitful project. 
 
“The welfare cluster was implemented within a top-down framework. When you 
gather a sufficiently large group and all opinions must be taken into account, the 
outcome is a round compromise. It is no more a concrete entity.  It involves various 
interests and expectations of different actors. Today, the focus is on services, 
development and changing of activities. Technology is seen as an enabling factor. It is 
adopted and utilized if it is possible and rational. The handle has been too often a 
technological one.  Our way of functioning has changed a lot. We highlight more 
that soft side, development and opening of services. It is more ambitious in terms of 
internalization. (Interviews 2004)” 
  
As mentioned earlier, one of the most difficult problem of the welfare cluster was that 
different stakeholders had totally different aims for it. Their perspectives and approaches 
were also different, and their interpretations of the core of the intervention varied. The 
other camp stressed the role of companies and enterprises and the other camp 
highlighted the role of the Finnish welfare system. 
  
 “If I consider this in terms of the Ministry of Trade and Industry our aim was to 
stimulate enterprises so that it will engender export, revenue and business. You are 
not able to do it alone but you need partners from the public sector, hospital districts, 
and municipalities. They were important as a testing arena, as a form of feed-back. It 
is a very usual regional problem that solution is home-spun and meets regional needs. 
The idea of copying is lacking. (Interviews 2004).” 
 
One of the paradoxes of the Finnish science and technology policies has been its 
character as a top-down hierarchical process in which implementation is primarily 
organizational. The welfare cluster was in this sense a challenge.  
In order to understand how the welfare issues are interpreted it is important to be 
aware of the fact that the whole Finnish system of social and health services was based on 
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the idea of local government. Municipalities are important links in the Finnish 
democracy system as they are very autonomous in their decision making.   
Earlier in 1993 MSAH had lost most of his regulatory instruments and this made the 
problem more complex.380 The history of Finnish information technology applications 
in health care was a parallel with this. There was no architectural design between 
municipalities or regions but municipalities and hospital districts have systems of their 
own. In terms of development, all experiments and renovation processes became very 
difficult. 
 
“In Macropilot it became evident that municipalities and their boundaries are real - 
there is no single purchaser, there are a lot of them doing what they want. The other 
issue was that the enterprises were not able to construct networks in the need of 
database experts, telecommunication experts and so forth. They were incapable of 
doing so. (Interviews 2004)” 
 
The problem was also that there were too many hopes for the intervention. The original 
idea to develop cooperation between two ministries was according to two key persons, in 
principle excellent but when linked with the other major issues it proved to be difficult 
in the welfare cluster case. 
 
“The original idea was to emphasize the role of actors not the ministries as such. The 
welfare cluster changed the situation so that the problem was rather how to dissipate 
the boundaries between industrial policies and social and health policies. How to get 
more genuine cooperation with MSAH and MTI?  Perhaps in retrospect there was 
too much effort. Those ICT projects also failed. So many things must be included 
(Interviews 2004).” 
 
In spite of difficulties the welfare cluster case was for the most of interviewees a policy 
experiment and a lesson. However, we may ask a lesson about what?  
Most of interviewees stressed that the welfare cluster case was outstripped, a closed 
case in 2004, and most of interviewees wanted to take another perspective onto the 
problems linked with the intervention.  
They would rather speak of the healthcare technology program 2004 - 2009, about 
FinnWell and its challenges. The objective of the five-year programme is to improve the 
quality and profitability of healthcare, and to promote business activities and export in 
the field. 
The programme stresses now that technology improves the quality and profitability of 
healthcare services only if new procedures are developed simultaneously with the products 
themselves. FinnWell is one of the most extensive technology programmes funded by 
TEKES. The total value of the programme is 150 million, of which TEKES funds about 
one half and the participants of the programme invest the other half. The project has 
three focus areas: processes of health care, technologies for diagnostics and care, and IT 
related products and services for healthcare.  
The original idea of the welfare cluster is now replaced with this gigantic new 
technology programme. The differences between the FinnWell and the original welfare 
cluster are very apparent. If the focus of the original welfare cluster was on welfare services 
including both social and health care services, the FinnWell is totally different. 
                                                            
380 A new Municipality Act of 1993 shifted guidance, supervision, and norm giving from MSAH to 
municipalities. 
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Most interviewees stressed that the welfare cluster case was an important intervention. 
Only some expressed a view that the intervention was too political and ideological. They 
rather thought that the defaults and failures resulted from other reasons. Evidently, its 
procedure and design were poor, and the great degree of confusion and uncertainty were 
linked with the issues that the intervention wanted to highlight.  
Most of the aims in the original design of the welfare cluster were political and 
ideological although only a couple of interviewees stressed this side of intervention. The 
original target of the intervention was to stimulate the welfare sector to push the actors in 
social and health care towards eliciting embryos of innovations and thus to help 
companies and industries in developing something totally new and radical. But the 
original target was blurred with other ideas in an interesting manner.  
The first idea was to highlight the underdevelopment of the market in the welfare 
service sector by emphasising the privatisation argument. The second idea was to 
problematize the idea of the public sector by stressing the transparency argument. These 
two ideas became the core of the intervention; that is, the accountability argument and 
the efficiency argument displaced the original idea of the welfare cluster. The problematic 
core of the intervention was now focused on institutional settings of the existing system 
of welfare services. Hence, the public system of welfare services as such was challenged, 
and the idea of the intervention was turned upside down to increase transparency and 
explicate the rigidities of the welfare system.  This became the core of the controversies 
between two ministries. 
In the late 1990s these problems were analytically studied in some surveys and 
studies381 implemented by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Those studies had a clear 
political role in the sense that they wanted to describe the problems of the public sector 
and especially the problems of the Finnish social and health sector from a new angle. 
The first study describes the procurement procedure and clarifies the selection process 
of a service provider from the service provider’s standpoint. The conclusion is that the 
most prominent deficiencies of the procurement market of municipalities relate to the 
municipalities’ unwillingness to externalize their services.382 
 The second study analyzes the impact of legislative regulation, public subsidies and 
taxation that distorts the competition on the social welfare and health care service 
market between the agents in the private, public and non-profit sector.383  
The third study tries to find explanations for the reasons why the number of 
procurements of services made by municipalities from the private sector has not 
substantially increased.384  
  
                                                            
381 Lith 2000; Melin & Paunio 2001; Södergård 2001.  
382 These include the decisive role of price in the selection of a service provider, poorly compiled tender 
invitations, defects in the value added taxation in health care, social services and food provision and the 
finacial aid and subsidies granted by RAY382 for social services which distorts competition.  
383 Among the factors distorting competition were the special role of the service provision of 
municipalities and joint municipal boards and non-compliance with the Public Procurement Acts and 
some other problems in legislation. Also subsidies granted by RAY to service providers and the hidden 
value added tax proved to be major problems. Also other factors like aid to employment, municipal 
subsidies were mentioned. 
384 The study examines and analyses the local sector as a buyer of services from four primary 
standpoints. It attempts 1) to clarify the concept of local market as such, 2) to describe the current ways 
of operating as a buyer on the market, 3) to study the motives of operating on the market and identify 
the developing prospects of procurements of services, 4) to analyze a variety of obstacles to the 
development of procurements of services as an internal and external issue.  
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7. RHETORICAL RE-DESCRIPTION 
OF STI POLICIES  
 
7.1. Point of departure for the re-description: the RIS and RIP perspectives 
revisited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. RIS and RIP perspectives revisited 
 
As a controversial intervention the welfare cluster aroused a lot of critical discussion. Its 
political meaning was that it provided a new forum for many further initiatives and, in 
fact, it clarified a lot of issues linked with STI policies. But in order to be able to show 
that the welfare cluster as a political intervention was necessary for Finnish STI policies, 
we have to analyse the rationale of those policies in details.  
My statement is that the welfare cluster case is of a great interest because it unlocks a 
variety of political dimensions embedded in STI policies.  I will argue that as a singular 
case it has been one of the most important interventions in Finnish STI policies. Its 
speciality is that it adduces very important, politically sensitive problems of those 
policies. My conjecture is that the aspects involved in it will be the most difficult issues 
of STI policies in the future.  
The key persons’ interpretations on the welfare cluster imply a lot of interesting 
questions related to politics in general. The conclusion they made was that the welfare 
cluster must be understood as an experiment. My question continues: an experiment of 
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what? In order to be able to answer to this question we have to examine how rhetoric is 
embedded in STI policies and how it is used in the Finnish case. 
This study aims to examine the scientific and political construction of STI policies. 
By making the distinction between the RIS and RIP perspectives I wish to stress that 
there are two different realms of STI policies described above. The first, the RIS realm, 
is gathered around the problem of STE hybrid justification and its core is to find a 
plausible scientific justification for the hybrid. The other, the RIP realm, is gathered 
around the problem of legitimation in contemporary political administration and its 
major argument is gathered into the globalization argument. This divide is often 
described as a collision between two different world views: homo economicus and homo 
politicus. To use Arendt’s terms controversy shows that vita contemplative dominates vita 
active, theôria is placed above praxis, and epistêmê over mere doxa.385 
In terms of STI policies the justification and legitimation are intertwined and 
interlocked in many ways. The aim of the re-description is to analyze both the 
theoretical dilemma and the practical dilemma of STI policies in order to open up new 
horizons and find new interpretations for understanding the STI policies and, in 
particular, its dependency on politics. 
This means that STI policies must be analyzed as a totality in which the dilemma of 
fact and fiction in the economical sciences and the dilemma of spatiality and temporality 
in the political sciences are used in order to justify and legitimate those policies. The first 
analysis focuses on the dilemma of the STE hybrid in pursuit of clarifying how scholars 
have characterized the hybrid and what kinds of strategies they have employed in order 
to find a plausible justification for it. This means that the primary interest in this 
analysis is on how economists have understood the dilemma of fact and fiction.  
The second analysis concentrates on the problem of horizontality embedded in STI 
policies. The aim of the analysis is to clarify complex links between the ethos of new 
political governance and STI policies.   
 
Five thematic moves   
 
In order to be able to analyze in detail what role rhetoric has in STI policies and how it 
works in practice we have to return to some very fundamental issues concerning rhetoric 
as an analytic tool in studying those policies. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca differentiate two different classes of premises: 
premises relating to “the real” and premises relating to “what is preferable”. The first 
class of premises is composed of a corollary of facts, truths and presumptions by which 
they are able to convince and persuade the audience in question. Those premises are 
treated as not being subject to discussion but taken for granted; facts are statements 
about reality and they require no further justification. Presumptions are premises that 
imply that something is real or actual and that something else is anti-real and potential. 
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca386 argue further that our knowledge of reality requires 
us not to simply accept everything we see as reality but we have to differentiate reality 
and appearance; it also follows that old concepts are no longer adequate and new 
concepts must be introduced. In other words, dissociation arguments divide the world 
into categories like “reality”/“appearance” “part”/”whole“ or “abstract”/”concrete”. This 
means that every association implies dissociation and vice versa.  
                                                            
385 Arendt 1958. 
386 Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca 1969, p. 4. 
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In terms of this study I will apply Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s rhetorical 
framework as an analytic toolbox by which I am able to examine the complex of STI 
policies further. The rhetorical framework allows us to access a variety of difficult 
scientific debates embedded in STI policies concerning its rationality, logic, ontology 
and epistemology. 
In order to be able to realize my rhetorical re-description I have differentiated five 
thematic moves as follows. 
The first thematic move is to clarify some theoretical discussions related to the 
problem of science, technology and innovation i.e. the axis of science, vision and 
ideology. Those three elements were extremely important for Joseph Schumpeter who 
originally introduced the idea of innovation. Those issues have been also a very essential 
aspect of STI policies in general, and they are present in many ways in our contemporary 
discussions related to STI policies and their political aspects. 
In the second move we will turn to examine how the scientific frameworks and models 
are involved in STI policies. The prevailing practices of STI policies utilize a huge 
resource of scientific frameworks and models seeking a coherent and plausible 
justification for these policies. In terms of justification, economics has a major role 
although other disciplines linked with the problem of the economy have become 
gradually more and more important.  
The role of economics is natural for many reasons. One of them is the fact that the 
whole idea of innovation becomes from economics, or to be precise, from evolutionary 
and institutional economics. When analyzing the methodological debates associated 
with economics I will focus on the construction of NIS within the OECD context. My 
major interest is here on scientific debates related to the evolutionary and institutional 
economics and how the leading scholars give reasons for the NIS framework and what 
they actually argue. 
In the third move we will return to the problem of government and legitimation 
linked with STI policies. At the heart of the new political administration is the role of 
the public sector. In the Finnish case it concerns how the welfare state works in the 
future. The Nordic welfare state is an outcome of a long historical process in which the 
public sector has been responsible for the development of welfare services. Now it is seen 
as problematic.  
The problem of the role of the public government in general seems to be an essential 
aspect of STI policies. This move shifts my focus onto the interpretation of the cluster 
framework as a complement to NIS. While the cluster framework has been used more as 
a strategic and pragmatic tool for re-organizing the political government, it has also been 
used as a strategic framework seeking to explicate the agenda of future technology 
policies. The NIS framework and the cluster framework can be seen as a pair and the 
Finnish example, the welfare cluster case, illustrates how problematic the coupling of 
these two frameworks may be.  
The point of the fourth move is to examine the dependency of STI policies on national 
environments. STI policies have been said to be exclusively a matter of national policies. 
Therefore, STI policies are made up of a variety of political instrumentation used as 
leverage to economic growth and wealth. This national aspect of STI policies 
amalgamates all the previous aspects in the sense that it highlights the point that STI 
policies are seen as a particular mode of policy as well as an inherent part of politics. STI 
policies must be linked with a complex of political debates in which issues like 
consensus, democracy, decision making, participation and legitimacy are included. 
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Rhetoric is increasingly essential when carrying through those policies. When 
analyzing the Finnish political culture further as a frame for STI policies, I try to clarify 
the success of Finland and the peculiarities of the Finnish political culture. 
The fifth move functions as a sort of summary of the rhetorical re-description and its 
analytic focus is on the dilemma of concepts and models in STI policies. The aim here is 
to demonstrate how scientific concepts and terms as well as models and theories having 
scientific origin are utilized in STI policies. This summary stresses the decisive role of 
those models in justifying and legitimating those policies by highlighting two 
complementary aspects embedded in them. It is obvious that concepts and models 
function as performatives and that they seem to provide a catalytic resource for 
institutional reforms and policy experimentations. 
 
7.2. Exploring the anatomy of STI policies: Rhetoric, ideology or what: 
The first move  
 
7.2.1. The holy trinity of economy, technology and innovation 
 
I will start this chapter by studying the genealogies of the idea of innovation. My first 
intellectual target is Karl Marx and his account of the relationship between technology 
and economy. I argue that Marx and his thinking are present in the current STI policies 
in many ways. But what makes Marx so important for STI policies? The answer depends 
on how we understand politics as we have discussed earlier. In order to be able to analyze 
the problem we have to return to some conceptual dilemmas related to politics as such. 
Those dilemmas become tangible when comparing two different approaches to 
economics: the neoclassical theory and the Marxian theory.  
 
Marx and powers of economy and technology 
 
One of the most important concepts of Marxian theory related to innovation is the 
concept of valorization. According to Marx, the essence of capital is the endless and 
limitless valorization of value, an essence which sets itself up behind the backs of people 
as he calls it.387 The German original term for valorization is "Verwertung" (specifically 
Kapitalverwertung) but this term is difficult to translate. It is often wrongly rendered as 
"realisation of capital", "creation of surplus-value" or "self-expansion of capital" or 
"increase in value". In modern translations of Marx's economic writings, the term 
valorisation is preferred because it denotes a highly specific economic concept.  
Marx’s point is that in capitalism everything that exists reveals itself to be valorizable 
- as capable of being drawn into a cycle of valorization. Value is, neither money nor 
capital, but the essence of valorizing, which makes everything that exists appear as 
valorizable. Value expresses itself quantitatively as well as qualitatively in the potential or 
realized exchange against money. But despite the real appearance of reification, it cannot 
be identified with the thing 'money'. Nevertheless, the essence of capital expresses itself 
above all in money.388  
In Marx’s philosophy, the value relation remains in the economic and social 
dimension. It is the money-mediated social relations of commodities which cover up and 
distort the relations of working people to each other. Capital, as a relation mediated by 
                                                            
387 STM 1998a and 1998b. 
388 See also Eldred 2000; Aronowitz 1988. 
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things, provides the economy with its form and also forms the basis upon which the 
superstructure is erected. The other social instances like the state, the legal forms, 
morality, culture, ideologies and even philosophy are supposed to be thought proceeding 
from this basis and correspond to it.  
For Marx, the possibility that one may give up the ownership of one's own labour, 
and in doing so give up one's capacity to transform the world is tantamount to being 
alienated from one's own nature. This is what Marx calls commodity fetishism in which 
the things that people produce appear to have a life and movement of their own to 
which humans and their behavior merely adapt. His conclusion is that the exchange and 
circulation of commodities really are the product and reflection of social relationships 
among people. Under capitalism, social relationships of production, such as those 
among workers or between workers and capitalists, are mediated through commodities. 
They include also the fact that labor can be bought and sold  in the market. 
Marx’s argument is that the alienation of human work is the defining feature of 
capitalism. He distinguishs industrial capitalists from merchant capitalists. Merchants 
buy goods in one place and sell them in another; they buy things at one market and sell 
them at another. Since the laws of supply and demand operate within given markets, 
there is often a difference between the price of a commodity in one market and another. 
Merchants practice arbitrage and hope to capture the difference between these two 
markets.  
The capitalist mode of production is capable of tremendous growth because the 
capitalist can reinvest profits in new technologies. When the rate of profit falls below a 
certain point, the result may be a recession or depression in which certain sectors of the 
economy collapse. Marx understood that during such a crisis the price of labor would 
also fall, and eventually make possible the investment in new technologies and the 
growth of new sectors of the economy. He believed that this cycle of growth, collapse, 
and growth would be punctuated by increasingly severe crises.  
If the debates on homo economicus focus on presumptions on human nature, the 
Marxian theory begins with the social relationships shaping and changing what human 
beings are, think and do. Neoclassical economic theory has a totally different approach 
to the problems of economy with different points of entry. The objects of the theories 
are different as the logics of these approaches are totally different.  
If the neoclassical theory always connects prices, wages, and profits to its organizing 
concepts of individual preferences, resource endowments and technology and if its 
theory is an individual human nature theory of the meaning of those objects, the 
Marxian theory begins with the concept of class. It always connects prices, wages, and 
profits to this organizing concept: the Marxian theory is a class theory in which the 
meaning of these objects is its intellectual core.389 
In the neoclassical theory all concepts are derived from priorities. Price is derived 
from what causes it, i.e. supply and demand. Then supply and demand are reduced to 
what determines them – the entry-point concepts of individual preferences, technology 
and resource endowments.   
The Marxian theory develops differently. Each concept is complexly linked with 
other concepts of the theory. Its key concept of class is useful in exploring the specific 
interrelations and interdependence of class, prices and wages. Marxian theory is a never-
ending process in which its entry- point concept is linked with others.  
                                                            
389 Wolff & Resnick 1987, p 239. 
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In the Marxian view, the economy is ceaselessly changing and each change in the 
economic aspect simultaneously changes the non-economic aspects. It follows that in the 
Marxian view the economy is shaped by the influences flowing from all other aspects of 
society.  It is also important to remember that Marxian theory prefers the term social 
formation rather than the term of society.  
 
Schumpeter on innovation and capitalism 
 
Schumpeter ´s idea of creative destruction in capitalism has been borrowed from Marx, 
who suggests that the main way for the capitalist firms is to increase productivity by 
introducing new and more efficient machinery. Companies that succeed in introducing 
new and more efficient technology will see their competitive position is improved.  
“The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from 
the new consumers’ goods, the new method of transportation, the new markets, the new forms 
of industrial organization that capitalist enterprises creates…This process of Creative 
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what 
every capitalist concern has got to live in.” 390 
For an aggregate economy this implies that capital accumulation and rising 
productivity go hand in hand. Schumpeter argues that we must grasp that “… the 
competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new 
types of organizations (...)- competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage 
and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but 
their foundations and their very lives. “391 
Schumpeter sees three key elements in the economic development: the idea of 
innovation (as a cause), the role of entrepreneurs (its subject) and the bank credit 
(means). Economic development presupposes capitalism as an institution, and 
Schumpeter stipulated bank credit as essential to capitalism, not private ownership and 
the profit incentive, because it was for him a commercial society.  
In capitalism, entrepreneurs demanding finance and capitalists supplying finance are 
linked through innovation, and profit and interest are related for the same reason. 
Schumpeter claims that interest does not exist in a static state, the source of interest is 
found in economic development and profit. His aim was to introduce a theoretical 
explanation of economic development rather than a historical description, as many 
understood his theory. 
Schumpeter’s major point is to focus on the dilemma of innovation by clarifying the 
concept itself. For Schumpeter, new products, new types or qualities of raw materials or 
intermediary products, the creation of new markets and new ways of organizing business 
are all innovations. In other words, he stresses that only successful innovations can be 
regarded as real innovations regardless of their transitory nature. Innovations vanish as 
soon as a sufficient mass of imitators has successfully entered the scene.  
According to Schumpeter, innovation must be distinguished from inventions; 
innovation is a specific activity (function) carried out within the economic sphere and 
for a commercial purpose, while inventions are carried out everywhere and without any 
intent of commercialization. Pointing to a system perspective Schumpeter argues that we 
have to differentiate the “entrepreneurial function” in a capitalist system.  
                                                            
390 Schumpeter 1942, pp. 82–83. 
391 Schumpeter 1942, p. 84. 
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The introduction of novelty is one important function: “knowledge and habit once 
acquired becomes a firmly rooted in ourselves as a railway embankment in the earth. It does 
not require to be continually renewed and consciously reproduced, but sinks into the strata of 
sub-consciousness.” 392  
An entrepreneur is the key concept in Schumpeter’s theory on economic 
development because of his/her role in carrying out innovations. It is very difficult to 
step outside the boundary of routines; to make an innovation is a challenging task, a 
risk.393  
Schumpeter sees that innovative investment is not financed by savings but by credit 
creation. Interest is not concerned with a real economy and it is not an intermediary 
between savings and investments. Interest is a monetary and dynamic phenomenon but 
for him the independent variable is the innovation rather than the money supply.  
It is apparent that Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction must be seen in a 
broader context. One alternative is to see it as a sort of triangle.394 It follows that the first 
dimension of Schumpeter’s theory explores the problem of routines in economic life and 
their transformation. The second dimension focuses on the quantitative analysis of 
waveform economic evolution. The third dimension highlights the co-evolution of 
economic life and socio-political life.  
The concept of creative destruction may be seen as a theoretical tool for connecting 
the economics and the sociology of capitalist society. Because capitalism has been “the 
propelling force of the rationalization of human behaviour” it has had very fundamental 
influences over human beings and their actions.395 
The classics introduced here stress the peculiarities embedded in the emergence of 
capitalism and market economy: Marx by articulating the dilemma of capitalism as such, 
Schumpeter and his followers by clarifying the dilemma of innovation.  The genotypes 
of capitalism are still alive in contemporary STI policies although their phenotypes are 
totally different. 
 
7.2.2. The mystical triangle of science, vision and ideology   
 
Schumpeter on vision, model and ideology 
 
One of the key arguments embedded in contemporary STI policies is that they advocate 
the necessity of institutional and structural reforms. This implies two major issues: the 
internal and external reflexivity of science and technology policies. The ultimate aim of 
those policies is to start a series of reforms to find new alternative interactions between 
science, technology and economy and further to link those reforms with general 
transformations-in-progress in political government.  
According to Schumpeter, the scientific inquiry consists of two stages: the formation 
of vision and the building of a model. The first stage is based on the perception and 
judgement of issues to be explored and this is what Schumpeter calls a vision. The 
second stage is to analyze the material conceived by the vision according to the scientific 
rules of procedure.396  
                                                            
392 Schumpeter 1934, p. 84. 
393 Schumpeter 1934, p. 93–94. 
394 Andersen and Lundvall 2006. 
395 Schumpeter 1942, p. 125. 
396 Shinoya 1997, p. 59. 
148  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
By distinguishing a vision from a model Schumpeter argues that these aspects are 
dependent on each other. He argues that ideology is a specific factor at the vision 
formation stage; ideology is incorporated into vision because scientific work takes place 
in a socially continuous process. “Ideologies are not simply lies; they are truthful 
statements about what a man thinks he sees.” 397 They have a fundamental role in the 
formation of vision. 
” (Vision) embodies the picture of things as we see them, and whenever there is any 
possible motive for wishing to see them in a given light rather than another light, the way in 
which we see things can hardly be distinguished from the way we wish to see them.”398 
This idea at the role of ideology and many other Schumpeter’s ideas are derived from 
Marx. Schumpeter accepted Marx’s idea of endogenous evolution and the self-
destruction of capitalism. In order to minimize Marx’s influence he criticized the 
economic interpretation of history. His proposition was that 1) the superstructure 
governs the economic process; 2) class structure is determined by diverse factors other 
than economic ones that makes phenomena often dynamic; 3) the social process of 
production displays an immanent evolution. 399  
Another very important person for Schumpeter was the economist Léon Walras, a 
major economic theorist.400 Schumpeter’s proposition was to make a double dichotomy, 
the static state versus the dynamic state, and refer to different economic phenomena 
implying different economic theories. Dynamic phenomena are, according to 
Schumpeter, characterised by innovation. It is important to understand that 
Schumpeter’s idea on economic development as caused by innovation is based on the 
idea that the underlying idea of his thinking was the idea of equilibrium. Innovation is a 
destruction of equilibrium. 
Schumpeter took Walras’s general equilibrium theory as his ideal model because it 
established the conceptual framework and clarified the mechanism of the economic 
order. It made economics a genuine science. Theory is not a piece of fiction; it is real.401  
But this inconsistency is only abstract because Schumpeter’s scope is broader. A 
theory of evolution covers not only the economic area but also other social areas. The 
concept of innovation links Walrasian and Marxian ideology in a very interesting way.  
Despite the destructiveness and destabilizing effects of innovation, the capitalist 
economic system has a remarkable adaptive capacity to absorb them quickly and 
revitalize itself as well. Despite its capacity to grow through effects of innovation the 
capitalist economic system cannot survive indefinitely. 
Esben Sloth Andersen402 in his analysis on post- Schumpeterian economics insists 
that Schumpeter’s originality and importance to evolutionary modelling is important. 
Although he lacked relevant analytic tools for clearly expressing his vision of economic 
evolution he acknowledged the point. So his real contribution was that he opened the 
“doors” for evolutionary modelling in economics.  
 
  
                                                            
397 Schumpeter 1951, p. 267–281. 
398 Schumpeter 1954, p. 42. 
399 Shinoya 1997, p. 81. 
400 Schumpeter 1954, p. 827. 
401 Andersen 2006. 
402 Andersen 1994. 
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Science, ideology and STI policies 
 
If our aim is to analyze STI policies as theoretical constructions, we may ask how science 
and ideology are interlinked and embedded in those policies. One interesting perspective 
is provided in the work of Gaston Bachelard.  
Bachelard’s point is that images have enormous power in science, and scientific 
images have also role in poetry and the arts. In his “applied rationalism” he defends 
strongly the active role of the mind in knowledge. His point is that epistemic categories 
constructed in science are relative to the historical situation, and the objects constructed 
in mind are mediated through scientific instruments. Theories are “materialized” 
through them.  
Although Bachelard persists to talk about epistemology his emphasis is on 
technology and technique, on doing and making, not on observing and theorizing. 
“Concepts and methods, all are a function of the experimental domain; all scientific thought 
must change when confronted with a new experience: a discourse on scientific method will 
always be a circumstantial discourse; it will not describe a definitive constitution of the 
scientific mind.” 403 
Another interesting move Bachelard makes in his theoretical endeavour is that 
although his philosophy has resemblances with pragmatism his aims to revise our 
conceptions of scientific knowledge are more radical. His critique on pragmatism 
highlights the impotence of pragmatism to analyze some seemingly contradictory 
epistemological imperatives in modern science; one of them is that perfect knowledge 
should be both detailed and universal.  
These contradictory tendencies can never simultaneously meet in any supposedly 
complete and perfect description of reality. The fault of pragmatism has been that it 
highlights science as a quest for knowledge of general laws and fails to see that the 
verification of such knowledge is intimately connected to the search for a detailed 
understanding of particular conditions and to the use of technology in conducting 
experiments.  
Bachelard’s proposition is a much more complex, multi-dimensional portrayal of the 
dynamics of science than a continuous approximation toward the truth proposed by 
pragmatists. His interest is in the factual interfaces between theory and material reality; 
Bachelard’s answer to the problem is to focus on the treatment of the technology-science 
relation and to make a distinction between scientific and technological imperatives.  
In the technological sphere goals are achieved and devices are constructed to perform 
functions for which they are designed. In modern technological innovations general 
principles are put to work through the process in which the detailed and general aspects 
meet and construct complex devices. In those processes science gains most confidence 
for its claims concerning material reality, but according to Bachelard the scientific 
progress is dependent on internal and epistemic contexts rather than on external factors. 
The acquisition of scientific knowledge is not for him an artefact at the mind but rather 
the interaction of thought and action.404 
Bachelard insists that we have to move away from such theories which define 
scientific knowledge in terms of a static, logical organisation of theories. Then he moves 
on to the problem of how to attain such knowledge. He argues that neither logic nor a 
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concentration of statements, judgements, or truths can provide the framework within 
which we are able to discuss the epistemological dynamics of science. The real focus of 
epistemology should be put on the correction of concepts and theories to acquire more 
detailed knowledge; the recognition of change as a correction rather than a form of truth 
or falsity is the starting point for true epistemology. Knowledge and its acquisition are 
intertwined whether we are talking about science, technology, reason or action. 
Bachelard’s student Georges Canguilhem’s key point is that science arrests time and 
constructs its objects as non-temporal forms not having a history. His epistemological 
concern focuses on the history of concepts. But the history of concepts is not the history 
of ideas, nor history of terms, of phenomena or theories. For Canguilhem, concepts are 
not embedded in theories and they do not derive their meaning from associated theories. 
They permit scientific questions to be formulated in a useful way, and theories provide 
scientific answers to those questions.  
What is interesting here is Canguilhem’s concept of scientific ideology. The concept 
attempts to describe how science-inspired visions are extended to social life and used as 
foundations of policy making. “By scientific ideology I mean a discourse that parallels the 
development of science and, that, under the pressure of pragmatic needs, makes statements 
that go beyond what has actually been proved by research. In relation to science itself, it is 
both presumptuous and misplaced.405 
But not only scientific concepts but also technology must be involved in the 
formation of scientific ideology. Technology is nowadays political because it is an aspect 
of what is to be human, as Canguilhem406 argues. It is political because it carries a certain 
telos of operations, it has always a direction. Technology is tied to our political self-
understanding and our understanding of politics.407  
In his theory of communicative rationality Jürgen Habermas408 wants to clarify the 
problem of what he calls communicative rationality. These post-metaphysical 
movements as he calls them have criticized the substantive conceptions of rationality and 
put forward procedural or formal conceptions instead. They have also replaced 
foundationalism with fallibilism which deals with what is valid knowledge and how it 
may be achieved. They have contextualized or situated reason in actual historical 
processes. Those movements have highlighted pragmatic structures of language and 
action. This is an orientation toward practice and a move away from theory in which 
they have recognized the moral and expressive functions of language.  
In his theory of universal pragmatics Habermas wants to construct the philosophical 
method of rational reconstruction. The basic concern in universal pragmatics is 
utterances in general: utterances are judged according to their communicative validity. 
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This is why Habermas makes the differentiation between two social realms, the system 
and the lifeworld which designate two distinct modes of social integration in his theory.  
The social integration carried out in the system operates through a functional 
integration of the consequences of actions. Economic and industrial systems are 
excellent examples of system integration: they have produced complex forms of social 
integration and interdependence despite their openly competitive orientations of 
individuals.  
In the terms of the lifeworld the social integration depends upon the coordination of 
action plans and the conscious action orientations of individuals. It relies on processes of 
human interaction including symbolic and cultural forms of meaning, and the 
coordination is carried out through communicative action. Communicative action at the 
heart of the lifeworld is responsible for accomplishing several fundamental social 
functions such as reaching understanding, cultural reproduction, coordination of action 
plans, and socializing individuals.  
Habermas makes a distinction between communicative action and strategic action: 
the coordination of action plans can be accomplished either through consensus or 
influence. Strategic action is oriented towards success, and communicative action is 
oriented towards understanding. Both of them are dependent on the lifeworld and occur 
in human interaction.  
In terms of communicative action it is important to understand the meanings of the 
action plans and in terms of strategic action the mutual understanding is not the goal of 
interaction. Strategic action is for Habermas parasitic on communicative action because 
it subjugates communicative action to a devalued role as a form of instrumental reason.  
One of the major claims Habermas makes in his theory is that all forms of 
interpretation must be forms of critique. All forms of texts consist of interests – his 
concept of interest is very similar to Gadamer’s concept of prejudice. It is very important 
for the reader that he/she is aware of his/her interest. Habermas makes a distinction 
between a) technical interests which motivate empirical-analytic enquiry, b) practical 
interests which motivate humanistic sciences and c) emancipatory interests which 
motivate philosophical enquiry, whose objective is to lay bare how consensus is 
obstructed by various forces, be they psychological or social. 409 
The technical interest understood as a modern ideology governs the empirical and 
analytic sciences as a kind of epistemology; it is a cognitive interest in technical control 
over objectified processes. Specialists control political and economic policies, argues 
Habermas. 
He follows the rationalisation argument advocated by critical theory. Herbert 
Marcuse410 saw the scientific tradition as an ideology that subjected society to its control. 
Adorno411 wanted in his Negative Dialectics to argue that all attempts by the subject to 
devour the object, our pursuit for identity, makes thought an accomplice of domination. 
Habermas continues by shifting the focus of rationality from the autonomous subjects to 
subjects in interaction. Rationality is a property of undistorted communication.  412 
His analysis of the public sphere413 clarifies how public opinion in this 
transformation shifts from rational consensus emerging from debate, discussion, and 
reflection onto the manufactured opinion of polls or these of media experts. The 
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functions of media have transformed from facilitating rational discourse and debate 
within the public sphere into shaping, constructing, and limiting public discourse to the 
themes validated and approved by media corporations. The interconnection between the 
sphere of public debate and individual participation has broken: citizens have become 
spectators of media presentations and discourse.  
In terms of this study Habermas’s theory points out how scientific knowledge and its 
rationality are linked with the public sphere and how the ideological formation of public 
opinion advances. This becomes evident if we examine how scientific knowledge is used 
in the public sphere in relation to STI policies and its legitimation.  
 
7.3. Scientific frameworks and models in STI policies: The second move  
 
As discussed earlier, STI policies utilize a broad variety of vocabularies and models used 
in economics as an analytic resource to clarify the STE hybrid theoretical justification 
and its practical legitimation. In consequence, we may say that one of the major features 
of STI policies is to adopt concepts, terms and models developed in economics.  
The STI policy documents openly advocate that the problem of innovation is the key 
issue. All disciplines and communities of science are welcomed to participate into the 
process of finding answers to the problem of innovation.  
The whole idea of clarifying the problem of innovation by expanding the traditional 
domain of economy is very much convergent with some theories in institutional and 
evolutionary economics traditions. Their criticism against neo-classical economics is that 
its scope to economic phenomena is too narrow. 
The intellectual core of STI policies is not a science policy reform as such. Rather, it 
seems to exemplify the state of modern economics, its quest for “cyborg sciences”, and 
more towards a holistic, evolutionarily oriented multi-disciplinary approach in which all 
the traditional boundaries between disciplines are dissipated.  
One of the key arguments in STI policy documents is that the economic world is 
inevitably changing and we ought to have new policies in congruence with those 
changes. What does it mean?  
My point is that one of the main reasons for the success of NIS is that it skilfully 
utilizes the contradictions hidden in economic ontology. That is to say that its 
theoretical core is based on the idea that all intellectual and cognitive work must set the 
focus on the problem of economic ontology. Its aim is to revise the traditional 
ontological categories and presuppositions of our belief system and to persuade scholars 
and scientists to participate in such a revision.  
Another aspect of NIS derived from the problem of economic ontology is the 
problem of epistemology related to economic world. This epistemological aspect 
becomes obvious in the problems related to the economic methodology. One way to 
think about methodology is to view it as the study of “methods”, m-methodology or as 
the study of methodology, M- methodology.414 The m-methodology is concerned with 
practical and specific issues, whereas the scope of M-methodology is broader and focuses 
on the issue of scientific knowledge.  
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7.3.1. The problem of fact and fiction in economics 
 
Models and theories in economics 
 
Economics, as the dismal queen of the social sciences415, has had a special role among 
other social sciences, and this makes it powerful as a discipline. As a scientific discipline 
it has been an object of contest generating a lot of debates concerning its status as a 
science. One aspect of that discussion is the problematic connection between theory and 
“reality”; there has been a lot of debate related to “blackboard economics”.  
It is argued that economics is a system which lives only in the minds of economists, 
not in reality. When economists are unable to analyze what is happening in the real 
world they invent an imaginary world they are capable working with.416 In other words, 
it is claimed that in order to be successful in economics you have to be excellent in 
mathematics and skilful in puzzle-solving and it has nothing to do with possessing a 
thorough knowledge of the political economy.417  
But although the debate among economists has been vivid, it seems obvious that the 
disjunction between facts and fiction is misleading.  
The concept of model has different meanings in everyday and scientific parlance: 
these mau include representational models, theoretical models and imaginary models. 418 
All these views assume that models represent an object. The representational model is a 
man-made construct that represents something that is not necessarily man-made.  
The point of theoretical models is that they do not describe all aspects of the object 
but rather provide a simplification for explaining or predicting certain phenomena. 
Theoretical models include mathematical, statistical and computational models. For 
their part. imaginary models make assumptions regarding the study object that are false.  
To put it simply - facts make true statements true. But there is a lot of disagreement 
among philosophers what counts as a fact and what counts as true in the community of 
scholars. To say that this is a piece of fiction is to say that the object we are concerned 
with is fictional because its existence and the truths uttered about it are dependent on 
the particular descriptions of it. In other words, there are non-fictional real objects in the 
world and the model is fictional if it has no reference to any real objects.  
It is often argued that economics is about modelling.419 There is a lot of ambiguity 
with regard to the concept of model. In the narrow sense it can refer to mathematics but 
modelling can also have a broader definition. Model building can be seen as a type of 
fact-oriented activity in pursuit of isolating key causal dependencies in real world: 
models can be seen as economists’ laboratories.  
Modelling is often linked with the problem of scientific theory. According to the 
standard view, scientific theories are simply sets of statements. They may be true or false 
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or corroborated or falsified on the basis of other statements about the empirical data.420  
According to the semantic view of scientific theory, scientific theories merely define a 
predicate. Theories are like a map; you create them but they do not say anything about 
the world as such. 
The structuralist view of scientific theories is a variant of the semantic view of 
theories and it holds that scientific theories are structures rather than statements. 
Structures are related to their empirical claims by certain systematic logical relationships. 
Specifying these logical relationships is the main goal of the scientific theory.  
Mäki argues further that the theoretical terms used in economics are totally different 
from those used in physics. The issue for economics is not the existence of the entities, 
but the way they are arranged.  
One of the most interesting suggestions to see the relation between ontology and 
epistemology in economics is the Heilbroner- Milberg thesis.421 Their argument is that 
adequate economic theories are consistent with a specific vision of capitalism as a 
complex social system characterized by capital accumulation as the driving force, the 
market as the organizational mechanism of allocation, the division between a private and 
a public sphere as dominant administrative principle. Their claim is that much of 
current economics has lost connection with such a vision.  
It follows that economic ontology draws from different sources such as other social 
sciences, social actors’ experience, philosophical arguments and categories, but the 
system of general conceptions about the economic realm does not determine the form 
and content of economic models. Heilbroner and Milberg simply argue that economic 
analysis without a vision is empty, merely a version of scholasticism. 
The third aspect of fictionality in economics is the problem of economic institutions. 
Such institutions are the rules of the game. They are the structures that relate incentives 
and rewards, education and employment, agendas of topics, and standards of assessment. 
The economic institutions also shape the values and goals of practising economics. Or, 
to put it differently, economic models are socially constructed. 
 
7.3.2. NIS as a policy framework 
 
Birth of NIS in the OECD 
 
Reijo Miettinen and Benoit Godin 422 have argued that the concept of NIS can be 
divided to two different families. The institutional family advocated by R. R. Nelson 
puts the focus on institutions and their role in determining the innovative performance. 
The knowledge family advocated by B-Å Lundvall focuses on knowledge and the process 
of learning. The origins of the knowledge economy are in the early 1960s and it re-
emerged in the early 1990s.  
The motive for NIS was that it helps to understand the differences between countries 
in terms of their capacity to innovate. It also clarifies how globalization affects national 
systems.423 
The birth of the idea of linking the traditional science and technology policies with 
innovation is an outcome of a long and heterogeneous process. Although the OECD’s 
key role has traditionally been linked with comparative statistics and the development of 
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measurement,424 the origins of the idea of innovation can be traced back to economics. It 
is apparent that the problem of innovation has been one of the most highly-debated 
issues among institutional and evolutionary economists, post-Schumpeterian, post-
Keynesian and neo-institutional economists. For several decades, economists have been 
criticized for their failure to integrate institutions into their theories and econometric 
models. Partly as a response to this, scholars invented the concept of (NIS) National 
Innovation System.  
A group of research institutes425 has played a significant role with regard to marketing 
and establishing the paradigm for science and technology policies. Most of this 
preparatory activity has occurred within the OECD context.426  
If we look closer how economic theorists attempt to dissolve the dilemma of 
technological change in the economic context, the significance of economic 
methodology becomes very clear. One of the most important issues in terms of 
economic methodology has been the debates contrasting  the equilibrium approach with 
the evolutionary approach. The discussion has focused on such issues as what is 
technology like, what is its development like or what are the roles of science and market 
in innovations and what kind of mechanisms can be found beyond the phenomena.427   
Evolutionary economics has its origins mainly in Schumpeter´s ideas on innovation 
and in those of many others such as Menger, Veblen and Marshall who have written 
about economical development and its nature. The leading theorists of evolutionary 
economics today, Nelson and Winter,428 have in their path- breaking book “An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change” provided severe criticism against mechanical 
neoclassical core assumptions: equilibrium thinking, profit maximization, the 
reversibility of time and the concepts of rationality and technology. 
Their theoretical core has been the cultural evolutionary triad of blind variation, 
selection and retention. Although their theoretical work has focused on the interaction 
between variation generating, retention maintaining and selection realizing mechanisms 
in radical uncertain conditions429, their problem is the lack of unifying theoretical basis.   
There is a lot of debate among institutional and evolutionary economists. Central 
theoretical controversies include such issues as 1) how neoclassical and evolutionary 
theories attempt to understand and explain technological change, 2) how to solve the 
dilemma of technology and organisation in the strategic management of technology and 
3) how the recent developments within the economic methodology and theoretical 
elaboration on technological change contribute to one another.  
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It is strange that technological change has not been the focal point of a 
methodological endeavour430, although it is well suited for epistemological analysis as an 
interface of social science and the natural sciences. Technological change throws light on 
how theoretical knowledge and observable world are related. This has played an 
important role in the evolution of intelligent life on the earth, and has been compared to 
that of language.431  
One special group of evolutionary economists has been interested in innovations and 
innovation theories. It is easy to differentiate three sub-schools: the post-Schumpeterian 
tradition, Nelson& Winter tradition and the national innovation system-tradition.  
The first tradition has emphasized such issues as: the sources of innovations, the 
structures of market and the dynamics of industries and lines of business. Freeman and 
Perez432 have suggested the use of innovation taxonomy: incremental (changes of 
“technology systems”) and radical (changes in “techno-economic paradigm”) 
innovations.433  
According to Perez the development of the technological paradigm involves follows 
some principles. The process starts with a big bang, and the first half is called the 
installation period. This is the time when the new technologies irrupt in a maturing 
economy and advance like a bulldozer, disrupting the established fabric and articulating 
new industrial networks, setting up new infrastructures and spreading new and superior 
ways of doing things. The second half is the deployment period when the fabric of the 
whole economy is rewoven and reshaped by the modernizing power of the triumphant 
paradigm.  
The turning point from the first half to the second half is a crucial crossroads, often a 
serious recession, that involves a re-composition of the whole system. In particular, the 
re-composition involves the regulatory context that enables the resumption of growth 
and the full fructification of the technological revolution.  The paradigm “dies” when 
the next big bang occurs.  
Today, we are at the threshold of new technological revolution but nobody knows 
what it is excatly. Perez is very much involved in the system theory in the sense that her 
idea of technological paradigms is based on the idea of change in three dynamic 
subsystems.  
The technological sphere where technological revolutions and techno-economic 
paradigms are constructed is the fuel of the capitalist engine. It has nothing or little to 
do with technological and scientific reasons. It is the mode of absorption and 
assimilation of innovations in the economic and social spheres that requires technical 
change to occur in coherent and interrelated constellations.  
The economic sphere is where production and financial capital interact.  The 
institutional sphere is the seat of politics, ideology and of the general mental maps of 
society of each period. It is also the sphere of norms, laws, regulations, supervisory 
entities and the whole structure responsible for social governance. During each surge 
there is coherence and isomorphism between the structure and the way in which firms 
and other sorts of organizations from schools to hospitals, political parties and 
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government departments function. These three spheres interact in such a way that each 
time there is inertia in one. Most processes of advance development in the capitalist 
system take place by combining the forces of conservation with the forces of 
transformation.434  
The second tradition has focused more on theories concerning economic change and 
growth. It has imported from Darwin’s evolution theory to economic analysis concepts 
like selection, variation and inheritance.435 The concept of path-dependency (QWERTY- 
argument) is used to describe the nature of technology. The tradition also stresses 
learning and routines and the strength of appreciative theorizing (simulations) in 
economy.436 Winter and Nelson are interested in the processes of change, and they see 
that the behavior of a firm or an organization is analogous with a biological genetics. If 
the genes transmit the information that influences the behavior of an individual’s 
routines, the routines are said to be their equivalent in firms. If in Darwinian theory the 
variation mechanism results from the error in genetic codes known as mutations, in 
Winter and Nelson’s theory the concept of mutation refers to shifts and changes in the 
behavioral patterns and technical routines known as innovations.  
The third tradition, based on various theoretical elaborations437 and, in particular, the 
definition of national innovation system (NIS), is interesting. NIS equals “the networks 
of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, 
import, modify and diffuse new technologies “ .438 
For R.R. Nelson, NIS is “a set of institutions whose interactions determine the 
innovative performance of national firms”.439 Lundvall characterises NIS as follows: “(it) is 
constituted by elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion 
and use of new, and, economically useful, knowledge.”440 The other group of the NIS 
authors focus on the analysis of institutions and describe the ways in which various 
countries have organized their NIS.  This group uses more theoretical language and 
focuses on knowledge and the process of learning itself.  
Lundvall441 was the key person who influenced that the OECD started to advocate 
the NIS as a new framework in 1994. One line of argument derived from this has been 
Lundvall’s442 contribution to the concept of the learning economy: it signifies a society 
where the capability to learn is critical for economic success. Lundvall443  stresses, 
following Arrow444  and Rosenberg445, strongly that learning is not only a transfer of 
information. It cannot be reduced to acts of transaction and transfer. There are four 
different kinds of knowledge: know-what (facts), know-why (principles and laws of 
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motion in nature, in the human mind and in society, know-how (skills -tacit and 
explicit knowledge) and know-who (social skills).446  
All these issues developed by economists have been a source of inspiration for 
developing the NIS paradigm. The OECD has had an important and decisive role in 
establishing this paradigm as a model for industrialised countries, which makes the idea 
of innovation policy highly interesting. 447 If the role of the OECD has been important, 
it has also been different as well and the knowledge-based economy approach has been a 
target for a strong critique. Although the concept of knowledge-based economy has been 
ambiguous and unspecific, the OECD has advocated it openly.448   
The theoretical core of NIS is derived from the ideas of those schools: the idea of 
innovation, the role of technology as the generator in economy, the idea of institutional 
reforms, the idea of knowledge and know-how as a major element in economy and 
economic growth and competitiveness.449  
Lundvall450 gives reasons for why such systems should be national. The first reason 
has to do with history; the economic structure of a country evolves slowly through time 
and has a strong enduring character. The second reason refers to a common culture, 
language and institutions, which arguably facilitate interaction between firms and their 
environments. This “systemic-ness” of a country´s innovation activity varies across the 
countries but some countries like the Nordic countries appear to fit the theory well 
while some other countries like France, the UK and Austria do not.451 This is very close 
to the OECD’s Research System report in 1972452 which suggested that “Scientific and 
technological research viewed from an institutional approach cannot be separated from its 
political, economic, social and cultural context.” 
It is important to be aware that Lundvall’s theoretical approach is different in many 
respects but he has strong sympathetic attitude towards system theory that becomes 
obvious in his definition of NIS: “The national system of innovation is constituted by the 
institutions and economic structures affecting the rate and direction of technological change in 
society. Obviously the NIS is larger than the R&D system. It must, for example, include not 
only the system of technology diffusion and R&D system but also institutions and factors 
determining how new technology affects productivity and economic growth. At the same time, 
the system of technological change is, of course, less comprehensive than economy/society as a 
whole.” 453 
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for Financing Innovation 1995, National Innovation Systems 1997, Boosting Innovation: The Cluster 
Approach 1999, Innovative Networks: Co-Operation in National Innovation Systems 2001, 
Innovative Clusters: Drivers of National Innovation Systems 2001, Innovative People: Mobility of 
Skilled Personnel in National Innovation Systems 2001, Dynamising National Innovation Systems 
2002, Governance of Innovation Systems 2005. See also Godin 1997; Godin 2002; Godin 2003. 
449 The theoretical core of NIS is derived from the ideas of those schools: the idea of innovation, the 
role of technology as the generator in economy, the idea of institutional reforms, the idea of knowledge 
and know-how as a major element in economy and economic growth and competitiveness. See also 
Miettinen 2002, Godin 2003. 
450 Lundvall 1992. 
451 Fagerberg 2003. 
452 OECD 1972, p. 199. 
453 Edquist & Lundvall 1993, p. 267. 
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Lundvall454 has recently tried to defend the term national system of innovation. His 
argumentation is of a great interest. First, he argues that the popularity of the term is 
naturally based on its rhetorical power, but his point is that it has helped to extend the 
traditional set of policy instruments toward non-price competitiveness. The “system” 
dimension of the term has moved the attention in policy circles onto charge of research, 
innovation and industrial development from the linear model to interactive thinking 
about innovation. But there are also a lot misunderstandings and crude interpretations 
such as the relationship between university and industry in the case of pharmaceuticals 
and biotechnology, for example. Those too narrow definitions forget the “interactive 
learning” between firms in low technology sector that is important for innovation and is 
not reflected in the development of the European innovation policy. 
One of the most interesting points Lundvall makes is that the NIS concept has been 
highly “dialectical”. The idea of the NIS concept is to pay attention to the Schumpeter’s 
Mark III455. In other words, the innovation system perspective brings in a broader set of 
actors and institutions to shape the innovation process. It brings networking among 
firms and knowledge institutions into the picture. His defence of the adjective 
“national” is very curious in the sense that he argues that the modern social science has 
surprisingly little to say about nation states.  
The term “national” is important because the original intention was to confront 
national economic policy strategies and standard economics. It has also become 
important because of the problems connected with globalization.  
In order to be able to explicate his arguments Lundvall introduces the idea of two 
complementary modes of innovation. The first mode is called the STI mode of 
knowledge management and learning in which the emphasis is to promote R&D, 
utilizing and creating access to explicit codified knowledge. The second mode is called 
the DUI-mode in which innovation strategies are mainly based on learning by doing, 
using and interacting. These strategies may involve organizational frameworks and such 
relationships between employees that utilize implicit knowledge and promote interactive 
learning.  
Another very interesting aspect of Lundvall’s defence is his discussion of theoretical 
concepts. His point is to argue that also in social science heuristic devices and unspecific 
concepts play a major role since they offer a broad and flexible framework for organizing 
and interpreting case studies and comparative analyses. In other words, the NSI concept 
is not a theoretical concept. It is both a political concept and an analytic tool in the sense 
that it combines a specific flexible perspective on the economyby suggesting what parts 
of the economy should be involved in the analysis. From a policy maker’s point of view 
it is important that the innovation system concept can be connected to economic 
growth and economic development.  
Mjoset456 defines theory as “accumulated knowledge, organized by human mind, to 
be used for purposes of explanation” and states that all attempts to establish “general 
theory” or “grand theory” without historical context are doomed to fail.457 Naturally, 
                                                            
454 Lundvall 2005. 
455 It is important to be aware that Mark III was not designed by Schumpeter himself. Mark I usually 
refers to individual entrepreneurs. Mark II refers to big corporations as major drivers of innovation and 
growth. 
456 Mjoset 2002. 
457 Lundvall accepts the idea that “grounded theory” produced on the basis of case studies and especially 
comparisons between specific cases is the most realistic ambition of social science. The more ambitious 
goal of transforming social science into mature science leads to disappointment and frustration.  
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there are theoretical elements in the NIS approach,  and most of them came from SPRU 
scholars’ empirical findings, the Sappho-study458 and the Pavitt taxonomy459. Lundvall 
explicates nicely how the NIS- approach as an analytic framework is linked with 
mainstream neoclassical economy and with Austrian economics. He shows that while it 
is possible to apply the principles of rational choice to the analysis of innovation and 
analyze it as an allocation of scarce resources, the analysis of innovation systems moves 
the focus towards the combination of innovation and learning.  
But then Lundvall makes an interesting move by highlighting the role of Friedrich 
List in his theoretical toolbox.460 In his famous The National System of Political 
Economy461 List argued that it is important to focus on the development of productive 
forces rather than on issues at allocation. His concept of the “national system of 
production” took into account a wide set of national institutions including those 
engaged in education and training as well as infrastructures such as networks for 
transportation of people and commodities.462 
Both Freeman and Lundvall point out in the spirit of List that government has to 
take an active role in promoting technological infrastructure. To apply the concept of 
the national system of innovation to developing countries must be seen as a kind of “re-
export” of Gunnar Myrdal’s idea of negative and positive feedbacks, cumulative 
causation, virtuous and vicious circles and the importance of institutions as a modern 
version.   
Their motive for using the concept of NIS has been to describe and compare 
relatively strong and diversified systems with welldeveloped institutional and 
infrastructure support of innovation activities. But NIS has been used mainly as an ex-
post rather than as an ex-ante concept. By introducing the concept they have stressed the 
evolutionary and path-dependent aspect of innovation processes to be taken into 
account in developing those institutional structures and support strategies. Lundvall 
points out that another weakness of the concept is that it does not capture the power 
aspects of development.  
 
7.4. New governance in STI policies: The third move 
 
A very important aspect of STI policies is its horizontality thesis. This thesis allows us to 
link the STE hybrid construction with that of new political governance. This chapter 
analyzes first the problem of new governance and its linkage to liberalism suggested by 
Foucault. One of the key aspects in STI policies is its strong dependence on 
measurement and international comparisons. How this statistical measurement is part of 
STI policies is the second theme of this chapter. These two issues are involved in the 
idea of horizontality and it is my intention to analyze how scholars and scientists have 
                                                            
458 Rothwell 1977. 
459 Pavitt 1984. 
460 Originally, the name of List was very important in his cooperation with Christopher Freeman in the 
early 1980’s. List was a nationalist critic of economic theory and one of the forefathers of the German 
historical school. See Freeman 1995. 
461 List 1977. 
462 List was openly against the “cosmopolitan” approach of Adam Smith who argued that free trade was 
assumed always to advantage the weak as well as the strong national economies. His point was that 
there is the need to build national infrastructure and institutions in order to accumulate “mental” 
capital and use it to spur economic development rather than to trust “the Invisible Hand” to solve 
problems. It was a perspective and strategy for the “catching up” economy of early 19th century 
Germany.  
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analyzed the problem. The fourth aspect of new governance becomes visible in the 
debate on the welfare state. This debate illustrates a variety of problems embedded also 
in STI policies but is often reduced to the problem of globalization. Globalization in the 
global market has implied a kind of new regime of privatisation in which IPR and 
copyright issues have become increasingly important for enterprises and companies 
operating in the global market.  
The other aspect of globalization can be reduced to the problem of nation states; 
what is the new role the nation states will play in the era of globalization. This involves a 
variety of interesting issues including the problem of the public sector and the notion of 
public good.  
 
7.4.1. New governace and the ethos of liberalism   
 
Foucault’s analysis of political reason follows Weber’s work as related to the mutations 
of politics and the history of systems of expertise. His strategy is to question the nature 
and limits of the political; the political for Foucault is itself a transactional space, a 
historically variable zone of rationalization and division.463 
“We need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a 
disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-
discipline-government.” 464 Foucault’s account of government is fascinating because it goes 
beyond the common idea that society has become dominated by routine, discipline and 
rationalization. He does not want to understand the idea of liberty as a fiction; vice versa 
he wants to analyze the conditions within which the practice of freedom has become 
possible. Freedom is neither an ideological fiction of modern societies nor an existential 
feature of existence within them. It must be understood as a formula of rule. Foucault 
links the analysis of the constitution of freedom with that of the exercise of rule.  
For Foucault liberalism is an ethos of government rather than a historical period. It is 
not a substantive doctrine of practice of government in itself but it is the restless and 
dissatisfied ethos of recurrent critique of state reason and politics. Liberalism represents a 
cautious and self-critical approach to government; politicians should govern cautiously, 
delicately, economically and modestly. 
His major argument is that government must be linked with the great discovery of 
political thought at the end of the 18th century with the idea of society. Government has 
to deal with a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms465. 
The new reality is society. Liberal political reason is the historical condition of the very 
object of social sciences. Society is embedded in the social sciences by its concerns: the 
technical, the ideological and the political.  
The social sciences can act as a technical solution to anxiety of drawing the boundary 
between society and the public authorities. Foucault wants to draw attention to the 
intellectual and practical techniques and inventions through which civil society is 
brought into being, distinct from political intervention but having contingent potential 
for political aspirations.  
The separation of the state and civil society is the consequence of a particular 
problematization of government. Government cannot override the natural dynamics of 
the economy without destroying the basis on which liberal government is possible. 
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There must be a political space in which the autonomy of society is preserved from the 
state intervention. It must also ensure the existence of political spaces in which a critical 
reflection on the state is possible.  
In other words, the activity of rule must observe and maintain the autonomy of the 
profession and the freedom of public sphere from political interference must be reserved. 
Foucault’s idea is to analyze the relations of the ethos of liberalism and its techne. 
Paradoxically, although neo-liberalism has tried actively to create the conditions in 
which entrepreneurial and competitive conduct is possible, it has provoked the 
invention and deployment of a whole array of organizational forms and technical 
methods to extend a field within which a certain kind of economic freedom can be 
maintained. 
The relation between expertise and politics is important for Foucault but he is only 
one link in a long chain. The theme was central for in Weber’s theory of rationalisation, 
as it was also for the Frankfurt school and for Habermas. While they all emphasize the 
historical relation between the technical and the political, but they thematize the nature 
and consequences of this relation differently.466  
All these theorists highlight the ways by which expertise translates society into an 
object of government. It is important to be aware that Foucault sees the relation between 
the technological and the political so that it is not defined in terms of boundaries of the 
state or a functional apparatus. His answer is that politics must be investigated 
genealogically. It includes that we have to analyze ways of coding and defining or 
delimiting the possible scope of action and components of an apparatus of rule. Then we 
have to analyze the strategies and limits proper for rulers and then the relations between 
political rule and rules exercised by other authorities.  
Nicholas Rose467 argues that public authorities employ such forms of expertise that 
enable the governance of society at a distance without any direct forms of repression or 
intervention. According to Rose the key aspect of neo-liberalism is to develop techniques 
of auditing, accounting and management that enable a market for public services 
autonomous from central control. It follows that the new governance changes the role 
and nature of expertise as well.  
The relation between government and liberalism is important for Foucault because 
there are two important aspects of liberalism: it is critical and it problematizes.  
“Government is a problematizing activity… The ideals of government are intrinsically 
linked to the problems around which it circulates, the failings it seeks to rectify, the ills it seeks 
to cure. Indeed, the history of government might be well written as a history of 
problematizations…” 468 
Studies of government ask by which means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, 
tactics, technologies and vocabularies authority and rule are accomplished.469 Some 
scholars have found the term of high modernism useful because it provides a name for a 
certain governmentality that became prominent in the middle of the twentieth century. 
It privileged a particular conception of science and technology as forces for social 
progress, highlighted the status of architects, planners and engineers as governmental 
authorities, and prioritised the bureaucracy and the plan as its technologies of power.470  
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This means that liberal rule must be understood as a governmental issue, not as a 
philosophical, theoretical or moral issue. Government seeks to be practical because it 
connects itself with various procedures and apparatuses in order to affect them. It 
implies that we have to speak about governmentalities as practices for the “formulation 
and justification of idealized schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying 
it”471. Governmentality is a form of intellectual machinery or apparatus that transforms 
reality amenable for political programming.  
Political rationalities have always a moral and epistemological form; their moral 
concern is the government as such and their epistemological aim is to embody particular 
conceptions of the objects to be governed and the subjects to be governed. They deploy 
a certain style of reasoning; language is itself a set of intellectual technique. Language 
makes reality thinkable and practicable: it renders contingent and complex practices in 
more accessible modes. 
Foucault’s principal interest was on the link between power and knowledge. One of 
the chief claims of his complex philosophy is that belief systems gain momentum as 
more people come to accept the particular views associated with the particular belief 
system as common knowledge. Such belief systems define the figure of authority – 
medical doctors for example and within such a belief system ideas crystallize as to what is 
right, wrong, normal and deviant. Within a particular belief system certain views, 
thoughts and actions become unthinkable.  
These ideas, considered to be undeniable truths, come to define the particular way of 
seeing the world and hence normalized. This subtle form of power lacks rigidity, argues 
Foucault. It lacks any concrete form occurring as a locus of struggle. On the contrary, 
resistance defines power and becomes possible through power.472 “One needs to be 
nominalistic, no doubt, power is not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a certain 
strength we are endowed; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in 
a particular society”.473 
It is important to note that Callon’s view on economics as a technology resembles in 
many respects Foucault’s idea of a technology of government. As Barry and Slater argue, 
Foucault points to the historical formation of particular forms of economic actor; 
economic freedom, competitiveness and rationality are conceived as product of specific 
forms of technical artifice. Neo-liberalism, as Foucault argued, does not involve the 
absence of government, but is itself a form of government which is intended to operate 
through the constitution of particular economic arrangements.474 Economic knowledge 
can destabilise as well as stabilise the formation of economic actors and markets. It can 
be both a technology of government and a technology of politicisation.  
 
7.4.2. Measurement of science and technology 
 
Theodor M. Porter argues in his historical analyses of quantification and measurement: 
“I do not claim that quantification is nothing but a political solution to a political problem. 
But that is surely one of the things it is.” 475  
His thesis is that quantification is associated with the pursuit of objectivity, 
understood as impersonal knowledge. The language of mathematics is according to him 
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well suited to embody objective adjustments because it employs highly structured and 
agreed rules which exclude personal idiosyncracy and subjective judgement. He 
emphasizes that effective quantification is never a matter of discovery, but always also of 
administration, hence of social and technological power. Porter regards numbers, graphs, 
and formulas primarily as strategies of communication and quantification for him is a 
technology of managing distance.  
His central claim is that quantitative objectivity is in a way a form of standardization, 
where rules are used to confine and tame the personal and subjective. Quantification is 
well suited for communication that goes beyond the boundaries of locality and 
community. Science did not always idealise this mechanical form of objectivity, but has 
come to do so as an adaptation to modern political and administrative cultures - which 
it at the same time has helped to shape.  
In his studies476 he has tried to show that the history of quantification is the history 
of a social technology, reflecting a sensibility that is as closely linked to fields like 
accounting and cost-benefit analysis as to physics. The ethic of systematic calculation as 
a basis for social decisions - and often, as in inferential statistics, also for scientific 
demonstration - responds to a political culture marked by distrust of elites and even, in a 
way, of experts.  
In other words, Porter is saying that our trust in numbers illustrates our pursuit of 
objectivity: it can be a political as well as a scientific goal. He is not saying that we have 
to reject the whole idea of quantification. Vice versa, his point is to find answers to the 
issue why quantification and measurement have become so important both in terms of 
scientific communities and of political governance.  
One of Porter’s key themes in his studies is to analyze the tension between the 
disciplinary and the mechanical senses of objectivity. The appeal to numbers is especially 
compelling to bureaucratic officials who lack the mandate of a popular election. A 
decision made by the numbers is prima facie fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity 
provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness. “Quantification is a 
way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends authority to officials 
who have very of their own.” 477 
One very obvious aspect of quantification is “technocracy”.478 The definition of 
technocracy supposes that “human problems, like technical ones, have a solution that 
experts, given sufficient data and authority, can discover and execute. Applied to politics this 
reasoning finds interference from vested interests, ideologies, and party politics intolerable. Its 
antithesis is decision making through the weighing of forces and compromise. Technocrats 
thus tend to suspect parliamentary democracy and prefer the “rule of the fittest” and a 
managed policy.479 
Technocrats wanted the authority to manage without being subjected to the constant 
scrutiny that parliamentary government entails. Technocracy means elitism and leans 
towards authoritarianism in the interest of productivity and efficiency.  
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Benoit Godin, who has examined the role of statistics and policy making and, in 
particular, the role of the OECD in science and technology policies, provides sklightly 
similar picture of science and technology policies480.  
One of the paradoxes linked with the OECD statistics is the Input/Output model in 
which the only ratio used in statistics to measure efficiency in science is GERD/GDP 
where GERD, Gross Expenditures on R&D, is the sum of R&D expenditures in four 
economic sectors: business, government, non-private non-profit and higher education 
and GDP accounts for economic outputs. In reality, R&D is not a part of the 
accounting system of nations because during the revision of the system of national 
accounts in the early 1990s, the United Nations rejected the idea of including or 
recognizing R&D.481 
The dilemma of GERD/GDP is that despite its alignment to the systems of national 
accounts, GERD is not really a national budget – it is a hybrid constructed from the 
results of several surveys. Some data comes from a survey (industry), others are estimated 
with different mathematical formulas (university), and others are simply proxies 
(government).Outputs measured via proxies rather than actual outputs, are constructed 
from different sources that do not share any common framework. IN this sense 
accounting in official statistics on science is a metaphor, not an accounting exercise as 
such.482 
Godin has three reasons that explain today’s orientation. The first one is the basic 
unit of science policy and analysis, efficiency. Economic growth, productivity and 
profitability rather than quality of life drive politics. The second one is that economic 
output is easier to measure than the social and cultural impacts of science because the 
data is available and standardized. The third one is that most studies are conducted by 
economists.  
One of the first frameworks developed for the historical understanding of science and 
technology and its relation to the economy has been the linear model of innovation. The 
model postulates that innovation starts with basic research, then adds applied research 
and development, and ends with production and diffusion. The model has been very 
influential. A variety of academic organisations and economists in particular have 
disseminated the model widely and thus justified the fact that governments that support 
science and technology use such a model. Ironically, science policies have carried a linear 
conception of innovation for many decades. Many scholars have argued that the model 
is dead but it is reasonable to in the manner of Godin: Is this really the case?483  
Godin’s solution is to trace the history of the model because there is no explicit 
analysis of its history.484 Godin suggests that it has three stages. The first stage (1900-
1945) was concerned with the terms basic research and applied science. This period is 
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characterized by the ideal of pure science and the problem of finding causal links 
between basic research and applied research.  
The second stage (1934-1960) added a third term to the discussion, development, and 
this is when the standard three stage model of innovation is born. The reasons for this 
model were analytical and statistical. The last stage started in 1950 and continues today. 
It has extended the model to non-R&D activities such as production and diffusion.  
Godin’s main thesis is that the model is a theoretical construction of industrialists, 
consultants and business schools seconded by economists. Another claim Godin 
advocates is that the long survival of the model, despite regular criticism, is due to 
statistics. The model is based on statistical categories for counting resources and 
allocating money to science and technology, and it was standardized under the auspices 
of the OECD and its methodological manuals. The model has functioned as a “social 
fact”, and rival models without statistical foundations have not substituted the model.  
The distinction between basic research and applied research is for Godin an example 
of political rhetoric.485 The dichotomy of pure science and applied science was a 
rhetorical resource used by scientists, engineers and industrialists for defining, 
demarking and controlling their profession, for financial support, for raising the status of 
a discipline (engineering), and for attracting scientists (industrialists).486 The curiosity of 
the distinction is that at the same time basic and applied research were discussed as 
cooperating. In particular, industrialists have used the dichotomy in order to persuade 
governments to invest in research.487  
Bush was utilizing this rhetoric in his famous book: “Advances in science when put to 
practical use mean more jobs, higher wages, shorter hours, more abundant crops, more leisure 
for recreation, for study, for learning how to live the deadening drudgery which has been the 
burden of the common man for past ages. Advances in science will also bring higher standard 
of living, lead to the prevention or cure diseases, will promote conservation of our limited 
resources, and will assure means of defence against aggression.”488 
In the early 1960s most countries have very similar definitions of research and its 
components, and the task of conventionalizing and standardizing the definition was 
given to the OECD. In 1963, OECD member countries adopted a methodological 
manual for conducting R&D surveys and producing statistics for indicators and policy 
targets. The Frascati Manual included precise instructions for separating research from 
related activities and non-research activities.489 The manual recommended collecting and 
tabulating data according to the three components: fundamental research (research work 
undertaken primarily for the advancement of scientific knowledge), applied research 
(work undertaken primarily to the advancement of scientific knowledge with a specific 
practical aim), development (the use of the results of fundamental and applied research 
directed to the introduction of useful materials, devices, products, systems, and 
processes, or their improvement of existing ones). 
                                                            
485 The concept of pure science was used as a term distinguishing natural philosophy i.e. science 
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486 Godin 2005a, p. 7. 
487 One of the key figures was J.J. Carty, vice-president, ATT, who strongly advocated the benefits of 
cooperation of purely scientific research and industrial research in the 1920s. He developed the first 
full-length rationale for public support to pure research in which he argued that the natural home of 
pure science and of pure scientific research is to be found in the university. His conclusion was that the 
money necessary for the carrying out of a grand scheme of scientific research should come both from 
the state and from the industries. See Carty 1924. 
488 Bush 1945, p.10. 
489 Godin 2005b. 
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Godin makes a very interesting remark in relation to the role of economists in the 
development of Frascati model. When the idea of defining research by those three 
components was generally accepted, economists were still debating on whether 
development is to be included in the definition. Economists accepted the definition with 
the three categories and used it in industrial research analyses and in such measurements 
where the contribution of science to economic progress was analyzed.490  
Traditionally, we think that it was Schumpeter who brought forth the concept of 
innovation in economic theory but, in reality, Schumpeter saw only a slight dependence 
between invention and innovation. The whole idea of a sequential model aroused from 
the technology push and pull debates in the 1950s and 1960s.491 One of the key figures 
in those debates was W.R. Maclaurin, who suggested that if we make a sequence of five 
steps: pure science, invention, innovation, finance and acceptance (diffusion) we may 
understand the problem better.492 These two models – the sequential model of 
innovation and the input-output model are crucial in terms of the linear model of 
innovation.  
E. M. Rogers493 an important scholar in the early 1960s depicted innovation as being 
composed of four elements: innovation, communication, consequences on the social 
system, and consequences over time. Later Rogers494defined that innovation are 
composed of six sequential steps: needs/problems, research, development, 
commercialisation, diffusion and adaptation, consequences. In the early 1960s the 
phase-like distinctions between invention, innovation and diffusion, and an 
understanding of them as a sequential process became social facts, taken for granted in 
OECD literature.495  
 
7.4.3. Problem of horizontality in STI policies 
 
If we look at the discussion related to cluster policies they seem to have close links with 
theoretical debates and criticism related to cluster theories. Some scholars have 
interpreted that the cluster policies are an example of policy formulations in which 
theoretical models – cluster and diamond models – are imported to the domain of policy 
making. Thus the cluster policies must be seen as an exemple of such policy 
formulations.496   
What makes the argument interesting is the fact that Porter’s studies and his model 
of clusters have been criticized a great deal by economist in particular497. In Finland, 
Porter’s models and ETLA’s cluster analysis were never understood as scientific 
endeavours as such but they were adopted as a practical framework.  
The cluster policies in different OECD- countries are naturally framed by the 
circumstances of adoption in terms of political intentions and chosen instruments. 
Hogwood498 uses the idea of a policy cycle to describe the life span through which an 
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idea is implemented and evaluated, a process that corresponds that when an idea is 
translated into actions.  
Benneworth and Charles499 adopt the idea of policy process cycles into clusters by 
stressing the fact that policy processes proceed from the political axis to the bureaucratic 
axis. 
 
- The first stage of a cluster policy is the decision to use a cluster approach. Once 
the decision has been taken, the particular national meaning and state role in the 
approach must be debated. The determination of the state role affects the policy 
as it directs the set of tools which can be used. In Finland, clustering was 
introduced as a high-profile policy enabling also other policy areas to join the 
process. It also made possible a common government approach.  
- The second stage is the selection and designation of clusters.  
- The third stage is a more technocratic phase from strategy formulation to 
programme delivery. This implies the identification of willing participants, the 
determination of the aims and targets for the cluster, and the planning and 
delivery of actions. 
- The fourth stage is an evaluation and reporting-back stage where lessons are 
learned and the possibilities of subsequent policy phases evaluated. The policy re-
emerges in the political sphere, where its appropriateness and efficiency as a 
policy measure can be democratically debated and decisions made over the future 
cluster policies. 
  
In order to analyze cluster policies in practice Benneforth and Charles pose six questions: 
1) Why do governments choose cluster policy?  2) How do governments set the criteria 
for targeting a cluster? 3) How are the cluster policy instruments chosen? 4) How are 
general framework policies customised to specific clusters? 5) How does a government 
shape the development of clusters? 6) What role do governments play in supporting 
innovation in cluster?   
Rather than providing a detailed summary of their analysis I will only highlight a 
couple of issues the scholars point out. The first interesting point concerns the question 
what makes the cluster approach so popular and attractive. Benneworth and Charles 
(2001) have a very simple explanation: low costs and high potential returns. They make 
a very interesting distinction by separating clusters and clustering. Whereas the former 
refers to an economic phenomenon, the latter refers to political phenomenon. 
Clustering is a process whereby inter-firm linkages and cluster externalities are built up. 
As a result hitherto disparate firms gain competitive advantages from their interaction.500  
However, the explicate aim of policy making is somewhat unclear. Therefore, we 
have to analyse carefully two issues. First, we have to pay attention to the learning 
problem and ask how clustering is possible without favouritism. It follows that all 
paradigmatic policy renewals may be analyzed as a learning curve or process where the 
focus is what should be done or or should not.  
This takes us to the second interesting dimension of the cluster framework the 
problem of its flexibility. We may put it otherwise and ask what is the governmental 
shaping of clusters: what is the role of government in supporting innovation in clusters. 
One of the most genuine goals governments have had is of course to influence cluster 
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behaviour, and the cluster policy style must be congruent with the national features and 
political culture. The key feature of a policy cycle is simply that the policy’s degree of 
innovation tends to increase with the strength of the driver of change: the earlier the idea 
of clustering is developed in the policy cycle, the greater the influence the idea can exert 
on the policy framework.  
Cluster policies became popular governmental tools because of their capacity to 
boost innovative performance. Some scholars have found out that many successful 
regions and nations seem to create and build connections between firms and 
technological suppliers and boost integrated technology transfer into innovation.501 Later 
this finding was translated so that the less successful regions and nations could improve 
their economic performance with institutional and policy reforms borrowed from more 
successful regions.502 This kind of thinking is very much in congruence with the learning 
economy and the idea of learning regions in which creating territorial institutions and 
mechanisms to facilitate business-led interactive learning is a kind of imperative for 
policy actions503.  
As the OECD -report summarizes, the cluster approach is a part of the growing 
family of innovation systems approaches. 504 They reflect the systemic character of 
modern innovation processes and the fact that innovations depend on market and non-
market induced interactions among actors. Those interactions and interdependencies are 
based on trade and innovation linkages, and information flows transcend the borders of 
individual sectors and industries. The cluster approach, as the report’s writers argue 
offers insights into how these linkages and interdependencies are shaped, how they 
evolve over time and how they affect innovation. The cluster approach has proved to be 
an analytic instrument but it also offers a robust organizing framework for addressing or 
removing systemic imperfections. It has proved to be a useful framework for developing 
and applying new forms of governance, moving away from direct interventions towards 
forms of indirect inducement. There is neither a standard cluster approach nor is there a 
fixed policy recipe for implementing the cluster approach in practice.  
According den Pim et al the lessons from cluster policies are very much systems 
thinking favoured analysis:  
 
1) Every country and region has its own selection of clusters and specialisations with 
different characteristics and role in the economy. Cluster studies are useful analytic 
instruments for understanding better how individual economies are structured, their 
specialisations, and the role that various clusters play in the wider economy. 
2) Clusters – perceived as reduced NIS – are the relevant selection and variation 
environments in which firms and other types of organisations such as intermediaries or 
knowledge institutions operate and innovate. 
3) The notion of an “ideal” innovation cluster is a fallacy. We may have four different 
arguments for it. 
 a) Clusters have different backgrounds and country specificities.  
 b) Clusters differ according to the characteristics of the knowledge base and the way 
 in which knowledge is diffused.  
 c) Seen from the life-cycle perspective the stage of cluster development vary. The 
 whole idea of a cluster life -cycle points to the fact that the form of facilitation by 
 policy makers will vary over the lifetime of cluster. 
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There is considerable variation in networking practices. Networking requires not only a 
certain level of trust and preparedness, but also an ability to define common goals, to 
engage partnerships across industrial sectors, to set up relationships with research 
institutions as needed, and to establish links with end-users or their representatives.  
In addition, the writers make some very valuable remarks concerning the usefulness 
of the cluster perspective from the perspective of policy making. For policy makers, 
working with an analytic concept like cluster, there is always the danger that they test 
the flexibility of a concept and wishful thinking comes into play. And this is exactly 
what occurred in Finland.  
Policy makers should also evaluate and analyze the cluster environment carefully 
enough. Clusters should not to be built on technologies, as tendency seems to be 
because this too technological emphasis leads to a bias towards technological knowledge 
and clusters dominated by manufacturing firms. The third challenge is that the cluster 
analysis must be linked to parts of the value chain that exceed national borders. In order 
to succeed, policy makers should achieve the right mix between analysis and action. A 
successful cluster policy depends on how policy makers are able to create the right 
framework conditions for innovation. It enables them to identify the barriers and 
building relationships as well as networks. Cluster studies can be a way of opening up a 
dialogue on how innovations take place in a particular cluster and of learning how policy 
makers can contribute to this process. The cluster approach is both an analytic tool for 
policy makers and a working tool to proactively created platforms and programmes for 
cross-disciplinary programmes.505  
Interestingly, the writers stress very strongly that innovative clusters are shaped by all 
kinds of policies. Each cluster is affected by a complex interplay of policies influencing 
the trading environment, sources of innovation, nature of places in which cluster 
resources come together and the regulations of the cluster. A focus purely on “formal” 
innovation or industrial policy, without a broad historically contextualised perspective, 
will yield a narrow and myopic view. The policies aimed at supporting innovation in a 
cluster should determine the factors that influence innovation in clusters. There is a need 
to look at a wider array of policies and their interaction in policy systems. It follows that 
cluster policy makers might need to intervene in policy areas and policy domains that 
may not be immediately associated with innovation policy. 
 The writers argue that cluster policy is a rather general approach to policy making 
and an action tool enabling framework conditions to be optimized for innovations in 
clusters. This requires an almost missionary orientation on the part of policy makers to 
convince others who are not primarily interested in innovation to take innovation on 
board as one of the relevant steering criteria.   
Clusters provide for policy makers a way of dealing with increased complexities and a 
better targeting policy by addressing particular systemic failures that hamper 
innovations. The main task for policy makers is to promote innovation in clusters and 
hence facilitate the networking processes and create institutional settings which provide 
incentives for market-induced cluster formation and forms of co-operation in both 
emerging and mature clusters.  
Following den Hertog et al some risks in cluster policy making can be identified. 
The major risk in cluster analyses and cluster policies is that policy makers and 
researchers focus only on high-tech clusters and ignore medium- and low- tech clusters. 
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Actually, they think that our traditional way of characterising clusters as low-, medium- 
and high- tech categories is misleading. It follows that working with standard policy 
models and using tool-push approach can be dangerous. Policy instruments and working 
tools are developed for particular vanguard clusters (e.g. ICT or biotechnology) and 
subsequently applied to other innovation clusters without consideration.  
Cluster policies should be seen as a kind of customising sets of policy tools to the 
needs of a particular cluster and not about applying a standardised a way in different 
clusters. There is no magic recipe for the success of cluster policies but it is a constant 
process of learning and improving. The most importantissue is to create awareness and a 
constructive debate about the situation in each cluster. The ideal outcomes are a 
common agenda and initiatives and policies that strengthen innovation in clusters.  
For policy makers the cluster approach is a challenge in the sense that policy makers 
have to combine their analytic skills to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
innovation dynamics and innovation style of a particular cluster. It demands the 
flexibility in terms of deciding the most appropriate role for fostering innovation. This 
requires a trajectory of experimentation and constant policy learning that involves a lot 
of trial and error.  
One of the biggest challenges is how policy makers deal with strongly 
internationalized clusters. Interpreted as a learning process implies cluster policy that 
policy makers must be able to change their policy measures and policy programmes. 
They have to yield a top-down approach and they have to be an integral part of the 
decision making.  
In conclusion, den Hertog et al506 represent a very challenging list for policy makers: 
 
- Close the gap between cluster analysis and daily policy practice.  
- Understand the whole set of policy tools available.  
- Understand which tools to use when.  
- Handle complex cluster programmes and projects.  
- Withstand the pressure to use cluster policies for traditional industrial policy 
purposes.  
- Act in various capacities ranging from sparring partners, programme managers, 
stimulating dialogue etc.  
- Combine a fairly pragmatic action-oriented approach but at the same time be 
able to reflect on policy making as well. 
- Switch between various clusters that might have different needs in terms of 
support and steering. 
 
One example is the EU context is the ISE project507 financed under the Fourth 
Framework Programme. Its explicit aim is to analyze the barriers and bottle necks of 
innovation policies utilizing the innovation approach.  
The summary report stresses strongly that STI policies should be conducted at the 
national or local level unless some specific arguments point to the EU level. The report 
as well as the SI- approach itself emphasizes interactive learning: communication across 
national borders. The innovation policy should be seen as a broad policy domain and 
take into account the following taxonomy: 1) Policies to develop and strengthen the 
knowledge infrastructure; policies depend to a great extent on national decisions and 
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investments. 2) Policies to develop some basic institutions which affect interactive 
learning; policies that increase trust, willingness, and ability to co-operate. 3) Policies to 
create specific organisations to support innovation activities; policies to support patent 
offices, standard setting agencies and technical service agencies. 4) Policies to improve 
conditions for financing innovation. These policies are termed framework condition 
policies but there are also targeted or selective types of policies when governments wish to 
intervene in the support of entrance and innovators. 5) Policies selectively or directly 
supporting the development of science and technology; public investment in R&D a 
significant component of overall R&D and knowledge creation in most European 
countries. 6) Public technology procurement policy; a demand side policy in which the 
effort to provoke or trigger innovation is the key issue.  
Turning the setting other way round allows us to ask what makes clusters so 
important in the innovation context. The OECD has been, as we have seen earlier, one 
of the most powerful promoter of the innovation and learning economy paradigm. Two 
influential OECD reports508 on clusters are of a great interest.  
Originally, the term cluster was proposed in the OECD as an organizing metaphor 
or a reduced NIS concept. The Innovative Clusters report highlights the fact that the 
national economy consists of several reduced-form innovation systems represented by 
various distinct industrial clusters. It implies that any country’s overall innovation 
system would necessarily include composite features of the innovation underway. The 
NIS framework was seen by many large OECD countries as requiring a fairly 
homogenous central policy approach, whose acceptability would therefore be greatest in 
the small national economies represented by the Nordic countries and the 
Belgian/Flemish fringe of Europe.  
In the large OECD countries a double-reduced NIS concept makes sense within 
another vague concept, the RIS addressed to a regional innovation system. This implies 
that the cluster framework plays a key role in the formulation and implementation of 
innovation policies in many countries.509 One of the most interesting findings in many 
countries has been that the value-chain cluster concept is useful in terms of analyzing the 
emerging role in the core process of innovation.  
If we want to understand the relationship between clusters and innovations we have 
to ask how individual firms absorb and embed available innovations or their inherent 
capacity to generate innovations. The cluster approach has been adopted by many 
countries since early 1990s but I will briefly discuss two cases, The Netherlands and 
Finland. The Netherlands510 was one of the first countries to adopt a cluster perspective 
as a part of innovation policy.  
Due to the novelty of the concept, the adoption of the cluster framework in the 
Netherlands has involved a lot of experimentation and learning. We may think that 
those experiments have been as much political lessons as conscious policy making. The 
introduction of the framework has taken place through four elements: competition 
policy and deregulation, general technology policy, macroeconomic policy, and solid 
and reliable physical infrastructure. The Dutch policy makers and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs in particular have consciously attempted to create a favourable and 
stable entrepreneurial climate. Their argument has been that only then can firms focus 
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on improving their competitiveness and innovation potential. The policy has tried to 
identify that potential and stimulate innovative clusters.  
One of the most important lessons the Dutch policy makers have learned is the fact 
that the government fulfils very different roles in different clusters. Each cluster is 
unique and the appropriate role for the government depends on the specific context of 
the cluster. Although the participants of a cluster may have a shared vision for 
strengthening the cluster, a follow-up is not automatic. The follow -up problem became 
transparent in some clusters that have been too broadly defined, making it difficult to 
agree on follow-up which would benefit all stakeholders.  
Another issue the analysts wanted to stress was that it is useful to distinguish between 
newly emerging clusters from more mature clusters. The challenge in dealing with the 
new emerging clusters is that the boundaries are not easy to determine. This implies that 
it is important to understand and define all the relevant players in the cluster because the 
clusters are different. Clusters may vary along various dimensions: demand, the type of 
knowledge, or the way in which clusters create new knowledge. Science-based clusters 
are at the forefront of new technological developments and constantly generate new 
knowledge where other clusters absorb the knowledge outside the cluster.  
The analysts list four aims for cluster policy by referring to the idea of systemic 
imperfection: 
  
- Limited interaction. The firms do not interact and therefore potentially fruitful 
opportunities for learning and innovation may be missed. An appropriate policy response 
may be to facilitate the development of a common infrastructure to enable firms to 
communicate.  
- Informational imperfections. The firm’s lack of insight into future technological and/or 
business developments constraints the innovative potential of a cluster. An appropriate 
policy response is to develop a common understanding of these key trends together with 
industry and knowledge institutions. This can be done by means of foresight studies, 
technology radars, market studies or technology roadmaps511.  
- Mismatch between knowledge infrastructure and business needs. This refers to a 
situation in which public knowledge institutes develop knowledge too far from business 
needs. Knowledge may be too “scientific” and not sufficiently application oriented. The 
responsibility of an appropriate policy response is more on educational policy side and it 
raises many questions e.g. what parts of academia must be involved in the innovation 
policy agenda.  
- Lack of demanding customers. 
 
In Finland512 the development of the cluster approach was a long process as discovered 
earlier. The Finnish industrial policy renewal had two origins. It was clearly a genuine 
enterprise to find a new broader approach to technology and industrial policies in which 
the forestry and metals industry were the two pillars of the economy. It was an essential 
part of implementing the innovation paradigm in general. “NIS thinking” had gradually 
entered the policy discussions and it made it relatively easy to get policy makers to adopt 
the cluster approach.  
Earlier interventions were very practical, but in 1996 the Science and Technology 
Policy Council Review (STPC review 1996) spoke about clusters at a general level. It 
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followed that the cluster approach was integrated to the implementation of science and 
technology policy rather than being a dominant policy dimension. In terms of 
application Finland chose another way than the Netherlands. The main objective for the 
inter-ministerial cluster-based programmes introduced in the STPC review in1996 was 
to improve collaboration between the various ministries and the sectors of government.  
The idea of those programmes was of course based on the cluster approach. Yet their 
primary aim was to open up a totally new arena for innovation policy developments. 
The programmes wanted to gather together all stake holders, companies, research 
institutes and companies, but also these sectoral government research laboratories and 
users to plan and execute joint projects.  
By introducing the inter-ministerial cluster programmes the Government wanted to 
duplicate work that had been done earlier. The management of these programmes was 
carried out by programme steering committees, comprised of funding organisations and 
major stakeholders. The specific objective was to create and improve linkages between 
government (ministries), research and industry. The political aspects of the Finnish 
cluster programmes were versatile. They have provided a totally new approach to 
innovation policy and a new approach to emerging industrial contexts. They have also 
been valuable in terms of policy implementation. They have contributed to cross-
disciplinary thinking and approaches in general.  
The core of cluster policies has been the problem of re-organizing national 
government structures rather than Porter’s idea of competitiveness as such. The 
framework has provided a legitimation basis for governmental re-organization as well as 
for new visions for science and technology policies.  
The other aspect of cluster thinking has been the problem of the public sector as 
such. In the course of time this aspect has become more and more relevant and it was 
also perhaps the most problematic part of the welfare cluster case. This aspect is taken 
into consideration in the next chapter. 
 
7.4.4. STI policies and the welfare state  
 
The economic settlement of the classic welfare state is often identified with the 
Keynesian welfare state or Keynesian social democracy.513 The governments consider it as 
their duty to secure a high and stable level of employment. This aim was linked with 
Keynesian demand management. One of the key arguments of the very complex 
Keynesian approach is that the market forces do not necessarily produce full 
employment and therefore governments should intervene in the economy by managing 
demand514.  
Post-war governments increased competition in order to maintain a high level of 
demand. The focus was on macro economic policy and demand management so that 
they would be able to control unemployment. It is important to understand that 
different countries applied the Keynesian apparatus in different ways. So Keynesianism 
does not only equate the classical welfare state because for example the USA and Japan 
have used Keynesianism but very differently.515  
It is also problematic to find the link between the Keynesian economic policy and 
economic growth.516 The oil crisis in the early 1970s changed the Western economies 
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dramatically and also the Keynesian policy faced many problems. Monetarists argued 
that the Keynesian policy leads to increased inflation and stagflation.517 
One of the most interesting accounts of Keynesianism is given by Bob Jessop. In his 
analysis Jessop differentiates between three complementary approaches to articulate the 
economic and the political in contemporary capitalism.  
First, the regulation approach suggests that the market forces are merely one factor of 
the capitalist expansion. In its broadest sense the economy includes both economic and 
extra-economic factors, and it must be understood as an ensemble of socially embedded, 
socially regularized and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social forces and 
actions organized around it.  
Second, Jessop treats the state as an ensemble of socially embedded and socially 
regularized institutions, organizations, social forces and activities around it. The neo-
Gramscian analysis highlights the complex and variable articulation of government and 
governance in underwriting state power. The state system is far more comprehensive 
than judico-political institutions which cover, however, important socio-cultural aspects 
in their relations to the state.  
Third, Jessop sees that the economy is an imaginatively narrated system that is 
accorded specific boundaries, conditions of existence, typical economic agents, 
tendencies and countertendencies as a dynamic system. 
His description of Fordism focuses on four aspects: a labour process (the mass 
production of complex durable goods), a macro-economic system (mass production and 
consumption in a national economy), a social mode of economic regulation 
(institutionalized collective bargaining and a Keynesian welfare state) and its general 
implications for social organization and cohesion (an urban-industrial wage-earning 
society).518 
Post-Fordism in terms of those four dimensions can be defined as follows: a flexible 
production process based on flexible machines or systems and flexible workforce; the 
dominance of a flexible and permanently innovative pattern of accumulation; supply-
side innovation and flexibility in the main areas of regulation; a social mode that is too 
difficult to anticipate.  
Jessop argues also that there has been an on-going transition process from a 
Keynesian welfare national state approach (KWNS) to a Schumpeterian workfare state 
approach (SWS). Politically, it implies that the domestic full-employment aim and 
redistributive welfare rights are de-prioritized in favour of international competitiveness. 
  
The key features of KWNS are: 
 
- Among the various spatial scales of formal political organizations, state level was 
regarded as primary. The key supranational institutions comprised various international 
and intergovernmental agencies; typically organized under U.S. hegemony these were 
designed to promote cooperation among national states in securing certain key 
conditions in the post-war economics. 
- State economic strategies and economic regulation assumed a relatively closed national 
economy. The international economy was understood in terms of financial and trade 
flows among various national economies.  
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- Among the various spatial scales of economic organizations, the national economy was 
accorded priority for state action, defined and measured in terms of national aggregates, 
and managed primarily in terms of targeted variation in these aggregates. 
- The primary object of welfare and social reproduction policies was the resident national 
population and its constituent households and individual citizens. 
- The primary units of the state’s social basis were individual political subjects endowed, 
as citizens of the national state, with various legal, political and social rights, and who 
were organized as members of economic-corporate organizations and/or as supporters of 
responsible political parties. 
- The axis of struggles over political hegemony at home was the “national-popular” and 
its realization in the development, expansion, and protection of such rights in an 
“economic-corporate” political process. 
 
Jessop’s central argument is that while such framework is no longer valid, it is alive in 
institutional and administrative settings and structures. The reorganization of the 
KWNS has started and deepened since the 1970s and it is articulated in three major 
trends: denationalization, destatization, and internationalization.  
The first trend of denationalization refers to the politico-economic processes in 
which the traditional functions of national states are transformed and shift their 
traditional sovereignty towards various supranational regimes and coalitions. This 
process implies that the cultural, judicial, political, economic, social conditions of the 
national sovereignty are re-defined.  Another side of this process is that the boundaries of 
spaces and scales at the sub-national level become unspecific and their interests go 
occasionally beyond the nation state interest.  
The second trend is the shift from the centrality of government to more 
decentralized forms of governance. It involves movement from the taken-for-granted 
primacy of official state apparatuses towards a taken-for-granted necessity of varied 
forms and levels of partnership between official, parastatal, and nongovernmental 
organizations in managing economic and social relations. The emphasis is on promoting 
and/or steering the self-organization of inter-organizational relations.  
Although public money and law would remain important in underpinning their 
operation, other resources – private money, knowledge and expertise – are also critical to 
success. In particular, there is a growing interest across a wide range of academic and 
professional disciplines and fields of social activity to be attached to network and 
partnership arrangements in corporate and regional governance. The expansion of 
regional-local, supranational, and trans-local or cross-border linkages has played a major 
role in the growth of governance at the expense of national government.  
The third trend refers to the increased strategic significance of the international 
context of domestic state action and the latter’s extension to wide extraterritorial or 
transnational factors and processes. This shift blurs the distinction between domestic 
and foreign policy and widens the territorial bases of actors who are either directly 
involved in decision making and/or whose opinions are taken into account.  
This trend is reflected in economic and social policy insofar as the prime object of 
economic and social intervention by nation-states in North America and in the EU has 
changed from the well-balanced domestic performance of the national economy to its 
overall international competitiveness understood in very broad terms. It can be seen in 
the shift from the Keynesian welfare concerns of the post-war nation-states to less state- 
centred Schumpeterian workfare concerns in an emerging new political regime.  
Economically, such concerns involve promoting product, process, organizational, 
and market innovations in open economies in order to strengthen the structural 
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competitiveness of the national economy by intervening on the supply side. Socially, 
they subordinate social policy to the needs of labour market flexibility and/or to the 
constraints of international competition.  
Jessop suggests that the possible erosion of the nation-state is a decisive factor in 
contemporary politics but continues that erosion must be understood as a process of 
decomposition involving a progressive loss of effective state unity. This does not imply 
that specific state apparatuses tend to disappear, it rather entails that a loss of their 
coherence in securing state functions is tied to a specific state project. Erosion can be 
discerned in the internal disarticulation of state apparatuses and in declining 
effectiveness. Put differently, there is a loss of horizontal coherence across different 
organizational levels and of different domains of state activity.  Schumpeterian 
workfare regime changes the focus of the national policies: 1) domestic full employment 
is de-prioritized in favour of international competitiveness; 2) redistributive welfare 
rights take second place to a productivist reordering of social policy; 3) the primary role 
of the national state is deprivileged in favour of governance mechanisms operating on 
various levels.  
The first break means that job creation is seen to depend heavily on the active 
management of the supply side and on the flexibility of the labour force rather than 
from effective management of national demand. It naturally shifts the goals, guidelines 
and agendas of various national political reforms.  
The second break is complicated and multifaceted. Jessop highlights a change in the 
“workfare-welfare” mix, an ongoing shift in the importance of welfare rights linked with 
tax and/or contribution based consumption of services. Welfare rights tend to become 
residualized and their provision subject to restrictions on demand and to downward cost 
pressures, especially for those excluded from the labour market due to age or incapacity.  
Jessop’s conclusion is that the emergence of a new accumulation regime and its mode 
of regulation i.e. the replacement of KWNS involve a cultural revolution as well as 
radical institutional innovation. Its central point is the emerging meta-narrative 
concerning globalization and its translation into pressures to prioritize the structural 
competitiveness; this meta-narrative has been linked with other widely accepted sets of 
diagnoses and prescriptions for the economic and difficulties confronting nations, 
regions and their various economic branches. According to Jessop the second major set 
of meta-narratives stresses the collapse of communism and the economic threads from 
East Asia.  
One of the most important aspects of the continuing restructuring and reorientation 
of the Keynesian welfare state is in Jessop’s view that governments highlight how 
essential it is in our global age to modify economic strategies, economic institutions, 
modes of governance and the form of the state. These must be redesigned to prioritize 
“wealth creation” in the face of international, interregional and intraregional 
competition.  
States have become actively involved in generalizing new norms of production and 
consumption through such measures as privatisation, fiscal incentives to investment and 
enterprise, flexibilization and market proxies in the public sector, workfare and learnfare 
rather than social citizenship entitlements, and promoting public-private partnerships.519 
All these aspects become more tangible in the light of the New Labour’s third way 
policies.520 The Third Way is seen as a new alternative different from the classic welfare 
                                                            
519 Jessop has developed his ideas further. See Jessop and Ngai-Ling 2006. 
520 Giddens 1994; Giddens 1998. 
178  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
state and the restructured welfare state but its basic values are based on the welfare state 
ideology. The most significant criticism against the Third Way is that the New Labour 
has moved from the equality to inclusion and from equality of outcomes to equality of 
opportunity.521 It has advocated openly the knowledge economy and insisted that social 
policy is the other side of economic policy. 
“Old style social democracy concentrated on industrial policy and Keynesian demand 
measures, while the neo-liberals focused on deregulation and market liberalization. Third 
way economic policy needs to concern itself with different priorities – with education, 
incentives, entrepreneurial culture, flexibility, devolution and cultivation of social capital.”522 
The New Labour tends to abandon redistributive, egalitarian policies in favour of 
moralistic and social integration policies. Viewing inclusion solely through work, policy 
makers understate the importance of services in kind. Its claim is that it has moved from 
fiscal redistribution through the tax and benefit system to an emphasis on redistributing 
opportunities and assets. The New Labour claims that if the right tended to stress the 
duties of citizenship and the left tended to stress the rights of citizens, the third way 
involves both of them. The third way of citizenship moves from “dutiless” rights towards 
“conditional welfare”.523 
The New Labour has pragmatically embraced the private sector and hence been very 
selective.524 In comparison with traditional social democrats the New Labour will not 
subscribe to monetarism but they rather argue that the role for demand management is 
too limited. If the older social democrats focused on the problems of demand, macro-
economic policy and full employment, the New Labour outs its focus on supply, micro-
economic policy and employability.525 
Bonoli et al526 outline three types of welfare state responses to globalization. 1) 
Globalization requires welfare retrenchment to reduce public expenditure and taxes. 2) 
It requires more rather than less government provision of public services. 3) A middle 
type emphasizes the compromises between welfare and competitiveness.  
The first position is based on the neo-liberal argument that the welfare state causes 
economic problems for governments – social welfare undermines incentives to work and 
savings for individuals. High tax rates persuade firms not to invest and they may find a 
better location. Bonoli and his colleagues argue that these arguments while limited, are 
valuable for governments in that they provide ideological ammunition for welfare 
retrenchment.  
The second position argues a contrary view: competitiveness requires state welfare. 
Because rich western countries cannot undercut their wages they have another option. 
They have to choose high technology and knowledge which means that they need skilled 
and well-educated labour force.  
The third position is a kind of compromise between welfare and competitiveness. It 
stresses investments in the health sector and education and prefers paid work rather than 
welfare: economic and social policies are different sides of the same coin. Shin detects 
some common trends in most welfare states – a market-conforming policy on business 
taxation, a reduction in the share of employers’ contributions to social protection 
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revenues, more limited income security programmes, an increased allocation of resources 
for active labour market programmes, and less state intervention in the labour market.527  
There are three different views on the relation between politics and welfare: 
discussion on citizenship, institutions and politics as such. Pierson528 has proposed a 
thesis which regards the welfare state as a politicized version of the modernization thesis; 
the welfare state is a product of successful political mobilization to attain full citizenship 
in the context of industrialism.  
In his analysis Esping- Andersen (1990)529 has distinguished three worlds of welfare 
capitalism – social democratic, Christian democratic and liberal regimes. Hs central 
argument is that politics has played a decisive role in the construction of welfare regimes. 
Today’s problem is whether politics still matters.530 The nation-states have naturally new 
pressures and challenges but there is little clear evidence of actual convergence. The 
impacts of globalization seem to be more ideological and provide a convenient rationale 
or excuse for political action or non-action.531  
 
Horizontality and the public sector reform 
 
One of the issues embedded in the transition of the welfare state is closely linked with 
the problem of horizontality in STI policies. My argument has been that to understand 
the welfare cluster intervention we have to link the idea of horizontality embedded in 
STI policies with the rationale of new governance. In other words, the idea of welfare 
cluster intervention must be understood not only in terms of STI policies but also in 
terms of reforming the public sector in general. In the early 1990s Finland also started a 
series of reforms in the public sector and the welfare cluster must be seen as a part of this 
process. But what is the point behind the public sector reforms?  
One of the best selling management texts or business texts ever has been the book 
“In Search of Excellence” by Peters and Waterman.532 It was based on Douglas 
McGregor’s X-Y theory’s eight themes: structure, strategy, systems, management style, 
skill, staff and shared values. This and another text written by Newman and Clarke 
533developing the “excellence” approach focus on building long-term capacity through 
transforming relations with customers and staff empowering staff. The approach aims at 
transforming the values and culture of the workforce and strengthening the 
commitment to organisations through partnership and the flattering of hierarchies.  
Flynn534 outlines six general issues: from equality of treatment to the promotion of 
different treatment for different people, from universal eligibility towards targeting, from 
public provision to the mixed economy of welfare, choice, from local policy to central 
control combined with an opposite move towards more local managerial and financial 
autonomy, and funding based on some measure of performance or volume of work. The 
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difficulty is to differentiate the old and the new management because the change seems 
to be non-linear and very complex.  
Newman and Clarke argue that the organizational construction of the classic welfare 
state was structured by two modes of coordination: by bureaucratic administration and 
by professionalism. The new public management perspective is different because it 
advocates the application of market mechanisms and the marketization of public 
services. Ferlie et al (1996)535 maintain that the evolution of new public management 
involves two modes.  
The first mode, the NPM model 1, highlights the efficiency drive. It was dominant 
throughout the early and mid-1980s and its aim was to make the public sector more 
business-like. The second mode, the NPM- model 2, focuses on downsizing and 
decentralization, and on such issues as contracts, quasi-markets and contracting out.  
A mixed economy of welfare has close links with the new management but its 
conceptual framework is different and utilizes the market, hierarchy and networks 
separation. It points to moves toward the greater use of markets but also towards the 
voluntary and informal sector as well. The state is part of a wider mix of welfare. This 
perspective involves also a kind of welfare pluralism. The distinction between 
production, finance and regulation is important here because the welfare mix perspective 
highlights the responsibility of NGOs and enterprises.  
Paul Koch and his colleagues in their analysis of innovation in the public sector536 
remark that if we define innovation as deliberate changes in behaviour with a specific 
objective in mind innovation is often problem solving. The emphasis is on novelty as 
Green et al. remark: “innovation is not merely synonymous with change. Ongoing change is 
a feature of most… organisations. For example the recruitment of new workers constitutes 
change but is an innovative step only where such workers are introduced in order to import 
new knowledge or carry put novel tasks.“ 537 
Koch et al.538 mapped different kinds of barriers and drivers for innovation in the 
public sector as follows: Size and complexity: the public sector comprises extremely 
complex and large-scale organisational entities that may develop internal barriers to 
innovations. Heritage and legacy: public sector organisations are prone to entrench 
practices and procedures. Professional resistanc: there are professional groupings with 
their own communities of practice, belief systems and perspectives. Risk aversion: public 
organisations are under the close scrutiny of both politicians and the media, and 
employees are not normally rewarded for taking risks. Need for consultation and unclear 
outcomes:  the large range of stakeholder involvement generates a strong requirement to 
consult and review and planned changes. Pace and scale of change: there have been so 
many reforms that employees are becoming “innovation fatigued”. Absence of capacity for 
organisational learning: there may be a lack of structures or mechanisms for the 
enhancement of organisational learning. Public resistance to change: elements of the 
public might be risk-averse. Absence of resources: there may be lack of financial support or 
shortages of relevant skills or other support services. Technical barriers: there may be lack 
of technical solutions to the problem at hand.  
In spite of all these barriers Koch et al find also a lot of important drivers or 
facilitators for innovation as follows: Problem- oriented drivers: people innovate in order 
to solve certain problem. Non-problem oriented drivers: innovations may improve on the 
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former situation. Political push: strategic change frequently requires strong, top-down, 
political will. Growth of culture of review: assessment practices may stimulate innovation. 
Support mechanism for innovation: authorities may implement policy measures aimed at 
funding and encouraging innovation. Capacity for innovation: public employees have 
often high levels of professional expertise, creativity and problem solving. Competitive 
drivers: performance targets may encourage the use of innovative approaches. 
Technological factors: technological innovation can be a strong determinant for 
subsequent innovation. NGOs and private companies: models developed by NGOs and 
private companies may be adopted by public institutions.   
The discussion related to horizontality must be understood as a component of 
accountability as discussed earlier. The idea of accountability is based on the idea that 
governments are responsible to their citizens for the good governance of the nation. It 
means that the ministers and the cabinet are responsible to the parliament for policy 
formulation and general implementation. Also, ministers and their departmental staff 
are responsible for detailed policy implementation and the provision of specified public 
services as authorised by parliament to eligible citizens. The accountability obligation of 
the governments arises from the nature of representative democratic government. 
Democratic governments are elected by citizens to act in the best interests of the nation 
on their behalf. There is an implicit requirement for public trust in the operations of 
government, as is embodied in the responsibility for accountability.539 
The birth of new public management in the 1980s is often seen as a reaction against 
allegations that governments are too large, inefficient, ineffective and unresponsive to 
change, and therefore they are not competitive enough.  One of the key arguments 
among the public choice theorists, a group of economists from Chicago University, was 
that the number of government employers should be reduced through the privatisation 
of government enterprises and the outsourcing of remaining public services to private 
firms whenever possible.540 
 
Privatisation and the welfare state: a dilemma of public good 
 
The idea of the public sector is sometimes linked with the idea of public good. Most 
economic arguments for government intervention are based on the premise that the 
marketplace cannot provide public goods or handle externalities. Public health and 
welfare programmes, education, roads, R&D, national and domestic defence and so 
forth are often understood as public goods. But what are these public goods?  
One of the most technical definitions541 of a public good is made by Paul Samuelson 
who says that a public good is a good which once produced for some consumers can be 
consumed by additional consumers at no additional cost. In this way public goods have 
two characteristics: nonexcludability and jointness in consumption. Nonexcludiability 
means that it is difficult to keep people from consuming the good once it is produced 
and jointness in consumption is exactly Samuelson’s definition. But although 
economists give a strict definition to the notion of public good, they usually refer in 
public debates to the public sector; it conveys the connotation of government 
production. In effect, public goods are often understood as government-produced goods 
implying that they should have those two aspects introduced above.  
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Technological progress can create new public goods such as street lights, roads, radio 
and television broadcasting or health care equipment. In terms of economics public 
goods provide a very important example of market failure in which market-like 
behaviour of individual gain-seeking does not have efficient results. A classical dilemma 
related to public goods is the free rider problem and another dilemma concerns the term 
global public good.  
Both of these dilemmas are present in the discussions of the welfare state. The 
premise of the welfare state tradition is that the state intervenes in the mechanisms of the 
market by regulation, by finance, by public production and by income transfers.542 The 
first three interventions involve direct interference in the market mechanism and the 
fourth may have indirect effects.  
In reality, the state interferes with the free market through a large number of 
regulations. Many of these interventions are relevant to the efficient and/or equitable 
operation of markets. The regulation of quality is concerned mainly with the supply 
side. Finance involves subsidies applied to the prices of specific commodities. It changes 
the slope of the budget constraint facing individuals and firms. Prices can be affected by 
a variety of taxes.543  
Regulation and finance modify the market but they leave the basic market 
mechanism intact. The state can take over the supply side by producing goods and 
services itself; the state owns the capital inputs and employs the necessary labour. The 
finance and production must be separate forms of intervention. This distinction is 
usually critical in the issues of privatisation.  
The Invisible Hand theorem asserts that a market allocation will be automatically 
efficient if and only if the assumptions of perfect competition, the absence of market 
failures, and perfect information all hold. If even one of these assumptions fails, the 
resulting market equilibrium will generally be inefficient and the intervention is 
appropriate. Perfect competition must hold in the product and factor market, and also 
in the capital market. The assumption is that economic agents must be price-takers and 
they must have equal powers. It means that there are no entry barriers in any market. In 
the presence of monopoly and oligopoly this is not possible.  
One of the most problematic issues in the debates on public and private provision 
concerns the issue of privatisation which involves four different cases. The figure below 
illustrates the themes and tendencies involved in debates on privatisation. Box 1 
illustrates the case in which production is private; here total supply is determined by 
producers; individuals decide how much to consume and pay for it themselves. Box 2 is 
otherwise identical with Box 1 but individual consumption is financed by the state. Box 
3 illustrates private market subject to regulation. Box 4 illustrates private production 
modified by both regulation and finance.544 
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Figure 4. Discussion on public and private provisio 
 
This table becomes more tangible and closer to reality if we add regulation to finance 
and production. There are different options available.  
- Option 1. A pure private market, 
- Option 2.  A private market plus state finance (income subsidy), 
- Option 3. A private market plus regulation: 3a) a market in which there is the 
regulation of individual consumption, 3b) a market in which there is the regulation 
of total supply, 
-  Option 4. A market in which private production, state regulation and finance are 
intertwined: 4a) a market in which supply is wholly private, 4b) a market in which 
total supply is determined by state, 
-  Option 5. A market in which public production, private allocation and finance are 
intertwined:  5a) a market in which supply is determined by private demand, 5b) a 
market in which supply is wholly public, 
-  Option 6. A market in which public is apart from private finance, 
-  Option 7. A market in which public is apart from private consumption decision, 
-  Option 8. A pure public market. 
 
The debates on these issues is a crucial part of modern politics and decision-making. 
One of the most difficult debates relates to social and health care. The main problem in 
the discussion has been: 1) how efficient or just is a competitive market for health care 
likely to be, 2) to what extent would public production and allocation be more efficient 
or just and 3) would any intermediate system involving both public and private sectors 
perform better than either of these two cases.  
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In Finland, the alternative 3 has been predominant in health care.545 
 “Since the market mechanism fails to reveal consumer preferences in social wants, it may 
be asked what mechanism there is by which the government can determine the extent to 
which resources should be released for the satisfaction of such wants .... A political process 
must be substituted for the market mechanism”.546 
The theories of welfare economics usually see the problem of efficiency/scarcity, 
known as Pareto optimality principle, as their major problem: "The community becomes 
better off if one individual becomes better off and none worse off". This means that the 
economy must achieve exchange efficiency in terms of whatever goods are produced for 
the individuals who value them most. It also means that there must be production 
efficiency, which means that in a given society with its resources the production of one 
good cannot be increased without decreasing the production of another.  
The economy must achieve also product mix efficiency so that the goods produced 
correspond to those desired by individuals.547 If there are important market failures such 
as imperfect competition, imperfect information, incomplete markets, externalities, 
public goods, and unemployment, the market is not Pareto efficient and the role of the 
government becomes crucial. In principle, there are two roles for the government either 
to make an intervention in the market, to make a Pareto improvement, or to start 
political processes and change existing bureaucratic and institutional structures. This 
kind of interpretation allows a lot of opportunities for political rhetoric. This has been 
also the situation in the debates concerning the welfare state. 
If we want to think like a public sector economist and our problem is that societies 
make choices concerning the use of limited resources, then we have to present four 
questions548: What is to be produced? How is it to be produced? For whom is it to be 
produced? How are these decisions made?  
This implies that governments must design schedules for their own production 
possibilities where they clarify for example the guidelines for the public -private 
allocation policies. The governments must also solve the problem of distribution by 
deciding the guidelines for their taxation policies and welfare programs. In Finland, the 
privatisation discussion has followed these guidelines. 
 
7.5. Cultural and national dimensions in STI policies: The fourth move 
 
A cornerstone of STI policies has been its dependence on national characteristics and 
histories. This national component has played a crucial role, in particular, in the Finnish 
decision making related to STI policies. The welfare cluster reveals another aspect of the 
Finnish STI policies because it was a very “Finnish” exercise. This also explains its 
idiosyncratic nature and highlights its significance for STI policies in Finland.  
 
7.5.1. Consensus and the Finnish political culture 
 
Nelson and Winter549 have pointed out that public policies tend to follow certain 
nationally rooted trajectories because most of changes occur locally and the selection 
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environment is comparatively constant. There are durable and important differences in 
national characteristics that shape and constraint national systems. Because countries 
learn and copy from one another policies have become more and more convergent.550 
Internationalization and competition among companies and nation states are certainly 
central reasons for such homogenization.  
Dimaggio and Powell551 suggest that the processes of homogenization should be 
analyzed as an isomorphic process. They argue that bureaucratization and other forms of 
organizational change occur as the result of processes that make organizations or 
organizational fields more similar, but they do not make them necessarily more effective. 
In the initial stages of their life cycle, organizations often display diversity in approach 
and form, but they seem to become more similar later.  
Bureaucratization and other forms of homogenization emerge out of the 
structuration of organizational fields552, and those aggregates attempt to constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life. Fields exist only if they are institutionally defined 
and structures. Dimaggio and Powell distinguish between three different mechanisms 
through which institutional isomorphic change occurs: coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism.  
Coercive isomorphism results from formal and informal pressures by organizations 
upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which 
organizations function. Coercive isomorphism can be subtle and implicit and stem from 
political influence and the problem of legitimacy.  
Mimetic isomorphism results from standard responses to uncertainty. When 
organizational structures are unspecific, or goals ambiguous, or when environments 
create symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves after other 
organizations. Uncertainty encourages imitation and in spite of the quest for originality, 
organizations must take into account other organizations. Naturally, if particular forms 
of organizations have been successful, organizations seem to follow them.  
Normative isomorphism is related to the collective struggle of members of an 
occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, and establish a cognitive 
base and legitimatization for their occupational autonomy. Professionalization, as 
Dimaggio and Powell call it, may lead to the formation of elites who define appropriate 
models of organizational structure and policy. As a result of this organizational structures 
may become rigid and taken for granted for decades. The political construction of 
science and technology policies in various countries seems to be very much in line with 
this kind of isomorphism.  
 
Consensus and economic policy  
 
One interesting perspective advocating a sort of isomorphism linked with the Finnish 
political culture is introduced by two Finnish economists, Jukka Pekkarinen and Juhana 
Vartiainen. 553 Their analysis focuses on the history of the Finnish economic policy 
seeking to explain the dramatic changes in the 1980s and in the 1990s. Finland’s 
economic policies changed drastically in the 1990s when Finland joined the EMU and 
replaced the Finnish mark with the euro.554  
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In economic policy debates in Finland there has been a certain tension between two 
groups: the intellectual community of economists and a looser group of politicians, civil 
servants, interest organizations, press and the general public.  Those two communities 
conceive of the scope, targets, constraints, tools and evaluation criteria of the economic 
policy in different ways. In Nordic countries including Finland tension between 
economic theory and economic policy has manifested itself in the argument that the 
formulation and implementation of national economic policies is one of the central tasks 
of the government. The whole existence of a nation-state is thus based on the country’s 
economic performance. This has been especially evident in small open economies.555 
These countries seem to have a relatively well-established national framework of ideas 
concerning economic policy, a framework is often called the national policy model. The 
policy model is nationally specific in the sense that no matter how similar the actual 
economic development of different capitalist countries, the style of argumentation about 
economic policy and corresponding balance among policy measures still differs 
remarkably from one country to another. The national policy model implies a lot of 
nation-wide coherence. In other words, there is a common framework to all parts of the 
national economic policy debate, which means that there is a common and coherent way 
to speak about the economy and formulate the problems and agendasof economic 
policy.  
The national economic policy model is created out of the broad economic-structural, 
cultural, social and institutional context of each country, and there are several features 
that seem to have a storical legacy. One of them concerns the economic structure of each 
country. Here particular attention will be paid to the industrial structure of the 
economy, its stage of development, and to the structure of foreign trade as an external 
constraint on economic policy. Another feature is linked with ideological factors and 
concerns the role of the state in the economy.  
The economic structure of each country is present in the power structure of classes 
and interest groups. Naturally the institutional features of states affect the ability of a 
government to innovate, implement and institutionalize different types of economic 
strategies. The status of government bureaucracy is relative to politically representative 
bodies. A strong bureaucracy may insulate policy from various policy pressures but it 
may also limit the influence of outside economic theorists over policy.556  
As Pekkarinen and Vartianen557 in their analysis on the Finnish economic policy 
tradition argue, the national model is “hidden” and taken for granted but in the era of 
crisis it becomes transparent. Consequently, the model itself finds itself in a crisis 
because the correspondence between economic theory and its structural determinates 
disappears. A national economic policy model based on the organization approach refers 
to a totality in which economic theory, political ideology, economic agents, national 
traditions, the stage of development and changes in the international environment form 
a complex system.  
 While the Finnish policy model has many parallels with other Nordic countries and, 
in particular, it is argued that it has similarities with Sweden, this is not the case. The 
Finnish model has displayed a rather one-sided emphasis on supply, cost and 
competitiveness factors, which relies on some pre-Keynesian elements such as the 
quantity theory of money for example, and Finland has never abandoned the principle 
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of sound finance. Curiously, the Finnish policy model has only few links with post-war 
economics. On the contrary, even the model itself has been opaque, never spelled-out by 
economists or policy makers. The model stems from the interwar era and has been a part 
of the national culture.558  
The Finnish policy model reflects the strong position of bureaucracy in Finnish 
policy making. Cabinets in Finland have traditionally been short-lived, but the role of 
bureaucracy has been enhanced. The Finnish economic policy has largely been a result 
of the bureaucracy’s daily routines of policy preparation and implementation.  
From the historical perspective one of the central aspects in Finland has been a 
strong governmental intervention in the economy. During the Second World War and, 
after the war, the state played a strategic role in the organization of production so that 
the country could pay its agreed war damage remunerations to the Soviet Union. The 
development of the productive structure and the fostering of necessary investments were 
seen as the main economic policy goals of the period. State-owned companies were 
established and the metal industry was created mainly through state initiatives designed 
to cover the war reparations. Simultaneously, new welfare programmes were also started. 
The public sector remained large, and both economic and social policies were 
interventionist.  
A character of the Finnish policy model has been very obvious; the Finnish fiscal 
policy has been anti-Keynesian in character. It has relied on the principle of sound 
finance, that is, that the state has traditionally been a net saver. This results from the 
idea of balancing the budget without financing it by loans even though the state’s own 
financial investments are counted like current expenditures. The emphasis has been on 
the need to enhance the competitiveness of the industry by curtailing its costs through 
fiscal measures. It has been in accordance with the old British Treasurer’s View: every 
penny lent by the state diminishes private economic activity by the same amount.559 In 
other words, Finnish fiscal policy has tended to reinforce rather than counterbalance the 
underlying cycles of the economy.  
The Bank of Finland has played a major role in maintaining the continuity of the 
Finnish policy model at political and institutional level. It has controlled fiscal policy to 
oppose the growth of state expenditure and hamper attempts to implement more 
countercyclical budgeting. As a result the state has been seen as an economic agent 
comparable to any private one while it has operated perhaps more severe budget 
constraints than private economic agents.  
Interestingly, the Finnish economic policy forms a domain of its own outside the 
Parliament and its political sphere. It is an autonomous domain in which the interest 
groups encounter and the role of the state has been that kind of a mediator between 
different groups. The Finnish economic policy can be seen as an example of 
corporatism.560As a result the economic policy is seen as a sort of engineering in which 
experts represent a set of calculations as a means to a certain ends set by politicians.  
The second typical aspect of the Finnish economic policy has been to set its goals by 
stressing the significance of economic growth, structural development and the open 
sector. The ethos of economic policy in Finland has strongly been that it is of an 
apolitical nature because the important and relevant decisions are made outside polis. 
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This aspect is complemented by the role of the Bank of Finland in fiscal policies and the 
special position of the Ministry of Finance when compared to other ministries.  
The third element of the Finnish economic policy is linked with the role of 
bureaucracy in Finland. The tradition has been that economic policy is designed behind 
the curtain. Thus, most initiatives and reforms in economic policy are suggestions by a 
small group of civil servants and experts.561 
The fourth typical aspect of Finnish economic policy is corporatism. The narrow 
characterisation of corporatism refers to certain structural characteristics of the wage 
bargaining institutions. A high degree of unionisation and vertically centralized 
organizational structures among employees and employers are features of corporatism. A 
broad definition of corporatism encompasses a state that is ready to negotiate with the 
interest organizations and interventionist in its economic policies. Corporatism is thus 
conceived as a tripartite bargaining structure between labour, capital and the state.562 
Interestingly, the Finnish corporatism has traditionally illustrated clearly the purposes of 
banks and export industries. In the 1980s the picture became more complicated.  
As Pekkarinen and Vartiainen563 point out, the serious recession in the 1990s was a 
test for the Finnish economic policy tradition. The traditions of fiscal policies, social 
corporatism and devaluation were all questioned. After the recession Finland took 
another course in economic policy but some aspects of the Finnish model remain to be 
seen.  
It is very apparent that the EU membership has changed the toolbox of the Finnish 
economic policy. Although STI policies form a policy area of its own, it has always 
followed the guidelines coined in economic policy and its role has been to support the 
aims of economic policies.  
 
7.5.2. From welfare to competitiveness 
 
When analyzing the recession of the early 1990s, Kiander564 claims that Aho’s cabinet 
signifies discontinuity in the Finnish tradition of consensus-building and over-the-block 
co-operation. It utilized the recession mood to make unpopular reforms such as 
reductions in almost all welfare entitlements and public services. Although many 
decision makers and analysts viewed the necessity of those reforms, the government’s 
inability to create co-operation between the interest groups made the crisis longer and 
deeper.  
The next cabinet led by Paavo Lipponen manifested a widely desired return to older 
modes of political co-operation. Unpopular reforms were continued but this time 
together with the labour market parties. The reviews produced by the Economic 
Board565 attest this clearly.  During Lipponen’s era the role of the Economic Board 
became very influential and important.566  
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An interesting finding in Kiander’s analysis is that the government’s instruments 
utilized during the recession in the 1990s were similar with those used during the 1970s 
recession. In both cases the key strategy for economic policy was linked with two issues: 
the competitiveness dilemma and the current account deficit dilemma. The logic of the 
strategy was very simple: if Finland is able to find a solution to those two dilemmas, it 
will stimulate the economy and economic growth. The third aspect was the employment 
strategy. 
In reality, the recession of the 1990s was totally different from the earlier crisis. In his 
analysis of the cycles of the Finnish economy in 1978-2000, Kiander differentiates 
economic cycles, labour market cycles and economic policy cycles.567 Kiander’s 
conclusion is that the Finnish recession of the 1990s was self-inflicted in the sense that 
Finnish policy-makers enabled it by their own decisions.  
One of those bad decisions was linked with the idea of tight monetary policies and 
policy makers’ incompetence to cope with the process of deregulation and the bank 
crisis. Utilizing some other Finnish analyses Kiander568 suggests that some elements in 
the economic crisis and its causes were the same: the tight monetary policies as well as 
the Finnish model of economic policy including its structural problems. The strong 
adherence to the economic model, combined with unskilful policy making, catalyzed the 
problems of the economy.  
In his analysis of the anatomy of the recession Lehtonen suggests that the recession 
must be seen as a three-dimensional temporal process in which the economic crisis is its 
first cycle. The second cycle is labour market recession and the third cycle is social policy 
recession.569 Although those three cycles were linked with one another and their 
anatomies are very different, the shadow of the recession was very long.  
Finland recovered from the economic recession surprisingly quickly. The currency 
deprecation in 1992- 1993 helped Finland to gain a better competitive position and the 
Finnish mark depreciated. Rapid export growth, together with depressed domestic 
demand, caused an unexpectedly strong improvement in current account from a deficit 
of 5 % to a surplus of 7% of GDP.  
Interestingly, Kiander argues that although the OECD has repeatedly stressed in its 
economic analysis570the importance of incentive-improving structural reforms as 
necessary conditions for sustaining improvement in employment, Finland’s rapid 
recovery in the 1990s was not linked with structural reforms. Vice versa, very traditional 
macro-economic factors were of greater importance. Also, the Finnish political 
governance and corporatist institutions remained relatively stable. The structures of the 
welfare state and the central labour market institutions including trade unions with a 
high unionization rate and centralized income policy remained almost intact.  
Kettunen, among others, argues that the Finnish political history can be viewed as a 
series of attempts to solve “the labour question” in one way or another.571 One of the 
most obvious aspects of the Finnish political culture has been the trend to stabilize the 
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polarity between the internal thread of international socialism and the external thread of 
international economy.  
This implies that the idea of consensus has been very important in the Finnish 
political history from the nationalist movement to these days. Warrants for consensus 
can be found in a solution to solve two controversies of a nation state: the controversy 
between the national and the international and the controversy between the social and 
the economic.  
The connections and alliances with other Nordic countries have been extremely 
important in terms of justifying and legitimating the idea of social policy but also in 
developing other policy sectors including the science and technology policy sector.572 
Nordic countries are not a homogenous entity but rather a diversified set of countries 
with different cultural and political backgrounds.  
In Sweden especially the Swedish Social Democrats have advocated openly that the 
Swedish system represents the Third Way between capitalism and communism. In 
Finland the dominant strategy for a variety of social and institutional reforms has been 
to depoliticize social policies. Social reforms have often been translated into pragmatic 
and functional issues rather than into political questions. The ethos has been the same as 
in all policy sectors: this is good for us all of us and this is good for Finland as a nation.  
Kettunen argues that in the Nordic countries the political coalition of workers and 
farmers and the consolidation of the practice of collective negotiations and agreements 
on the industrial labour market is not a series of compromises in pursuit of a common 
good. In view of the compromises achieved in tripartite negotiations each Nordic 
country has chosen a slightly different way but the Nordic comparative framework is 
extremely important in terms of defining social problems and solutions. The 
comparative framework enabled countries to construct systems of their own in 
comparison with other countries.  
Another curiosity of the Finnish political culture is that after the Second World War 
the concept of the present society was coined with various attributes implying the 
emergent aspects of the future. One of the most curious attributes was the “Finnish 
society” indicating the division between the new social sciences advocating the idea of 
conflict and the historical school advocating the idea of national continuity.  
As Alain Touraine573 puts it “The idea of modernity has always been associated with the 
construction of society: a mechanical society was transformed in to an organism, into a social 
body whose every organ contributed to its smooth working. Society was both a sacred body 
and an eternal soul which could transform savages into civilized human beings, warriors into 
citizens, and violence to law. This representation has not vanished, and it is still colours 
official discourses, but it has lost its power.” 
He remarks further that the decline and fragmentation of objective reason has led to 
a gradual divorce between four cultural worlds: eros, consumption, the company and the 
nation. The technical world endures communication between these cultural worlds; 
what functionalist sociologists call “the social system” is no more than a technical 
apparatus. Technology has also a positive dimension in the sense that it protects 
everyone against cultural totalitarianism.  
It is self-evident, as Kettunen emphasizes, that the traditional conception of society 
has lost its potential. Therefore, it is easy to understand the rise of civil society in 
political discussions in recent years because of the changes in the concept of society. 
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Although the idea of civil society is not linked in Finland with the critique of the welfare 
state, as is the case in Sweden, the political discourse related to civil society has been 
vivid. 
In Finland, the role of bureaucracy and government has been very different from 
Sweden. If the government is understood among politicians and policy makers as a form 
of governance, in Finland the role of bureaucracy is understood in a very Hegelian spirit 
as an aspect of the state. Political administration has always had a special role in Finland: 
it has traditionally understood its role as a problem solver in political conflicts. Their 
task has been to introduce boundaries and limits of compromises but they have often 
translated their suggestions into a form of functional necessities. In other words, they 
have shifted many issues with political and interest potentiality to the realm of needs and 
government.   
It is worth noting that the rationale of the Finnish social policy in the 1960s was tied 
to a kind of convergence in which the differences between Sweden and the Soviet Union 
were minimized. In spite of their differences both countries were examples of 
industrialized societies, not of two different political systems. Interestingly, this kind of 
convergence has been also a part of Finnish STI policies.574 
In the early 1990s the introduction of the concept of “welfare society” to substitute 
the concept of the welfare state in Finland has been interesting. What may be surprising 
is that it has been very useful not only in defending the welfare state but in criticizing 
the contradictions embedded in it. The concept has been used as a critical tool against 
certain aspects of the welfare state and also as an argument for legitimating the 
advantages of the welfare state model.   
What makes the welfare cluster case interesting is that it illustrates a variety of 
internal political undercurrents in Finnish political culture; its tendency to solve the 
problem of conflict by highlighting the functionality of the policy making. It also 
mirrors nicely the emergent social and political developments in which the meaning of 
the concept of society is changing. I agree with Kettunen who argues that the former 
social policy rationale has been replaced by the competitiveness rationale and the welfare 
cluster case illustrates this replacement. 
 
Lisbon strategy and Finland 
 
Before the EU membership one of the key themes in the membership debateswas the 
problem of social policy. The point politicians and policy makers wanted to stress was 
that the membership does not affect our social policies. It is a matter of national policies 
– Finland has a mandate of her own in social policy and if the EU membership changes 
something those changes are mostly positive. This kind of argumentation was in those 
days plausible, but the development of the EU in the 1990s has turned this upside 
down.  
Today, the focus in EU in the European social model show how it is on the 
boundary between the single market and the member states’ economic, education, 
employment and social security policies. It follows that there are a lot of contacts 
between the member states and the EU in issues related to social policies.  
Naturally, Finland has its own responsibility for taxation and social security exists, 
but its EU membership has irreversibly changed the course of the country’s social and 
health policy. If the political focus of the EU was put on the creation of the Internal 
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Market, today it is on the reform of the welfare states or the reform of the structures of 
the public sector575. The EU has tried to create a bordless area where people, goods, 
services and money can all move around freely. This four-fold freedom of movement is 
sometimes called “the four freedoms” and the EU legislation must be in congruence 
with those four freedoms.  
It is important to be aware of the fact that while the EU is more than a confederation 
of countries it is not a federal state. The curiosity of the EU becomes visible in the 
method of decision-making in the EU. The Commission makes a proposal to the 
Council and the Parliament who then debate it, propose amendments and eventually 
adopt it as a EU law.  In those processes they will often consult other bodies such as the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Within 
the EU only what the EU can do has been defined but no definition on what the 
member states can do has been given. The power of the EU is more or less a power of 
frames and preconditions rather than anything else as a legislator. 
The other aspect of the EU power becomes apparent in the Lisbon strategy which 
includes two main policy strands: to pursue economic reform to prepare the knowledge 
economy and to strengthen the European social model by investing in people. One of 
the key arguments for the European social model is that it helps to manage the changes 
which the knowledge based society is bringing about. The key is to put people at the 
centre of the EU’s policies. 
 This implies that the goal of restoring full employment is the key objective of 
economic and social policy. In other words, social policy must be seen as a 
complementary aspect of economic policy, as a factor of production and it must also be 
seen within the life-span context. Another aspect of the European social model is that 
the costs of social policy must be seen within the larger context.  
Communication to the Spring European Council of 02 February 2005 highlights 
three issues: more growth, more and better jobs and better administration. In other 
words, all political interventions must be seen as within the context of economic policy, 
employment and political governance.576 
In terms of social policy the Lisbon strategy interestingly stresses the needs to 
modernize the European Social Model, to invest in people and to prevent social 
exclusion. The problem is that there is no such thing as a shared European social model 
but rather a variety of models with some common features. 
As André Shapir577 argues in his critical analysis on the European social model the 
biggest challenge for the European economy is to become sufficiently flexible as to avail 
of the opportunities and surmount the threads. It requires reforming the labour market 
and social policies because itha failure to do so it could jeopardise two of its crucial 
policies, the Single market and the monetary union.  
Shapir’s second argument is that the notion of European social model is misleading. 
There are different European social models with different features and different 
performances: the Nordic model (high level of social protection, high level of taxation, 
extensive intervention in labour market, mostly in the form of job-seeking incentives), 
the Anglo-Saxon model (more limited collective provision of social protection merely to 
cushion the impact of events that would lead to poverty), the Continental model 
(provision of social assistance through public insurance-based systems, limited role of the 
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market in the provision of social assistance), the Mediterranean model (high legal 
employment protection, lower levels of unemployment benefits, spending concentrated 
on pensions). Shapir’s argument, very similar to suggestions advocated by other think-
tanks, is that only the Nordic and the Anglo-Saxon models are sustainable.  But the 
problem is that the social model in small, consensual, wealthy and ethnically 
homogenous northern European countries is not a model for larger economies such as 
Germany, France and Italy with huge wealth and income differences and mass 
immigration.  
Shapir’s third argument is that the labour market and social policy are still strongly a 
matter for the member states alone, not for the European Union. His conclusion is that 
there is a strong case for reform in the continental and Mediterranean countries and he 
presents two reasons for focusing on those countries: first, the welfare state system is 
inefficient and, second, arithmetic. The combined GDP of the nine continental and 
Mediterranean countries accounts for two-thirds of that of the entire EU- 25 and 90 % 
of that of the 12 member states. Europe cannot and should not have a strategy for 
reforming the national labour market and social policies. It is up to each national 
government to devise and implement its own strategy. A two-handed strategy combining 
product and capital market reforms at the EU level with labour market and social policy 
reforms at the national level would be a superior strategy for reforming the national 
labour market and social policies alone. While the Lisbon strategy was an attempt to 
implement this kind of strategy, it has been too weak.  
William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr578 have argued in their analysis on European 
integration that it has some parallels with the National Socialist proposal for a New 
Economic Order in the Nazi Germany. Its central point was the idea of 
Grossraumwirtschaft where Europe was perceived as an extended economic space onto 
which the Nazi dream of German economic autarchy, self-sufficiency and racial 
supremacy was projected. They do not argue that the New Economic Order continues 
with the European integration project; they rather argue that this unconventional 
comparison highlights the special character of the EU/EC model, with the indirect 
government as its central feature. The common market can be seen as a particular art of 
governing. 
Their second thesis is that European integration implies a mutation in the logic of 
power in the sense that the questions of power and rule are reformulated in terms of the 
governance of social and economic processes. Their point is that European integration 
makes Europe knowable and governable as a space of social, economic and political 
processes.  
The political aspects of the European integration become clearer if we examine 
shortly how it represents the ideas of ordoliberalism.579 The market for orodoliberalists 
does not possess the capacity for self-regulation which classical liberals accord to it. They 
reject the idea of a strict separation of politics and law from the economy and stress that 
it is the principle of order we must pay attention to in the analysis of Wirtschaftsordnung. 
In other words, political and legal interventions are not seen as secondary to the market 
but as constitutive of it. Law is no longer a super-structural phenomenon but an 
essential part of it. All this becomes apparent in the case of cartels and monopolies.  
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Ordoliberalism suggests that economies do not evolve under their own dynamics but 
are formed through key political and legal decisions. The economic rationalization of 
social policy is very consistent with ordoliberal principles.580 
 
7.6. Role of performatives and rules in STI policies: The fifth move 
 
In order to be able to understand all the complexities hidden in STI policies we must 
take the fifth move and focus on the dilemma of concepts and models used in those 
policies. One of the key aspects of the rhetorical re-description is that it provides a 
toolbox by which we are able to understand that concepts and models in politics are 
temporal and situated. In reality, argumentation in STI policies is just the opposite. Its 
argumentation refers to causation and complex economic and cultural changes in our 
external context and introduces a variety of proofs and testimonies in pursuit of 
explicating and justifying those policies.  
This implies that we have to analyze two major issues: how concepts and models are 
used as performatives and how they constitute an extensive reserve for politicisation and 
politicking – the two essential aspects of STI policies.  
 
7.6.1. STI policies as an arena for performatives: New framework – New terminology – New 
policies 
 
The role of scientific debates linked with STI policies can also be analyzed by following 
Latour’s and Woolgar’s credibility model in which the rhetorical perspective on science 
suggests that scientists construe and use arguments formulated in language in order to 
raise or lower the plausibility of statements as perceived by relevant audiences. For 
Latour and Woolgar scientific work is a form of writing, production of literary 
inscriptions such as computer data sheets, table and figures, curves and diagrams, 
working papers and published articles.  
In their view the process of increasing “facticity” is the key element of science and 
thus science for them is “the process of construction of facts.” It follows that justification 
is a matter of scientists exercising rhetorical persuasion in which the rhetoric of de-
contextualization plays an important role.  
As Mäki581 remarks, Latour and Woolgar postulate that there is an institutionally 
homogenous rhetorical space in which justification takes place. In other words, like 
McCloskey they seem to postulate a sort of perfect market of scientific ideas but they do 
not clarify the institutional entry conditions as clearly as would be needed.  
Mäki suggests that in science rhetorical persuasion has three levels: at the level 1 
scientists attempt to buy their ideas about the domain of study (the level of selling 
empirical or theoretical claims). At the level 2 scientists attempt to sell the idea of this or 
that approach or method of studying the domain better (the level of selling 
methodological claims). At the level 3 scientists attempt to market themselves as 
competent and credible scholars in their field, worth being listened to and receiving 
resources for further research (the level of selling sociological claims). His conclusion is 
that if we understand science as a rhetorical process in which rhetorical conventions are 
understood as entry conditions, the social conditioning of science becomes stronger and 
more complex.  
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It follows that there is a variety of “gate keeping” conditions and procedures tacitly 
accepted by the disciplinary profession that delimit the protagonists and the contents 
and styles of claims and that contain issues worthy of recognition and further 
consideration.  
Another very interesting aspect of Mäki’s analysis is his suggestion of the existence of 
a sort of private rhetoric, rhetoric directed to an internal audience. The idea is that a 
person is socialized into the culture of his field rhetorically tests his/hers ideas and 
arguments first privately in his mind before they are represented to an external audience. 
It seems thus plausible to think that there is an in-built conservatory tendency in that 
testing. Rhetorical conventions belong to the institutions of various disciplines 
constraining and enabling scholars’ belief formation.  
All these issues are present in debates linked with STI policies. The idea of those 
policies as argued earlier is to clarify and analyze the dynamics of STI policies by 
introducing new approaches for analyzing and understanding science and scientific 
knowledge. But those rhetorical accounts do not speak of politics at all or if they do, 
their analytic toolboxes are useless for a thorough analysis of the role of politics. The 
“political” is often a synonym for something very complex and unattainable, as if the 
attribute political seems to blur the context totally. 
If the idea of the linear model of innovation has been a cornerstone of science and 
technology policies in the OECD, the new cornerstone of STI policies has been NIS, 
the concept of a national innovation system. The problem of NIS is that it has two 
severe limitations: lack of substance and statistics. However, NIS has proved to be very 
useful for participation in debates concerning technological gaps and competitiveness.582  
Jääskeläinen583 argues in his dissertation that the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI) used Porter’s diamond and cluster models as if they were scientific. For policy 
makers Porter’s models provided a set of scientific arguments to illustrate the changing 
economic and political changes in global and national environment. MTI used these 
tools to take the leading role of a strategic think tank in relation with other branches of 
administration. The new industrial policy connected the problem of the public sector 
with industrial policies. The public sector was now understood as a policy tool for 
constructing responsive infrastructural environments for national competitiveness. In a 
way the cluster framework became a new language of communication between the 
governmental administrators and other partners.  
The interpretations of the Finnish policy makers can be summarised so that the 
welfare cluster case has been a lesson. This implies that although the scope of the 
intervention has been too ambitious and complex, it has been valuable. What makes 
policy makers think in that way?  
If we examine the recent reports and publications related to STI policies, this kind of 
a perspective becomes intelligible. The premise of the NIS paradigm is to stress the 
meaning and significance of learning as a part of the turbulent economy and as a part of 
political governance. The point underlines repeatedly the problem of learning. The 
learning aspect opens up new horizons for policy making. Nobody is against learning 
because of its apolitical nature. This becomes obvious in numerous OECD and EU 
reports and publications. 
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Reijo Miettinen584 has criticized the conceptions of learning that the innovation 
policy paradigm advocates. His point is that Lundvall attempts to differentiate the 
various types of learning (earning by doing, learning by interacting, learning by 
searching) by linking them to four types of knowledge (know-what, know-why, know-
how and know-who) have been more or less black boxes. The most problematic point of 
Lundvall’s theory is that learning activities cannot be studied with the traditional data 
and methods used in economics.  
Reijo Miettinen585 argues that the use and status of NIS can be seen as a sequence in 
which a theoretical concept taken from international discussions was transformed into 
the foundational term of domestic science and technology policies as well as of industrial 
policy. Its status was confirmed and legitimated by reference to the decisions of the 
Council itself, government bodies and ministries. NIS was understood as an object of 
planning, as a system whose structures and boundaries, efficiency and accountability will 
be systematically developed and evaluated.  
The new language utilized in the implementation of STI policies has implied that it 
has impeded the discussion of political alternatives. But the discussion has been 
monotonous, voicing a kind of official worldview. The problem is, as Reijo Miettinen586 
has pointed out, that there is the alternative that no genuine social entity called a 
national innovation system exists. Another problem, as we have seen, is that the rationale 
embedded in the NIS framework involves only values and norms having links with 
national economic competition. All other values are excluded from the discussion.587  
Godin has used the term buzzword in order to describe the role of political language 
in the OECD context.588 After their introduction the most important buzzwords such as 
“knowledge-based economy”, “productivity” have become an essential aspecta of OECD 
policies. These buzzwords have totally different backgrounds: the “knowledge-based 
economy” was introduced before there was any agreement of the nature of its statistical 
apparatus. The term was simply so persuasive that the OECD started to use it.  
The other buzzword “productivity” is of a great interest. Since the early 1990s the 
OECD has used productivity as the main yard stick.589 Godin argues that productivity 
was first seen as reproduction, then understood as output, then as efficiency, and then as 
outcome.   
Godin’s point is that the terms and concepts have been essential for the development 
of science and technology policies, and the NIS is a good example.590  
The NIS work in the OECD was based on the new growth theory or the endogenous 
growth theory developed by such economists as Romer, Grossman, Helpman and 
Lipsey.591 The endogenous growth theory is an attempt to overcome the deficiencies of 
neo-classical growth theory by building macro-economic models out of micro-economic 
foundations.  
It highlights the importance of new technologies and human capital and, in 
particular, it stresses that policy measures can have an impact on the economy’s long-run 
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growth rate.. Subsidies on research and education are important because they increase 
the growth rate.  
A point of departure of the endogenous growth theory is that the world is not 
defined by scarcity and limits of growth. Instead, it is a playground of nearly unbounded 
opportunity where ideas beget new products, new markets, and new possibilities to 
create wealth. One of Romer’s key ideas is that ideas have a crucial role in driving 
growth. To promote economic growth is to encourage the development and diffusion of 
new ideas. The argument that ideas are important is based on the role of new 
technologies because they create increasing returns: new technologies begetting new 
products are generated through research. This implies that also services are important in 
regard with economic growth.592  
Benoit Godin introduces three reasons for using concepts and frameworks in policy 
making. First, they are popular because they help us to identify relevant problems and 
issues. Second, they are valuable because they suggest mechanisms hidden in problems 
and introduce a variety of models to explain changes in our environment. Third, they 
have an essential role in recommendations and they may generate participation and 
activity as well as give us stories to be told.  
The development of the Finnish innovation system has been developed in the way 
the internal thesis of STI policies suggests. The Finnish policy interventions have 
focused on the reforms in which the boundary between the basic and applied research 
and the reciprocal roles of the key institutes are re-defined. In 2006 the Finnish 
innovation system is as follows:593  
 
The national innovation system is an extensive entity comprising the producers and 
users of new information and knowledge and know-how and the various ways in 
which they interact. At the core of the innovation system are education, research and 
product development, and knowledge-intensive business and industry. Varied 
international cooperation is a feature running through the system. The producers of 
new knowledge include universities and polytechnics, research institutes and business 
enterprises. The users are mostly enterprises, private citizens, and decision-makers and 
authorities responsible for societal and economic development. The role of scientific 
information in societal and economic development has been constantly growing, 
which increases the significance of cooperation and networking both between the 
public and private sectors and within the sectors. 
 
The aim of science, technology and innovation policies is to ensure a balanced 
development of the innovation system and strengthening cooperation within it. This 
means that cooperation with economic, industrial, labour, environmental and regional 
policies as well as social welfare and health care services are extremely important.  
The Finnish system is based on the division of labour between the Science Policy 
system and the Technology and Innovation Policy System. The domain of science policy 
system is defined as follows:594 
 
Finnish science policy has been developed on a long term with a view to 
strengthening the national innovation system. The aim of science policy is to enhance 
knowledge and the level and international visibility of Finnish research in cooperation 
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with different stakeholders. With a view to promoting the international success of 
research, support is given to high-standard research and to research expected to make 
international breakthroughs with additional input.  
 
The Government’s aim is now to increase public R&D funding with aim of raising the 
GDP share to 4 %. This will be done by increasing public R&D funding through the 
Academy of Finland and through core university funding by highlighting the quality 
and impact of funding.595  
 
Technology and innovation policy measures seek to contribute to enhancing the 
competitiveness of Finnish industry and the well-being of society, with the aim of 
making Finland capable of providing companies with a top-flight innovation 
environment internationally, which also attracts foreign R&D investments. Thus, at 
the beginning of its term, Mr. Vanhanen’s second government intends to prepare a 
National Innovation Strategy. 
 
According to the strategy funding will be allocated to centres of strategic excellence in 
sectors that are pivotal to the development of the national economy, society and citizens’ 
welfare. It means more emphasis on stronger business management skills, the 
development of service innovations and growth entrepreneurship. Innovations must be 
based on customer and consumer needs. In terms of the development of the innovation 
environment, it is important to support networking with leading countries and regions 
in technology and participation in standardisation activities at European and 
international levels. 
 
7.6.2. STI policies as a forum of new governance and institutional  re-engineering  
 
Finland has been a pioneer in implementing the NIS framework and its policies have 
been so successful that Finland has become a model country. This is obvious and self-
evident if we examine the reports reviewing the competitiveness of national economies 
and the performance of their innovation systems. The key question is whether this 
development is dependent on the implementation of the NIS framework should this be 
so, the subsequent question is: how?  
A relevant question is also why did Finland and other advanced NIS countries 
advocate institutional reforms in their STI policies? Why are those reforms so 
important? This aspect of STI policies becomes more understandable as it is linked with 
discussions in evolutionary and institutional economics. 
Nelson’s and Sampat’s596 analysis of institutional economics admits that the right 
general definition of institutions is lacking. Their endeavour attempts to build 
institutions into growth theory. They claim that scholars studying economic growth are 
in considerable agreement regarding the “immediate” factors behind economic growth 
such as technological advance, investments in physical capital, and the growth of human 
capital. Most of those scholars also agree that institutions are an important factor and 
involved in economic growth.  
Their conclusion is that effective economic performance depends on the mastery of 
relevant “social” technologies as well as on “physical” technologies. Social technologies 
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are embodied in organization forms, bodies of law, public policies, codes of good 
businesses and administrative practice, customs, and norms.  
 For Nelson and Sampat institution is like a paved road across a swamp; without a 
road crossing would be impossible, or at least much harder. The only way to achieve low 
transaction costs in activities is to develop institutionalized ways of carrying out the task.  
Their major point is that prevailing social technologies strongly influence the way in 
which physical technologies evolve. It means that it is useful to think of physical and 
social technologies as co-evolving as a cultural process. The key development problem is 
to reform institutions and further encourage and to support the adoption of superior 
physical technologies that are in use elsewhere.  
Nelson and Mazzoleni have elaborated on this theory later597. They have suggested 
that if the view that recent changes in the international economic environment and the 
trend that emerging technologies are increasingly dependent on scientific basis, is 
accepted, public research institutions  (universities and public laboratories) are extremely 
important in the future. Their point is that learning from other countries’ practices i.e. 
to catch-up with their practices, is the key for economic growth and competitiveness. All 
this discussion on institutions and their role in the economy has partly shifted onto 
rhetorical vocabularies used in STI policies.  
Barry’s analysis of governing technological societies provides a somewhat different 
outlook.598  He stresses strongly that the interactivity embedded in European policies 
must be linked with changes in understanding scientific expertise. If the governance 
stressed earlier one disciplinary scientific expertise, today governance is organized 
differently. It stresses flexible times, creativity, guidance, and an intensive use and 
concealment of expertise. The imagination and expertise is worked with rather than 
contradicted by the authorities.  
One temptation is to write the history of technology as simply adjunct to the history 
of political doctrines and ideas. The second temptation is to associate the grand 
transformations in politics and government with significant developments in the history 
of technology. Barry’s suggestion to follow Foucault’s footsteps is to underline a shift 
from political anatomy to political chemistry. 
Barry’s idea is to openly question the disciplinary division between the study of 
science and technology, and studies of contemporary politics. He develops three lines of 
argument as follows:599  
The first is the geographical- political argument: there is no opposition between the 
universal application of scientific knowledge and technical instrumentation. The local 
specifics of politics must be taken into account. 
The second argument is political and philosophical: there is no opposition between 
politics and science and there is no opposition between a science which is rational and 
objective and a politics guided by passion and interest. One cannot assume either an 
opposition between a science which is oriented towards instrumental control and a 
domain of politics oriented towards public debate. Barry insists that it is necessary to 
make a distinction between politics conceived as ways of codifying particular 
institutional and technical practices, and the political conceived as an index of 
contestation and experiment. 
                                                            
597 Nelson and Mazzoleni 2007. 
598 Barry 2001. 
599 Barry 2001, pp. 200–201. 
200  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
The third argument is about technology, invention and time: in a technological 
society technology is reckoned to be central to the invention of new political and 
cultural institutions. A technological society should not be understood as a stage in the 
evolution of society, nor as a particular mode of government, but rather as a particular 
form of orientation to the political present. Central to this orientation is the equation of 
invention in general with technical innovation.  
Barry maintains that the concepts of networks, cyborgs, interactivity and 
deterritorialisation seem to speak of a world in which the boundaries of nation-states, 
persons and firms are blurred. His conclusion is that the political invention is linked 
closely with the new forms of circulations, scientific research and technological 
development which involve the generation of two kinds of loci. The production of 
scientific knowledge is associated with specific localized sites of calculation, observation, 
monitoring, technical practice and experiment. The sites of experiment may be many 
but the experiments are difficult to make. The sites may be temporary, unstable and 
subject to legal challenge or political contestation.  
One of the most interesting sites is called the technological zones of circulation.600 
These sites come into being when technical devices, practices, artifacts and experimental 
materials are made comparable or connectable. They link together different sites of 
scientific and technical practice. In terms of political analysis, they are interesting as they 
provide an arena for the demonstration, testing and calibration of practices. Another 
aspect of these sites is that they provide a forum where it is possible to develop technical 
and regulatory standards and clarify the problems of intellectual property rights. 
Andrew Feenberg601 has in his analysis of the social dimensions of technology 
maintained that technology is an essential aspect in terms of the constitution of a 
functionalist world. His analysis combines two different views on technology: that of 
substantivists and that of constructivists. On the one hand, it is important to study what 
technology means, rather than to focus on what is does, and, on the other hand, it is 
important to analyze who makes technology, why and how.  
Feenberg’s point is to differentiate between four aspects in his analysis: the 
controversy between objectivation and, on the one hand, and the controversy between 
functionalization and realization, on the other hand. In terms of functionalization the 
process of objectification includes according to Feenberg de-contextualization ( isolation 
of the object from the natural world- tree is conceived as timber) and reduction (de-worlded 
things  are stripped out of technically useless qualities – tree is reduced to roundness for a 
wheel). The process of subjectivation includes autonomisation (subject isolates as much as 
possible from the effects of its action on its object) and positioning (technical action controls 
its objects through their laws).  
In realizing the process of objectivation includes systematization (isolated, de-
contextualized technical objects are combined and re-embedded in the natural environment) 
and mediation (ethical and aesthetic mediations supply object with secondary qualities that 
embedded it in its new social context), and the process of subjectivation includes vocation 
(technical subject’s add up to a craft, vocation) and initiative ( capitalism led to sharp split 
between positioning and initiative, strategy and tactics and supports the use of devices and 
systems). Feenberg’s analysis can be presented as follows: 
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 Functionalization  Realization 
 Primary instrumentalization Secondary instrumentalization 
 
Objectification De-contextualization Systematization 
Nature to put to use Take the object out of context Combine various objects into 
  others 
 Reduction Mediation 
 Reduce object to the usable Ethical and aesthetic 
 parts mediations embed object in 
  social context 
 
Subjectivation Autonomatization Vocation 
Person acting Subject isolated from effects Subject’s acts add up to a 
 of its actions vocation, reserve act of tools 
  on their user 
 
 Positioning Initiative 
 Subject places self“ Margin of maneuver” in 
 advantageously to use natural system allows limited action, 
 laws or technology supports system 
 
 
Figure 5. Four aspects of technology 
 
Another perspective on political governance becomes transparent in the case of 
accountability, a grey zone of know-how and expertise between economics and new 
governance. Mary Morgan602 argues that economics has always had two faces in the 
Western tradition: Adam Smith’s tradition, the science of political economy, and John 
Stuart Mill’s tradition, the art of economic governance. The former aims at describing 
the workings of the economy and revealing its governing laws, and the latter is 
concerned with using that knowledge to fashion economic policy. In the 20th century 
those two faces have often been contrasted as positive and normative economics.  
Morgan stresses that the 20th century economics can be characterized as an 
engineering science, as a science of applications. The development of economics was 
closely linked with the idea that western economists were expected to formulate 
development paths and to design new economic institutions to foster market economies. 
Economists’ task is to carry out technical assessment for economic decisions or to tinker 
with and to design new incentive structures for all kinds of everyday cases.   
But these new economic technologies are not the only policy tools for designing and 
justifying interventions in the world. They are also scientific tools forged for theory 
development.  As these tools are not independent of high theory, but  they were rather 
supported by its development. Economics has become, in effect, a tool-based discipline, 
argues Morgan. These quantitative techniques have given economics the aura of 
scientific modernity. 
The internal re-construction of the Finnish innovation system in this millennium has 
followed the guidelines of institutional re-engineering. The roles of key actors funded by 
such organisations as SITRA, TEKES, the Academy of Finland and other research 
institutes as well as the whole university system have been revised. All of them have 
adjusted their strategies and institutional settings in the pursuit of increasing the 
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efficiency of the Finnish innovation system. The point of this institutional re-
engineering is to extend the boundaries of those institutions so that they are able to 
participate more fully in the construction of a more responsive innovation environment.  
SITRA’s new strategy published in 2004 is based on five fixed-period programmes, 
each of which consists of various projects and measures.603 One of the most interesting is 
the Health Care programme.  
The objectives of the Health Care programme are to improve the status of 
customers, to increase the profitability and effectiveness and to improve co-operation 
between the public and private sectors, to promote comprehensive use of new 
technologies and services, and to generate new business in Finnish and international 
markets.604  
TEKES has also revised its strategy and changed its name, to the Finnish Funding 
Agency of Technology and Innovation. The bottom line of the new strategy is that the 
development of the Finnish industry and the service sector depends on technological 
means and innovation. They will renew the economy and increase added-value, 
productivity and exports because they create employment and enhance well-being. The 
new strategy lists in a manner following the OECD a variety of arguments emphasising 
the importance of innovations.605 
 
Finland’s future will be founded on innovation and competence. Growth in 
productivity will be based on the renewal of the economy and society through new 
innovations and renewing practices. (…) The strength of the Finnish innovation 
environment lies in broad and confidential cooperation between enterprises, academia 
and other stakeholders both globally and locally.606 
 
The new openings are the service business and service innovation theme and the public-
private partnerships theme as well as the renewing innovation activity theme.607  
Matti Vanhanen’s both cabinets have paid a lot of attention to the Finnish university 
system by establishing Aalto University in 2008: Helsinki University of Technology, the 
University of Art and Design and Helsinki School of Economics are merged into a new 
university.  In addition, the university legislation will be reformed in 2009, and then the 
Science and Technology Policy Council will become the Research and Innovation 
Council.  
  
                                                            
603 The programme areas are Health Care, Food and Nutrition, Environment, Russia and India. 
604 The list of the ongoing projects illustrates what is the point of the Health Care programme: Health 
Fund, Internationalisation, Paperless Health Care, Multi-Centre Specialised Health Care, Seamless 
Services and Support Services. 
605 The new strategy enlists the following areas to be allocated in the future: Global value networks; 
Wellbeing and health; Interactive media; Service business and service innovations; Clean energy; and 
Scarce resources.   
606 TEKES 2008, p. 2. 
607 The ideas embedded in the welfare cluster are now continuing in a variety of technology 
programmes. See TEKES 2007 – SERVE – Innovative services 2006 -2010; TEKES 2008b – 
Innovations in social and health care 2008-2015. 
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8. NEW HORIZONS AND RE-
INTERPRETATIONS 
 
8.1. In a search of new horizons and interpretations: Preliminary remarks 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the fact that in terms of rhetorical re-description STI 
policies can be “read” as a fabrication of arenas where new concepts and frameworks are 
utilized. STI policies themselves construct the preconditions of their acceptability by 
introducing theoretical proposals aiming at justifying the STE hybrid. This construction 
resembles a performance in which a series of theoretical suggestions are its substance.  
The second conclusion argued previously is that theories do not survive unless they 
are related to practices. This is the political point of STI policies: the aim is to change 
the prevailing practices by proving the environments of those policies, by connecting 
theoretical aspects to a series of political interventions. This is why STI policies must be 
understood within the new political governance and its ethos and mentality.  
This chapter completes the rhetorical analysis and its aim is to find new re-
interpretations for STI policies. Such re-interpretation stresses the political aspects of 
those policies and is composed of three elements. I will use here the term re- 
interpretation spectrum.608 
The first re-interpretation spectrum concentrates on the problem of the scientification 
of politics as discussed in the introduction. My first conclusion is that it is natural that in 
the case of STI policies the definition of science and, in particular, the distinction 
between basic and applied science is taken for granted. Second, it is also very apparent 
that scientific concepts and models play a fundamental role in STI policies. Third, those 
concepts and frameworks are employed as performatives in justifying those policies 
theoretically. 
The second re-interpretation spectrum highlights the problem of the politicisation of 
science and its point is to stress strong insistences of institutional reforms in STI policies. 
My aim is to analyze how technology and the idea of institutional reforms are 
interlinked in STI policies. These two aspects of STI policies are often translated into 
the controversy between the Natural and the Social.  
The third re-interpretation spectrum focuses on the problem of political theorizing 
embedded in STI policies. I wish to examine and analyze whether STI policies can be 
interpreted as a peculiar form of political theorizing: is it ideology, rhetoric or what? My 
claim in this study is that the ethos of STI policies is inherently linked with the 
controversy between the Natural and the Social, on the one hand, but, on the other 
hand, it is also inherently connected with another controversy between the oikos vs. the 
polis. Those three different sets of re-interpretations are arranged in this chapter as 
follows.  
I will start by addressing the problem of cyborg sciences and stress the advantage of 
Mirowski’s interpretation.609 The key point is that the revival of the neoclassical theory 
and the birth of the cyborg sciences after the Second World War are intertwined with 
one another. My interpretation proceeds as follows. 
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First, the birth of cyborg sciences is an important aspect of contemporary STI 
policies and its significance and meaning in particular are too often underestimated. 
Second, the cyborg science argument is not enough because it does not help us to 
understand STI policies as a political intervention.   
Therefore, the controversy of the Natural vs. the Social embedded in STI policies has 
to be interpreted by using the term of political theorizing. I point out political theorizing 
as an essential aspect of the political ethos embedded in STI policies and hence the 
controversy oikos vs. polis is inherently essential.  
It follows that only by taking into account the linkage between those two 
controversies embedded in STI policies are we able to understand how rhetoric and STI 
policies are closely inter-linked.  
 
8.2. STI policies and cyborg sciences: From simple mechanisms to complex 
emergences 
 
“An economist by training thinks of himself as the guardian of rationality, as ascriber of 
rationality to others, and the prescriber of rationality to the social world. It is that role I 
will play.” 610 
 
Mirowski argues in his More Heat than Llight 611 that the progenitors of neoclassical 
economic theory copied the reigning physical theories in the 1870s. He stresses that 
economic theories resonate with the physics and other natural sciences of their time.  
In particular, they resonate with the interrelations among the triad of body 
(anthropometrics), motion (physics) and value (economics). Mirowski argues that the 
reasonableness of classical political economy changed when the understanding of the 
underlying physics changed in the 1870s.  
The concept of energy became coextensive with the entire range of physics – its 
conservation, its mathematical representation as field theory, dynamics, determinism, 
entropy, thermodynamics, relativity and quantum mechanism. 612 With proto-energetics, 
energy was conceived with the help of field formalism but not as a conserved substance. 
Value was no more associated with body substances such as labour. Neoclassical 
economics was based on a different physics than classical theory but its categories were 
still body, motion and value.  
Mirowski argues that the neoclassical theory of the 20th century retained the 18th 
century physics in order to hold on to its unifying principle of utility maximization 
subject to constraint. His major point is that economics as a discipline has utilized the 
theoretical apparatuses of natural sciences advocating the idea of the relation between 
the social and the natural. 
Mirowski connects the relation between the Natural and the Social with the rhetoric 
of economics. McCloskey argues in his Rhetoric of Economics613 that rhetoric provided a 
way to understand arguments and debates among economists. The concept of cyborg 
science is linked with a number of new sciences generated in the immediate post-war 
period.614 These sciences are often called “cybernetics”.615 
                                                            
610 Arrow 1974, p. 16. 
611 Mirowski 1989, p. 3. 
612 Mirowski 1989, pp. 11–98. 
613 McCloskey 1985. 
614 Mirowski lists such disciplines as information theory, molecular biology, cognitive science, 
neuropsychology, computer science, artificial intelligence, operations research, systems ecology, 
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In economics the rise of the cyborg sciences has been contrasted with a number of 
issues. If the neoclassical economists stressed simplicity and interpreted their a priori 
laws as being temporally invariant, cyborg scientists tended to highlight diversity, 
complexity and change. They believed that order could be defined as relative to be 
background of noise and chaos out of which the order should temporally emerge as a 
process.  
The cyborg scientists thus advocate that the traditional conception of the economic 
process must be revised. As Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen616 points out in his The Entropy 
Law and the Economic Process, a common conception is that the economic process must 
be understood as a mechanical analogy. In this representation, the economic process 
neither induces any qualitative change nor is it affected by the qualitative change of 
environment into which it is anchored. It is an isolated, self-contained and ahistorical 
process, a circular flow between production and consumption with no outlets and no 
inlets. Although this conception has been strongly criticised it is still alive. 
Many critics have maintained that there is a variety of economic phenomena that 
cannot be reduced to the locomotion metaphor and hence be explained by mechanism. 
One aspect of this criticism can be linked with the birth of a new branch of physics, 
thermodynamics, and the entropy law. But what is entropy is the question.  
The first law of thermodynamics says simply that the total quantity of matter and 
energy is never altered. In other words, the first law of thermodynamics does not 
contradict with any of laws of mechanics. The only conclusion is that the change 
undergone by matter and energy must be qualitative.  
For example, if we burn coal, the chemical energy of the coal is free; it is available to 
us for producing some mechanical work. In this process free energy loses this quality 
gradually. Ultimately, it always dissipates completely into the whole system where it 
becomes bound energy, energy that can no longer be used for the same purpose.  
Entropy is an index of the relative amount of bound energy in an isolated structure, 
or in other words, of how energy is distributed in such a structure. High entropy refers 
to a structure in which most or all energy is bound, and low entropy to a structure in 
which the opposite is true. The curiosity is that the second law of thermodynamics is in 
contradiction with the principles of classical mechanics. This means that there is a 
continuous and irrevocable qualitative degradation of free into bound energy. In modern 
interpretation this means that there is a continuous turning of order into disorder. This 
is based on the observation that free energy conceives an ordered structure while bound 
energy is in a chaotic, disordered distribution.  
Georgescu-Roegen617 remarks that the whole idea of entropy has misled scientists to 
believe that if the entropic processes were not irrevocable it follows that there will always 
be scarcity ever. The other misconception is that there must be some form of energy 
with a self-perpetuating power (e.g. nuclear energy). Generally speaking, entropy is a 
mysterious notion.  
This becomes evident in the case of life and living organisms. It is nowadays a 
commonly accepted fact that any life-bearing structure maintains itself in a quasi-steady 
state by sucking low entropy from the environment and transforming it into higher 
                                                                                                                                                   
immunology, automata theory, chaotic dynamics and fractal geometry, computational mechanics, 
socio-biology, artificial life and game theory.  
615 Pickering 1995. 
616 Georgescu-Roegen 1971. 
617 Georgescu-Roegen 1971, p. 6. 
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entropy. This idea can be extended to economy as Georgescu-Roegen has attempted to 
show in his own analysis of the economic process.  
Therefore, it is important to understand the link between the birth of cybernetics 
and the development of neoclassical economics. Mirowski618 has interestingly 
distinguished between two different types of recent economics. There is the main style of 
economics, axiomatic, formal, atemporal and mechanical, and inclined to assert the 
perspective of Archimedes, and there is a tendency towards the cyborg sciences. Good 
examples of the first strand would be general equilibrium theory and econometrics.  
If the neo-classical theory is an application of Newtonian physics, the development 
of mathematical economics after the Second World War was linked with an attempt to 
unify the study of human beings and intelligent machines through John von Neumann’s 
general theory of automata.619  
The birth of cybernetics was closely linked with the problem of the second law of 
thermodynamics or the problem of Maxwell’s Demon, as it is sometimes called.620 
Although the Demon has been repeatedly announced as dead in physics, it has 
continued its life as a third choice between Darwin’s evolution theory and the second 
law of thermodynamics. For many, the Demon came to stand for the triumph of Life 
over Death. It allowed life to prevail, to maintain homeostasis and growth in the face of 
entropic degradation. Molecular genetics, the theory of information, cybernetics and 
von Neumann’s theory of automata are all theories that found their point of departure 
with the Demon. 621   
Something special happened as Evelyn Fox Keller622 pointed out when the Demon 
was no more understood as “homunculus” it was understood as a “code”. Mirowski 
characterizes this recent trend in economics by the term of cyborg science and refers to 
Donna Haraway623 who has used the term to indicate that something profound has 
happened to biology as well as to social theory and cultural conceptions of gender.  
The central idea of cyborg sciences depends on the existence of the computer as a 
paradigm object for everything. There is no cyborg science without reference to the 
“computer”; the computer straddles the divide between the animate and the inanimate, 
the living and the lifelike, the biological and the inert, and the Natural and the Social.  
This breaching of the ramparts between the Natural and the Social, the Human and 
the Inhuman, is a second characteristic of the cyborg sciences. In other words, after the 
Second World War a cyborg intervention agglomerates the heterogeneous assemblage of 
humans and machines, intention and teleology and - Nature has taken on board many 
features conventionally attributed to Society.624  
                                                            
618 Mirowski 2002. 
619 The list of these important persons is impressive but among the most important ones are such 
scientists as Norbert Wiener and his theory of cybernetics, Claude Shannon and his information 
theory, Alan Turing and his “Turing Machine”. 
620 Because heat was re-conceptualized as molecular motion, the British physicist James Maxwell who 
believed that the second law could be reversed suggested that there is a homunculus stationed at a door 
portioning off a cooler from a warmer gas. Because the cooler gas was composed of faster and slower 
molecules, the Demon could wait till one of the fastest molecules was headed toward the door, quickly 
whip it open, let the molecule pass to the warmer gas, and then close it with even more precise alacrity 
to prevent to return migration of faster molecules. In this manner the Demon could make heat flow 
from a cooler to a hotter body and violate the second law. 
621 Mirowski 2002, p. 46–48. 
622 Keller 1995. 
623 Haraway 1991. 
624 Miroski 2002, p. 13. 
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The third characteristic of cyborg sciences is that as the distinction between the 
Natural and the Social weakens, the sharp distinction between “reality” and simulacra 
becomes less taken for granted and harder to discern.625 The computer has an important 
role in this because the computer blurs the boundaries between the “self-evident” 
categories of experiment, instrument and theory.626 
The fourth hallmark of cyborg sciences is that they are rooted in the heritage of the 
distinctive notions of order and disorder in the tradition of physical thermodynamics. 
Questions dealing with the nature of disorder, the meaning of randomness, and the 
directionality of the arrow of time are important, and the cyborg sciences make ample 
use of the formalisms of phenomenological thermodynamics as a reservoir of inspiration.  
The fifth feature of the cyborg sciences is that such terms such as “information”, 
“memory” and “computation” become for the first time physical concepts to be used in 
the natural sciences. In his information theory Claude Shannon had to divorce 
information from any connotations of meaning or semantics and associated it with 
“choice” from a pre-existent menu of symbols.627 
The sixth characteristic of the cyborg sciences is that their birth was a part of 
conscious political interventions. It was a product of planned coordination by teams 
with structured objectives, expensive discipline-flouting instrumentation, and explicitly 
retailed rationales for the clientele.  
The origins of the cyborg revolution are naturally many but one of the most 
important manifestos dealing with the development of economics was Friedrich Hayek’s 
paper “The Use of Knowledge in Society” in which he insists: “What is the problem 
which we try to solve when we try to construct a rational economic order? On certain familiar 
assumptions the answer is simple enough. If we possess all the relevant information, if we can 
start out from a given system of preferences, and if command complete knowledge of available 
means, the problem which remains is purely one of logic.(…) The peculiar character of the 
problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of 
the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form 
but solely as dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of 
how to allocate “given” resources (...); it is a problem of utilization of knowledge which is not 
given to anyone in its totality.” 628 
This quote must be understood within Hayek’s attack against “scientism”. The Road 
to Serfdom appeared in 1944, and Hayek did not want to belong to a circle whose 
ambitious aim was to extend the “scientific method” to social theory and planning. He 
told later that although he had difficulties to fully understand von Neumann’s 
mathematical ideas he was very astonished how easily von Neumann understood his 
point. They shared the similar problem but their angles were different.629 
Hayek’s linkage to cyborg sciences is that he was one of the first economists who 
realized that complexity must be added to the agenda of economics. His legacy is, above 
all, that he understood that if we extend the market metaphor we may notice that brains 
and markets has a lot of common. The irony is that Hayek was not well aware of the 
developments in logic and the mathematical sciences and was rather hostile to statistics. 
In effect, he renounced the formal theory of the abstract logical automation as well as 
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the pragmatic technics of simulation. This view is totally different from the theories of 
John von Neumann and Herbert A. Simon.630 
But as Mirowski631 remarks, the problem is that research has neglected three aspects 
of the reorientation: the political reorientation of economic discourse, the cultivation of 
a new scientific patron, to assimilate and tame some new conceptual developments 
emanating out of the cyborg sciences.632  
One of the key points of the reorientation was the idea of linear programming in 
which the market was a vast program aiming to develop the language of programming. 
This constituted a bridge where the logicians, the engineers, and the operation 
researchers could discuss the matter together. It linked the military, the cyborg science 
and economics. It was also a historical cusp where the terms “software” and “hardware” 
were separated.633  
It is also possible to think that this was the cusp when the whole idea of economists 
as “software engineers” was born. Economists could now focus on the algorithms needed 
for the manipulation of efficiency targets or shadow prices and leave all institutional, 
historical and political issues to “hard-ware” engineers.634  
The core of the new agenda was that the economic agent was an information 
processor who behaved like a little econometrician. Another aspect of this new agenda 
was that all problems of processing encountered by the agent had to be specified as 
problems of imperfections of information, not as problems of cognitive computational 
limitations. 
The cyborg scientists, having a strong military ethos, thought that the computer 
must be seen as a tool in decision making under uncertainty in the fluid and ill-defined 
war situation. The other scholars thought that uncertainty was a minor problem of 
inductive inference. In other words, the military forces wanted to enhance centralization, 
communication and control and supported the cyborg sciences for those reasons. 635 
The key figure is perhaps Kenneth Arrow who in his Social Choice and Individual 
Values introduced his “Possibility theorem”.  “If we exclude the possibility of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the only methods of passing from individual 
tastes to social preferences which will be satisfactory and will be defined for a wide range 
of sets of individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial… the doctrine of voters’ 
sovereignty is incompatible with that of collective rationality” 636 
The core of Arrow’s much criticised theorem is to construct the link between the 
mechanical market and the centralized plan. One line of criticism was that Arrow 
simplifies the whole idea of politics. “Voting, from this point of view, is not a device 
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military purposes such as SRG (Statistical Research Group of the Applied Mathematics Panel at 
Columbia), the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, and the RAD Lab at MIT in Cambridge. In 
other words, military patronage was crucial in defining the shape of post-war economics. See Hands et 
al 1998. 
633 Ceruzzi 1989, p. 249. 
634 Mirowski 2002, p. 261. 
635 The relationship between the Cowles scholars and cyborg science scholars was full of ambivalence 
and confrontations. But it is obvious that most Cowles scholars were infatuated with the vision of 
institution-free economics and they discovered in operations research a new virtual reality where war 
was seen as a problem in logic, politics was seen as a problem in logic, machines were seen as the best 
embodiment of logic. In statistics they thought that they have found a way of conjuring order out of 
chaos. Mirowski 2002, p. 285. 
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whereby each individual expresses his personal interests, but rather where each 
individual gives his opinion of the general will.” 637 
In other words, the theorem had nothing substantial to say about information-
processing, feed-back control aspects, democratic politics or market organization. 
According to the theorem voting is a degraded and undependable mechanism of the 
expression of rationality. In effect, Arrow’s impossibility theorem launched a new 
discussion on rational choice and it has been very influential in social and political 
sciences.   
Arrow’s theorem was full of controversies and inconsistencies and, in particular, a lot 
of critique was linked with the problems of game theory. The main reason for the 
critique was that John von Neumann’s theory was not compatible with the Walrasian 
mechanical equilibrium model. 
The publication of John Nash’s equilibrium theory  was an answer to many 
problems. The core of Nash’s complicated theory can be put as follows. Von Neumann’s 
theory was searching for an alternative grounding for the certainty provided by 
mathematics and its terminus and his real interest was not on the game theory but on 
the theory of automata. Nash saw it differently. The act of axiomatization was the 
paradigm of making everything “fit” into the scheme of rationality. Another aspect of 
Nash’s equilibrium theory was that strategy is to be bound with the process of 
formulating speculative models of the expectations of the opponent: strategy was a 
subset of statistical interference.  
In terms of this study it is relevant to focus on Herbert Simon who has pioneered 
most of the themes embedded in the cyborg sciences. He was the first person who 
realized that the invention of the computer was the key for economics. He also took a 
political concern over planning and transmuted it into a uniform psychological 
environment for decision making. He also realized that the computer was the perfect 
tool for simulation.638 
The problem of artificial intelligence and the computer was one of the key problems 
for Simon; how could computers be utilized in decision making and simulation? The 
other thematic Simon was involved in was the problem of bounded rationality. The 
concept of the boundedness of rationality was derived from the rejection of the 
neoclassical mathematization of economics, but it was also a reaction against game 
theory and von Neumann’s theory of automata. While von Neumann did not believe in 
analogies between the digital computer and the brain, Simon insisted that there are some 
analogies between computer software and the hierarchies of bureaucratic administration.  
The perfect rationality of neoclassical economics could not describe the behaviour of 
real human agents. It requires that agents know far more than any real agents are ever 
able to know and it also requires that they have perfect knowledge of the available 
choices and all relevant information so that the optional choice can be computed and 
executed. Simon thought that real human agents have neither the information nor the 
computational capability to make such perfect rational choices. In contrast to this 
economic man, Simon introduces the administrative man who makes choices in an 
environment of limited information and limited computational capacity. 
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Apparently, the concepts Simon developed in bounded rationality served as a 
springboard to his interpretation of artificial intelligence. His bounded rationality 
program embodied ideas for programming a computer how to think.639 
It is important to be aware that Neumann was a proponent of the logical possibilities 
for innovative reasoning opened up by the computer and his inspiration was closely 
linked with Alan Turing’s notion of the Turing machine. In contrast to them, Simon 
thought that the formal logic never describes how humans think. His conception was 
that a machine can simulate the behaviour of human problem solvers in well-specified 
situations and his aim was to articulate “theories of the middle range”. In other words, 
Simon believed that it is possible to simulate human behaviour over a significant range 
of tasks but these simulations do not pretend to model the whole mind and its control 
structure.640 He must be understood as a simulator rather than as an advocator of a 
particular model of rationality. 
Simon’s point is that all systems are divided into lower level modules that deal with 
high-frequency changes in the environment, middle-management modules that deal 
with moderate frequency types of coordination between tasks, and a few modules that 
deal with low frequency changes in the overall homeostatic behaviour of the system. In 
his theory of hierarchy Simon argues that it is only necessary to describe the middle layer 
of modules since they are the only system dynamics accessible to observation from 
outside the system. The very high frequency base modules appear to be inert while the 
lowest frequency modules are never fully law-governed.641 Later, Simon expanded his 
theories to biology and attempted to find a novel alliance with evolutionary biology in 
order to underwrite the general theory of a computational approach to the origins of 
order. Irony is that Simon’s program of simulacra is very much dependent on von 
Neumann’s theory of automata.642  
In his famous lectures The Sciences of the Artificial Simon643 has distinguished the 
artificial from the natural as follows: 1) Artificial things are synthesized (though not 
always or usually with full forethought) by man, 2) Artificial things may imitate 
appearances in natural things while lacking, in one or many respects, the reality of the 
latter, 3) Artificial things can be characterized in terms of functions, goals, and 
adaptation, 4) Artificial things are often discussed, particularly when they are being 
designed, in terms of imperatives as well as descriptives.  
Simon’s aim is to conflate the contrast between the pre-given/constructed with 
another distinction, the non-teleological/goal-directed, and to show that the natural 
sciences have fundamental difficulties to handle with the second term of these 
distinctions. “The central task of a natural science is to make the wonderful 
commonplace: to show that complexity, correctly viewed is only a mask for simplicity; 
to find pattern hidden in apparent chaos.”644  
Simon’s importance is that he started with a problem in economic methodology with 
an aim of finding a scientifically satisfactory theory of economic rationality. His search 
led him first to the theory of bounded rationality and then into cognitive science and AI.  
 
                                                            
639 Sent 1997. 
640 Simon 1991. 
641 Simon 1973. 
642 Mirowski 2002, p.468. 
643 Simon 1982, p.8. 
644 Simon 1982, p.3. 
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8.3. Horizon I: The natural vs. the social controversy: An essential 
rhetorical resource of STI policies 
 
The birth of cyborg sciences has generated a lot of debates related to difficult 
philosophical issues in ontology and epistemology but they have also been a springboard 
for a variety of methodological debates and controversies in economics in particular. 
Those philosophical debates are hidden in the the Natural vs. the Social controversy, 
and it can be argued that the dilemma is a kind of metaphysical core of STI policies 
where we may differentiate between four positions. 
First, those who represent the first position believe that the Natural and the Social 
are identical. Those who believe that the Social can be reduced to the natural represent 
the first subgroup, extreme reductionism; those who believe that identity is linked with 
laws belong to the second subgroup; the representatives of the third subgroup believe 
that epistemic methods are identical; those who think that the identity is based on 
metaphorical structure belong to the fourth subgroup. 
Second, those who think that the Natural and the Social are disjunct, but 
individually law-like, represent the second position. The disjunction is based on the 
belief that the Natural and the Social have different epistemic or ontological status or 
that the Natural and the Social have totally different purposes.  
Third, those who think that the Natural is objectively stable, whereas the Social is 
patterned on it but not stable, represent the third position. This position is very 
common in Durkheim’s sociology.  
Fourth, those who believe that the Natural and the Social are both unstable and 
hence jointly constructed as mutually supportive are the representatives of the final 
position. The differences between the representatives are linked with their belief of how 
they understand the origins of the construction. They might believe that the 
construction is associated to interests, that it is an outcome of practices, or that it is a 
matter of will.  
Mirowski has outlined a very useful taxonomy of reactions to the controversy 
between the Natural and the Social and shows how different the approaches might be. 
The names refer to scientists representing the various positions645: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
645 Mirowski 1994  
212  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
 
1 The Natural and the Social are 
identical in 
a. in every respect (extreme 
reductionism) 
b. laws ( Churchland)  
c. epistemic methods (Glymour, 
Cartwright) 
d. metaphorical structure 
(Schumpeter) 
2. The Natural and the Social are 
disjunct, but individually law-
like due to 
a. epistemic status (Windelband, 
Rickert, Weber, Kuhn) 
b. ontological status rooted in 
psychology ( Dilthey, Taylor)  
c. purposes ( Habermas, Dreyfus) 
3. The Natural is objectively stable, 
whereas the Social is patterned 
on it but not stable, implying 
a. sociology of collective knowledge 
(Durkheim, Mannheim) 
b. sociology as epistemology 
(Douglas, Bloor, Shapin) 
 
4. The Natural and the Social are 
both unstable and hence jointly 
constructed as mutually 
supportive 
a. out of interest ( Latour, Haraway, 
ANT) 
b. out of practices (modern 
pragmatists, Hacking, Rouse) 
c. out of will ( Nietzsche, Foucault) 
 
Figure 6. Four different approaches to the Natural and the Social 
 
Mirowski has also argued that in economics there exists a close correlation between 
Cartesian epistemology and the structure of neo-classical economics whereas 
institutionalist economics can be “read” from the pragmatic programme.646  
Mäki647 has recently analyzed the peculiarities embedded in economics and used the 
concept of economic imperialism introduced by George Stigler in 1984. In his thinking 
the concept denotes the imperialism of the discipline of economics in the academic 
world and he defines three notions. The notion of imperialism of standing (the prestige 
and academic power associated to scientific disciplines and research fields) that of 
imperialism of style (the standards and techniques of inquiry), and that of imperialism of 
scope. 
The issue of scope was a popular subject for economists in the 19th century. It can be 
defined in terms of problems, facts, or phenomena. Mäki proposes that the scope of 
theory T can be defined in terms of explanation and expansion and implies three 
different constraints: the ontological constraint, the pragmatic constraint and the 
epistemological constraint.648 In his view Economic Imperialism is based on the hubris of 
economics in which the point is to advocate the idea that economics has a constitutive 
role for other social sciences. 
                                                            
646 In other words, the first generation of institutionalist economics from Veblen and to John R. 
Commons utilized the philosophical resources developed by William James, John Dewey and C. S. 
Peirce. This divide is still present in economics today. See Mirowski 1990.   
647 Mäki 2002c; Mäki 2002b; Stigler 1984. 
648 Mäki 2009. 
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8.3.1. Rationality embedded in cyborg sciences: Controversy 1 
 
Wilhelm Tenbruck649 argues that throughout his writings Weber was stuck withone 
fundamental problem: What is rationality? In his famous theory of rationalisation 
Weber argued that the rise of capitalism in western societies must be understood in 
terms of rationalisation in four domains (Weber 1978): 1) market behaviour: as a 
process toward objective quantitative methodologies and pure calculations provided that 
there is law and stable institutional context, 2) law:as an accelerant process of legalizing 
the society there must be systems of norms, rules and law as a framework for making 
among other things instrumental contracts and so forth, 3) bureaucracy: the 
transformation of administration toward machine like predictive apparatus as a rival of 
arranging substantial communal frameworks , 4) vocational ethics (Berufsethik): where 
the internal asceticism and forms of life are connected in the way that it becomes the 
generator of market, law and bureaucracy.  
One alternative to clarify Weber’s sometimes very ambigious usage of the concept of 
rationality is to distinguish between three different usages650: The first usage refers to the 
capacity to control the world through calculation which means “scientific-technological 
rationalism”. The second usage refers to the systematization of meaning patterns, the 
cultured man’s “inner compulsion” to understand the world and take a consistent and 
unified stance to it known as  “metaphysical- ethical rationalism”. The third usage, 
“pratical rationalism”, refers to the achievement of a methodological way of life as the 
consequence of the institutionalization of configurations of meaning and interest.  
The standard interpretation is that Weber conceived of sociology as a comprehensive 
science of social action. For Weber, a bureacratic coordination of human action is the 
distinctive mark of modern social structures and an ideal type. Bureaucracies are goal-
oriented organizations designed on the basis of rational principles in order to efficiently 
attain their goals. Weber believed in the multi-causality of social phenomenon, but the 
system character of human societies makes predictions impossible. Predictions become 
possible only if we focus our concern on a limited number of social forces. Weber is 
often seen as an alternative to Marx, but his criticism of Marx was focused more on the 
Marx’s emphasis on economy; social and cultural aspects have more complex links to 
economy, the links are not explicit and determinate.  
Cybernetics, as well as the whole tradition of systems theory, can be seen within this 
Weberian rationality. Cybernetics apparently advocates a particular form of rationality 
and has a strong functionalist tone. This functionalism is embedded in the rational-
choice theory, one of the key arguments related to homo economicus.  The basis of homo 
economicus is laid on the concept of rationality.  
Traditionally, one distinguishes two different views of rationality: normative and 
descriptive rationality. Normative rationality relates to how one ought to behave, and 
the latter view simply pertains to how one behaves. The normative view allows us to 
explain behavior by showing that it was rational: the person in question had goals and 
beliefs that made it appropriate for her to behave in the way she did.  
The descriptive view to rationality is less applicable to explanation but if we assume 
that a person is rational, the descriptive view guides us to investigate her goals and beliefs 
                                                            
649 Tenbruck 1980. 
650 Schluchter 1979. 
214  FROM WELFARE TO INNOVATION STI – policies under the spotlight 
 
what the person presents for her behavior.651 Postulating rationality implies that we 
should focus on means-end relationships and beliefs underlying observed behavior.  
Rational behavior is often divided into two categories: thin and thick rationality. 
Thin rationality means that actors possess consistent preference rankings and make their 
choices according to those rankings. Thick rationality expands thin rationality by adding 
requirements that pertain to the nature of goals pursued. A person is rational if she acts 
as thin rationality assumes, her behavior is directed toward reasonable goals, her means 
are reasonable with respect to the ends she is pursuing, and her expectations regarding 
her environment are reasonable.  
Rationality often implies that it is action with purpose. It should imply consistent 
preferences and aim at utility maximization. If actors have no consistent preferences, 
utility maximization makes no sense. This is the moment where Herbert A. Simon’s 
bounded rationality and Kenneth Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem enters the discussion. 
In other words, if an economic agent’s rationality is bounded, it follows that they have 
to make decisions under uncertainty. The key question is how to characterize rational 
decisions.  
However, if rational action is purposive it means that in the absence of goals we are 
unable to distinguish between rational and non-rational decisions. The definition of thin 
rationality implies that actions are rational if they lead to the preferred outcome. It is 
possible to distinguish three types of decision making in rational choice theory.  
First, making choices under certainty means that rational actions are such actions 
that are consistent with preferences which in turn are complete and transitive. 
Connectedness and transitivity mean that we are able to construct alternatives from the 
worst to the best. Second, making choices under risk refers to a situation in which actors 
do not know what their actions’ outcomes are. Third, decision making under 
uncertainty when one has a quite good idea of what shoul happen if various 
conditioning events occur, but when one has only a vague estimate of the likelihood of 
those events. 652According to rational choice theory, rational decisions are rational if the 
action is accordance with the preferences. 
But this kind of picture of the economic man is problematic. Philip Pettit653 has 
suggested that there are two sorts of assumptions that economists make about the minds 
of agents with whom they are concerned. The content-centered assumptions are such 
things that the agents desire, which things they prefer and with what intensity. The 
process-centered assumptions are about the ways in which these desires are present in 
action.  
Durkheim argues that in the explanations of social phenomena we must seek 
separately the efficient cause which produces them and the function they fulfill. “The 
determination of function is . . . necessary for the complete explanation of the phenomena. . . . 
To explain a social fact it is not enough to show the cause on which it depends; we must also, 
at least in most cases, show its function in the establishment of social order."654 His point is 
that “function” is better than “end” because social phenomena do not exist for the useful 
results they produce.  
The problem is that for most functional explanations in social science there is no 
obvious mechanism to cite and thus the explanation is apparently baseless.655 The 
                                                            
651 Harsanyi 1986.  
652 Nurmi 2006, pp. 22–33. 
653 Pettit 2001. 
654 Durkheim 1966, p. 95. 
655 Elster 1979. 
215 
 
problem of functionalism in social sciences is simply that it is not clear what mechanism 
is supposed to operate in the black box. And those black boxes are in most cases empty, 
argues Pettit.  
By the same token, rational-choice theory is an attempt to use economic models of 
explanation in areas which go beyond what is traditionally seen as economic. Rational-
choice theorists try to explain the agent’s behavior by postulating the contents of the 
black box in the head of homo economicus.656 In short, they make two different 
assumptions. First, they make process-centered assumptions about the way in which 
desires of preference are issued in action and, second, they make content-centered 
assumptions about the sorts of things that the agents desire. But what is the mind of 
homo economics like? The general assumption is that their desires lead to action via their 
beliefs about the options available, that is, their decisions and actions are subjectionally 
rational. action.  
 
8.3.2. Epistemology embedded in cyborg sciences: Controversy 2 
 
Philosophically the cyborg sciences imply an interesting approach to the problem of 
emergence as William Wimsatt657 has argued. Richard Levins658made a distinction 
between “aggregate”, “composed”, and “evolved” systems Wimsatt thinks that the 
relevant explanations are causal but need not be deductive or involve laws. Emergence is 
for him one broader kind of pattern of relationships between a system property, 
relationship and the organisation, and properties of the parts, but here accounts of the 
concept often diverge.  
But how is the distinction between the Natural and the Social linked with STI 
policies? The linkage becomes tangible if we look at recent discussions among 
economists related to the economics of science (ESK)659. D. Wade Hands660 has 
suggested that there are three different approaches to the economics of science: 
philosophers applying various aspects of economic theory to science´, economists 
studying science with an eye toward the growth knowledge, the non-mainstream 
economists studying science.  
If the mainstream versions of ESK are often linked with mainstream economics and 
mainstream philosophy, Hands has suggested a list of alternative versions of ESK as 
follows: Evolutionary economics of ESK, Institutionalist ESK, Hayekian ESK, Bounded 
rationality ESK and Economic sociology and ESK.661 
In order to be able to illustrate how dilemmas of epistemology are embedded in 
those versions I will concentrate on two different accounts of epistemology. My point is 
to illustrate that the controversy about the Natural and the Social is one of the most 
important controversies in the philosophy of science linked with the social sciences. 
                                                            
656 Pettit argues that sometimes this is plausible and refers to Nelson & Winter 1982. 
657 Wimsatt 2006. 
658 Levins 1970. 
659 ESK= The economics of scientific knowledge. 
660 Hands 2001, p. 365. 
661 The nonmainstream economics can be classified into three categories: a) the Marxists literature 
including Mannheim, Bernal, and different versions of social epistemology, b) the social exchange 
models literature including for example various gift giving models (Mauss), c) the economic condition 
necessary for the growth of scientific community literature including a variety of analyses related to the 
history of economy.   
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An interesting link with this discussion is produced by Philip Kitcher. Kitcher’s662 
point of departure is Alvin Goldman’s approach known reliabilism. According to 
Goldman reliability is the ability to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs. There is 
no single standard for passing the reliabialist criterion; very high ratios are desirable but 
<.5 is probably sufficient.663 For Goldman reliably produced beliefs are justified beliefs, 
and knowledge is thus a reliably produced true belief. A belief-producing process is 
reliable if it produces a high ratio of true beliefs, and a reliable belief-producing process 
is one that is justified.  
Kitcher’s point is that what counts as a “justification”, the standards of reliability, 
must be based on social standards. Reliability of the social process affects the beliefs of 
individuals. For Kitcher the most important thing is the distribution of reliable beliefs 
within the community.  
It means that we have to encourage such social processes and supporting institutions 
that increase the ratio of reliable beliefs to total beliefs within the population. Social 
epistemology is for Kitcher a study in epistemic industrial organization. The aim of his 
normative philosophical project is to discover what kind of arrangement of our cognitive 
institutions is most conducive to epistemic efficiency.  
For Kitcher, it is not so important whether scientists do not follow the 
methodological rules or norms. His point is not the cognitive uniformity but rather one 
of diversity. This implies that economics is a particularly suitable discipline to explain 
how individuals acting as sullied self-interested agents could bring about a division of 
cognitive labor. Kitcher is not arguing for the complete laissez-faire mentality. Rather, he 
seems to argue, that it is possible to have unintended optimality as described in 
mainstream economics.  
If the methodological debates in economics have focused on the problem of fact and 
fiction, the recent discussion in SSK tradition provides a totally different view. The 
traditional epistemology stresses that epistemology must be psychologistic: 
“Epistemology should be psychologistic. Whether or not people are rational in their 
beliefs depends not simply on what beliefs they hold or how the propositions they 
believe are logically connected, but also on how their beliefs are psychologically 
connected.” 664 Epistemology with non-psychological basis is out of question.  
One of the most fascinating theoretical proposals within the SSK context is Kusch’s 
programme of communitarian epistemology in which knowledge is recognized as a social 
status. The programme of communitarian epistemology helps us understand why 
concepts and frameworks are so important in STI policies.  
According to Kusch, the aim of communitarian epistemology is to understand rather 
than change epistemic communities. It follows that Kusch’s programme differs from 
social epistemology in many ways. “Social epistemology“, as a reform, is manifested in 
Kusch ´s judgment as two different forms: the “science policy programme” and the 
“complementary programme”. The former seeks to determine ways of making science 
more democratic and accountable to the public. Its aim is to increase our ability to 
choose between the developments of different kinds of knowledge. Its deliberate 
assumption is that if we are able to influence the collective production of scientific 
knowledge, then we are able to manipulate the social organization of scientific 
communities. This is not the goal of communitarism.  
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The complementary programme aims at remedying the shortcomings of traditional 
individualistic epistemology. The communitarian epistemology is more radical: it insists 
that the individualistic tradition is wrong as to the category of the isolated individual 
knower itself. There is no such knower for the communitarian.  
It is also important to be aware that Kusch regards scientific knowledge and ordinary 
forms of language as far as the “socialness” of knowledge is concerned equal.  
A point of departure for Kusch is to resurrect the idea of testimony. Traditional 
epistemology thought of testimony as a mechanism for the transmission of knowledge 
from one individual to another. According to the individualistic view, testimony is 
nothing but the transmission of a complete item of knowledge from one individual to 
another. From the communitarian view point testimony is not just a means of 
transmission of complete items of knowledge from and to an individual.665  
Kusch666 uses the term testimony in a way that is roughly synonymous with 
communication or learning from communication. His theoretical aims are very 
ambitious. If Michael Welbourne667 focuses more on the object of knowledge (e.g. how 
the pooling of evidence enables teams to know more about the world) and if John 
Hardwig668 concentrates more on the subject of knowledge (e.g. how testimony 
constitutes knowers with specific commitments and entitlements) Kusch attempts to 
bring both sides, the subject and the object, under one theoretical roof. His aim is to 
show that the communicative generation of new communal subjects of knowledge is due 
to the same type of process that also generates objects of knowledge. Testimony is linked 
to the generation of the social status “knowledge” in general, and the imposition of that 
status in particular circumstances.  
Kusch`s major claim is that an performative testimony is important but overlooked 
category of testimony, and that it is a necessary condition for the existence of constative 
testimony: performative beliefs generate their referents, empirical beliefs not. Or to put 
it in other words, performative beliefs are important because they make empirical beliefs 
possible.  
Most theories of realism and anti-realism make global claims about the nature of 
reality, and reflect on how it relates to our concepts and representations. In Susan 
Haack´s “innocent realism” (1998) the core thesis is that the world, the one, real world, 
is largely independent of us. The second thesis says that our descriptions of the world are 
true if and only if they accord with the way the world is. The third thesis concerns the 
relationship between different descriptions of the world. There can be more than one 
but different true descriptions must be compatible. The theory rejects the idea that the 
world is “the totality of mind-independent objects”. According to Haack many true 
descriptions of the world make no reference to human existence. The sixth thesis insists 
that we can make “direct” contact with the world. Conceptualisation does not make our 
contact with the world “indirect”.  
                                                            
665 Testimony is a generative of knowledge in the sense that it constitutes epistemic communities and 
epistemic agents, social statuses and institutions, taxonomies, and the category of knowledge itself. 
Understood in a very narrow sense, testimony has its place in the legal context and in its widest sense 
testimony stands for our epistemic interdependence. Traditional epistemology refers to the four sources 
of knowledge (testimony, perception, memory and reason). Perception covers both outer perception of 
the physical world and inner perception. Reason includes intuition as well as deductive and inductive 
inference. Perception, memory and reason are taken to be faculties of the individual mind. When 
traditional philosophy speaks of testimony it refers to knowledge gained from other’s indicative say-so.   
666 Kusch 2002, p. 18. 
667 Welbourne 1993.  
668 Hardwig 1985. 
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Kusch’s analysis669 on the rational constraints upon empirical beliefs is interesting. 
Kusch focuses on rules and norms by which empirical beliefs are justified and become 
communal beliefs. In his formulation we have to make a difference between rules and 
norms. Rules are explicitly formulated standards or prescriptions, norms are standards 
and prescriptions that are not stated and that figure implicitly in our practices. It is 
usually difficult to put a norm into words. Most of our “epistemic prescriptions” are 
norms, not rules. Rules presuppose norms. Kusch asks: how do we know norms and 
“what” do we know in knowing them? His answer is that we know them by exemplars: 
these are the cases of actions and beliefs that are taken to fulfil the norms. The 
communal performative belief constituting a norm is a belief in the exemplary role of a 
number of cases.  
Kusch insists that in science, as Kuhn suggested, scientists try to convince their peers 
by assimilating their solution into a recognized paradigmatic solution; implicit norms are 
more important than explicitly stated rules. In everyday life we have model solutions. 
Justifying a belief involves showing that the relationship between the belief and our 
evidence is similar or analogous to one of communally endorsed exemplars for types of 
justification.  
It means that the justification is in principle contestable. In addition, justification is 
relative both in terms of exemplars and in terms of a given community. It is also relative 
to the judgments of similarity that link the pair to one or more of these exemplars. 
Justification is never algorithmic; it is impossible to write it down. It is important to 
note what follows: the norms of justification are as much results of acts of justification as 
they are determinants of acts of justification. Communal performative belief constituting 
a given norm changes with each interaction. In summary, Kusch defends the 
communitarian approach and finitism as follows670:   
First, he does not side with Haack and Searle because they represent the idea of one 
true description of the world. According to finitism, terms are applied step by step to 
new cases and the application is guided by interests. There are no exemplars that are 
sacrosanct and the correctness of the application is determined by interactions within a 
community. Language is too fluid, too contextual and too social for the conception of a 
“final” true description to make such sense.  
Second, Kusch is against innocent realism because it is committed to truth as 
correspondence. The idea of the world as the sum, or totality, of facts is in his view 
incoherent.  
Third, Kusch wants to reject with his communitarian program the idea that relativity 
and underdetermination play a role only when choosing between different conceptual 
schemes, but not when it comes to choices within conceptual schemes.  
Fourth, he is against Hilary Putnam’s “internal realism” because he rejects the role of 
community in his internal realism. It follows that Putnam is inclined to favour the 
axiomatic and “meaning- determinist” line. It is a way to block relativism. The question 
that remains both in Goodman ´s and Putnam ´s case is how the worlds of science and 
art are collectively constructed.  
Fifth, he argues that if we reject the idea that conceptual schemes are like timeless 
axiomatic systems, it becomes more difficult to speak of their incompatibility. If a 
conceptual scheme develops over time, then its relation to other conceptual schemes 
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must be subjected to change. It means that we have to take a third conceptual scheme to 
judge that two conceptual schemes are incompatible.  
Sixth, if we reject conceptual schemes as monolithic and determinate systems of 
meanings, it does not imply that we have to give up conceptual relativity. We argue only 
that the present use of any classification is always determined by contingent local 
interests and goals, and that the future path of any classification is open.  
Seventh, Kusch highlights that communitarianism and meaning-finitism are not 
forms of idealism or anti-realism in general. General statements of idealism, anti-realism 
are equally meaningless as are general statements of realism. Both of them try to speak 
about everything out there; this is incoherent.  
Eighth, he wants to remind how terms like “reality” and “world” are used in 
everyday life. Ordinary language talks of worlds in the plural, the realist’s singular (the 
one world) owes its initial intelligibility to religion and the dream of physical 
reductionism. Finally, Kusch insists that in meaning finitism it is not a deep 
philosophical issue to talk of one world or many worlds. 
 
8.4. The political genealogy of STI policies: The echoes of the Cold War 
 
If we return to the history of science and technology policies and carefully re-analyze 
Vannevar Bush’s report and the political climate around the Cold War, it is obvious that 
economics plays a crucial role. The debate during the World War II was about whether 
the state has an obligation to support the sciences in general.  
There were two big questions related to economics. Was economics truly a science? 
Was there persuasive evidence that economics yielded sufficient social benefits to justify 
its public subsidy? Bush’s report to President Truman must be seen in this context. The 
discussion focused on whether the social sciences in general were “mature” enough, 
whether they employed the true scientific method, whether they were capable of 
conducting both basic and applied research, whether their research topics were too 
political, and whether it was possible to conceive of a coherent research program for each 
discipline.671  
When the NSF (National Science Foundation) was created in 1950 the social 
sciences were not included until 1956. In other words, economics was put by the NSF 
on trial for over a decade. It is worth to note that business leaders saw the role of 
economics as one of a facilitator: the alliance between “Keynesian” economists helped to 
secure sensible public policies that would respect and strengthen the free enterprise 
system.  
One dimension of this trial period was the development of operation research (OR). 
Operation research broke up to the British and American variants of science funding 
and management.  
The British version evolved later into the left-wing sociology of science, whereas the 
American version was immersed into Mertonian sociology of science and the neoclassical 
economics of technical change. Both of them were subservient to the extensive 
infrastructure of science management run by the military and later units such as NSF 
and NIH (National Institutes of Health).  
Mirowski argues that the reason is OR.672 Cold War’s “double truth” was that, on the 
one hand, those who were outside research communities were assured that scientists 
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were the freest of the free spirits and that scientific inquiry could never be planned or 
dictated and, on the other hand, those who were inside research communities focused 
on reprocessing physical mathematical models into social science doctrine in pursuit of 
justifying interventions in the funding and organisation of science. His conclusion is 
that in the UK philosophers of science and the idea of context-free scientific method 
were seen as “the enemy”, whereas in the USA philosophers of science were not seen as 
“the enemy”. Vice versa, many were actively opted into the development of OR and 
decision theory.  
It is apparent that natural scientists, and primarily physicists, were responsible for the 
creation, conduct, and codification of OR in the World War II. They were more 
familiar with probability and statistics in the 1940s than social scientists.  
Another aspect of OR is that it was bound up with struggles over the modality of the 
funding of scientific research and the ability of the paymasters to dictate the types of 
research pursued. Operation research can be seen as an attempt to find a generic 
“scientific method” to be deployed in advising clients. It is also evident that the whole 
idea of OR was closely accompanied with RAND.  
One very essential aspect of OR is that it presaged a multidisciplinary approach to 
the understanding of social processes and it contributed positive reactions to 
technological change. It was a major instrument for the stabilization of the American 
orthodoxy in economics.673 
 The irony is that originally Bush opposed the idea because it would threaten and 
undermine the role of the university in science. “OR was a tool for military managers to 
enhance rational decision making in integrating civilian scientific and technological 
resources. Managerial and political ends were primary.” 674 
The outcome was a mix of game theory, symbolic logic, communication theory, 
linear and dynamic programming, queuing theory, simulation techniques, cost-benefit 
analysis, time series and cross-section statistical estimation, and network analysis.  
Sometimes OR is defined as a part of mathematics but in the terms of mathematics it 
embodied nothing novel. But the siginificance of OR becomes evident if we conceive it 
as a process of triangulation between the natural sciences, economics and the nascent 
field of science policy were interlinked and where the computer was its major rallying 
point. “Physicists wanted to be paid by the military but not be in the military; physicists 
wanted to do social research for the military, but not be social scientists; physicists wanted to 
tell others what to do, but not be responsible for the commands given.”675  
OR was important because it provided a platform where the post-war relationship 
between the natural scientists and the state was forged. It also provided a site where 
neoclassical economics became integrated into the newfound scientific approach to 
government, corporate government, and the conceptualization of society as a cybernetic 
entity. In addition, OR had a profound effect on the intellectual contents of such 
academic disciplines such as economics, psychology, and computer science.  
The history of OR in Britain is often associated with the struggle between two 
groups. The other group, often understood as the British version of OR, was the social 
planning of science movement. One of the leading figures was J. D. Bernal who 
advocated the idea of social planning and government funding. The other group was 
“Society for the Freedom of Science” movement and its key figures were Michael 
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Polanyi and Friedrich von Hayek whose aim was to protect science from corruption 
through government planning.   
One of Steve Fuller’s key findings in his analysis on Kuhn676 is that Kuhn’s followers 
in science studies never speak about the larger political and economic scene that sustains 
Big Science and that they have never utilized the empirical and explanatory resources of 
the political sciences and economics. Ironically, as Fuller describes, the reception of The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions was totally different from its author’s expectations.  
One of the key reasons for explicating and clarifying all these complex theoretical 
issues linked with post-war economics is that these controversies and disputes played a 
crucial role in the birth of the whole idea of science policy. These debates are still present 
in today’s STI policies and most of them are taken for granted as the preconditions of 
those policies.  
I will argue that the justification of STE hybrid is the core of those policies and that 
economists have had a leading role in the process. All those discussions and debates 
linked with the cyborg sciences are present in STI policies. The ethos is the same: 
science and technology are vital to economic growth.  
The most important point of STI policies is that those policies change the social 
structures of science as well. As Mario Biagioli677 and James Boyle678 argue, the 
traditional conception of scientific authorship has changed radically in recent years. In 
effect, there is a tendency to be conflated more and more in the legal and economic 
spheres. It means that the traditional idea of copyright cannot be applied to science in a 
simple and straightforward manner.  
The traditional dichotomy in science policy concerns the distinction between basic 
science and applied science. It implies that there is a clear division of labour between 
scientists and engineers. In the era of STI policies this division is blurred. 
The third aspect of new scientific authorship is that scientists have lost their 
individuality and submerged their contributions within some larger communal whole. 
Most scientific work in the natural sciences is made in a group as seen in the fact most 
articles and papers are published by a group of scientists and scholars. 
Biagioli and Boyle conclude that the new legislation of patents and copyrights will 
transform the way in which scientific work is currently conducted. Simultaneously, the 
traditional structures and contexts of universities are also transforming as well.679  
If the Second World War and the Cold War era were catalysts for the birth of 
science policy in the United States, and its implementation consciously blurred the 
boundaries between science and ideology, STI policies represent the new cycle of this 
complex process.  
 
8.5. Horizon II: The oikos and the polis controversy embedded in STI 
policies 
 
It is worth noting that the Greek polis was opposed to the oikos, and politikos was 
referring to the polis and polites as the counter-concept of despotikos, an attribute 
referring to the oikos.680 A polites was a full citizen, as opposed to children, slaves, 
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foreigners, women and others. The political had an oppositional tone against the 
despotic order. Politikos referred to the arkhé politiké,i.e.  to a polity and to the 
community of citizens. The distinction between the scientific and artistic disciplines of 
politics also has its origins in Greece.  
In this chapter I will argue that the classical controversy between the oikos and the 
polis is embedded in STI policies. This means that STI policies can never be separated 
from the problem of politics. The controversy has been labelled as economisation, 
marketisation, monetisation, and commodification.  
In order to be able to justify my oikos/polis argument I will introduce two different 
approaches to understand the controversy embedded in STI policies. The first of them is 
called the ideology of innovation and the second of them is called the rhetoric of 
innovation. The first alternative highlights the role of public policies in STI policies and 
stresses the linkage between neo-liberalism and the new political governance in STI 
policies (the RIP perspective). The second alternative stresses the role of rhetoric in STI 
policies and focuses on the linkage between the rhetoric and scientific knowledge in STI 
policies (the RIS perspective). These two alternatives can be seen as complementary rather 
than exclusionary interpretations.  
 
8.5.1. Ideology of innovation and the politics of governance and legitimation:            
Controversy 3 “Ideas are weapons” 
 
Freedom is perhaps the most controversial concept in 20th century politics, although in 
the Western world it is often taken for granted. Weber, who in his bureaucratization 
analysis was very pessimistic, saw the politics of representative democracy as an 
expression of freedom. Weber’s idea was based on freedom-as-contingency, not in terms 
of hazards but in terms of the omnipresence of Chancen. In political thought the 
Weberian moment refers to turning the analysis of Chancen into a means of rendering 
intelligible human actions.681 But what is freedom ultimately? 
In principle, there are three different families of views about freedom.682 The first 
family is republican. Freedom refers to a certain set of political arrangements; to be a free 
person is to be a citizen of a free political community. A free political community is not 
subject to rule by foreigners and the citizens play an active role in government. The 
opposite of freedom is despotism.  
The second family is often called liberal. Freedom is a property of individuals and 
consists in the absence of constraint or interference by others. A person is free to the 
extent that he or she is able to do things as he or she wishes and is not blocked or 
hindered from carrying out activities by other people. Whereas for the republican 
freedom is realized through a certain kind of politics, for the liberal freedom begins 
where politics ends. Many members of the liberal family have a variety of beliefs about 
the proper role of government, but they all share the view that freedom is a matter of the 
scope or the extent of government rather than of its form or character.  
The members of the third family may be called idealistic in the sense that they stress 
the internal forces that determine how a person acts. A person is free when he is 
autonomous. The struggle for freedom is not linked with external environment, but it is 
linked with a person’s inner restrictions preventing him from realizing his own true 
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nature. The idealist identifies certain conditions as necessary for his freedom and this 
links freedom and politics in his thinking. 
A famous attempt to clarify the concept of freedom was made by Isaiah Berlin.683 For 
Berlin there are two different forms of liberty: negative liberty and positive liberty. 
Negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. But Berlin does not 
explicitly say what counts as interference or constraint. Positive liberty is the possibility 
of acting in a way that one can take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental 
purposes. Whereas negative liberty is usually attributed to individual agents, positive 
liberty is sometimes attributed to collectives or individuals as members of given 
collectives. For example, Hayek and Mill are often seen as defenders of negative liberty.  
Freedom for Berlin is a form of self-mastery. A person is free when he controls his 
own life, rather than being an instrument of someone else’s will. Berlin’s distinction was 
not his own but it was based on a long philosophical tradition usually linked with Kant 
and many others. Those two perspectives have often been seen as a complementary pair 
in political philosophy.  
Quentin Skinner684 has stressed that the concept of freedom is very difficult and 
misused very frequently. His sarcastic point is that freedom is too important issue to be 
left to liberals only.  
 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory of discourse 
 
Laclau and Mouffe685 hold that the openness of the social is the very condition for 
formulating democratic projects in general, although it is based on contingent forms of 
reason and ethics hitherto restrained by the rationalist dictatorship of Enlightment.  
The theoretical propositions of Laclau and Mouffe are consciously context-
dependent, historical and non-objective.686 There has been a strong tendency within 
Marxism to assert that the political is determined by something that is not in itself 
political but rather social and, in the last instance, economic. This tendency – the 
disappearance of politics - often referred to essentialism is connected within Marxism 
with two versions of economism: epiphenonalism and reductionism.687 The general idea of 
the first is that the form and function of the legal, political and ideological 
superstructure is determined by the economic base.  
Laclau and Mouffe have tried to go further from structural reductionism by taking as 
their starting point the problem of the economic sphere. Within Marxism it seems to 
have two different meanings referring to material production (theory of historical 
materialism) and referring to capitalist commodity production (theory of the capitalist 
mode of production). It serves as a kind of theoretical platform for the development of a 
neo-Gramscian theory of discourse advocated by Laclau and Mouffe. In practice, they 
have replaced the traditional Marxist notion of the economy with a theory of the 
discursive construction of the economic.   
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Their theory of discourse focuses on the political construction of identity. They stress 
three crucial factors in the analysis of concrete discourses; the relations of difference and 
equivalence, the workings of different kinds of overdetermination, and the unifying 
effects of nodal points.  
The first factor refers to the trend to emphasize equivalence over difference although 
the relation between difference and equivalence is undecidable. The second factor refers 
to Freud’s idea of overdetermination - it occurs at the symbolic level and takes the form 
of either condensation or displacement. The third factor is based on the idea that every 
discourse attempts to dominate the field of discursivity by expanding signifying chains. 
The privileged discourse points that partially fix meanings to the floating signifier are 
called nodal points.688  
The nature of nodal points such as “nation”, “party” and so forth is that although 
they are empty signifiers – they are floating within the field of discursivity- they are 
useful in terms of discourse because it is possible to fix their meaning and link them with 
a chain of paradigmatic chain of equivalence.  
Laclau and Mouffe689 argue that if we question the transcendence of the economy it 
leads us to the concept of discourse. The notion of discourse is of a central importance 
to their theory and Laclau and Mouffe link this notion to the problem of meaning. They 
argue that discourse must be defined as a decentred structure in which meaning is 
constantly negotiated and constructed. Thus, in their theory the concept of discourse690 
designates the constitution of a signifying order that is not reducible to its linguistic nor 
extra-linguistic aspects. 
Another aspect of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory is their analysis of hegemony. They 
argue that the starting point of any analysis of political subjectivity is difference. Identity 
is a result of the hegemonization of a field of differential subject positions – it is not an 
embodiment of a pre-given, paradigmatic interest under which many other interests and 
identities can be subsumed.  
Hegemonic practices of articulation constitute discourse and the irreducible play of 
signification within discourse provides condition of possibility for hegemonic practices. 
Hegemony and discourse are mutually conditioned in the sense that hegemonic practice 
shapes and reshapes discourse, which in turn provides the conditions of possibility for 
hegemonic articulation. That process is conditioned by social antagonisms.691 These 
antagonisms establish the boundaries of the discursive formation of society. Their claim 
– very Wittgensteinian indeed – is that it is impossible to give a clear definition of social 
antagonism – it can be symbolized only.  
The third interesting aspect of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory is their strong criticism 
against idealist constructivism and descriptivism. However, it is possible to argue that 
their theory is a version of realist constructivism; it is also materialistic and an enterprise 
to go beyond descriptivism and anti-descriptivism692. The descriptivist account of the 
relation between the object and its discursively constructed form stresses the meaning of 
the words that we use to refer to the external world of objects. Every word has a meaning 
which is defined by a cluster of descriptive features. The word refers to all those objects 
in reality that have the properties designated by the cluster of descriptions.  
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If a descriptivist is interested in the immanent and intentional contents of a word, 
the anti-descriptivist account regards the external causal link as decisive, the way a word 
has been transmitted from one subject to another in a chain of tradition. But as Žižek693 
argues those two opposing views miss the same crucial point- the radical contingency of 
naming. If Searle694 has defended the descriptivist account against Kripke,695 Žižek in his 
Lacanian approach emphasizes the role of contingency in the discursive formation of 
society.  
The fourth aspect of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s discourse theory is its account of the 
political. In order to understand their point we have to clarify Derrida’s idea of 
undecidability. “undecidabilty is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for 
example, of meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly determined in 
strictly defined situations (for example, discursive- syntactical or rhetorical- but also political, 
ethical, etc.) They are pragmatically determined.696 
This undecidablity calls for a decision which must necessarily pass through the ordeal 
of the undeciablity, while taking into account the rules of its structural context. 
According to Derrida the problem is that the western metaphysical tradition by 
privileging unity over dispersion, necessity over contingency, presence over absence and 
so forth prevents us from recognizing the structural undecidability of the world. But 
how could the formation of that undecidability be revealed? Derrida’s answer is 
deconstruction. Deconstruction is not a demolition, not an analysis, not a critique, not a 
method nor an operation.697 In itself deconstruction is nothing in the sense that all 
attempts to predicate it are doomed to failure.  
The structural undecidability becomes transparent in ethical and political decisions. 
Politics can be defined as taking constitutive decisions in an undecidable terrain. 
Decisions have a non-algorithmic character and become dependent on the creation of 
consensus for a certain option among a range of alternative options.698 The creation of 
consensus for a certain option cannot be reduced to the process of identifying the 
common denominator.  
The process can be described rather as a process of coming to agreement through 
persuasion.  Persuasion has nothing to do with showing somebody’s beliefs to be 
inconsistent with certain absolute criteria of rationality. Persuasion has nothing to do 
with causing somebody to change his beliefs by systematically breaking down their 
resistance. Persuasion takes the form of an attempt to make somebody give up one set of 
beliefs in favour of another by offering the re-description of the world which, on a 
pragmatic basis, presents a new set of beliefs as more suitable, amore ppropriate or more 
likely.699  
In politics, the link between the re-description of the world and persuasion is very 
evident. Politics can be defined as a simultaneously constitutive and subversive 
dimension of the social fabric.700 It leads to an assertion of the primacy of politics over 
the social.701 Politics cannot be understood as deriving from something else which is not 
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political in itself. Politics cannot be confined to a particular institutional region of the 
social; it constitutes an all-pervading dimension of the social fabric.  
This kind of interpretation of the political is very close to the woprks of such classics 
as Machiavelli and Hobbes. Machiavelli saw political power as operating within the 
social and conceived as a plethora of practices and forms of organisations. Hobbes 
located the political outside the social and conceived it in terms of the sovereign power 
of the state. 
Laclau and Mouffe want to advocate a radical plural democracy in which they want 
to go beyond liberalism and communitarism. The history of the contingent articulation 
of liberalism and democracy is a process of intensive political struggles which has taken 
the form of the democratization of the liberal state. Democracy is a historical process in 
which the competition between different political elites for the votes of the masses has 
been central.702 In our political and ideological world there is a clear conflict between the 
traditional liberal appraisal of pluralism, individualism and freedom and the democratic 
principles of unity, community and equality. Mouffe703 argues that it is important to 
discard the dangerous dream of consensus and accept the permanence of conflicts and 
antagonisms. 
The liberal notion of democratic citizenship tends to privilege rights over obligations: 
the citizen is conceived as a bearer of universal rights that are protected by the law 
enforced by the state. Liberalism reduces democratic citizenship to a question of the legal 
status of the individual and sees social cooperation as a means of enhancing our 
productive capacities and increasing each person’s individual prosperity. There is no 
common good: each individual should be able to define and seek his or her own 
conception of the good. It also conceives the individual, rather than the citizen as active.  
As Rawls704 in his proposal for a theory of justice suggests, the definition of 
citizenship is the legally ensured capacity of each person to form, revise and rationally 
pursue his or her conception of the good. Citizens are individuals who use their civil, 
political and social rights to pursue their own interests within constraints imposed by the 
exigency to respect the rights of others. Democratic citizenship is defined in terms of 
liberal democratic rights and these rights are guaranteed by a rational agreement between 
free and equal individuals who are ignorant, at the moment of agreement, of everything 
that could be prejudicial to their impartiality. Because the rights of democratic citizens 
are rooted in this rational agreement, the right has naturally priority over any conception 
of the common good.  
This kind of position has strongly been attacked by communitarians and also by 
Mouffe.705 Mouffe argues that the liberal tradition has stripped politics of its ethical 
components but if we attempt to reconnect politics and morals we should not aim to 
subordinate politics to moral values specified by the common good. Rather, we should 
emphasize the role of grammar of conduct – the interaction of rights and obligations in 
our conception of democratic citizenship.  
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New political governance and ideology 
 
For Freeden706 the study of ideology is not a specialized study of certain doctrines, but a 
particular approach to the study of political thinking as such. It regards political 
thinking as a ubiquitous and normal aspect of social life and insists that political theory 
must encompass these phenomena. His point is that politics consists centrally of the area 
of collective social life that involves decision-making, the ranking of policy options, the 
regulation of dissent, the mobilization of support for those activities, and the 
construction of political visions.  
 Freeden enlists three postulates. First, thinking about politics significantly relates to 
political issues. Second, thinking about politics relates importantly to the political 
thinking actually taking place within political entities. Third, inasmuch politics is a 
social and not merely an individual activity, so is political thinking and thus it must be 
examined as a series of collective conducting loosely patterned thought-practices.  
Freeden argues that in the study of ideologies we have to keep in mind three issues. 
First, ideologies are themselves political thought-practices and as such have distinct 
features. Second, ideologies contain a specific category of thought- practice, namely 
pertaining to understanding the relationship between theory and practice. Third, each of 
the major ideologies displays different interpretations of the relationship between theory 
and practice.  
Practice refers to the performance of and participation in an identifiable regular 
action and thought, one replicated as well as shaped by other such practitioners. Many 
acts do not constitute practices and some practice-cum-regularities of thinking do not 
constitute acts. On the macro level ideologies are special type of thinking about politics,  
and on the micro-level they are sets of specific thought-practices whose content and 
morphology differ from one ideological family to another.  
Freeden illustrates his theory by using political decision making as an example. A 
decision involves that a choice is made among options, and political decision making 
involves making such choices as shaped by a collectivity. The concept of choice 
implicitly refers to the notion of pluralism, which means that there is more than one 
option to be chosen. This means that in the context of political decision making there is 
more than one voice, and as an act it is a matter of ranking between those voices. 
Decisions are “closures” that permit policies to be formulated or justified against a 
multiple path background. 
If we accept this, argues Freeden, we will regard political thinking in a political 
community as an explicit or implicit competition over the control of political language. 
That control is aimed at through the most crucial feature of the ideological act: the 
deconstestation of the essentially contestable, through which a decision is made that it is 
both possible and justified. Within the internal logic of politics this is a heuristic 
necessity and also a practical one: decisions must be taken and they need to be either 
legitimated or enforced. The control over language is an attempt to monopolize the 
meanings that concepts carry. To achieve such control is the basic feature of political 
thinking.  
Not only are political concepts related to ambiguity and indeterminacy, but they are 
also linked with inclusiveness. Inclusiveness relates to the point where competing 
appraisals of arguments cannot knock out each other. It is tied to the impossibility of 
reaching an end point in an argumentative chain, yet those points are conditioned by 
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moral paradigms, conventions of argument, demands of efficacy, or other cultural 
practices. In other words, the political theorist needs to theorize about the kind of 
thinking that goes into the act of decontestation. Decontestative thinking is central to 
political theory, Freeden insists.707  
Therefore, it is important to analyze three forms of decontestation. The first is the 
attempt to attach precise allocations of meanings to determinate concepts, and the 
second is the stipulative ascription of meaning to a term. The second form may be 
underpinned by rhetoric. In the third form of decontestation, insimulated 
decontestaton, the semblance of decontestations created by ambiguity and vagueness. In 
sum, we may say that ambiguous and vague expressions of political thinking are 
intentional and importantly functional forms of political thought. But how do they 
structure political discourses?  
Freeden follows in his task Skinner’s observation that “acts are also texts” and stresses 
that political theorist must be sensitive to the fluctuating interchange of conceptual 
structures with the world of practices. Such underpinning in indeterminacy does not 
signify a flaw in our conception of the world but singles out the very locus of human 
choice. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with chaos or extreme relativism. 
Methodologically it underpins the pluralism that guarantees that neither political theory 
nor ideology will ever die.  
In analyzing political language and thinking it is important to understand that we 
deal with an instance of complex holistic relationships with three features. First, any 
concept is a means to any other concept. Second, some conceptions of a concept may 
also intersect with a part of another concept. Third, the configuration of concepts has 
been constructed so as to constitutea collectively desirable, or attractive, set of human 
and social circumstance.708 
Freeden709 has stressed that the boundaries of old ideological families are nowadays 
very unspecific. In his analysis he differentiates two new mutations that he calls 
globalism and welfarism. Globalism aspires to be a new holism in a double sense. First, it 
is an offspring of the macro system previously referred to philosophically as universalism 
and politically internationalism. Second, it assumes the form of integrated and 
encompassing ideological positions through which major political questions are 
addressed. Freeden does not want to give globalism or globalization the status of 
ideology.  
Manfred Steger 710has criticized Freeden with six claims: 1) globalization is about the 
liberalization and global integration of markets, 2) globalization is inevitable and 
irreversible, 3) nobody is in charge of globalization, 4) globalization benefits everyone 
(… in the long run), 5) globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world, 6) 
globalization requires a global war on terror. His point is that with regard to semantics 
these six claims absorb and rearrange a concept into a hybrid meaning structure of 
genuine novelty. Their political role consists of preserving and enhancing asymmetrical 
power structures that benefit particular social groups. 
Heikki Patomäki711 has in his recent book on neo-liberalism in Finland argued that 
the constituents of contemporary neo-liberalism are many but the key values of their 
program are the same: the premise of private property, the premise of freedom i.e. 
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individuals have the right to decide what to do with their property and the premise of 
competition in the market. One of his theses is that neo-liberalism is above all a doctrine 
implemented in current public policy reforms rather than an economic theory as such. 
According to Patomäki another aspect of neo-liberalism is that it openly utilizes a variety 
of neo-classical theories in economics rather than political philosophies advocated by 
Hayek and Friedman.  
Interpreting neoliberalism as a version of political governance, Patomäki argues as 
does Jessop, that the real target of its reforms is to unlock the Keynesian mechanisms 
embedded in modern nation-states in order to adapt them for the new global economy. 
In sum, Patomäki and Jessop seem to argue that it is precisely neo-liberalism and its 
ideology that characterize globalization. 
 
8.5.2. Rhetoric of innovation and the politics of concepts and justification:                
Controversy 4 “In the beginning was the word” 
 
STI policies might be understood as an ideology as discussed above, but it is also 
possible to interpret it as a particular form of rhetoric rather than as a particular form of 
ideology. The key point of this study is to examine why rhetoric plays so important role 
in STI policies. Therefore we have to examine shortly what sophists really argued.  
One of the curiosities linked with sophists is that there is a lot of misunderstanding 
in regard with their thinking. Their criticism is often understood the first movement of 
enlightenment who used human rationality to criticise myths and authorities. But this 
kind of characterization utilizes the idea of defining ancient Greece as the childhood of 
western culture or Homo sapiens. If anything, sophists were criticising truth’s dependence 
on culture.  
Barbara Cassin argues that we must focus carefully on the quarrel between the 
sophists and Plato and Aristotle.712 The core of Cassin’s argumentation is her critical 
stance to the status quo of philosophy and her somewhat radical conclusion is that 
sophists have played perhaps the most important role in the development of 
modernity.713  
Cassin argues that the real other of philosophy has been represented by sophists, a 
group of outcasts. One of the reasons for their exclusion was that they tried to advocate 
the idea that the expression “to speak to” must be taken into account as well as the 
expression “to speak of”.  Rhetoric, as Cassin714 stresses, makes sophists interesting 
because one of the key issues they highlighted was the controversy related to the 
concepts of logos and time.  
The controversies can be reduced to the contrast between time and space, topos and 
kairos. The controversy is present in the contrast between the spatial order and temporal 
“opportunism”. Cassin maintains that traditional distinctions such as philosophy, 
linguistics, literature and so forth are only strategies of naming, as sophists advocated. 
Cassin considers the Sophistic tradition as a way of thinking, as a fascinating alternative 
to philosophy, and her point is to show that philosophy is not a neutral store of thinking 
but rather a style of thinking.  
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After Plato, philosophers have not put up with politics and the majority of 
philosophers has tended to reject politics as a dirty game, or they have tried to reduce 
politics to philosophy. Cassin introduces two different forms of rhetoric: the rhetoric of 
space and the rhetoric of time or the tradition of “ontology” thinking (philosophers) and 
the tradition of “logology” thinking (sophists).   
 While the rhetoric of space, the discourse (le dicours) attempts to tame temporality 
and submit it to spatiality: its organising principle of representations is topos, the rhetoric 
of time attempts to organise representations as spontaneity rather than as a closed 
totality, and its organising principle of representation is kairos.  
For sophists rhetoric is a vast performance which, by means of praise and counsel, 
produces the consensus required for the social bond. This consensus is minimal because 
for sophists consensus is not a requirement of a uniform unity: they do not require that 
everyone thinks in the same way (homonoia), but only that everyone speaks (homologia) 
and lends their ear. 
For the sophists one of the key notions was the notion of kairos to which many later 
thinkers such as Machiavelli (occasione), Weber (Chance), Schmitt (Ausnamezustand) and 
Benjamin (Geistesgegenwart) return. As a term it has many connotations and refers to 
chance, crisis, breaks or solution, and it can be understood both as a contrast to topos 
and also as a contrast to skopos – a way of thinking in which aims are taken for granted.  
One of the best-known attempts to understand the logic of political language is 
Koselleck’s temporalization thesis715. Koselleck’s claim is that there is an ever-increasing 
abyss between the concepts of Erfahrungsraum and Erwartunghorizont. Past experience is 
increasingly less able to serve as a basis for future expectations; the break with the 
continuous space of experience is the most important aspect in the temporalization of 
politics. Another aspect of his thesis is the relative denaturalisation of the temporal 
experience, as manifested in the technologies of transportation and travel. But he is 
sceptical of the possibilities of new technology to establish a new Spielraum of action. 
The third dimension of temporalization concerns the metaphorical reinterpretation of 
spatial concepts into temporal ones.716  
It is important to note that Cassin’s temporality thesis is different from Koselleck’s 
idea of Sattelzeit. If Koselleck’s thesis is that the temporalization of concepts is possible 
only through metaphors because time is not observational, Cassin thinks that sophistic 
thinking is a critique of spatiality in favour of temporality rather than a metaphoric 
transformation from spatial concepts to temporal concepts.  
One may argue that Weber’ s political and social theory plays a central role in the 
following issues: the concept of rationalization, the spheres of values, and the idea of 
freedom of the individual cultural being. The last theme is of a great interest because, as 
Palonen717 points out Weber never wrote a concise exposition of his understanding of 
the concept, which is very coherent taking into account his nominalistic and 
perspectivistic approach. One often noticed aspect of Weber’s political and social theory 
is his refusal to use the concept of “society”. This is also vunderstandable because for 
Weber “society” is a political concept. It is politics that determines the boundaries and 
membership of “societies”.718 
If we return to Palonen’s analysis on the polit vocabulary in which he difines four 
basic nouns polity, policy, politicization, and politicking - we are provided with new 
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resources to analyze STI policies as a rhetorical endeavour and a form of political 
theorizing.719 In Palonen’s view the dilemma of political theory is the concept of politics 
as such. In the classical interpretation “polity” is understood as a spatial framework for 
politics: it is there that policies and politicking takes place. In this classical interpretation 
politicization is understood as the extension of this “framework”.  The non-classical 
interpretation regards politicization as the constitutive speech act of politics and polity as 
a contingent complex of specific historical politicization.  
The difference between the sphere and activity concepts of politics concerns the 
thematization and significance of politicking while polity as metaphorical space is 
common for both interpretations. The problem is that thinking spherically is an obstacle 
in the search of alternatives to the existing polity.720 
Palonen has suggested in his attempt to conceptualize politics by the idea of politics-
as-activity that in order to be able to withdraw the politics-as-sphere conceptualization 
we have to conceptualize politics as the scarcity of time into three clusters. Interestingly, 
he implicitly utilizes the conceptualizations used in economics; now the core of that 
complexity is time. In the first cluster we deal with the lack of time (a struggle against 
time), in the second cluster we deal with the distribution of scarce time (a struggle of 
time), and in the third cluster we struggle with time (a struggle with time).  
While it is easy to reject Palonen’s attempt to re-conceptualize the concept of 
politics, I strongly disagree with such attempts. In my view Palonen is not only clarifying 
the problems of politics; rather, his actual aim is to genuinely find novel horizons to the 
dilemma of rationality and its universality in politics.  
Palonen introduces us a different approach to the dilemma of political theorizing by 
explicating how political practices trigger problems for the political theorist. He has 
differentiated four genres of political theorizing: statements, justifications, explications 
and descriptions of performance.  
 
STI policies as a corollary of statements 
 
The genre of statements refers to the question what. This means the adoption of a stand 
either for or against a position in a given controversy. A statement expresses a position 
for or against a proposal; it also contains definite formulations specifying the stand and 
marking the difference between the proposal and the opposing view.  
It is worth noting that political agents have the last word in the formulation of 
statements, although experts, advisers and theorists may have a role in the invention of 
alternative formulations or in pointing out distinct political potential. If we adopt this to 
STI policies, it applies to them surprisingly well. The history of science and technology 
policies illustrates that the controversy of the Natural and the Social has been the core of 
those policies. In other words, the dilemma of rationality and the dilemma of 
epistemology have been key statements that those policies depend on: all debates linked 
with science and technology policies return to those dilemmas.  
In terms of this study it is obvious that STI policies can be seen as an arena in which 
this statement is discussed and will be discussed in the future. My conclusion is that STI 
policies can be seen as a corollary of statements linked with the controversy between the 
Natural and the Social or to put it in Weberian terms, the dilemma of Kulturmensch. 
Weber’s clarifies it as followsas he says that the condition for human sciences “lies not in 
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our finding a certain culture or any “culture” in general to be valueable but rather in the fact 
that we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate 
attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.”721 
 
STI policies as acts of justification  
 
By the notion of the justification of a standpoint Palonen refers to the question why. It 
does not mean that politicians merely assign their advisers or think-tanks the task of a 
finding legitimation for a standpoint they have already taken. He refers to Skinner as 
follows. “Thus the problem facing with an agent who wishes to legitimate what he is doing at 
the same as gaining what he wants to cannot simply be the instrumental problem of tailoring 
his normative language in order to fit his projects. It must in part be the problem of tailoring 
his projects in order to fit the available normative language.” 722 
This is the key problem of political theorizing in terms of legitimation. Any action in 
order to obtain acceptance and support must be politically significant. It must have a 
justification and it must be modified in order to be accepted. Or to put it in other 
words, political theorist is obliged to understand the situation and the language of the 
political agents in their own theorizing. Political agents are obliged to recognize political 
theorizing as a relevant part of their activity. The what  question cannot be treated 
independently but it is related to the why question.  
In this study I have argued that STI policies must be understood as a complementary 
process in which theory and practice are interrelated with each other. This can be 
reduced to a maxim: without practice there would be no theory and without theory they 
would be no practice. This means that in STI polices the horizontal thesis is extremely 
important. It links the theoretical debates with political government and its practices. I 
have explicitly argued that the boundary between justification and legitimation becomes 
blurred and unspecific and rhetorical expertise is increasingly demanded to explicate this 
boundary. 
 
STI policies as series of explication 
 
The third genre is that of explication. A programmatic text is never self-sufficient but 
requires commentaries, interpretations, elaborations, demarcations, and so on. Palonen 
argues that the aim of explication is to make a statement transparent. In order to make a 
point it is important to clarify how the previous views must be linked with a new 
statement.  
In this study one of the issues has been to explicate that STI policies must be 
understood as a complex political process if we want to to find a credible justification to 
the STE hybrid. In order to be plausible enough, STI policies can seen as a form of 
action in which “epistemic bipolarity” forms its core. In other words, STI policies can be 
seen as a sort of testimony in which commentaries, interpretations, elaborations and 
demarcations linked with the STE hybrid are welcomed. This means that STI policies 
are in a state of continuous suspense. In STI policies the genuine aim is naturally to 
make statements transparent. This implies that there are a lot of contradictions and 
controversies embedded in STI policies in relation to theories and practices.   
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In this study I have argued that STI policies can be seen as an ongoing political 
process, and that those policies can be linked with other fundamental changes in politics 
in general. To put this differently, is to say that there is a lot of path-dependency and 
one-dimensionality, but also that there are many alternatives and choices embedded in 
STI policies, and this opens doors for rhetoric. 
 
STI policies as politics of performances 
 
The fourth level of political theorizing refers to the performances of politicians. It is 
concerned with the question of how persons act when they act politically. How do 
politicians take their stand or justify or explicate a certain standpoint?  
 In his analysis of Skinner’s perspective on political theorizing, Palonen reminds that 
a re-description of what is meant by theorizing is an implicit aspect of the perspective. It 
requires a dismissal of the venerable demand that theory or knowledge should concern 
only what is considered the universal, timeless, invariant or law-like. The conventional 
modes of theorizing lack the tools inherent in the discussion of what is though to be 
singular, temporal, momentary, local and historical or contingent. Skinner’s wants to 
direct our attention to the search for tools to aid in understanding of how politicians 
deal with contingent events.  
Palonen highlights that the politician is an ideal type of person who is able to assess 
the contribution of controversy to the improvement of our understanding of the activity 
of politics. Politicians can illustrate the limits of the experts’ and specialists’ knowledge, 
and also point out its irrelevance when experts fail to imagine the alternatives or a 
partisan way of presenting them. 
In terms of STI policies this is very true because it is almost impossible to act as a 
politician or policy maker without using the vocabularies developed in STI policies. I 
have argued that STI policies must be understood as a political process that is full of 
paradoxes.  One of those paradoxes is that there are only few politicians who are 
genuinely interested in science and technology policies. Another paradox is that the 
public discussion on science and research, as well as on technology and technological 
innovations, has occurred in very limited circumstances in spite of all efforts linked with 
the public understanding of science. The new breakthroughs in natural sciences such as 
nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and biotechnology dominate the discussion. These 
two paradoxes are often linked with the dilemmas of expertise and expert knowledge in 
contemporary politics and STI policies, in particular. 
In this study I have shown that most of STI policies occur behind the curtains and a 
diverse group of researchers, experts, civil servants and naturally some alert politicians 
have roles of their own. But all those representatives of STI expert groups at national 
level as well as in international level are in the midst of politics. They are politicking and 
they are politicizing, although some of these persons themselves might disagree.  
 
.  
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9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1. Rhetoric as a method  
 
“We have politics because we have no grounds, no reliable standpoints – in other words, 
responsibility and rights, the answers and the claims we make as foundations disintegrate, 
are constitutive of politics.” 723 
 
In this chapter I will focus on some critical points that this kind of study obviously 
involves. First, I will clarify two critical momentums of this study: rhetoric as a method 
and my position as a scholar. Second, I will discuss the problem of interdisciplinarity 
which is one of the key elements in this study. This study can be seen as an example of 
STS studies where the research interest is on the political aspects of science and 
technology. Third, I will conclude this chapter by returning to the problem of political 
theorizing. My conclusion is that STI policies reflect the trend of the displacement of 
politics as it is often called.  
In other words, STI polices are closely linked with the problem of regulatory state in 
which the key issue is the legitimacy of political authority. As a particular form of policy 
STI policies reflect several problems linked with legitimacy and democracy in liberal 
democracies. My radical conclusion is that STI policies are one of the key forums in 
which the very essential debates and negotiations related to the concept of politics 
become manifest rhetorically, and this makes STI policies very political.  
 
Boundaries of rhetoric as a tool 
 
“Politics, ideology, and power matter more than metaphysics to most advocates of 
construction analyses of social and cultural phenomena. Talk of construction tends to 
undermine the authority of knowledge and categorization. It challenges complacent 
assumptions about the inevitability of what we have found out or our present ways of 
doing things.”  724 
 
Collingwood’s distinction between absolute and relative presuppositions has been a sort 
of compass utilized in this study. His original idea was to avoid the traditional 
metaphysics understood as an ontological inquiry and to develop a new metaphysics. In 
order to be able to do so Collingwood differentiates between three distinct meanings of 
the term “cause”. In the historical sciences (sciences which deal with the mind) “that 
which is caused the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent, and causing 
him to do it means affording him a motive for so doing.”725 Collingwood calls this sense I of 
the term cause.  
The sense II of the term is used in the practical sciences of nature, such as 
engineering and medicine, where, “that which is caused is an event in nature and its 
cause is an event opr state of things by producing or preventing which can produce or 
prevent that whose cause it is said to be.” 726 
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The sense III of the term is employed in the theoretical sciences of nature where 
“that which is caused is an event or state of things and its cause is another event or state of 
things such that (a) if the cause happens or exists, the effect must happen or exist even if no 
further conditions are fulfilled (b) the effect cannot happen or exist unless the cause happens 
or exists” 727  
The main difference between sense I and senses II and III is that whereas the 
practical sciences of nature explain the occurrence of events by appealing to empirical 
regularities, the historical sciences explain actions by ascribing reasons to agents. The 
natural sciences are concerned with empirical or external relations between events and 
the historical sciences are concerned with internal, non-empirical relations between 
actions and the motives/beliefs they express.  
Collingwood’s point is to draw attention to three different types of explanation 
rather than to distinguish between explanations that have ontological or existential 
import and explanations which do not and which are consequently epiphenomenal 
(rationalizations). One of the key themes of this study has been to examine how those 
three different kinds of explanations are embedded in STI policies. 
According to Collingwood, neither the proposition “mind exists” nor the 
proposition “matter exists” are metaphysical propositions because they do not assert the 
existence of metaphysical kinds (matter and mind). They are methodological 
assumptions that govern the study of mind and matter.  
In effect, I have argued that in the terms of STI policies the internal new order must 
have a justified and credible warrant by which to understand and explain the formations 
of the STE- hybrid in our contemporary world. This internal thesis, as I have called it, 
constitutes the theoretical dilemma of STI policies. 
My second thesis, the external thesis, is that the internal thesis is not enough. In 
other words,  it is impossible to understand the totality of STI policies without taking 
into account its strong links to changes in the nature of political government. One of the 
most fundamental changes is linked with the idea of transition from the ethos of 
political government to the ethos of politicial governance. This constitutes a practical 
dilemma of STI policies. 
In order to be able to investigate the rhetoric embedded in STI policies I have 
introduced two complementary rhetorical perspectives: the RIS perspective and the RIP 
perspective. By utilizing those two perspectives my aim has been to characterize the 
rhetorical nature of those policies. My claim is that those policies can be seen as a series 
of scientific arguments (i.e. as a process of scientification of politics) seeking to find 
theoretical and practical explanations for those policies. 
Those pretentions can be labelled as the immaterial and material conditionals of 
these policies. The first immaterial conditional is composed of a political process in 
which the construction of new epistemologies in forms of models and concepts seek to 
warrant these policies. The construction process is dependent on the theoretical 
suggestions (the import of concepts and frameworks) that are advocated by STI policies 
and that can be understood as performative acts. 
The second material conditional is linked with the other developments in 
contemporary political governance where the point is to renovate and reorganize the 
public sector or, to put it more generally, to change the traditional conception of the 
nation-state and also other issues related to democracy and decision making. In other 
words, the practical aim of STI policies is to legitimate those policies by triggering a 
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series of political interventions (i.e. as a process of political interventions) in which the 
aim is to change the existing institutional setting of political government. This political 
aim becomes apparent in a variety of interventions advocating the need to change the 
socio-cultural practices embedded in them. The construction of these conditionals is 
linked with the idea of learning (i.e. the advocacy of necessity of institutional reforms) 
and its ethos in which the meaning of experiments in modern policy making is seen as a 
necessary condition for STI policies.  
But how do I see myself as a scholar within this context? Paul Ricoeur and his 
conception of action, time and narratives give an interesting answer to this. Ricoeur 728 
has in his studies stressed that intelligible action is the proper object of social sciences. 
But the most interesting aspect of Ricoeur’s thinking is his conception of time.  
Ricoueur729 differentiates between phenomenological time and cosmological time. 
The order of past-present-future within phenomenological time presupposes the 
succession characteristic of cosmological time. Ricouer argues that any philosophical 
model for understanding human existence must employ a composite temporal 
framework.  
The only suitable candidate is the narrative model to represent the human world of 
action. Narratives draw together disparate and discordant elements to form the 
concordant unity of a plot that has a temporal span. All the elements that a narrative 
unites are contingencies; they could have been chosen differently.  
To Ricouer narrative has three stages of interpretation that he calls Mimesis1, 
Mimesis2 and Mimesis3. Mimesis1 can be seen as action itself, as an arrangement of 
objective events, or as a construction of plot for the present time-space framework. It is 
very apparent that these interpretations have totally different accounts of what is the 
state of affairs. Mimesis2 introduces another stratum of interpretation, a more general 
account of what is the state of affairs by introducing a model, a narrative or a theory 
explaining Mimesis1.  
For Ricouer, Mimesis2 is always linked with the dilemma of time and temporality; it 
means re-organization of time by introducing new interpretations, testimonies and 
critique. The action in Mimesis2 never fulfils the criteria of scientific in the positivistic 
sense. Mimesis2 always involves interpretative, moral and political element.  
Mimesis3 refers to the moment when Mimesis2 is shifted to Mimesis1. What 
happens in Mimesis3 is that the scholar’s narrative dissolves into actors’ practices either 
by shaping actors’ interpretations or by re-organizing their action.  
Ricouer’s point is that Mimesis2 and Mimesis3 are present in all our actions in the 
sense that historical interpretations are inherently in motion. In other words, he simply 
highlights the special character of historical study process as an idea: this can be seen to 
be the purpose of interdisciplinary research as well. In sum, this study is an attempt to 
construct Mimesis2, a rhetorical narrative for STI policies, and hopefully it provides 
some new horizons to interpret those policies.  
 
Dilemma of interdisciplinarity 
 
As Julia Klein730 claims interdiscilinarity is a problematic concept because there is a 
general uncertainty of the meaning of the term. What is a discipline is also an important 
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question. In the most general sense, discipline refers to systematic instruction given to a 
disciple.731  
Michel Foucault732 uses the term épistémè in his analysis of the knowledge/power 
systems and utilizes the term as a strategic apparatus which permits the separate 
statements which are possible, justified and acceptable within the field of scientificity 
but which may not to be characterized as “scientific”. 
The idea of academic discipline refers to a body of knowledge a sphere of knowledge 
underpinned by some institutional and organizational practices. This implies that we 
have both a set of old academic disciplines such as physics, chemistry, and mathematics 
and some middle-ranged disciplines such as social psychology, social economy and so 
forth, disciplines with a more or less clear position and status among other academic 
disciplines. In addition to these we have a variety of groupings that aim at the status of 
discipline. All disciplines have naturally histories of their own and these histories usually 
have external origins rather than internal.733 
In terms of interdisciplinarity this study owes a lot to STS tradition, one of those 
recent academic endeavours advocating the idea of interdisciplinarity. Its aim has been 
to entice scholars from various disciplines to study topics and issues related to science 
and technology by using novel approaches. The STS tradition tangles in this sense with 
gender studies and cultural studies which have similar aspirations.  
The idea of interdisciplinarity has proved to be ambivalent. It has been stigmatized 
by a number of attributes such as non-science or non-scientific. The origins of the 
critique can be traced back to institutional and organizational issues, the lack of 
intellectual interaction, methodological issues, the diversity of basic theoretical 
convictions and metaphysical issues.734  
In this study interdisciplinarity means an epistemological and methodological 
challenge. In retrospect, I clearly acknowledge that I have encountered problems of 
interdisciplinarity in different situations. I am also aware of the fact that my personal 
attraction for “transgression” leaves room for critique. Regardless of these problems, I 
believe that inquisitiveness and intellectual curiosity are the real hallmarks that a scholar 
in political sciences must have, but I openly admit that the outcomes and results 
constitute the criteria with which these hallmarks are ultimately evaluated and assessed. 
 
9.2. Conclusion: STI policies and politics 
 
STI policies and displacement of politics  
 
This is a thoroughly political study and therefore based on inter-disciplinary approach. 
Bonnie Honig735 has distinguished two types of political theorists. Her point is to 
stabilize two positions from which she defines and negotiates the issue of the 
displacement of politics. Her severe concern is that politics is displaced from our 
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contemporary western democracies in a curious ways and she tries to understand that 
displacement. 
The first type of theorists Honig calls virtue theorists who “confine politics to the 
juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, 
building consensus, maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities. 
They assume that the task of political theory is to resolve institutional questions, to get 
political rights, over, and done with, to free modern subjects and their sets of arrangements of 
political conflict and instability.” Among virtue theorists she locates such theorists as 
Kant, Rawls and Sandel. 
 The second type of theorists is called virtù theorists who “see politics as disruptive 
practice that resists the consolidations and closures of administrative and juridical settlement 
for the sake of the perpetuity of political contest.”   
These two approaches represent totally different accounts of politics. If virtue 
theorists want to eliminate dissonance, resistance, conflict and struggle from politics, 
virtù theorists see them as its constituents. Virtù theorists such as Skinner, Arendt or 
Weber are not interested in maintaining of order, system or society. Rather, they seek 
possibilities and alternatives and stress non-linearity and disruption rather than linearity 
and functionality.  
The problem of politics and the political was also Carl Schmitt’s motive in his classic 
The Concept of the Political.  Its main argument was that political questions are never 
mere technical issues to be solved by experts. One of the main reasons for our current 
inability to envisage the problems in our societies is that we are not able to see them in a 
political way. Political questions always involve decisions which require us to make 
choices between conflicting alternatives. Schmitt emphasizes that the hegemony of 
liberalism, which includes individualism and rationalism, has a major role in the 
displacement of politics and maintains that there is a liberal critique of politics rather 
than a mere liberal policy.  
Schmitt’s insight is that the political identities consist a sort of friend/enemy or 
us/them relation.736  For Schmitt the political world is not a universe but a pluriverse. As 
Chantal Mouffe737 remarks, the deeply entrenched conviction in Western democracies 
that they are embodiments of the best regimes and they have the civilizing mission to 
universalize it must be critically employed. Political concepts, argues Mouffe, must be 
understood in terms of pluriverse. “…it depends on who interprets, defines, uses them 
[political concepts]; who concretely decides what peace is, what disarmement, what 
intervention, what public order and security are. One of the most important manifestations of 
humanity’s legal and spiritual life is the fact that whoever has true power is able to determine 
the content of concepts and words. Caesar dominus et supra grammaticam. Caesar is also lord 
over grammar.” 738 
If we analyze STI policies by utilizing those theoretical suggestions we will find a 
variety of possibilities to understand those policies. If we line up with the virtue 
theorist’s perspective we can naturally highlight the juridical, governmental and 
administrative aspects of STI policies. In this case our interest focuses on how 
stabilization, consensus, contracts and solid identities are linked with those policies.  
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But if we take the virtú theorist’s perspective our view to STI policies is totally 
different. We must focus on activity, practices, disruptions, dissonance, resistance, 
conflicts and controversies embedded in STI policies.  
My thesis is that by linking these perspectives we are able to comprehend how strong 
the bond between politics and STI policies is in the end. Then we are able to realize the 
bond between STI policies and rhetoric. I am not arguing that STI policies must be 
reduced to politics. Rather, I argue that it is impossible to grasp the problem of STI 
policies without taking into account the problematic concept of politics. In this sense 
STI policies help us to understand how important conceptual change is in our 
contemporary understanding of politics and how these policies are linked with current 
changes. 
If we prefer the virtue theorist’s perspective the problems of STI policies are 
ultimately a theoretical challenge in which the STE-hybrid construction plays a major 
role. Its logic is based on the top-down account of politics. As seen in this perspective 
the problem of STI policies is to find a plausible theoretical justification for these 
policies so that policy makers are able to re-organize the political governance, its internal 
administration and its institutional settings to correspond better to new demands. This 
re-organization is a complex political process in which theoretical knowledge is 
translated into a variety of political strategies, visions, and political interventions. In this 
legitimation process theoretical knowledge is related to empirical data by utilizing 
different, mainly statistical, methodologies.  
If we prefer the virtú theorist’s perspective we take a totally different and more critical 
stand to the problems of STI policies. Our concern is more on practices and the bottom-
up account of politics because our focus is on how to create spaces for possibilities. 
Arendt has seen virtú as an excellence of political founding; it has a unique capacity to 
found new regimes, generate political power, and to set up the institutional conditions 
for its maintance and regeneration. According to her, virtuosic action subverts the rise of 
the social, and virtú has a role to play the transvaluation of values. 
This study has utilized Finland as an example  of STI policies. The key issue from 
this part is whether Finland deserves the characterisation of the Finnish model. What 
makes the Finnish case so exceptional and special?  
Antti Pelkonen739 argues in his dissertation on the changing aspects of Finland’s 
science and technology policies on the basis of Bob Jessop’s and Neil Brenner’s 
analyses740 that changes in the Finnish science and technology policies reflect Finland’s 
strong emphasis on technological upgrading. This has implied two issues: the 
breakthrough of the innovation paradigm in science and technology policies and the 
growing pressure of commercialisation in university research.  
Pelkonen’s conclusion is that his empirical case study on the Helsinki region 
supports the core arguments of the competition state thesis. Finland has clearly shifted 
towards the competitive state where market orientation and commercialisation have a 
strong role in public policies.  
The basis of the Finnish science and technology policies has been the corporatist 
tradition and the Finnish consensus tradition. As Kuitunen and Lähteenmäki741 stress in 
the study of the Finnish technology policy, it is a small clique of civil servants and 
experts who have constructed and modified the Finnish science and technology policies.  
                                                            
739 Pelkonen 2008. 
740 Brenner 1999; Brenner 1998. 
741 Kuitunen and Lähteenmäki- Smith 2006. 
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My own conclusion follows this and my critical argument can be reduced to the 
following. Previously, I have argued that Finland has a variety of national peculiarities in 
politics and in various cultural policy practices which play an important role in 
implementing STI policies in Finland. I claim that these cultural and historical 
peculiarities fit the ethos of STI policies because they appear to provide a lot of flexibility 
and inventiveness for Finland’s policy making. In fact, STI policies emphasise only 
narrow definitions of politics.   
This ambiguity becomes apparent if we reflect the very fundamental signifiers of 
liberal democracies such as democratic representation. Political authority is regarded to 
be legitimate when it fulfils three criteria: legal validity (when political authority is 
created and conforms to a set of established rules), moral justification (when these rules 
are based on principles and beliefs widely accepted by the society), and consent (when 
the actions of ruling authority are confirmed by the consent and public support of the 
government).742 
We can pose the question how legitimate the Finnish implementation of STI policies 
has been in terms of these three criteria. It is obvious that in the future those problems 
will be far more complex. As the member of the EU Finland will be even more 
dependent on the rules and legal procedures the European integration necessitates. 
European integration is often criticised and claimed to be the Trojan horse of neo-
liberalism and technocracy in the sense that it understanding of sovereignty and 
democracy has many weaknesses and deficits when they are applied as principles of the 
rule of nation-states.  
 Majone743 argues that the EU is a regulatory state although it itself does not have the 
status of the state. One of the Majone’s key points is that the EU policy making system 
is concerned with regulation rather than on redistribution. Where redistribution 
concerns prevail, legitimacy is ensured only by majoritarian means. With reference to 
democratic mechanisms the EU policy making system is imperfect. The Finnish model 
of implementing STI policies shares much with this European policy making model.  
The EU highlights economic, social and legal regulation. It means that European 
institutions are legitimate in terms of pure efficiency considerations. Majone insists that 
European legislation is regulatory and technocratic and that the absence of political 
controls often ensures efficiency in the system of policy making. For him the European 
model of legitimacy is the non-majoritarian model of legitimacy.  
In such non-majoritarian systems legitimacy and policy making rely primarily on 
performance criteria. It follows that the public good is realized if professionals are in 
charge because they are not subjected to the biases and distortions of electoral politics.744 
“… technocratic legitimacy is but one variant of a much more general type of legitimacy, 
recurrent through history, which claims the right to rule by virtue of access to some special 
knowledge, whether this be a society’s traditional wisdom (traditional rule), divine revelation 
(theocracy)´, moral insight (philosopher kings), the future course of history (Marxism-
Leninism), or specific knowledge (technocracy)”745 In all these cases the power holders claim 
that privileged knowledge is good for society; ordinary people have no access.In such 
cases legitimacy is equated with efficiency and performance. 
My conclusion is that STI policies must not be seen only the fruits of neo-liberal 
ideology but rather as an emergent form of new political governance in which rhetoric 
                                                            
742 Bentham 1999, pp.15–20. 
743 Majone 1997. 
744 Malone 1996. 
745 Beetham and Richardson 1998, p. 17. 
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has a very special role. It is also clear that STI policies favour regulatory aspects rather 
than redistribution aspects. In fact, it is the political core of  STI policies: to encourage 
displacement from the welfare/redistribution issues to the innovation/regulatory issues. 
It is important to acknowledge that in the case of STI policies we do not deal with 
issues that havesignificance in one particular policy sector only. Rather, these are issues 
with global meaning. The themes and issues linked with STI policies are relevant in 
relation to our western contemporary economy-driven cultural values, the core of our 
Weltanschauung as such.   
STI policies seem to be an important arena in our contemporary society where the 
negotiation on the boundaries between the political and the anti-political sphere takes 
place. STI policies seem to constitute the basis on which memberships in and alliances 
with communities and states can be established. These policies have a crucial role in 
organizing the rules and reforms linked with new political governance and its cultural 
practices. 
It is obvious that the ethos of Vannevar Bush’s report, the role of science as a 
precondition for economic growth and development, is still alive. 746  It follows that in 
terms of polity, STI policies have a peculiar role in the sense that they clearly engender a 
variety of controversies and confrontations related to the concept of politics itself.  
My point is that the complex issues related to STI policies are not purely policy 
issues. The impacts and influencies of STI policies are more radical and more profound. 
First, in terms of polity the question is which issues are traditionally understood as 
being defined as political issues. STI policies are inherently linked with the disputes and 
controversies concerning the end of ideology and the end of history. Mouffe argues in 
her analysis that our contemporary world is rather characterized by the end of politics 
rather than by the end of history. Political argumentation has disappeared and it has 
been replaced by moral, economic or legislative discussion, and argumentation. 747  It is 
easy to see that the argumentation related to STI policies involves a lot of similar 
discussion.  
Second, in terms of politicking the definition of political action in STI policies seem 
to blur those traditional definitions if we understand politicking as a borderline concept 
in the debates related to politics. In other words, the rhetoric linked with STI policies 
openly advocates that its political aim is to increase varieties of actors as well as to find 
new platforms and agendas for these policies by a series of interventions aiming at the 
redefinition of the traditional boundaries between the public sector, the private sector 
and the civil society. This testimonial dimension of STI policies can be seen as the core 
of those policies. 
Third, in terms of policy STI policies represent a distinctive style of politicking in 
which the aim is to coordinate and regulate actors’ activity. While the first target of 
those policies is to renovate the traditional science and technology policy as through a 
series of internal reforms, the second target of STI policies is to reach hegemony among 
other policy sectors.  
Fourth, all these issues are present if we examine the dilemma of politicization linked 
with STI policies. The power of STI policies is its huge capacity to produce ad infinitum 
new vocabularies and concepts in contemporary politics. The first aspect of this 
rhetorical mangle can be called the mangle of conceptualization that is based on the 
                                                            
746 Mirowski 2002, p. 517. 
747 Mouffe 2002; Mouffe 2005. 
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controversy between the Natural and the Social. The second aspect of this rhetorical 
mangle is linked with the controversy between the oikos and the polis.  
In effect, it would be fallacious to think that STI policies have nothing to do with 
rhetoric and, in particular, it would be equally fallacious to think that STI policies have 
nothing to do with politics.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Comparing Keys and Locks- Will Welfare Cluster Become a New Door to 
Innovation Policy? Study report published in 2005 by MTI Financed Studies 
 
STUDY QUESTIONS  
 
1) How do you define the concept of welfare cluster?  
2)  How and when was the welfare cluster born? What was its history and 
origins? 
3)  How were the key actors in advocating the idea of the welfare cluster? 
What was your own role and contribution? 
4)  What was the content of the welfare cluster and how do you 
understood its central contribution? 
5)  Were there other choices and what made the welfare cluster so 
essential? 
6)  What makes the welfare cluster so important and what kinds of 
arguments were used in pursuit of legitimating it? 
7)  What were the proper goals and aims of the welfare cluster? Was there 
any political debate concerning the intervention? 
8) Who were the most important parties in it? What made those parties 
so valuable? 
9)  How do you assess the results of the welfare cluster?  
10)  What will be the role of the welfare cluster in the future?  
11)  Which reports and documents are the most important ones in your 
thinking? 
12)  What else must be taken into account in the case of the welfare 
cluster? 
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